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The International Law Studies "Blue Book" series was initiated by the Naval
War College in 1901 to publish learned essays, treatises, and articles that
contribute to the broader understanding of international law. This volume, the
81st of the series, contains papers addressing the issues discussed and debated at a
colloquium hosted here at the Naval War College from June 23 to 25, 2004, entitled
International Law Challenges: Homeland Security and Combating Terrorism.
This colloquium's charter was to study and debate various international law issues
affecting homeland security, homeland defense, and the combating of terrorism.
Renowned international law scholars and practitioners of all stripes—academics,
military officers, government officials, and those representing various political per-
suasions—participated in collegial but often spirited and always fruitful discussions
and examinations of these issues. A vastly increased understanding and appreciation
of the role of international law in the ever-changing 21st century resulted.
This colloquium received generous support from the Israel Yearbook on Hu-
man Rights; the Roger Williams University Ralph R. Papitto School ofLaw, Bristol,
Rhode Island; the Lieber Society on the Law ofArmed Conflict ofthe American So-
ciety of International Law; the Pell Center for International Relations and Public
Policy of Salve Regina University, Newport, Rhode Island; and the Naval War Col-
lege Foundation. Without this much-appreciated support, this noteworthy and
highly productive event would not have been possible.
On behalf of the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the
Commandant of the Marine Corps, I extend our sincere thanks and appreciation
to the participants, contributing authors, editors, and supporting organizations for
their contributions to this successful gathering and to the publication of this out-
standing addition to the historic "Blue Book" series.
J. L. SHUFORD
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College

Introduction
In June 2004, the Naval War College hosted a colloquium entitled International
Law Challenges: Homeland Security and Combating Terrorism. This colloquium
was made possible with the support of the Israel Yearbook on Human Rights; the
Roger Williams University Ralph R. Papitto School of Law, Bristol, Rhode Island;
the Lieber Society on the Law ofArmed Conflict of the American Society of Inter-
national Law; the Pell Center for International Relations and Public Policy of Salve
Regina University, Newport, Rhode Island; and the Naval War College Founda-
tion. Without the support and assistance of these organizations, this event would
not have been the success that it was, and this volume would not be before you as it
is. I sincerely appreciate their support.
As noted in the Introduction to Volume 79 of the "Blue Book" series, the events
of9/ 1 1 brought home to the United States that, perhaps unlike any time in the past,
the "tyranny of distance" could not be relied upon to protect its citizens from
harm. That volume, International Law and the War on Terror, contained the pro-
ceedings of a colloquium hosted by the Naval War College in June 2002.
This colloquium, held two years later, examined actions taken since then, e.g.,
the Proliferation Security Initiative, a response to the growing challenge posed by
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and re-
lated materials worldwide; and measures initiated to increase the control and secu-
rity ofmaritime borders. Additionally, with the growing insurgency and increasing
terrorist acts in Iraq, issues of occupation law, which the United States had last ap-
plied following World War II, played a prominent role in the discussions ofthe col-
loquium participants.
I thank the editors—Captain Thomas Sparks, US Coast Guard and Com-
mander Glenn Sulmasy, US Coast Guard—for their substantial efforts in the pub-
lication of this volume. I also would like to recognize two long-time supporters of
the Naval War College and the International Law Department, whom they credit
with completing "the lion's share ofthe substantive editing ofthis volume": Profes-
sor Emeritus Jack Grunawalt and Captain Ralph Thomas, JAGC, US Navy (Ret.).
Without question, their dedication, conscientiousness, and perseverance were
principally responsible for the production of this volume. Additionally, I thank the
conference coordinator, Commander Glenn Sulmasy, US Coast Guard, for his su-
perb efforts in organizing the event.
Additionally, a special thank you is necessary to Rear Admiral Jacob Shuford,
President of the Naval War College; Dr. James F. Giblin, Jr., the College's Provost;
and Dr. Kenneth Watman, Dean of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies, for their
leadership and support in the planning and conduct ofthe conference and the pub-
lication of this volume.
The "Blue Book" series is published by the Naval War College and distributed
throughout the world to academic institutions, libraries, and both US and interna-
tional military commands. This volume, International Law Challenges: Homeland
Security and Combating Terrorism, is a fitting and necessary addition to the series as
the United States and its coalition partners continue to wage this "long war."
DENNIS L. MANDSAGER




In the summer of2004, a sense ofnormalcy had returned to the homeland ofthe
United States. One could say the "sleeping giant" that had awakened on 9/11
had fallen back "asleep." Military victories in Afghanistan and in Iraq had been
achieved. Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom
(OIF) were officially declared as examples of military successes. Domestically, the
USA PATRIOT Act had been passed and was implemented. The reorganization of
the government had occurred and the National Security Strategy of 2002 had be-
come part of US strategic culture. US Northern Command (NORTHCOM) had
been created. Establishment of the Department of Homeland Security resulted in
the merging of 22 federal government agencies and a department staffed by over
177,000 personnel. Bringing the war on terror to the enemy overseas was seen as
necessary to protect the homeland. This new war, one that mixes law enforcement
and armed conflict, was the challenge of the 21st century and the United States was
preparing for a long-term struggle. The Bush Administration clearly articulated its
belief that in "taking the fight" to the terrorists overseas, our homeland would be
more secure.
With this in mind, legal scholars, practitioners, judge advocates and warriors
gathered in Newport, Rhode Island at the US Naval War College in late June to re-
view, debate, and challenge the myriad legal issues surrounding the evolving reality
of the Global War on Terror.
The need for a reasoned, rational legal regime to enhance domestic security be-
came critical after 9/11. Jihadists, and the Global War on Terror itself, do not fit
squarely into existing laws or custom. The predominant enemy we now fight is
neither warrior nor criminal but a hybrid of both. In addition, the war being
waged is at times against lawful combatants (e.g., the armed forces of Iraq) and at
times against entities deemed illegal combatants. Some of these "enemy combat-
ants" would have protections afforded by the law of armed conflict and some
would not. A growing nexus between international law and the concept of home-
land security had emerged. Ambiguity as to this intersection of international law
and national security law (homeland security) provided a unique backdrop for
two and a half days of intense debate and intellectual exchange on the seminal le-
gal issues of our times.
The Honorable Ryan Stiles, Associate Counsel to the President and Deputy
Counsel to the White House's Homeland Security Council, initiated the debate
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with a discussion of the relationships between international law and homeland se-
curity. He further articulated the need for the Global War on Terror to be viewed as
warfare and one not suited for a law enforcement response—a different tack from
pre-9/1 1 approaches to combating terror. His talk set the stage for what turned out
to be a recurring, stimulating debate during the colloquium.
The case is made that it is critical for US (and Western) policy makers to under-
stand that the Global War on Terror is in fact a war and not a law enforcement ac-
tion. The events of 9/1 1 arguably displayed the manifest failure ofemployment of a
law enforcement response to the threats of international terror. Some have gone so
far as to claim that the West's previous law enforcement only responses created, in
large part, the bold actions taken by al-Qaeda at the end ofthe 20th century and the
beginning of the 21st. The colloquium revealed, however, that considerable angst
and cynicism remains regarding some of these assertions. Nonetheless, most
agreed that the magnitude of the events of 9/11 and the repeated world-wide at-
tacks and attempted attacks of the jihadists (primarily al-Qaeda) have demon-
strated the relative weakness of past approaches and have fueled demands for new
policies and tactics that continue today.
In its response, the US government offered new, sometimes controversial ap-
proaches. The colloquium brought together military and civilian experts, all lead-
ers in their respective fields, to assess and debate these approaches and the legal
issues that dominated the military liberation of Iraq and the regime change that
was underway as the colloquium began, e.g.:
• Maritime border security issues;
• The law of the sea and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI);
• Application of the law of armed conflict to certain military operations and
occupations;
• Lawfulness of the military commissions underway in Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba;
• The new strategy of "pre-emption" and anticipatory self-defense; and
• The lawfulness of targeting individual terrorists which was the subject of a
spirited debate between Mr. Kenneth Roth, Executive Director of Human Rights
Watch and Professor Bob Turner of the Center for National Security of the
University of Virginia School of Law.
A special highlight of the colloquium was an address by the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Homeland Defense, the Honorable Paul McHale. His description of
the coordination between the combatant commander (NORTHCOM) and the
xiv
Thomas McK. Sparks and Glenn M. Sulmasy
Department of Homeland Security was most informative and appreciated by the
participants.
It was a privilege to have so many fine representatives from myriad perspectives
present to challenge these critical issues. Assembling this international group over
the previous year was certainly not an easy task, but when our distinguished panel-
ists from around the world were gathered together the fruits of that effort were very
apparent. Exploring the nexus between homeland security and international law
made for an invigorating experience. Scholars and representatives from across the
political spectrum made for lively discussions.
Sincere thanks must go to Professor Emeritus Jack Grunawalt and Captain
Ralph Thomas, JAGC, US Navy (Ret.) for their tireless efforts on behalf of the Na-
val War College and this "Blue Book" in particular. Their knowledge of the issues
and editing skills were critical in making this book a reality. Also, a special thanks to
Professor Dennis Mandsager for his foresight in directing an exploration of this
evolving area of the law.
Thomas McK. Sparks Glenn M. Sulmasy







The International Dimensions of
Homeland Security
Ryan P. Stiles*
As I think we all know from the news and recent statements by both Attorney
General Ashcroft and Secretary Ridge, we are entering an unprecedented
period of threat as we go into the summer; a threat that is projected to continue
through this November's elections. So what we're doing here has practical implica-
tions and will apply in the real world where terrorists routinely flout international law.
My goal for this morning is not to overlap with the discussions ofthe panels that
will occupy much ofthe next three days of this conference. They will address many
of the supporting issues regarding international implications of homeland secu-
rity. My goal is to frame the debate: how, from a US Government perspective, the
Bush Administration looks at homeland security and its objectives, and then to
look at some specific ideas and concepts about how homeland security interacts
with the international dimensions.
To frame the debate we must define homeland security. I think many people
unfortunately skip that first definitional issue. The United States definition of
homeland security is found in President Bush's July 2002 National Strategy for
Homeland Security, 1 which was released as part of the Administration's proposal
for creating a Department of Homeland Security. Ifyou haven't read it, I encour-
age you to do so. The Strategy defines homeland security as "a concerted national
Deputy Counsel, Homeland Security Council, the White House.
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effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America's vul-
nerability to terrorism and minimize the damage and recovery from attacks that do
occur." 2 Each piece of this definition is attached to a specific concept that requires
additional analysis.
"Concerted national effort." Obviously the federal government has a critical role
to play in homeland security. Yet the federal government alone cannot possibly
protect the United States from future terrorist attacks. The Administration's ap-
proach to homeland security is based on the principles ofshared responsibility and
partnership with Congress, state and local governments, the private sector and the
American people.
The concept ofthe first responder is one ofthe critical issues and one ofthe most
difficult concepts in homeland security because the federal government is often
not the first responder. In many cases, it will never be the first responder because
anywhere from 80 to 90 percent ofour critical infrastructure is in the hands of state
and local governments, and the private sector. 3
The federal government depends not only on partnerships with state and local
governments but additionally with the private sector. It is a daunting task to coor-
dinate all of those things, including such challenges as incompatible communica-
tion equipment. Federal government entities must be able to communicate with
the first responders who inevitably have their own independent and different com-
munications systems.
"Prevent." The first priority of homeland security is to prevent terrorist attacks.
Post-9/1 1, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) (and the Department of Jus-
tice (DOJ) as well) transformed itself from being a traditional law enforcement
agency to making its number one goal the prevention of terrorist attacks. That ne-
cessitates a shift in concept and a shift in tactics for the FBI; that shift is a good one.
It also makes the Department of Justice and the FBI's tasks significantly more dif-
ficult. Furthermore, it makes it increasingly difficult when we respond and deal with
individual terrorists in the United States. In the past, most law enforcement consisted
simply of investigation and response to terrorist attacks. If a terrorist attack occurred,
the DOJ and FBI would investigate, identify the perpetrators, and put them on trial.
This responsive mode did have limited success and did produce some convictions.
Now, however, the Department of Justice's success in accomplishing its new
mission is challenged, if measured by a conviction rate, because now their intent is
to prevent those attacks in the first place. By interrupting terrorist attacks before
they occur, the DOJ will not have that clear chain of evidence that produced post-
attack convictions. Now intent must be established before an attack occurs. That
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means by necessity that the Department of Justice is probably going to lose a lot
more cases in the short-term since they don't have the evidence trail they were able
to produce during the post-attack trials because the plot has indeed been foiled.
That's not necessarily a bad thing, however. The Department of Justice is metic-
ulous about which cases they bring to trial and which they don't. It is not a decision
made by the individual US Attorney offices. Each terrorism case is scrutinized both
in those offices and by the Criminal Division at Main Justice in Washington, D.C.
"Terrorist attacks." Homeland security is focused on terrorism in the United
States. Terrorism is defined in the United States in a variety ofways but a definition
that captures some of the core concepts of terrorism would be "any premeditated
unlawful act, danger to human life or public welfare that is intended to intimidate
or coerce civilian populations or governments."4
This definition captures the core concepts shared in the various iterations of the
United States Code. As I'm sure many ofthe international practitioners here know,
defining terrorism in the first instance is probably one of the most pressing prob-
lems facing the international community.
The United States has attempted to define the term at least for those who carry
out attacks in this country. I think one of the key challenges for the international
community is to develop an agreed upon definition of "terrorism." It is nearly im-
possible to eradicate something without having a definitional basis of what it is
that's to be eradicated.
"Reducing America's Vulnerability." The United States is an ever-evolving, ever-
changing target. As we shore up our defenses in one area, terrorists exploit vulnera-
bilities in other areas. A good example of that was a program called the Transits
Without Visa Program that was shut down by the federal government in the sum-
mer of 2003 because of some specific intelligence that terrorists may be looking at
that program as a way to enter the United States. 5
An example of that program is an individual flying from South America to Eu-
rope who stops over in the United States for a connecting flight. Traditionally that
person wasn't required to have a visa to "transit" the airport in the United States.
However, that presented a seam for terrorists to exploit because they wouldn't have
to go through the screening process with the Department of State or Department of
Homeland Security. Thus, an individual could get on a plane in another country
and, in some instances, land at an airport in the United States and simply walk un-
challenged right out of the airport.
So you had a double vulnerability. One, terrorists would be on planes, which we
know they like to use to attack the United States; and two, operationally they enter
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the country in a fairly easy fashion. The United States has now closed that gap, al-
though 1 do think a more secure program is probably in the offering at some point.
Once that program was ended, the terrorists looked for new vulnerabilities. So it
is a constant challenge to make sure that when closing one gap or seam, new gaps
and seams are not created. Avoiding new vulnerabilities is of great concern to those
in the White House. Accordingly, when conducting our policy evaluations we
work hard to ensure that the new, fresh policies do not inadvertently open a bigger
seam when we close a smaller one.
"Minimizing the damage." As I mentioned at the outset, the greatest chance to re-
spond effectively and minimize loss of life resides with our first responders, gener-
ally not with federal government entities. We're working with our state and local
governments and the private sector to make sure they have their own homeland se-
curity plans to deal with whatever event may occur.
"Recovery." It is the intent of the United States Government to build and maintain
various financial, legal and social systems that will ensure recovery from all forms
of terrorism.
Responding to attacks on the homeland has been a vexing problem for the
United States for the last 40 or 50 years. The old thinking about what type of attack
would occur was focused primarily on nuclear strikes. Under that conceptualiza-
tion, there would be the strike, the government would have to go somewhere,
emerge at some later date and then repopulate the institutions.
Of course with the nuclear strike it was assumed that there would be an advance
warning ofan impending attack, so that continuity ofgovernment operation plans
were premised on having some period oftime to make preparations for the attack.
Now we have an entirely different model for attack and recovery: a "no-notice"
event potentially aimed at decapitating the United States Government, to include
the President and his staff, the cabinet departments, Congress and others. That
model also means that we must look at other methods of making sure that our in-
stitutions survive because we're not going to be able to have 24 hours or even five or
six hours to place those in key leadership positions in secure places.
Homeland security and national security are two obviously related concepts. But
there is a core distinction. National security looks towards guaranteeing the sover-
eignty and independence of the United States with the values and institutions in-
tact. This is slightly different from "homeland security." To provide the
overarching strategy to ensure our national security, President Bush issued the Na-
tional Security Strategy of the United States.
6 If read together with the National
Ryan P. Stiles
Strategy for Homeland Security\ you'll see they reflect an integrated concept, and
that homeland security is a concept—not just a Department.
Within the concept ofhomeland security are the Continuity of Operation plans
mentioned earlier; Critical Infrastructure and Protection, which is principally ex-
ercised within the United States, although some infrastructure is shared with Can-
ada and Mexico, and defense against weapons of mass destruction (WMD). These
obviously have to be dealt with if they enter the United States, but once they arrive
on our shores we're already in trouble. Thus, much oftheWMD efforts are focused
overseas as we combat terrorism.
Another weapon of great concern is MANPADS (man-portable air defense sys-
tems). These short-range, ground-to-air missiles are one of the greatest threats to
aviation around the world today. They're cheap, increasingly available on the black
market, and exist in large numbers. Civil aircraft are virtual "sitting ducks" to ter-
rorists who possess MANPADS. The United States is working to strengthen secu-
rity over existing stockpiles and to prevent their continued proliferation. We are
also working on measures to reduce the vulnerability ofboth military and civil air-
craft to these weapons.
Prior to the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) on
November 25, 2002, funding for what we today call homeland security was spread
throughout the government. But even in fiscal year 2003, the first year following the
Department's establishment, only 51 percent ofwhat the Office ofManagement and
Budget considers homeland security spending was spent at DHS. 7 For fiscal year
2004, that figure is up to about 60 percent. In terms of actual total dollars, funding
dramatically increased after September 11th, with about twice as many dollars de-
voted to homeland security in fiscal year 2003 as compared to the preceding year.
One organization of which you may be unaware is the Homeland Security
Council (HSC). In October of 2001, the President created the Office ofHomeland
Security within the White House. Governor Tom Ridge became its head as a White
House-appointed official. 8 Then when Congress created the Department of
Homeland Security, Governor Ridge became "Secretary" Ridge and left the White
House to become a cabinet secretary.
At the same time, the Office ofHomeland Security transformed into the Home-
land Security Council. The HSC's primary role is to serve as confidential adviser to
the President on homeland security matters in much the same way as the National
Security Council does on national security and foreign policy matters.
The Homeland Security Council's member's primary responsibility is to coor-
dinate interagency efforts to ensure that the homeland is safe. HSC members work
closely with the DHS staff, but also spend much of their time working with col-
leagues at the Department of State, Department of Justice, and the Central
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Intelligence Agency. The reason, of course, is that the Department of Homeland
Security can't do homeland security at the federal level by itself. It must coordinate
its functions with those of other government agencies. Those functions are often
based on funding priorities. I suspect I surprise no one when I say those agencies
often don't agree on the best way forward. When that occurs a mediator is required
and that's generally the role of the HSC.
The Homeland Security Council was built on the concept of the National Secu-
rity Council,9 which was created in 1947 by the National Security Act. The NSC
and HSC are parallel organizations and sit side by side; one coordinating national
security, the other homeland security. The NSC has no operational capacity, nei-
ther does the HSC. We simply try to resolve disputes and push efficient policy
decision-making to secure the homeland.
America must pursue a sustained, steadfast, and systematic international
agenda to counter the global terrorist threat and improve our homeland security. If
the United States is 100 percent effective in homeland security, we will still have
failed because most of the threats will be emerging overseas. If we aren't working
cooperatively with our other States—our international partners—then we have
really no chance at preventing terrorists from reaching our borders. If we can't
screen cargo before it gets here, ifwe can't screen passengers before they step offthe
plane, ultimately we will lose the fight because those individuals will find methods
to attack us even if we're secure within the borders. Thus the international agenda
for homeland security is extremely important. We have to win our "away" games as
well as our "home" games.
The following table lists the major homeland security initiatives with interna-
tional dimensions.
Major Homeland Security Initiatives with International Dimensions
• Create "Smart Borders"
• Combat fraudulent travel documents
• Increase security of international law enforcement cooperation
• Intensify international law enforcement cooperation
• Help foreign nations fight terrorism
• Expand protection of transnational critical infrastructure
• Amplify international cooperation on homeland security S&T
• Amplify international cooperation in response to attacks
• Review international obligations to international treaties and laws
8
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Many of these initiatives don't touch on the military components, which are
more "overseas combating terrorism" than "homeland combating terrorism." I do
this intentionally because I think our later panels will speak to those issues.
I also wanted to emphasize the international dimensions in a lot of projects that
probably don't have a lot of visibility and are unknown to most people. The first is
the creation of Smart Borders. We have a 5,500-mile border with Canada, a 1,900-
mile border with Mexico, and 95,000 miles of shoreline. According to the 2000
census each and every year the United States admits 500 million people, including
330 million non-citizens through our borders. 10
Our Smart Borders initiative must be able to deal with that flow of people, as
well as the 1 1.2 million trucks and 2.2 million rail cars that cross the border annu-
ally. The Department of Homeland Security is spearheading the effort to create
Smart Borders. America requires a border management system to keep pace with
its expanding trade, while protecting the United States and its territories not only
from terrorist attacks, but also illegal immigration, illegal drugs and other
contraband.
The future of Smart Borders must integrate actions abroad to screen goods and
people prior to their arrival in sovereign US territory. The border control agencies
of the federal government also must have seamless information chain systems that
permit communication among and between themselves and federal, state, and lo-
cal law enforcement communities.
I want to address two specific programs within the Smart Borders initiative.
One is the US-VISIT program that deals with land borders into the United States.
The law requires that an automated entry/exit program be implemented at the 50
busiest land ports of entry by December 3 1 , 2004 and all ports of entry by Decem-
ber 31, 2005.
The 50 busiest land ports of entry process 94 percent of the foreign visitors who
enter and exit the United States through established border crossing. The concept
of US-VISIT, which is being run by the Department of Homeland Security, is a
continuum of security measures that begin before an individual enters the United
States and continue through arrival and departure from the United States.
US-VISIT incorporates eligibility determinations made both by the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security and, of course, the Department of State. Using
biometrics such as finger scans and digital photographs, DHS will determine
whether the person applying for entry to the United States is the same person who
is issued the visa by the Department of State.
Additionally, the biometric and biographical data are checked against a watch
list, thereby improving DHS's ability to make admissibility decisions, as well as the
Department of State's ability to make visa determinations. US citizen entry
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procedures are currently in place at 115 airports and 14 seaports. This year US-
VISIT will be expanded to the 50 busiest land ports.
Since US-VISIT was launched in January 2004, it has already achieved some
successes—mostly in the non-terrorist area to include drug smugglers, gangsters,
and child molesters. Since the US Government stood up DHS, the Department of
State has intercepted more than 200 people with prior suspected criminal or immi-
gration violations. They include convicted rapists, drug traffickers, convicted armed
robbers and numerous individuals committing visa fraud. The "non-terrorists" of
today are creating pathways for the entry of bona fide terrorists of tomorrow.
Another important initiative to create smart, secure borders is addressed in sec-
tion 343 of the Trade Act of 2002, as amended by section 108 of the Maritime
Transportation Security Act, which requires that regulations be promulgated pro-
viding for the transmission to US Customs and Border Protection through an elec-
tronic data interchange system. The new system will provide information
concerning cargo that is brought into or taken out of the United States prior to ar-
rival or departure. This helps target specific cargos for potential, especially biologi-
cal and chemical, weapons for inspection when they arrive at our borders. Of
course, we can't have trucks backed up for miles on the Mexican border awaiting
entry. If we wait until the cargo arrives at the point of entry to see what's on the
manifest, we will have failed. We also will have failed our international partners be-
cause we will not have helped them facilitate their own internal economic stability.
A second major initiative is combating fraudulent travel documents. The De-
partment of Justice, in conjunction with the Department of State, is spearheading
this effort. They announced a new program that will contribute substantially to
travel document security and our ability to impugn the movement of terrorists and
other criminals. During the processing of travelers at ports of entry, if a hit occurs
against the Interpol database, the hit will be verified with US authorities before ac-
tion is taken against a bearer of such a passport. This is a significant step in the di-
rection of curbing not only terrorism but also identity theft and other types of
identity fraud. Travel document fraud, including the fraudulent application and
use of the US passport, represents a serious and growing threat to our national se-
curity. However, it is not the individual who has stolen them who is necessarily the
terrorist or expected terrorist. Often they are middlemen who steal passports and
passport numbers, create fraudulent documents and sell them to the terrorists.
So we can't only concentrate on who we know or suspect of being international
terrorists. We have to go at the middlemen who are facilitating the preparation of
those fraudulent travel documents. Currently the Interpol database contains 1.6
million records reported by 41 different participating member countries. Of the
1.6 million records, approximately 60 percent are passports while 40 percent are
10
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national identification documents. The United States has provided about 300,000
documents to that Interpol database. Although this is a relatively new initiative, it
has had great success with the number of entries into the database increasing
rapidly.
Contained within the initiative to combat fraudulent travel documents is the is-
sue ofbiometric passports. The Administration has asked Congress to pass legisla-
tion to extend for two years the October 26, 2004 deadline by which countries must
produce biometric passports to participate in the Visa Waiver Program. The prob-
lem is when Congress passed the law establishing the October 26, 2004 deadline it
didn't have a complete understanding of what is required to produce an effective
biometric passport. Biometric passports address a key weakness in our system for
identifying terrorists. There are really two concepts. First, is the person standing
before me the person that is identified in the travel documents? Second, is that per-
son a good guy or bad guy?
Ifyou fail at either one of those ends, you aren't going to catch known and sus-
pected terrorists. A person may have perfectly good travel documents that aren't
on any watch list. But if that person is someone other than the individual he pur-
ports to be, the validity of the travel documents is meaningless. That is the issue
biometric passports are trying to address.
It is estimated that 13 million visitors from visa waiver countries enter the
United States each year. Travelers from visa waiver countries are allowed to enter
the United States for up to 90 days for business or pleasure using only a passport.
Our international partners tell us this is one of the key issues for them because it
permits entry to citizens of those countries that the Department of State and De-
partment of Homeland Security has determined as having secure documents. The
Visa Waiver Program allows citizens ofthose countries easier entry into the United
States. They don't have to go through the extended visa process. They can come in
simply with their passport. We're working hard with our international partners to
make sure this program continues in place while those countries come up with the
technology and the decision-making necessary to continue to participate in the
Visa Waiver Program.
The next issue I want to address is the increase in security of international ship-
ping containers through a program called Container Security Initiative (CSI).
Containerized shipping is a critical component of global trade because about 90
percent of the world's trade is transported in cargo containers. 11
In the United States almost halfofincoming trade by value arrives by containers
on board ships. Nearly seven million cargo containers arrive on ships and are
offloaded in U.S. seaports every year. In post-September 1 1th America, Container
Security Initiative programs are key components to our homeland defense, based
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on the idea that it makes sense to extend our zone of security outward so that
American borders are the last line of defense and not the first.
Through CSI, maritime containers that pose a risk of compromise by terrorists
are identified and examined at foreign ports before they are shipped to the United
States. In so doing, the United States hopes to prevent terrorist attacks from being
carried out by preventing the arrival ofdangerous materials to the United States in
the first instance.
CSI consists of four core elements: (1) using intelligence to identify and target
containers that pose a risk; (2) prescreening those containers that pose a risk in the
port of departure rather than the port of arrival in the United States; (3) using de-
tection technology to screen containers that pose a risk; and, finally, (4) using
smarter, tamper-resistant containers.
Obviously this would be an impossible initiative without our international part-
ners. When we look to our international partners, despite what you may read on
occasion, we have tremendous cooperation on all levels in all these initiatives I've
discussed. They're brought into the decision-making process in the first instance
and their considerations are taken into account. I think for the most part we've
done a good job in working both through multilateral and bilateral negotiations to
make sure their concerns are addressed.
Intensifying international law enforcement cooperation occurs on many levels.
Perhaps the most important area is terrorist financing; the ability to freeze assets.
The Patriot Act 12 greatly assists our international efforts to freeze assets, but obvi-
ously law enforcement cooperation occurs at intelligence and other levels as well.
I must again emphasize that the United States is committed to coordinating
with our international partners to combat terrorism. As part of that coordination,
the United States provides specialized training and assistance to help build the ca-
pability to combat terrorism. This occurs not only for military forces but also in the
civilian agencies. Additionally, the United States hosts seminars to help our inter-
national partners draft their legislation, and to provide assistance regarding issues
like MANPADS and bioweapons. The United States also provides equipment from
time to time and science and technology advice on enhancing border security.
We're also expanding the protection of transnational critical infrastructure, es-
pecially with Canada and Mexico. As the events of August 2003, when failures in
the power grid caused blackouts in large areas of northeastern United States and
Ontario, Canada bore out, ifyou have an event in the United States that cascades to
our neighbors, that is a big problem.
But it is a greater problem if it were to be part ofa terrorist attack preventing first
responders who rely on the power grid to respond and execute their initiatives. Be-
cause we share such a large border with our friends in Canada and Mexico, a lot of
12
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our security, especially cybersecurity and obviously electrical security, crosses that
border. So we work with them to help make sure that those systems are more se-
cure from terrorist attack.
We also amplify international cooperation on homeland security through sci-
ence and technology, a key concept being biosensors and also sensors ofnuclear ra-
dioactive material. We work on science and technology with our international
partners and once that technology is developed, we provide that to those friendly
nations as well so that we can assist them in combating terrorism on their own
shores as well as here. Other countries which haven't yet been targeted by terrorism
still have an interest in ensuring that biological, chemical and nuclear weapons
aren't being transited through their country.
We also work on improved cooperation and response to attacks. Last May, the
United States staged a massive terrorist attack simulation to test our new plans. Ca-
nadian officials were involved in role playing. The scenario provided for simulated
terrorist attacks in Seattle and Chicago. The hypothetical Chicago attack occurred
at a Chicago Bulls-Toronto Raptors basketball game.
After the game the Raptors and their supporting contingent got back on their
plane and returned to Canada, only then to realize that an attack had been carried
out. So they had already spread the agent that was released in Chicago. This simula-
tion allowed for cross-national planning on how the two countries could carry out
a coordinated response, e.g., determining whether or not the border could be or
should be shut down.
The United States, at the federal government level, looks to make sure we're po-
sitioned to deal with almost any imaginable scenario. We've gotten very good at
doing "red cell" planning to hypothesize the full variety ofattacks, although there is
still considerable room for improvement. We'll never know until the next attack
occurs, but the United States Government is very focused on making sure that
there are preparations made for any kind of attack.
Finally, reviewing international obligations, international treaties and laws.
We also work on a bilateral basis to negotiate and renegotiate Mutual Legal Assis-
tance Treaties (MLATs). These assist US law enforcement agencies in gathering
and exchanging information and evidence with foreign authorities for use in
criminal trials.
We have many different international fora we can use to secure our interna-
tional objectives. Obviously the United Nations plays an important role, as well as
the Organization of American States and other regional groups, the G-8, and the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).
One of the great concerns of the G-8 is the MANPADS threat. ICAO handles
biometric passport issues. I am too technically illiterate to assist the determination
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of whether there should be a 32-bit contactless chip embedded in a passport, but I
do know we must have one uniform, worldwide readable document so we don't
have some countries developing a technical form of passport.
In conclusion, as President Bush states, "We will not achieve these goals over-
night [But] we will prevail against all who believe they can stand in the way of
America's commitment to freedom, liberty, and our way of life." 13 But as we strive
to reach those goals a key component is our international efforts. We will not se-
cure America if we only secure the homeland from within our hard borders. We
have to work with our international partners. We've had great success so far and we
continue to hope to have that kind of success in the future.
Now many critics have said that the war on terror is not a winnable war, but the
same critics said that about the Cold War as well. We must eradicate terror as an ac-
cepted tactic in warfare. Some people say again that's impossible, but I ask you to
compare other forms of warfare and tactics that were previously acceptable and
widespread, but now, for the most part, have been eradicated or substantially re-
duced as a tactic of war. Look at slavery, piracy, and genocide. Today these are
among the universal crimes, but for hundreds, ifnot thousands, ofyears these were
looked upon as acceptable methods of conducting war.
It's going to take a long time to drive terrorism into the same dustbin, but the US
Government is giving its best to put an end to this evil. We again thank our interna-
tional partners for their help in making us secure in our homeland and we will con-
tinue to work with them to secure theirs as well. Thank you.
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Comparative Approaches to Security and
Maritime Border Control
Dale Stephens'
Remarkably perhaps, the question ofmaritime border protection attracted an
unprecedented level of political debate during the course of the Australian
federal election of November 2001, ultimately becoming a significant issue in de-
ciding the outcome of that contest. Indeed, the election became, in essence, a refer-
endum on the Federal Government's revised policy concerning strict maritime
border protection measures designed to prevent the influx of illegal migrants arriv-
ing by sea into Australia. This issue was principally ignited by the Australian Gov-
ernment's stance in denying the admission into Australia of 433 illegal migrants
rescued by the Norwegian container ship MV Tampa ] in August of that year and
the subsequent passage by the Australian Parliament, on September 26, 2001, of
omnibus border protection legislation that provided for a robust legal regime. 2
This new legislative scheme infused the Australian Defence Force (ADF) with sig-
nificantly greater authority to intercept and remove suspected illegal entry vessels
from Australia's maritime zones. There is no doubt that the reverberations of the
attacks of September 11, 2001 (hereinafter referred to as 9/11), which were in-
tensely felt within Australia at the time, also heavily influenced approaches to the
* Commander, Royal Australian Navy. The views expressed in this article are those of the author
alone and do not necessarily represent the views of the Australian Government, the Australian
Defence Force, or the Royal Australian Navy.
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issue of maritime border protection by both the Government and the Australian
population. Such reverberations, in conjunction with the emotions generated by
the Bali bombings of October 2002, 3 continue to largely influence approaches to
maritime border protection issues within the Australian body politic, though not
without criticism by significant segments of the Australian public.
The unprecedented level of political debate relating to maritime border protec-
tion at the time of the election has been matched by an equally intense academic
debate as to the lawfulness of actions taken by the ADF in intercepting incoming
vessels carrying unlawful immigrants and denying them entry into Australia. The
lawfulness of the actions undertaken by the ADF in implementing the Govern-
ment's stringent border protection policies were also the subject of domestic litiga-
tion (which occurred while such operations were ongoing) within the Australian
Federal Court, as well as a fulsome and comprehensive Senate Inquiry following
the 2001 election.
The legal issues, which have been hotly debated with respect to these events, are
possibly familiar to an American audience. They concern questions of constitu-
tional capacity, especially the extent of executive power to direct military opera-
tions under the constitution in the face of potentially contrary legislative direction.
They also touch on issues of international law relating to law of the sea rights and
obligations and, of course, issues concerning the incorporation of international
law within domestic law and the priority of either domestic or international law in
operational decision making.
The Australian Defence Force and its Law Enforcement Role
The Australian Defence Force generally, and the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) in
particular, have a solid tradition of exercising law enforcement powers on behalfof
the Commonwealth Government. Unlike restraints imposed upon parts of the US
military, there is no comparable Posse Comitatus Act4 limitation on the use of the
ADF or RAN to enforce federal law. To the contrary, provisions of Australian
Commonwealth law specifically authorize military members to exercise necessary
law enforcement powers. Indeed, when the issue was peripherally raised in a con-
stitutional context in the 1970s, a justice of the High Court of Australia noted in
dicta that he could not conceive ofany inherent limitation on the use of the ADF to
enforce laws ofthe Commonwealth Government. 5 Such a reflection is entirely con-
sistent with Australian constitutional interpretive methodology dating to the
1920s, which has traditionally given full effect to the terms of Commonwealth
laws provided they are based upon a requisite head of constitutional power. Con-
comitantly, the courts have been slow to impose any implied personal rights or
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obligations arising from the Constitution which might act to restrict ADF law en-
forcement capacity. Indeed, there is no equivalent of the Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendments to the US Constitution in the Australian Constitution nor is there
the same historical experience that led to the passage of the Posse Comitatus Act in
the United States, namely post-Civil War Reconstruction and the fear of martial
excess. 6
As a result of the broad constitutional capacity ofthe ADF to enforce Common-
wealth laws, there has developed a relatively large, though disparate, corpus of law
that guides RAN maritime law enforcement operations, particularly that ofthe pa-
trol boat force operating offofnorthern Australia. In essence, the ADF has respon-
sibility under Commonwealth legislation for such diverse areas as fisheries,
customs, migration, and quarantine control, and more generally for issues such as
anti-piracy. Notwithstanding this broad range of subject matter, the powers exer-
cisable by the ADF differ according to the particular subject, thus the specific piece
of legislation under which operations are being conducted will shape the powers
and responsibilities ofADF officers. Importantly, there exist significant differences
between various applicable pieces of legislation.
Fisheries enforcement has traditionally occupied the central focus ofADF law
enforcement operations and has involved both major and minor RAN vessels.
Thus, Australia routinely deploys a major fleet unit to its territories of Heard and
McDonald Islands located in the Southern Indian Ocean (approximately 4100 ki-
lometers southwest of Perth, Western Australia) to intercept major foreign fishing
vessels engaged in wide-scale commercial fishing activities. Such deployments have
led to some dramatic enforcement actions including one in particular, which is be-
lieved to be the longest hot pursuit in recorded history. 7 More generally, fisheries
enforcement largely occurs in the northern Australian Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ) with respect to lower scale illegal fishing activity. For example, in the first
four months of 2004, there were 48 interceptions of foreign illegal fishing in that
region. 8 With respect to customs enforcement, the ADF usually acts in conjunction
with the Australian Federal Police, typically focusing on maritime drug interdic-
tion operations. In 2003 for example, the RAN deployed a guided missile frigate
with a contingent of Special Air Service (SAS) troops on board to successfully in-
tercept a North Korean freighter that had landed 150 kilograms of heroin on the
southern Australian mainland.
MV Tampa and Border Protection
As previously mentioned, the Tampa incident generated considerable debate
within Australian political and legal circles. The timing of that incident, coinciding
as it did with 9/11, witnessed a subtle revision of approach regarding the question
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of illegal entry—from one of mere migration control to one with greater national
security overtones. This in turn has influenced the nature of legal analysis ofthe in-
ternational and domestic legal rights that may be exercised in maritime border
control actions and has influenced contemporary policy and legal choices.
The MV Tampa Case
On August 26, 2001, the Norwegian container ship Tampa rescued 433 people
from a grossly overloaded and sinking Indonesian-flagged wooden-hulled vessel in
the Indian Ocean. That vessel had been attempting to reach Australia from Indo-
nesia as part of a people-smuggling operation and, accordingly, the persons on
board did not possess lawful entry visas. Having rescued the crew and passengers,
the Tampa's Norwegian master intended to return them to an Indonesian port to
disembark them, when a decision was made to divert to Australian territory. The
master then sought to drop them at Christmas Island, an Australian territory close
to Indonesia. Representatives of the Australian Government contacted the ship
and informed the master that the ship did not have permission to enter Australian
waters and could not disembark the migrants. The master responded by claiming
that some of the migrants on board were suffering from dire medical emergency
and thus relied upon the right of "distress" to demand entry into the port facilities.
Australian authorities countered by preparing medical teams to fly out to the vessel
to address the alleged medical emergencies. During the course ofplanning the pro-
vision ofmedical assistance, the ship steamed into the Australian territorial sea sur-
rounding Christmas Island and was then boarded by 45 SAS soldiers who traveled
by fast boat to the vessel. Through a dramatic standoffduring the next few days, the
vessel was visited by the Norwegian Ambassador to Australia who received a note
from the migrants outlining their assertions of refugee status. Proceedings were si-
multaneously filed in the Federal Court by public interest lawyers seeking an order
of habeas corpus to compel the Australian Government to bring the migrants into
Australian jurisdiction. The Government sought to prevent such access. The mi-
grants appeared to be from a number of countries, including Afghanistan, Iraq,
Kuwait, Sri Lanka and Pakistan.
After several days, the illegal migrants were voluntarily transferred to an Austra-
lian naval vessel and transported to the island nation of Nauru where representa-
tives of Australia and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) subsequently processed their applications. The Australian Government
was aware that this was the commencement of a wave of vessels carrying persons
seeking refugee status and ultimately implemented Operation Relex, which was
designed to prevent entry into Australian internal waters by such craft.9 Approxi-
mately a dozen vessels attempted to transport illegal migrants to Australia
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following the Tampa incident; the ADF/RAN successfully intercepted all of these
vessels. 10
Legal Issues Raised
The ability to intercept vessels carrying unlawful migrants is addressed within the
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Law of the Sea Conven-
tion) in Article 33, which permits a coastal State the authority to exercise "the con-
trol necessary" within the contiguous zone to prevent infringement of
immigration laws. Accordingly, as a matter of international law there can be no
question of attracting state responsibility on the part of the coastal State for the in-
terference with navigational rights of vessels infringing such laws. Additionally,
such authority exists, a fortiori, in the territorial sea where Article 19(g) expressly
notes that the loading/unloading of persons contrary to coastal State immigration
laws "is prejudicial to the peace, good order or security" of that State and consti-
tutes passage which, under Article 25, a coastal State may "take the necessary steps"
to prevent.
The difficulty confronting the Australian action lay with the application of do-
mestic law concerning ADF powers. The Australian Migration Act provided for a
highly formalized procedure with which "Commanders" of duly commissioned
ships were required to comply in order to exercise powers relating to the detention
of illegal immigrants. Moreover, the Act seemed to generally contemplate that per-
sons detained would be conveyed into Australian Migration Act jurisdiction (i.e.,
land territory) rather than removed from it. On the day SAS forces boarded the
Tampa, the SAS were not acting in accordance with powers pursuant to the Migra-
tion Act. They were neither duly appointed "Commanders" for the purposes of the
Act nor were they in command of a commissioned ship as required by the Act, but
rather were acting pursuant to specific Government direction under the executive
power of the Constitution. This executive power is exercisable in circumstances of,
inter alia, national security and is identical to the type of power President Truman
unsuccessfully sought to exercise in the Youngstown case. 1 1 The difficulty facing the
Commonwealth in relying upon the executive power in the context of the Tampa
interception was that it was squarely the type of situation described by Justice Jackson
in the Youngstown case as being one where the Legislature had passed specific legis-
lation, which essentially directed an incompatible regime. As with the result
reached in the Youngstown case, it seemed to be a very precarious basis upon which
to base military action. Indeed, a single Judge of the Australian Federal Court that
decided the Tampa case in the first instance determined the matter against the
Commonwealth. 12 Subsequently, however, the matter was decided in favor of the
federal Commonwealth Government on appeal by a 2-1 majority. 13 The opinion of
23
Security and Maritime Border Control
one the majority Justices on appeal expressly acknowledged that the Common-
wealth possessed sufficient constitutional authority by use of the executive power
to prohibit illegal entry in terms that seemed to correlate such denial with national
security goals. It was a remarkably wide reading of prerogative powers and, signifi-
cantly, was handed down on September 16, 2001. It seems very plausible that the
events of 9/1 1 did influence judicial thinking, especially as the author of the opin-
ion envisaging such a wide interpretation of prerogative powers was not expected
to have decided the matter in the way he did. 14
The decision has been criticized by some academic commentators for failing to
properly have regard to implicit international obligations contained within the
1951 Refugee Convention 15 to which Australia is party. 16 Indeed, the issue seems to
have been discussed in the literature as highlighting new and possibly intractable
tensions between national security concerns arising from the "war on international
terrorism" and humanitarian obligations to accord basic procedural rights to all
unlawful migrants arriving by sea so as to properly determine who may have a bona
fide claim to refugee status.
It is against this background that the border protection legislation that was
passed in September 2001 maybe better understood. 17 Under the current domestic
legal regime outlined in the Migration Act, the ADF is empowered to intercept all
vessels suspected of containing unlawful migrants entering the contiguous mari-
time zone and may remove such vessels either to a nominated third country pro-
cessing center or simply to a "place" seaward of the contiguous zone. This latter
method of removal necessarily gives rise to potential objections under the Law of
the Sea Convention with respect to the capacity to detain, and indeed tow, foreign-
flagged vessels across international waters. There are a number of answers that
might be offered to such objections. First, while Australia has ratified the Law ofthe
Sea Convention, there exists no mechanism of self-executing treaty implementa-
tion within Australia such as exists within the United States. Accordingly, while
some aspects of the Law of the Sea Convention have been incorporated into Aus-
tralian domestic law, it is certainly not a comprehensive incorporation and there is
no inconsistency with the amended Migration Act legislative powers to remove
such vessels. This does not, of course, answer potential questions of state responsi-
bility that might arise from interfering with freedom of navigation rights ofthe flag
State of the vessel, yet notwithstanding ADF actions there has yet to be any kind of
claim raised by any nation State that has alleged breach of such obligations. Sec-
ond, and in partial answer to the first issue, the practice to date has been to tow only
those vessels with Indonesian nationality under the terms of a "letter of notice"
provided to Indonesia advising of such intent to return Indonesian flagged vessels
carrying unlawful migrants. The return of such vessels to the 12nm edge of the
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Indonesian coast under Operation Relex was observed by Indonesian authorities
without protest and Australian international lawyers have characterized this for-
bearance as "constructive acquiescence."
The issue of unlawful immigration and border control mechanisms has neces-
sarily been brought into sharper relief in the context of the war against terrorism.
Notwithstanding the navigational regime contemplated in the Law ofthe Sea Con-
vention pertaining to the application of immigration laws in the contiguous zone
and territorial sea only, the general jurisdictional rules of international law con-
cerning both territorial and prescriptive jurisdiction relating to national security
controls does admit to an extended reach of application beyond these maritime
zones. Under these principles it is entirely arguable to admit to the extra territorial
application of migration controls that might be exercised within international wa-
ters where this is deemed to be a necessary incident of preserving national security
interests. Indeed, the skein ofauthority emanating from a US Court ofAppeals and
the US Supreme Court, respectively, in the Nippon Paper18 and Hartford Fire 19
cases would seem to lend support for such reach, at least in circumstances where
the intent of foreign actors is to unlawfully interfere with domestic activities and
their conduct in fact produced or is likely to produce a substantial effect. More
trenchantly, the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 137320
on September 28, 2001 would seem to provide ample Chapter VII authority to
override objections of navigational interference reflected in the Law of the Sea
Convention. Resolution 1373 deals with international terrorism in the context of
the post-9/11 environment. Article 2(g) thereof calls upon States, acting under
Chapter VII authority, to "prevent the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups
by effective border controls." Pursuant to Articles 25 and 103 ofthe Charter, which
demand compliance with such decisions and provide for the overriding of incon-
sistent provisions contained in any international agreement, such a stipulation
could readily displace navigational rights of vessels carrying unlawful migrants in
circumstances where there is a suspicion ofterrorist connection. The requisite level
of suspicion of terrorist connection required to authorize action need not neces-
sarily be high. The academic Derek Jinks has persuasively argued that in the con-
text of international terrorism the rules of state responsibility have been applied by
virtue of both Resolution 1373 and international consensus to significantly lower
the threshold of attribution between private actors and the State in circumstances
where the State merely harbors or supports such actors. 21 Such a development fur-
ther dilutes the original tests promulgated by the International Court of Justice
(IC) in the Nicaragua case22 and the International Criminal Court for the Former
Yugoslavia in the Tadic appeal23 regarding attribution criteria. While such an ap-
proach may be critiqued for being both under and over inclusive,24 it nonetheless
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grounded offensive military action in Afghanistan in 2002 and thus opens the door
for consideration of lesser forms of control mechanisms. If such action is accept-
able in the context of offensive military operations then surely it permits a State to
tighten maritime border controls beyond the traditional limits of the contiguous
zone and thus authorize preventative action within international waters where this
is deemed necessary to preserve both national and international security. That
such a proposition relies upon the authority of Resolution 1373, as it does, is hardly
revolutionary. As far back as 1949 in the ICJ's Corfu Channel decision, the highly
respected Judge Alvarez pointedly acknowledged the capacity of the Security
Council to vary maritime navigational rights where this was necessary to preserve
international peace and security and fully accepted the consequential diminution
of sovereign rights that such actions might entail. 25 Indeed, as evidenced by the
Certain Expenses26 and Namibia27 decisions of the ICJ, the challenge of interna-
tional lawyers today seems not so much as deciding what the Security Council can
do, but rather determining the limits of what it may not do. 28
The clash between national security measures as applied in the context ofborder
control actions and humanitarian aspirations of those seeking asylum and human
rights obligations ofthe coastal State does raise uncomfortable conundrums. In the
current environment of the war on terrorism, States such as Australia are choosing
to accord national security and the orderly processing and screening of asylum
seekers within countries of origin (rather than on the shores of Australia) a higher
priority. While such a choice might be criticized on both legal and policy
grounds,29 it is not altogether unique within the domestic jurisprudence of a num-
ber of countries who have faced similar issues. The US Supreme Court in Sale v.
Haitian Centers Council 30 for example, in an 8-1 majority decision determined
that high seas interdiction of Haitian asylum seekers did not attract obligations un-
der the Refugee Convention 31 as the Court construed neither the Convention nor
supporting US domestic law as applying beyond territorial boundaries of the
United States. 32 Similarly, the UK Court ofAppeal in the recent 2002 decision ofA
v. Secretary ofState for the Home Department33 determined that measures adopted
by the UK Government following 9/11 to detain and expel non-nationals dero-
gated from a host of international human rights guarantees (detention policies and
rights to a fair trial) but were nonetheless acceptable as derogations which could be
justified in times of public emergency. What is intriguing in that instance was that
the UK Government's detention of non-nationals was directed more at the threat
such non-nationals posed to the United States than the United Kingdom, but




While invocation of national security measures to inform approaches to maritime
border control suggest a theme of arrogant unilateralism, this is not necessarily the
case. The experience of maritime law enforcement by Australia within the region
has been one ofexceptionally constructive co-operation. This has been particularly
pronounced with Australia's near neighbors such as Papua New Guinea and Indo-
nesia and more generally with countries situated in the South West Pacific under
the Nuie Treaty,34 but has also extended more broadly to countries situated within
the Indian Ocean which was amply demonstrated by the South Tomi incident of
early 200 1. 35
In that instance, a Togolese registered vessel had engaged in illegal fishing activ-
ity at Heard and Macdonald Islands and was pursued from the EEZ ofthose islands
by an Australian Fisheries Authority vessel in a two-week hot pursuit that extended
along the entire southern length of the Western Indian Ocean to the coast ofSouth
Africa. During the course of the pursuit offers of warship assistance were received
from French authorities who occupied the French possession of Kerguelen Island
and, similarly, South African authorities who were exceptionally helpful when as-
sistance was requested. In the event, an Australian military boarding team was dis-
patched to South Africa and transited through that country for deployment upon a
South African warship that met South Tomi as it rounded the Cape ofGood Hope.
With hastily prepared complementary rules of engagement and mutually agreed
understandings of the legal issues involved, Australian military members (who
were also authorized fisheries officers under the relevant legislation) successfully
apprehended South Tomi from the flotilla of South African warships that had
steamed out into international waters to intercept the vessel. An Australian steam-
ing party was placed onboard South Tomi and the vessel returned back to Western
Australia where the ship and catch were forfeited and the master prosecuted. From
a Law of the Sea Convention perspective, the incident raised a number of interest-
ing legal issues which included, in particular, the capacity of one nation to hand
over hot pursuit to another nation while still maintaining law enforcement juris-
diction upon apprehension. In that regard, the Convention merely makes refer-
ence to "government ships" without mentioning the nationality ofsuch ships as an
integral criteria for hot pursuit. Similarly, the question of whether the skirting of
South Tomi through the territorial sea of Kerguelen Island would have rendered
the hot pursuit otiose even when the coastal State, in this case France, did not ob-
ject to the continued pursuit. In any event, this latter issue was not in issue, for
while South Tomi seemed intent on entering the French territorial sea at Kerguelen
Island it eventually diverted its track and did not do so.
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The international legal issues thrown up by the South Tomi incident were never
tested within international legal or diplomatic fora as Togo made no representa-
tions on behalf of the vessel upon its arrest or subsequent prosecution. The issues
nonetheless demonstrated the unilateral nature of many of the rights contained
within the Law of the Sea Convention. It seemed a very odd outcome that notwith-
standing the co-operation of so many nations in seeking to apprehend this vessel,
that the terms of the Convention had, in theory at least, the capacity to defeat this
intent.
Conclusion
The tightening of its maritime border control laws by the Australian Government
has generated considerable academic criticism by those who validly rue the subor-
dination of humanitarian priorities. Such measures have nonetheless been sup-
portable under a sheath of domestic and international legal authority and,
moreover, have proven to be extremely effective in stemming the tide of seaborne
unlawful migrants. Australian embassies in countries of origin apply the very same
tests for refugee status in those countries as would apply to the hapless asylum
seeker washing up on Australian shores.
The events of 9/1 1 and the associated war on terrorism continue to resonate in
approaches to maritime security issues and have permitted the ascendancy of na-
tional and international security measures which have the potential to override
long standing navigational rights. The key in confronting international terrorism
and ensuring adequate maritime border security is striving for multilateral cooper-
ation rather than resolute reliance upon unilateral rights. The experiences of the
ADF/RAN in undertaking law enforcement measures within our region in concert
with countries such as South Africa, France and Papua New Guinea have amply
demonstrated the magnificent ability to "force multiply" military means so as to
secure common ends. Such co-operation is ofcourse key to ensuring effective mar-
itime border security and more broadly to ensuring a durable victory in this war we
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European and German Security Policy
and International Terrorism
Torsten Stein*
German security policy cannot be separated from that ofthe European Union,
especially when it comes to border controls as one of its principal elements.
Since the 1970s, the European Union (then the European Economic Community
(EEC)) has been engaged in harmonizing the Member States' security policy,
which has, in the light of the ongoing European integration, become one of its pri-
mary goals, especially with regard to the enlargement of the European Union, which
took place on May 1, 2004. The importance of both European and transatlantic co-
operation in this field cannot therefore be overemphasized, particularly since the
events of September 11, 2001, which have confronted all States with a new threat. 1
The most prominent feature ofthe threat posed by international terrorism is the
changed profile of its perpetrators: Al Qaida, and the persons and organizations as-
sociated with it, is not confined to nations, regarding either its members or its aims.
The offenders are recruited from various countries and together constitute an in-
ternationally organized structure of terrorism, of which all Western societies can
be victims, as witnessed last in Madrid. From a sociological point of view, this in-
ternational terrorist structure differs from all known criminal groups. The
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spectrum reaches from illiterate religious fanatics to highly educated businessmen
with international experience. 2 The focus of this article shall therefore be on the de-
velopment of border controls and their effectiveness in the fight against interna-
tional terrorism.
Legal Regimefor Security Policy and Border Controls in Europe and Germany
The ongoing European integration has brought Europe's citizens not only eco-
nomical, but also great personal freedom, a development which found its climax in
the introduction ofEU citizenship by the Maastricht Treaty on European Union. 3
But by granting those freedoms, a need for coordinating justice and home affairs
became obvious. Starting with the Naples Agreement on the Cooperation of Cus-
toms Services in 1967,4 informal governmental cooperation in the area of justice
and home affairs has evolved. In this context, the TREVI Group, 5 mandated to
combat terrorism, illegal immigration and organized crime, and composed of ex-
ecutives of the Member States' respective authorities, was created. The Single Eu-
ropean Act of 1986, 6 which introduced the concept of the Single Market, brought
about the need to create a balance between market freedoms and security interests,
especially as far as controls ofthe EEC's external borders and the creation of a com-
mon European asylum and immigration policy were concerned.
The Schengen Regime
Due to the difficult and tedious process of reconciling policies in the area ofjustice
and home affairs, France, Germany and the Benelux countries concluded the 1985
Schengen Agreement7 with a view to abolishing controls at the internal borders,
harmonizing measures in the area of visas and asylum policy, and creating police
and judicial cooperation. The 1990 Schengen Implementation Agreement (SLA) 8
codified the abolishment of internal border controls, laid down the procedure for
controls at the external borders, and provided common rules for issuing short-
term visas and for determining jurisdiction for asylum requests according to the
Dublin Agreement.9 The SIA came into force in 1995. The most interesting fea-
tures of the SIA for the topic of this article are the introduction of cross-border
pursuit and shadowing and of the "Schengen Information System" (SIS). The lat-
ter is a computerized network allowing the Member States' police authorities to ex-
change data on wanted persons as well as stolen goods, e.g., cars. The weak point of
the SIS is that it is designed to serve only 18 Member States. Therefore, the Euro-
pean Community Council, at the urging of the Schengen Executive Council 10 (the
primary organ created by the Schengen Agreements), directed that a second-gen-
eration Schengen Information System (SIS II) be developed that would take into
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account new developments in information technology and update the system with
new capacity criteria. 1 1 However, SIS II has not yet been implemented, due to techni-
cal difficulties. The foregoing agreements, as well as the legal instruments decreed by
the Schengen organs, collectively constitute the Schengen Regime, which is now ap-
plicable in all EU Member States except the United Kingdom and Ireland. 12
The Treaty ofAmsterdam, 13 which first stipulated the creation ofan area of free-
dom, security and justice as one ofthe EU's goals, 14 incorporated the Schengen Re-
gime into the European Union. 15 The provisions of the Schengen Regime were
transferred in 1999 16 to the respective legal bases of the Treaty Establishing the Eu-
ropean Community (TEC) 17 and the Treaty on European Union (TEU). 18 A new
Title IV on visa, asylum, immigration and other policies related to the free move-
ment of persons was inserted into the TEC. Since then, the statutory basis for EC
and EU measures in the areas of justice and home affairs that was before to be
found in the Schengen Regime can now be found in the TEC and in the TEU. 19 Ac-
cordingly, the Schengen Regime forms part of the acquis communautaire, which
the accession States must adopt. Exceptions apply only to the United Kingdom and
Ireland as States that originally did not sign the Schengen Agreements, as well as
Denmark, who opted out of some parts of the Maastricht Treaty establishing the
European Union in 1992.
Since most ofthe measures adopted on the grounds ofTEC/TEU provisions, ex-
cept for regulations, need to be transformed into national law by the Member
States, both EC/EU measures and national laws coexist, but also intertwine.
Sparked by the innovations of the Amsterdam Treaty, the Council of the European
Union decided, while meeting in Tampere, Finland in 1999, that the creation of an
area of freedom, security and justice should be given the same importance as the
realization ofthe Single Market. The area of security thus should comprise fighting
cross-border crime, drug trafficking, illegal immigration and terrorism as the neg-
ative aspects resulting from the area of freedom. The European Commission was
mandated to create a scorecard, which, at regular intervals, would show the prog-
ress in creating an area of freedom, security and justice.
Europol-Agreement
Police cooperation between Member States was and is to date a significant aspect of
an area of security. Therefore, the European Drugs Unit was set up as early as 1995
as part of the TEU's police and judicial cooperation,20 enabling Member States to
exchange and analyze information on criminal acts and assisting national police
authorities in combating crime. However, the Drugs Unit was subsequently man-
dated with further competencies in the areas of drug trafficking, illegal dealing of
radioactive and nuclear materials, illegal immigration, trafficking in human
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beings, illegal moving of automobiles and money laundering. The exchange of in-
formation with the Drugs Unit was carried out via liaison officers in each Member
State, who had to comply with the respective national laws protecting personal
data; therefore personal data could not be stored directly with the Drugs Unit. In
1999, the European Drugs Unit was replaced by the European Police Office
(Europol), which was established on the basis of the 1995 Europol Agreement. 21
Europol has essentially the same competencies as its predecessor, the Drugs Unit,
but it maintains a computerized information system, which is fed with data di-
rectly from the Member States. Furthermore, personal data can be stored with
Europol, on condition that it is only used to investigate serious crime falling into
Europol's competencies. In addition, personal data fulfilling these conditions can
be processed to third countries and their authorities, subject to an international
agreement or in a situation affecting vital interests of a Member State or if immi-
nent danger must be averted. 22 The agreement with the third country must include
provisions on the type ofdata to be transmitted, on its recipient and on the purpose
for which it is required. Also, the question of liability in the case ofunauthorized or
wrongful processing of data needs to be regulated. Should these requirements be
met, the transfer ofdata is possible, but limited to law enforcement agencies. How-
ever, these agencies are obliged to delete the transferred data as soon as they are no
longer required for the specific purpose intended. 23
Eurojust
Besides enhancing police cooperation, the Council ofEuropean Union, at its meet-
ing in Tampere in 1999, decided to expand judicial cooperation in order to im-
prove the fight against organized crime and agreed on the creation of an agency in
which prosecutors, judges or police officers with comparable authority would join
forces. To this end, Eurojust was established in 2002. 24 Article 3 of the Council De-
cision states that the purpose of Eurojust is to coordinate and facilitate investiga-
tions and law enforcement between the respective Member States' authorities.
Article 4, in turn, provides that Eurojust's competence extends to the same forms
of crime as that of Europol, but in addition Eurojust is mandated to deal with spe-
cial forms ofcrime such as computer crime, fraud and corruption, money launder-
ing as well as unlawful practices causing damage to the environment. Article 14
authorizes Eurojust to process personal data, but mandates maintenance ofa mini-
mum level of data protection as stipulated in the Council of Europe Agreement of
January 28, 1981. 25 Furthermore, pursuant to Article 19 of the Council Decision,
personal data must be deleted if it is wrong or incomplete. This also applies to per-
sonal data no longer required for the original purpose.
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In order to ensure the effectiveness of police and judicial cooperation, Eurojust
works closely with Europol and can exchange information to this end. 26 Moreover,
Eurojust is empowered to conclude cooperation agreements, including provisions
for the exchange ofpersonal data, with third countries, competent institutions un-
der the TEU/TEC, international organizations and law enforcement agencies of
third countries, subject to approval by the Council.27
The coming years will determine if the judicial cooperation practiced through
Eurojust will stand the test of time. In the long run, a truly effective information
network between investigative and law enforcement agencies within the European
Union can only be achieved by concluding a formal cooperation agreement be-
tween Eurojust and Europol, as envisaged in the Council Decision28 and by giving
those two agencies access to the SIS, as currently planned.29
Legal Instruments in the Fight against Terrorism
The danger posed by terrorist attacks carried out with nuclear, biological and
chemical weapons, as well as conventional weapons, calls for determined action by
all Western States; international terrorism can only be fought by extensive and op-
timized international cooperation.
European Level
As early as 1995 the EU-US Action Plan30 was established to foster cooperation in
the fight against the global threats of organized crime, terrorism and drug traffick-
ing. On a European level, the Council of the European Union, at its Vienna meet-
ing in December 1998, adopted an Action Plan for implementing the Amsterdam
Treaty provisions on building an area of freedom, security and justice. 31 The Ac-
tion Plan underscored the fight against terrorism as one of the EU's aims. Special
emphasis was also placed on the central role of Europol as an important instru-
ment of enhanced cooperation between the Member States. However, the mea-
sures foreseen in the EU Action Plan, as well as the existing measures intended to
realize an area of security, e.g., provisions of the Schengen Regime and the Europol
Agreement, did not prove to be effective; a fact that was tragically affirmed by the
attacks of September 11, the planning of which took place in Germany and re-
mained undetected. The new security threat called for advanced countermeasures
on the part of both the European Union and the European Community, as well as
at the national level in order to confer the necessary competencies upon the au-
thorities responsible for protecting the population and fighting the latent danger.
Therefore, the Council of the European Union at its extraordinary meeting of
September 21, 2001 agreed on an Action Plan specifically aimed at combating
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terrorism, The Action Plan included enhanced police and judicial cooperation.
These were to be facilitated by the introduction of the European Arrest Warrant
(the creation ofwhich had already been anticipated at the 1999 Tampere meeting),
a uniform definition of terrorism, and the creation of a list of terrorist organiza-
tions, as well as the formation ofjoint investigation teams and of an anti-terrorism
unit within Europol. In addition, it was decided that security measures for air
transportation and quality controls for security at airports should be enhanced.
In fulfilling both UN Security Council Resolution 1373 of September 18, 2001
and the guidelines set out by the Action Plan of September 21, 2001, the Council
adopted two Common Positions on combating terrorism and on the application of
certain measures to this end. 32 According to an update of June 27, 2003, these
Common Positions contain, in addition to a definition of "terrorist act," a list of
52 persons and 34 groups that are subjected to enhanced police and judicial coop-
erative scrutiny and whose funds and assets are to be frozen. Based on the Com-
mon Positions, the Council adopted a decision on police and judicial cooperation
in criminal matters under Title VI of the TEU,33 which defines the scope of admin-
istrative assistance in preventing and combating terrorist attacks. Thus, every
Member State has to establish a specialized authority within its police service hav-
ing access to all information relating to terrorist offenses. These authorities are
then required to forward the information to Europol and Eurojust.
For the purpose of EC-wide implementation of the Common Positions, the
Council of the European Union issued a Regulation "on specific measures directed
against certain persons and organizations in combating terrorism." 34 The list at-
tached to this Regulation names 26 persons and 23 organizations whose funds and
other assets are to be frozen. The Regulation was subsequently extended,35 pursu-
ant to a Council of the European Union Common Position of May 27, 2002,36 to
specifically apply to persons and organizations connected to Osama bin Laden, the
Al Qaida network and the Taliban. Since the Member States' national laws and
measures were partially in need of improvement, the Council issued a decision in
November 200237 aimed at reassessing those laws in order to attain higher effi-
ciency in combating terrorism.
One legal instrument expected to show great effect in fighting terrorism is the Eu-
ropean Arrest Warrant,38 which is designed to replace the political and administrative
phases ofthe old extradition process with one single court procedure. It constitutes the
first palpable realization ofthe principle ofmutual recognition in criminal law matters,
which was agreed upon by the European Council in Tampere in 1999.
As regards criminal law, a 2002 Council Framework Decision39 on combating
terrorism is of vital importance, since for the first time a move towards harmoniz-
ing the Member States' criminal laws was made in the sense that minimum
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standards for terrorist offenses and their elements, and for law enforcement, were
defined. The need for such a decision becomes obvious when it is considered that
as late as 200 1 , only six EU Member States had incorporated provisions on terrorist
offenses into their criminal laws.40 With this Framework Decision, the European
Union has laid a foundation for a comprehensive system of combating terrorism,
whereby the Member States' law enforcement agencies, assisted by Europol,
Eurojust and the SIS, can improve the effectiveness of their investigations.41 How-
ever, the Framework Decision has not been fully implemented into all Member
States' national laws. As of March 2004, only eight Member States had imple-
mented it, although Article 1 1 ofthe Framework Decision had set a deadline ofDe-
cember 21, 2002. This puts the events of March 11, 2004 in Madrid into an even
more tragic light.
National Level
Measures to combat the terrorist threat have also been taken on the national level,
principally through the implementation ofEU decisions. This article will focus on
Germany as an example. The German Law on Combating Terrorism, which came
into force on January 1, 2002, created a statutory basis for further measures and for
enhanced cooperation between the various existing German security authorities.42
The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundes-
verfassungsschutz), as one of Germany's principal security agencies, was tasked to
investigate cases involving organizations opposed to the idea of international under-
standing and peaceful coexistence of peoples. That agency now has the power to de-
mand information on bank accounts and their holders from banks or other financial
service providers. Thus, financial transactions to and from organizations with ex-
tremist or suspicious attitudes can be disclosed and further support for those orga-
nizations cut off. In addition, further competencies for disclosure of information
by telecommunication and mail service providers as well as airlines were created,
some of which were transferred to the Federal Intelligence Service (Bundes-
nachrichtendienst) and to the Naval Intelligence Service (Marineabschirm-
dienst).43 At the same time, all the measures just mentioned are subject to a strict
control regime by impartial bodies. 44
Another agency endowed with new investigative and executive authority is the
Federal Office of Criminal Investigation (Bundeskriminalamt). That agency can
now directly intervene in cases of information technology (IT) sabotage, as one of
the potential fields of future terrorist attacks, without further consultation with
other agencies. If it has an initial suspicion ofan offense, it can now initiate its own
investigations and use its own resources for gathering information, especially in
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the areas of terrorism and IT sabotage, while working together closely with other
security agencies.
The Federal Border Police (Bundesgrenzschutz) has been granted power for
training and deploying armed sky marshals. 45 Furthermore, in the interest of air
security, the provisions of the air transportation law were altered to allow the rein-
forcing of controls and quality standards at and around airports, as well as the use
of military aircraft to shoot down hijacked airplanes as a last resort. The latter pro-
vision permits for the first time the deployment ofthe Federal Army (Bundeswehr)
within Germany in other than disaster operations. It was passed against strong op-
position. The need for such a competence became all too obvious on January 5,
2003 when a deranged man commandeered a motorized glider, circled over Frankfurt/
Main for several hours and threatened to crash the plane into the building of the
European Central Bank. Fortunately, the plane did not have to be shot down by the
summoned F-4 pursuit planes—no legal basis existed for such an action then46—
,
since the perpetrator gave up after three hours and safely landed the plane. The re-
inforced control standards at airports now include checking the reliability of airport
employees. To this end, the air security authorities can obtain unlimited disclosure
of information from the Federal Central Register (Bundeszentralregister).47
Similarly, the Law on the Review of Security Measures introduced strict control
and security measures in order to prevent sabotage of other vital or militarily im-
portant installations. In the future it will be possible to explore the personal and
economic background of employees in nuclear plants and other focal points of
critical infrastructure. The Federal Office ofCriminal Investigation therefore keeps
in close contact with the respective operators of the relevant facilities in order to
update the security assessment and optimize both protective measures and the
flow of information.48
This new and intensified investigative work resulted in 182 criminal investiga-
tions of individuals with Islamic backgrounds between September 2001 and Febru-
ary 2004. Seventy of those were led by the Federal Office of Criminal Investigation
and 1 1 2 by the regional police (Landespolizeien), the latter maintaining a close co-
operation with the competent federal authorities. The Federal Office of Criminal
Investigation alone investigated 25,600 hints and traces, taking advantage of the
changed provisions in the Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozessordnung),
which allow a simplified procedure and advanced competencies for intercepting
correspondence, including telephone, cell phone, and e-mail contacts. However,
the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) 49 declared some
portions of the latter competencies unconstitutional.
In order to guarantee an adequate and constitutionally sound criminal convic-
tion, the German Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch) had to be adapted to the new
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circumstances, therefore new provisions were inserted into the code. Previously
only membership in a terrorist group constituted an offense, so that the courts
could not adequately react to terrorism in its new, international dimension. With
insertion of the new provisions into the Criminal Code it is now possible to convict
foreign offenders—especially members of Al Qaida. 50
The investigations initiated between 2001 and 2004 led to several severe sen-
tences and some criminal proceedings are still under way. The weaknesses of the
new provisions and the difficulty of their latent infringement of the rule of law,
which is highly protected in Germany, becomes especially apparent in the case of
Mounir al Motassadeq (a member of the Hamburg group of Al Qaida terrorists
who prepared and carried out the attacks of September 11), whose verdict was
overruled and remanded due to insufficient evidence. 51 Cases like that of
Motassadeq demonstrate that all States have to join in a closer cooperation (in this
case it was alleged that the United States had evidence it did not make available to
the German court) so that the efforts of the single nation State in building up pres-
sure against terrorist organizations through criminal convictions and adequate
court sentences will produce the intended effect.
Before repression of crimes committed, however, comes prevention of terrorist
attacks. Preventive measures on the federal level in Germany were taken, inter alia,
in the field of financing of terrorist groups. Identifying the financial sources fund-
ing terrorists and preventing financial transactions are critical aspects of combat-
ing terrorism. Also in this area, the complexity and diversity of transaction paths
call for coordinated cooperation of security agencies and the financial sector, on
both national and international levels. On the multinational level, the Financial
Action Task Force (FATF), 52 ofwhich 30 States besides Germany are members, has
adopted a total of eight special recommendations on combating the financing of
terrorism. In August 2002, Germany became the first State within Europe to fully
implement the guidelines of the FATF, as well as the corresponding provisions of
EU directives on money laundering, into its national law. 53 That legislation assigns
special importance to the role of the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) within the
Federal Office of Criminal Investigation. 54 The FIU functions as a central office for
investigative leads, for matching of international measures and for informing other
national or European authorities about methods of fighting money laundering or
other means ofsupport for Islamic organizations. Nonetheless, finding evidence of
planned financial support of terrorist attacks remains a very difficult task despite
new competencies enabling authorities to acquire information on account holders
and transactions from financial institutions. Still, principal features of transaction
methods were successfully identified and cut off. Given the complex and shrouded
paths of monetary transactions, further isolation of international terrorism's
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financial sources requires intensive international cooperation among States and
exchange of information between their respective counterterrorism authorities.
Border Controls
In addition to breaking up terrorist groups already existing within the European
Union, preventing the entry of terrorists into the territory ofEU Member States is
another point of focus, and shall be the main one under scrutiny here. In this con-
text, one needs to consider the fact that in a territory without internal customs and
immigration borders, such as the greater part of the European Union due to the
Schengen Regime, the State penetrated by a terrorist organization is not necessarily
the State that is the target of attack.
The European Council is responsible for the adoption of uniform measures for
control of the EU's external borders. 35 The Schengen Implementation Agreement
(SIA) defines the external borders of the European Union as all land, sea and air
borders ofMember States that are not internal borders. 56 However, Member States
are not precluded from concluding separate arrangements with third nations, as
long as those agreements are in accordance with Community Law. 57
Specific measures for the control of the EU's external borders are detailed in the
SIA. 58 A Member State confronted with the entry of a third country national must
comply with the SIA mandate that the security interests of all other Member States
have to be taken into account pursuant to Community Law. 59 Therefore, third
country nationals can be denied entry if they constitute a danger to the public or-
der, national security or international relations of any Member State. To this end,
the Member States have drawn up a common list of wanted persons, from which
the names of individuals to be denied entry are transferred to the SIS and thereby
made available to all Member States. In order to be put on this common list, per-
sons have to fulfill the criteria set out in the SIA (prison sentence of at least one
year, suspicion of having committed a serious crime, severe breach of entry and/or
exit regulations),60 and there has been compliance with national procedural rules.
All persons are subject to controls regarding their entry/exit, stay and work
documents. 61 In every case, their identity must be verified. 62 Third country na-
tionals are subject to a stricter control than EU citizens,63 they generally have to
submit to separate customs clearance procedures. In exceptional cases, i.e., for hu-
manitarian reasons, if national interests or international commitments are con-
cerned an individual Member State can grant entry to third country nationals
irrespective of fulfillment of the requirements just mentioned. However, the entry
in those cases is limited to the sovereign territory ofthe Member State concerned. 64
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External borders may only be crossed at border checkpoints and during their re-
spective designated passing hours.65
In order to comply with the foregoing provisions, the Member States concerned
must monitor the boundaries of the external border and deploy specially trained
border patrols to this end.66 The latter is quite a problem regarding the EU's new
Eastern border, since border fortification and patrol are largely inadequate.
What is more, all available technical resources must be applied in identifying
terrorists in order to achieve effective detection and defense against terrorism. In
particular, the identity ofvisa applicants and other persons entering the territory of
a Member State of the European Union must be effectively assessed, since reliable
identification is the basis for all further measures. As far as passport and visa con-
trols are concerned, responsibility is divided between the Council of the European
Union and the Member States. The Council is responsible for establishing general
rules governing short-term visas (up to three months). 67 Competence over long-
term visas remains with the individual Member State. The Council has specified68
those third countries whose nationals must be in possession of a visa in order to en-
ter the European Union, as well as those countries that are exempt from visa obli-
gations. In order to qualify for a visa waiver, third countries must fulfill certain
criteria regarding illegal immigration, public order and security, especially danger
of terrorist attacks. The EU's external relations do, of course, also play an impor-
tant role in assessing whether a visa waiver will be granted. In certain cases, Mem-
ber States can permit exemptions from visa obligations.69
The Council is also responsible for laying down procedural rules for the issuing
ofshort term visas, particularly with regard to subject matter, jurisdiction ofthe is-
suing authority, and material requirements. 70 Jurisdiction for visa issuance lies
with the diplomatic or consular representative of the Member State of destina-
tion. 71 Details can be found in the Common Consular Instruction (Gemeinsame
Konsularische Instruktion) of the Common Handbook of the Schengen States. 72
The Council also made provisions for the design of short-term visas.73 The Euro-
pean Commission proposes the details of visa design. The security criteria for
short-term visas include the appearance of an unforgeable visa and the informa-
tion to be entered on it. 74
In the area of seafaring, a Council of the European Union directive establishes
registration formalities for ships entering and leaving ports of the Member States75
(largely based upon an International Maritime Organization Agreement of
1965 76 ), and on the issuance of visas at the border, including those for sailors in
transit. 77 The latter prescribes reporting requirements of Member States' authori-
ties responsible for visas in the case of signing in and signing off of ships lying in
ports of the Schengen area. Additional qualifications for entry into the Schengen
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area must be fulfilled between the competent authority and the shipping company/
shipping agent in order to obtain a visa at the border. These procedures guarantee
the exchange of security-relevant information, in particular through the SIS, be-
tween the Member States. 78
In the area of identification, special attention is accorded to biometrics. The reg-
istration of biometrical data (fingerprints, face, hand and iris screening) and their
inclusion in passports or visas can allow for positive identification of notorious ter-
rorists and violent enemies ofWestern societies, and therefore pave the way for ap-
propriate countermeasures. Moreover, they constitute an effective means for
allocating documents to their owner. On the EU level, the European Commission
proposed introducing digitalized photographs into EU Member States' passports.
Germany envisages the use of biometrics in three important fields: border con-
trols for entry, in visas and other residence permits, and in passports and national
identification documents. The necessary amendments to the relevant laws (Pass-
und Personalausweisgesetz) have already been enacted. Together with the use of
biometrics, entry procedures can be extensively facilitated and accelerated by in-
troducing an automated, computer-assisted border control process. 79 A corre-
sponding pilot project began operation at Frankfurt airport at the beginning of
2004. However, the introduction ofbiometrical passports prescribed by the United
States for maintaining the visa waiver program vis-a-vis EU citizens, is taking longer
than expected. The initial deadline of October 26, 2004 was extended to October 26,
2005, and has now been extended for a second time. The current deadline is Octo-
ber 26, 2006. It is therefore undecided whether the former visa requirements for
entry into the United States are going to be reintroduced.
Considering this development, the essential need for harmonizing the EU's ex-
ternal border controls on a high standard becomes all too obvious. It cannot be in
the interest of the European Union to have terrorists circumvent the high-tech
border controls ofone Member State by entering a neighboring State not applying
the same technical standards for border controls. What is more, the coordination
among the States must include harmonizing the applied biometrical methods. Last
but not least, biometrics is a relatively new technology subject to uncertainties and
avoidable errors, which could be eliminated by joint efforts in exchanging infor-
mation and experience between the States involved in the interest of an optimized
outward protection. Germany, therefore, strives for greater cooperation in this
area within the European Union, and with its G8 partners.80
Within the context of this cooperation, the forwarding of personal data on pas-
sengers embarked on transatlantic flights is a matter of current importance and
needs to be mentioned here. As of February 5, 2003, and pursuant to the US Avia-
tion Transportation and Security Act of 2001, the US Bureau of Customs and
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Border Protection and the US Transportation Security Administration require air-
lines to provide access to so-called "PNR" (Passenger Name Record) data for inter-
national flights. Provision of this data by European Union airlines conflicts with
European Union laws and regulations, 81 both because no specific authority therein
allows for such transfer and because it has not been determined that the data will be
"adequately protected" by the receiving authority as defined by European Com-
munity law. 82 What is more, US authorities, by accessing the personal data of EU
citizens, encroach upon the sovereignty of EU Member States without being au-
thorized to do so under public international law.
In order to both create a legal basis for the justified security interests of the
United States and to ensure adequate data protection to which the EU citizens are
entitled, the European Commission has proposed that an agreement be entered
into between the European Community and the United States. 83 Such an agree-
ment would meet the legal requirements of the European Community pertaining
to data transfer and would justify the encroachment upon the Member States' sov-
ereignty. Furthermore, the Commission has determined that the proposed agree-
ment would guarantee adequate protection of personal data as mandated by the
applicable European Parliament Directive. 84 The Council signed this agreement at
the end ofMay 2004 over the protests of the European Parliament. The European
Parliament argues that the agreement violates the Treaty Establishing the Euro-
pean Community,85 since it purports to amend the relevant Directive86 which, as a
legal instrument adopted according to the procedure set forth in Article 251 of that
treaty, requires European Parliament approval for amendment. Accordingly, the
European Parliament has decided to bring the matter before the European Court of
Justice. A majority ofmembers ofthe European Parliament deems the right ofaccess
to PNR-data granted to US authorities to be too broad, since the agreement makes
no reference to the extent of data protection mandated by European Community
law,87 especially with regard to a potential transfer of the data to third countries.
Although the basic criticism of granting a right of transferring personal data to
the US authorities as being too far reaching maybe justified, one needs to take into
account the fact that the European Commission has obtained guarantees from the
US Bureau of Customs and Border Protection in the form of a self-commitment88
for appropriate use of the data and that the current state of affairs—transfer of per-
sonal data without any legal basis—is simply unacceptable.
Intrastate Countermeasures in Case ofa Terrorist Threat
As soon as terrorists have been identified, either on the basis of European and inter-
national cooperation or as a result of the extended national competencies, further
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procedures become the responsibility of the Member State concerned. Therefore,
the authority to deny German visa and residence permits in a simplified procedure
was enhanced by adapting the provisions of the 1990 Aliens Act (Aus-
landergesetz) 89 to accord with the Law against Terrorism (Terrorismusgbekamp-
fungsgesetze).90 Enemies of society and its democratic foundations who are ready
to use or appeal for violence in pursuing their goals are now explicitly prohibited
from obtaining a visa. In addition, the use of unforgeable features in national
identification documents and residence permits has been enhanced by legislation.
Since the provisions of the Asylum Procedure Act (Asylverfahrensgesetz) 91 have
been amended so as to include registering fingerprints, photographs, and, in the
future, biometrical data of asylum seekers, it is now possible to save voice record-
ings ofasylum seekers, thus providing information on their country of origin. Fur-
thermore, these data can now be stored for up to ten years after irrevocability of the
asylum decision and can be processed by the police and security authorities for
identification purposes in a simplified procedure. The main aim in this area is to
standardize and simplify the procedure, as well as to make it more automatic, while
maintaining an adequate level of data protection.
Pursuant to the new Immigration Act, which was finally agreed on in June 2004,
after the first version had been declared unconstitutional by the German Supreme
Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) on formal grounds, an admitted asylum seeker
who is a member of a terrorist organization or an organization supporting terror-
ists can be deported in a simplified procedure. The new Immigration Act92 entered
into force on January 1, 2005, and contains stricter rules on arrest and extradition
of foreign terrorists or extremists endangering Germany's internal security. If ex-
tradition is impossible due to the potential of torture or implementation of the
death penalty by the country of destination, notification requirements and con-
straints on the freedom of movement can be applied in order to maintain control
over the potential danger.
Apart from the measures already taken on the basis of the EU Action Plan, Ger-
many continues to campaign for further initiatives to enhance transnational co-
operation within the Council of the European Union, especially on improving
information flows, identification systems and searches for wanted terrorists (pro-
file search). In this context, it needs to be mentioned that the success in combating
cross-border terrorist networks depends on concerted and determined action of
the international community. The cooperation within international organizations
and fora, such as the United Nations, G8,93 NATO or OSCE (Organization for
Security and Co-operation in Europe) 94 is therefore of paramount importance.
The Council Recommendation on joining the G8 network of contact points with
24-hour service for combating high-tech crime 95 is just one example of this
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cooperation. In addition, bilateral agreements and informal cooperation in iden-
tifying, arresting, prosecuting and sentencing terrorists continue to be necessary
on the international level. A further aim of the German Law against Terrorism is
to protect the population as well as possible and to minimize the vulnerability of
key points of infrastructure. However, the competencies created need to be used
continuously and with determination. Particularly in the areas of air security and
infrastructure protection, measures taken to date have brought about an easing of
tension. Close cooperation between the Department of the Interior, other security
authorities and the operators of key infrastructure facilities, as well as airlines,
warrant both continuous updating on the threats faced and the development of
suitable strategies for countermeasures.
While terrorist act prevention is the main focus of the measures addressed in
this article, optimizing crisis management after a terrorist attack requires at least as
much attention. Civil protection plays a central role in this context. According to
an Action Plan of the German Department ofthe Interior, key infrastructure facili-
ties, i.e., all organizations and institutions ofvital importance for the population
—
especially energy and water facilities, the breakdown ofwhich can cause a long last-
ing shortage of supply, material disturbance of public security and other dramatic
consequences for the population and the State's structures—are the center of at-
tention in this context. In the event of extensive catastrophes, attacks or other crisis
situations, federal and regional (Lander) civil protection resources need to be com-
bined. For this purpose, the new federal Bureau for Civil Protection (Bundesamt
fur Bevolkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe) was created as a further pillar of
national security. The new bureau began its work in May of 2004. It can avail itself
of the Joint Information Center of the German Federal State and the Regions
(Gemeinsames Melde-und Lagezentrum des Bundes und der Lander, (GMLZ)),
which began operations in the autumn of 2002 and which can coordinate crisis
management (both information and countermeasures) in the scenarios men-
tioned above.96
For information and warning purposes, the GMLZ can utilize the German Emer-
gency Information System (Deutsches Notfallvorsorge-Informationssystem),
which provides the public with precautionary information about rescue, evacuation
and supply via the Internet and telephone hotlines. In the case of an extraordinary
emergency situation (e.g., an attack on a nuclear plant), a satellite based warning sys-
tem, in place since October 2001, can, within seconds, issue public warnings to be
broadcast on all public television and radio stations. The Department of the Inte-
rior is currently engaged in the development of other possible warning systems,
such as alerting phones or clocks, and coordinating protection measures. Together
with its European neighbors, Germany is developing defense concepts and
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participates in joint exercises that form part of the program on the improvement of
cooperation in preventing and fighting terrorist threats of a chemical, biological,
radiological or nuclear nature (e.g., EURATOX 2002, a simulation exercise involv-
ing radiological and chemical fallout resulting from a terrorist attack).
More attention is increasingly being paid to computer network attack, the rela-
tively new form of information technology terrorism. Since most of the vital facili-
ties of infrastructure—from traffic lights to nuclear plants—are computerized,
defense against attacks on these systems, the consequences of which can be cata-
strophic, must have utmost priority. In Germany, the Federal Bureau for Security
in Information Technology (Bundesamt fur Sicherheit in der Informationstech-
nik) examines the potential sensitivity of critical infrastructure and prepares those
systems for defense against terrorist interference by creating framework plans or by
directly cooperating with the systems' operators.
The last element of the Department of the Interior's Action Plan is fighting ter-
rorism at its roots. Defense against Islamic terrorism is most effective at its finan-
cial and ideological source. Isolating terrorists from their ideological and economic
support should be not the last, but the foremost goal ofboth national and interna-
tional measures in fighting terrorism.
Conclusion
The Coalition against Terror must cooperate closely in order to respond effectively
to the new "asymmetric" threats our nations face today. But it needs also to advo-
cate respect for and advancement of human rights in the countries that form the
cultural base for international terrorism and to build up political pressure against
oppressive regimes. By fostering democratic reforms and the development of the
rule of law, as well as by handing over power to the oppressed peoples themselves,
terrorist structures can more often than not be destroyed at the root, and true fa-
natics can be cut off from their sources. It is beyond doubt that international coop-
eration at its highest level in this area is of paramount importance. The European
Union and its Member States take their international responsibilities seriously and
are therefore involved in Operation Enduring Freedom in Africa and in the Gulf of
Oman, are part of the Coalition against Terror in Afghanistan, and demonstrate
great material and personnel commitment to the International Security Assistance
Force for a sustainable pacification of Afghanistan.
The fact that the European Union is not the "United States of Europe," there-
fore having to share competencies and jurisdiction not with federated but sover-
eign States, creates some difficulties and sometimes delay in achieving the
necessary measures. But there can be no doubt that the European Union and its
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Member States will live up to their international responsibilities in the future and
will remain a true and reliable partner of the Free World.
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The Proliferation Security Initiative:
Security vs. Freedom of Navigation?
Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg*
Introduction: Object and Purpose of the Proliferation Security Initiative
The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) was announced by President Bush
in Krakow, Poland, on May 31, 2003. ' It is generally conceived of as a US re-
action to the So San incident that occurred in December 2002 and that involved a
Cambodian-registered vessel en route to Yemen suspected of illicitly transporting
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) components that were ultimately destined
for Iraq. 2 As a matter of fact, the intercepting Spanish frigates, upon boarding and
searching, discovered SCUD missile parts on board the vessel. However, the So San
was released after it had become clear that the missiles, though coming from North
Korea, were destined for Yemen.
The announcement by President Bush triggered a series of meetings of the
(originally eleven and now fifteen3 ) States participating in the initiative. During the
Brisbane meeting they seemed to be prepared to follow a proactive course of action
with the aim to effectively impede and stop shipments ofWMD, delivery systems,
and related materials.4 However, a far more cautious approach was chosen during
the Paris meeting in September 2003. There the participating States agreed upon
the so-called "Interdiction Principles" which, in general terms, provide the politi-
cal basis for unilateral or concerted activities aimed at the prevention ofWMD
proliferation. 5 It needs to be emphasized here that PSI is neither a treaty nor some
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form of an international body, least of all an international organization. It is to be
seen as a concerted effort by the participating States to supplement, not to substi-
tute, existing treaties and regimes dealing with the problem of WMD prolifera-
tion.6
PSI's ultimate goal is to effectively "interdict the transfer or transport ofWMD,
their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors
of proliferation concern." The term "states and non-state actors of proliferation
concern" refers to
[T]hose countries or entities that the PSI participants involved establish should be
subject to interdiction activities because they are engaged in proliferation through: ( 1
)
efforts to develop or acquire chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons and associated
delivery systems; or (2) transfers (either selling, receiving, or facilitating) of WMD,
their delivery systems, or related materials. 7
As regards "states of proliferation concern" it is more or less evident that this
term refers to Iran and North Korea and to other States striving to acquire WMD
and their delivery systems. 8 At first glance, the term "non-state actors of prolifera-
tion concern" seems to cover transnational terrorists and their organizational
structures. However, in view of the fact that transnational terrorism is subject to a
special international regime the correct understanding is that it relates to all pri-
vate persons, like the notorious Pakistani Dr. Khan, 9 and entities involved in
clandestine proliferation activities, regardless of a terrorist background. There-
fore, PSI is not to be mistaken for an exclusively counter-terrorism activity. While
the Initiative may trigger concerted actions of the participating States if there are
reasonable grounds to suspect that, e.g., WMD transported on board a vessel are
ultimately destined to a terrorist group, its scope is certainly not limited to such
scenarios.
The means by which the participating States intend to reach the Initiative's goal
comprise: exchange of information; if necessary, modification of the respective do-
mestic law and of international law; and "specific action."
Of course, exchange of information is subject to the protection "of the confi-
dential character of classified information." Still, the principal readiness of the par-
ticipating States to rapidly exchange information should not be underestimated
because the information concerned is usually classified and not too easily shared
with other States even ifthey are close allies. Equally important, and far from being
a matter of course, is the willingness of the participating States to modify their do-
mestic law in order to enable them to fulfill their commitments under the Initia-
tive. If the modification of domestic rules does not suffice because rules and
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principles ofinternational law prove either insufficient or an obstacle for the Initia-
tive's objectives, the participating States have to be prepared to take the necessary
steps on the international level. First efforts in that respect have been initiated by
the United States and may eventually result in an amendment ofthe 1988 Conven-
tion for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation 10 at the end of 2005. n
The Initiative's core commitments, however, are laid down in Interdiction Prin-
ciple 4 on "specific action," i.e., the participating States will:
Not transport or assist in the transport ofWMD;
Board their own vessels in their respective internal waters and territorial sea areas as
well as on the high seas, if there is reasonable ground for suspicion that they are
engaged in proliferation activities;
Consider to provide consent to boarding of their vessels by the authorities of other
participating States;
Take measures against foreign vessels in the sea areas covered by their territorial
sovereignty and in their respective contiguous zone; and
Take measures against foreign aircraft in their respective national airspace.
At first glance, none of these commitments seems to imply insurmountable legal
problems—the more so because the participating States have stressed that their in-
terdiction activities will be "consistent with . . . relevant international law and
frameworks, including the UN Security Council." Indeed, international lawyers
seem to widely agree that in view of its rather limited scope PSI finds a sufficient
basis in the existing law. 12 This is certainly correct insofar as interdiction measures
are taken against vessels and aircraft belonging to one of the participating States.
Vessels flying a State's flag and aircraft bearing a State's markings are subject to
that State's sovereignty. 13 Accordingly, they may be visited and searched by that
State's organs in sea areas and in airspace not covered by the territorial sovereignty
of another State. The said position is also correct if the flag or home State has con-
sented to interdiction measures by another State 14 or if the foreign vessel or air-
craft is traveling in the internal waters or national airspace of a participating
State. 15 However, some doubts remain with regard to interdiction measures taken
against foreign vessels within the territorial sea because the rules of the law of the
sea on enforcement measures by the coastal State are less clear than they seem to
be. These questions will be addressed in the second part of this article. Moreover,
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the question arises whether States participating in PSI are excluded from interdict-
ing foreign vessels and aircraft in high seas areas and in international airspace. It is
true that, according to the wording of the Interdiction Principles agreed upon in
Paris, there is no indication that they are prepared to interdict the transport of
WMD and related material in those areas if on board a vessel or aircraft not be-
longing to one of them. Still, this does not necessarily mean that the participating
States have for once and for all excluded that possibility. Therefore, the third part
of this paper will deal with the legality of interdiction measures on the high seas
and in international airspace. However, before dealing with these legal problems it
is important to first establish the relationship of PSI and the international anti-
proliferation regime. As will be shown in the first part, the Initiative is far from be-
ing a fundamentally novel approach by States sharing a common concern with re-
gard to the threat posed by the proliferation ofWMD and their delivery systems.
Some of the voices raising (legal) concerns with regard to PSI seem to ignore the
fact that a comparatively small group of States has a long history of close coopera-
tion with the aim of preventing the proliferation ofWMD and their delivery sys-
tems. PSI is but a small tessera in the mosaic that is the international anti-
proliferation regime.
The International Anti-Proliferation Regime
It is a fact all too often ignored that there already exists a rather sophisticated inter-
national regime aimed at the prevention of the proliferation ofWMD. This regime
covers not only nuclear weapons and nuclear material but also chemical and bio-
logical weapons, including their components, as well as delivery systems and the
related technology. It consists of"hard law obligations" and ofa number ofsupple-
menting agreements of a merely political character. Most of those formal and in-
formal agreements pertain to specific weapons and materials. It should be
mentioned, however, that there are three further instruments that are based on a
comprehensive approach but that will not be dealt with here because they only in-
directly contribute to counter-proliferation ofWMD: the International Ship and
Port Facility Code (ISPS Code), 16 the Container Security Initiative (CSI), 17 and the
"Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism" (C-TPAT) Program. 18
Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Material
According to the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT), 19 nuclear-weapon States are prohibited from making available, either di-
rectly or indirectly, to non-nuclear-weapon States "nuclear weapons or other nu-
clear explosive devices" (Article I). Non-nuclear-weapon States, in turn, are under
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an obligation not to "manufacture or to otherwise acquire such weapons or de-
vices" (Article II). According to Article III, paragraph 1, a non-nuclear-weapon
State is obliged to "accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated
and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in accor-
dance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the
Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfill-
ment of its obligations assumed under" the NPT. The IAEA has safeguards agree-
ments in force with more than 145 States around the world. Most of these are
comprehensive safeguards agreements concluded pursuant to the NPT. Other
types of agreements are known as item or facility safeguards agreements and vol-
untary offer agreements. Also in place is a Model Additional Protocol to safeguards
agreements that grants the IAEA complementary verification authority. 20
The NPT-IAEA system is supplemented by the Zangger Committee and by the
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), both informal groups of States that aim at
strengthening the counter-proliferation efforts. The Zangger Committee21 was
formed in 1971 and consists of 35 States. Its main task is to harmonize the interpre-
tation of nuclear export control policies by specifying the meaning of Article III,
paragraph 2, ofthe NPT. Accordingly, the so-called "trigger list"22 relates to source
or special fissionable materials and to equipment or materials especially designed
or prepared for the processing, use, or production of special fissionable materials.
By interpreting and implementing Article III, paragraph 2, the "trigger list" helps
to prevent the diversion of exported nuclear items from peaceful purposes to nu-
clear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Such material may only be ex-
ported by one of the participating States if three conditions are met: ( 1 ) non-
explosive use assurance, (2) observance of the IAEA safeguards requirement, and
(3) commitment to re-transfer. The Nuclear Suppliers Group23 comprises 40 nu-
clear supplier countries. It seeks to contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear
weapons through the implementation of guidelines for nuclear exports. In view of
NSG's informal character the guidelines are not legally binding; they are, however,
implemented by the participating governments that take the necessary decision at
the national level according to their respective domestic law.
Finally, there are two draft conventions that, if ever accepted by a representative
number of States, will certainly contribute to strengthening the international re-
gime against the proliferation of nuclear weapons and of nuclear material: the
Draft Convention for Suppression of Nuclear Terrorism (CNT) 24 and the Draft
Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT). 25
The Draft CNT would exclusively address acts by individuals. Therefore, its
scope would not include the issue of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons or
nuclear threats posed by States or intergovernmental organizations. States parties
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would be obliged to cooperate in preventing or prosecuting acts of nuclear terror-
ism by, inter alia, adopting necessary legislative and technical measures to protect
nuclear material, installations and devices, and to forestall unauthorized access to
them by third parties. It would supplement the 1980 Convention on the Physical
Protection of Nuclear Material. 26
Fissile material, e.g., enriched uranium, is a key component in the development
of nuclear warheads. After the General Assembly of the United Nations had passed
a resolution on the prohibition of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other ex-
plosive devices27 an ad hoc committee was established by the Conference on Disar-
mament in 1998, with a view to negotiating a treaty banning the production of
fissile material for nuclear weapons. While it is unclear whether the work on the
FMCT will produce results, the FMCT would cap the amount of fissile materials in
nuclear weapons States and non-parties to the NPT. However, it would not apply
to plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium for non-explosive purposes and to
non-fissile material (e.g., Tritium). It would not address existing stockpiles.
Chemical and Biological Weapons
Chemical weapons and biological weapons are governed by the
1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War ofAsphyxiating,
Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (GP
1925),28
1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their
Destruction (BTWC),29 and
1993 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (1993
CWC). 30
The Australia Group (AG) 31 is an informal arrangement of 39 States and the Euro-
pean Commission which aims to allow exporting or transshipping countries to
minimize the risk of assisting chemical and biological weapon (CBW) prolifera-
tion. Its task is to ensure, through licensing measures on the export of certain
chemicals, biological agents, and dual-use chemical and biological manufacturing
facilities and equipment, that exports of these items from their countries do not




With regard to WMD delivery systems, there is no treaty or other legally binding
instrument either prohibiting or restricting the transfer ofsuch delivery systems or
of related technologies. However, there are three informal arrangements aiming at
the prevention of their proliferation.
The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) 32 is an informal non-treaty
association of 34 States that have agreed on the prevention of the proliferation of
missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and of related technologies. Similar to
the Zangger Committee and the NSG, the MTCR is functioning on the basis of
guidelines that are amended by an Equipment and Technology Annex. In addition,
the Hague Code ofConduct against the Proliferation of Ballistic Missiles (HCOC)
was adopted in November 2002. 33 The object and purpose of the HCOC is to curb
the proliferation of WMD-capable ballistic missiles and to exercise maximum re-
straint in developing, testing, and deploying such missiles. 34
Security Strategies ofNATO, the United States and the European Union
At the end of this overview of the international regime it needs to be emphasized
that proliferation ofWMD and their delivery systems has been identified as a ma-
jor security threat in NATO's new Strategic Concept ofApril 1999, 35 in the US Na-
tional Security Strategy ofSeptember 2002,36 and in the European Security Strategy
of December 12, 2003. 37 The US National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass
Destruction ofDecember 2003 provides that: "U.S. military and appropriate civil-
ian agencies must possess the full range of operational capabilities to counter the
threat and use ofWMD by states and terrorists against the United States, our mili-
tary forces, and friends and allies." The EU member States, according to the Euro-
pean Security Strategy, have recognized that "[a]ctive policies are needed to
counter the new dynamic threats. We need to develop a strategic culture that fos-
ters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention."
Moreover, the European Union has adopted the EU Strategy Against Prolifera-
tion ofWeapons ofMass Destruction which provides for a strengthened identifica-
tion, control and interception of illegal trafficking in WMD. Hence, the European
Union is prepared to adopt "common policies related to criminal sanctions for ille-
gal export, brokering and smuggling ofWMD-related material"; to consider "mea-
sures aimed at controlling the transit and transshipment of sensitive materials";
and to support "international initiatives aimed at the identification, control and
interception of illegal shipments."38
The EU approach towards the proliferation issue may be less proactive than the
US approach. Still, both EU strategies clearly indicate that the European Union will
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not restrict itself to diplomatic means but that it is prepared to also make use of
armed force whenever this may prove necessary.
PSI as a further Cornerstone of the International Counter-Proliferation
Regime
It has been shown that PSI is a common effort of a group of States that fits well into
the already existing counter-proliferation regime. 39 Subject to the final determina-
tion of its legality under international law, PSI is without doubt to be considered an
additional step towards an effective prevention of the proliferation ofWMD and
their delivery systems. Its informal character enhances the participating States'
ability to flexibly react to proliferation activities by States and individuals of con-























Figure 1: PSI as Part of the International Counter-Proliferation Regime
Interdicting the Transport ofWMD in the Territorial Sea
The success of PSI is, of course, dependent on the firm political will of the partici-
pating States. However, some of them, e.g., Russia and Germany, have continu-
ously stressed that their active participation in the Initiative presupposes the
legality of the measures taken under international law. As long as interdiction mea-
sures are taken in the respective territories, national airspaces, and internal waters
they are in conformity with international law.40 The same holds true if ships and
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aircraft are intercepted in international sea areas and in international airspace ei-
ther by, or with the consent of, their respective flag or home State.41
However, when it comes to intercepting foreign vessels within the territorial sea,
the question arises whether the law of the sea provides a sufficient legal basis. It
needs to be emphasized that interference with foreign shipping, even if it occurs in
the territorial sea of the intercepting State, will always have to be measured against
the freedom of navigation, especially against the well-established right of innocent
passage. Since all States participating in PSI are heavily dependent upon free sea
lanes and unimpeded maritime commerce, they will certainly not too easily in-
fringe upon those freedoms and rights. The precedent they set may be copied by
other States and could contribute to a new form of"creeping jurisdiction" that may
ultimately prove counterproductive. It is, therefore, vital for PSI that interdiction
measures are in compliance with the regime of the territorial sea as set forth in the
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea42 (1982 LOS Convention)
and in the corresponding customary law.43
Without prejudice to the inherent right ofself-defense, the right ofcoastal States
to interfere with foreign vessels in their territorial sea is regulated in Articles 25 and
27 of the 1982 LOS Convention.44 According to the latter provision, the coastal
State may exercise its criminal jurisdiction on board a foreign ship, i.e., it may ar-
rest persons, conduct investigations, and temporarily detain the vessel, if crimes
have been committed on board during passage that impact upon the coastal State.
In view of the fact that coastal States are entitled to prevent infringement of, inter
alia, their customs, fiscal, immigration and sanitary laws and regulations (Article
21, paragraph 1), enforcement measures taken against vessels suspect of transport-
ing WMD, WMD components or delivery systems, do not seem to pose any prob-
lems. If the States participating in PSI enact legislation prohibiting the transport of
such material they would be in a position to enforce these regulations against sus-
pect vessels. It may, however, not be left out of consideration that the mere breach
of the domestic (criminal) law of the coastal State will justify the exercise of its
criminal jurisdiction only in cases where the crime has been committed on board a
ship passing through the territorial sea after leaving the coastal State's internal wa-
ters (Article 27, paragraph 2). If the vessel concerned has not left a port of the
coastal State the exercise of criminal jurisdiction, according to Article 27, para-
graph 1, is limited to one of the following cases:
(a) if the consequences of the crime extend to the coastal State;
(b) if the crime is of a kind to disturb the peace of the country or the good
order of the territorial sea;
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(c) if the assistance of the local authorities has been requested by the master
ofthe ship or by a diplomatic agent or consular officer ofthe flag State; or
(d) if such measures are necessary for the suppression of illicit traffic in
narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances.
In the context of PSI, the coastal State will therefore be obliged to prove that the
prohibited transport ofWMD and related material meets the conditions of either
subparagraph (a) or (b). An analogy to subparagraph (d) is not justified in view of
the restricted scope of that exception. In view of the fact that the coastal State's en-
forcement jurisdiction in the territorial sea is in principle complete,45 and in view
of the dangerous character of such cargoes, the coastal State will in most cases be in
a position to provide sufficient evidence that the said conditions are met. Still, it
should not be left out ofconsideration that there is no general and complete prohi-
bition of the transport of such material. Therefore, the coastal State that wishes to
interdict the transport ofWMD through its territorial sea should give prior notifi-
cation of its domestic legal rules prohibiting such transports.46
If the crime has been committed before entry into the territorial sea and if the
ship, proceeding from a foreign port, is only passing through the territorial sea
without entering internal waters, the coastal State may not take any steps on board
the ship.47 However, this rule will in most cases not be an obstacle for interdiction
measures because the transport ofWMD or of delivery systems constitutes a per-
manent crime, i.e., the perpetration continues during passage.
Finally, the question remains whether the coastal State would be entitled to take
enforcement measures against foreign vessels by referring to a "non-innocent"
passage if there is no domestic law or regulation prohibiting the transport of the
items in question. According to Article 25, paragraph 1, of the 1982 LOS Conven-
tion, the coastal State "may take the necessary steps in its territorial sea to prevent
passage which is not innocent." Article 19 of the Convention provides that passage
is not innocent if it is "prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal
State" (paragraph 1) or if the vessel is engaged in one of the activities listed in Arti-
cle 19, paragraph 2. Transporting missiles orWMD is not mentioned in paragraph
2 which, e.g., the United States considers "an exhaustive list of activities that would
render passage not innocent."48 Accordingly, some authors have serious doubts as
to whether interdiction measures may be based upon the assumption of the non-
innocent character of the transport ofWMD. 49 However, this position is not very
convincing. According to UN Security Council Resolution 154050 "proliferation of
nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, con-
stitutes a threat to international peace and security." Daniel Joyner argues,
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therefore, that it "should be relatively unproblematic ... for coastal states to justify
overcoming seagoing vessels' right of innocent passage through their territorial
waters when there is a reasonable basis for suspicion that they are involved in pro-
liferation." 51 Although the coastal State's reaction, according to Article 25, para-
graph 1, will be limited to "preventing" such innocent passage, this does not mean
that the suspect vessel may only be ordered to immediately leave the territorial sea.
Such a restriction merely applies in cases of warships not complying with the
coastal State's laws and regulations because warships, even ifwithin a foreign terri-
torial sea, enjoy sovereign immunity. 52 With regard to merchant vessels that do not
enjoy sovereign immunity, the coastal State will therefore be entitled to take all
necessary steps, including the arrest of the vessel and seizure of its cargo. 53
Interference with Foreign Vessels and Aircraft in High Seas Areas
As seen, the interdiction measures agreed upon in the Paris Interdiction
Principles54 are consistent with existing international law. 55 The participating
States do not yet envisage interdiction activities in high seas areas or in interna-
tional airspace unless their own vessels and aircraft are concerned or unless the flag
or home State has consented in a boarding or interception by another participating
State. As a matter of fact, such consent was the legal basis for the interception the
BBC China in September 2003. 56 Consent, including presumed consent, will also
be the decisive legal argument for the interception, boarding, search, diversion,
and arrest of Liberian- and Panamanian-flagged vessels according to bilateral
agreements concluded by the United States with the two States. 57 The same holds
true for an amendment of the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention) 58 that is ex-
pected to be agreed upon in the end of 2005.
It needs to be emphasized here that no considerable legal problems are involved
if there are reasonable grounds for suspicion that a vessel encountered on the high
seas (or a civil aircraft in international airspace) is engaged in the transport of
WMD and their delivery systems and that the cargo is destined to transnational ter-
rorists. There is today widespread agreement that in case of a terrorist background
interception, boarding, search, or arrest of vessels and aircraft finds its legal basis
either in the (inherent) right of self-defense or in the international law of counter-
measures (in combination with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373
(2001) 59 ).
However, it remains to be seen whether the PSI States would be entitled to also
interdict the transport ofWMD on the high seas or in international airspace if
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there is neither a terrorist background nor a (presumed) consent by the flag or
home State.
Law of the Sea
Merchant vessels on the high seas are subject to the sovereignty of their respective
flag State.
60 The same holds true with regard to civil aircraft in international air-
space. 61 Therefore, third States are not entitled to interfere with such vessels and
aircraft unless such interference is justified by the consent of the flag or home State
or by a special agreement.62 There is, as yet, no express treaty prohibition of the
transport ofWMD and their delivery systems.63 Moreover, such activities may not
be equated with piracy.64 Therefore, the only provision of the 1982 LOS Conven-
tion serving as a basis for interdicting such transports in high seas areas is Article
1 10, paragraph 1 (d) and (e). Hence, as was the case in the So San incident,65 the
vessel must be without nationality or, though flying a foreign flag or refusing to
show its flag, it must, in reality, be of the same nationality as the intercepting war-
ship. It remains to be seen whether the proposed amendments of the SUA
Convention66 will also result in a modification of the LOS Convention or contrib-
ute to the emergence of a new rule of customary international law. At present,
however, the international law of the sea does not provide a legal basis beyond the
scope of Article 1 10 of the 1982 LOS Convention.
Self-Defense
As in cases with a terrorist background, the right of self-defense will serve as a legal
basis if the conditions triggering that right are met. Hence, if the transport of
WMD is sufficiently linked to a given threat ofan armed attack its interdiction will
be justified, because there will be a "necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelm-
ing, leaving no choice ofmeans, and no moment of deliberation."67 This will be the
case if a merchant vessel is sailing in the immediate vicinity of the outer limit of a
State's territorial sea and if there are reasonable grounds for suspicion that there is
a nuclear weapon on board. Under the right of self-defense the coastal State will
certainly be entitled to take all necessary measures, including the capture ofthe ves-
sel, in order to effectively counter the threat. 68 The same holds true if the suspect
vessel is destined to a third State whose government has shown an aggressive atti-
tude and has given sufficient evidence that it would make use (or would consent in
the use) ofWMD as soon as it disposes of such weapons. Accordingly, the Cuban
Quarantine could have been justified as a necessary measure of preemptive/
interceptive69—not preventive—self-defense. 70 It may well be that in some near or
distant future the customary right ofself-defense will also apply to less immediately
threatening circumstances. The US National Security Strategy may then be
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characterized as the first precedent contributing to a progressive development of
international law. For the time being, however, coercive measures of a purely pre-
ventive character are not in compliance with the right of self-defense. The mere
shipment ofWMD and their delivery systems will in most cases not meet the three-
fold test of immediacy, necessity and proportionality. 71 Hence, except for extraor-
dinary circumstances, an extension of PSI to interdictions of foreign vessels and
aircraft in the high sea and in international airspace cannot be based upon the right
of self-defense. 72 It needs to be emphasized that any extensive interpretation, claim
or application of the right of self-defense to situations traditionally not covered by
that right may serve as a welcome precedent for other States. Even if they display a
certain conduct that the PSI States are unwilling to tolerate, the latter will be in a
most unpleasant and difficult situation because they will certainly be reminded of
their prior conduct. Moreover, all States, including the PSI States, should be aware
of the tremendous achievements of the past three years. Prior to September 11,
200 1 most international lawyers and governments would have agreed that the right
of self-defense does not apply to attacks by a group of private persons. Today no-
body would doubt that this is the case. A further extension of the right of self-de-
fense to situations not meeting the test ofimminence would not only be premature
but, ultimately, counterproductive.
Counter-Measures Short of Serf-Defense
However, the above findings do not rule out the possibility of a further legal basis
justifying the interdiction ofWMD transports on the high seas and in international
airspace that is all too often left out of consideration: counter-measures short of
self-defense.
Admittedly, in its Resolution 1540 the UN Security Council has not authorized
the boarding or capture ofvessels and aircraft suspected oftransportingWMD and
their delivery systems. 73 Had the Security Council provided such an authoriza-
tion—either in general terms or with regard to vessels and aircraft of a given na-
tionality—the resolution would be a perfect legal basis. 74 However, the continuous
plea for an express authorization by the Security Council whenever security issues
are at stake is unrealistic. It is based upon an erroneous perception of the UN sys-
tem of collective security. Of course, a functioning institutionalization of the use of
force, including measures short of self-defense, may be an ideal worth working for.
However, at present the system is far from perfect. It would amount to wishful
thinking to believe that, e.g., the People's Republic of China will ever vote in favor
of a Security Council resolution aimed at the proliferation activities by North Ko-
rea and authorizing the interdiction of North Korean ships and aircraft suspected
ofbeing engaged in such transports. Moreover, the present system of international
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law is far from excluding unilateral or multilateral action outside the UN system of
collective security.
Be that as it may, with Resolution 1540 there now exists a legally binding docu-
ment that unambiguously specifies the obligations of all States with regard to the
prevention of the proliferation ofWMD by non-State actors. Contrary to the views
expressed by some politicians75 and international lawyers76 the Security Council is
not limited in making use of its powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter in sit-
uations in which a specific State threatens the peace. In other words, the Security
Council may, in view of its primary responsibility for peace and international secu-
rity, act as a quasi-legislator if the only means to counter a threat to the peace is a
general and abstract resolution. The international community has not protested
against either Resolution 1373 or Resolution 1540, thus acquiescing in the perfor-
mance of such powers.
It may be recalled that, in Resolution 1540, the Security Council, acting under
Chapter VII, has identified a series of obligations with regard to the prevention of
WMD proliferation by non-State actors77 :
1
.
[A] 11 States shall refrain from providing any form ofsupport to non-State
actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport,
transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means
of delivery;
2. ... all States, in accordance with their national procedures, shall adopt
and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-State
actor to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or
use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery,
in particular for terrorist purposes, as well as attempts to engage in any of
the foregoing activities, participate in them as an accomplice, assist or
finance them;
3. ... all States shall take and enforce effective measures to establish
domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or
biological weapons and their means of delivery, including by establishing
appropriate controls over related materials and to this end shall:
(a) Develop and maintain appropriate effective measures to account for
and secure such items in production, use, storage or transport;




(c) Develop and maintain appropriate effective border controls and law
enforcement efforts to detect, deter, prevent and combat, including
through international cooperation when necessary, the illicit
trafficking and brokering in such items in accordance with their
national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with
international law;
(d) Establish, develop, review and maintain appropriate effective
national export and trans-shipment controls over such items,
including appropriate laws and regulations to control export, transit,
trans-shipment and re-export and controls on providing funds and
services related to such export and trans-shipment such as financing,
and transporting that would contribute to proliferation, as well as
establishing end-user controls; and establishing and enforcing
appropriate criminal or civil penalties for violations of such export
control laws and regulations ....
Accordingly, every State that either allows or otherwise—actively or passively—as-
sists in the transport ofWMD and their delivery systems by non-State actors will
violate its international obligations under Resolution 1540. A justification based
on an assertion that the State in question does not possess the necessary means to
comply with its duties is immaterial because Resolution 1540, in paragraph 7,
specifically:
Recognizes that some States may require assistance in implementing the provisions of
this resolution within their territories and invites States in a position to do so to offer
assistance as appropriate in response to specific requests to the States lacking the legal
and regulatory infrastructure, implementation experience and/or resources for
fulfilling the above provisions.
Therefore, a State that knowingly allows the transport ofWMD and of their deliv-
ery systems or that does not intervene by preventing such transports on board ves-
sels flying its flag or on board aircraft bearing its markings commits an
internationally wrongful act. According to the well-established principles of the
law of State responsibility,78 as codified in the 2002 rules prepared by the Interna-
tional Law Commission (ILC),79 the State injured by a violation of international
law is entitled to take the necessary countermeasures in order to either induce the
wrongdoer to comply with its obligations or to reestablish the legal status quo ante
instead ofthe delinquent State. 80 Since all forms ofWMD proliferation activities by
non-State actors are to be considered a threat to peace and international security
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and since the vast majority of States, including the People's Republic of China,
agrees that such activities pose a considerable danger, the category of "injured
State" is not limited to potential target States. Consequently, countermeasures and
reprisals involving visit, search and capture may be taken against vessels and air-
craft for the mere reason that they are flying the delinquent State's flag or that they
are bearing that State's markings (genuine link). However, in view of the impor-
tance of the freedom of navigation and overflight such measures must be necessary
and strictly proportionate. That will only be the case if there are reasonable
grounds for suspicion that the vessels or aircraft concerned are indeed engaged in
illicit activities ofWMD transportation, i.e., that they are acting without the legal
authority of any State. 81
Conclusions
There are some who are skeptical about the Proliferation Security Initiative, which
they consider a too proactive and, thus, dangerous undertaking. 82 However, they
also agree that proliferation ofWMD and their delivery systems constitutes a con-
crete threat to international security. Still, they are not prepared to admit that the
Initiative has been built on a sound legal basis. PSI, as it now stands, is in perfect
conformity with both the international law of the sea and, though in exceptional
cases only, the right of self-defense. Its legal basis has further been strengthened by
UNSC Resolution 1540, thus enabling the participating States to extend their inter-
diction activities to the high seas and to international airspace. A fortiori, they may
interdict transports ofWMD and their delivery systems in areas covered by their
respective territorial sovereignty, i.e. in their national airspace and in their territo-
rial sea areas. Such interdictions—wherever conducted—presuppose that there
are reasonable grounds for suspicion that the vessel or aircraft is engaged in prolif-
eration activities not legally authorized by any State. The freedom ofnavigation is a
principle far too important and vital for the national economies and for national
and multilateral security interests to be interfered with easily.
Of course, the silver bullet is a treaty based approach. As seen, the United States
has succeeded in concluding bilateral agreements with the two most important flag
of convenience States—Liberia and Panama. 83 It is to be expected that further bi-
lateral agreements will follow, thus enabling the US Coast Guard to effectively in-
terdict the transport ofWMD and ofWMD-related cargoes by non-State actors. If
the IMO member States succeed in amending the 1988 SUA Convention there will
be a multilateral treaty serving as a further legal basis. However, the States of the
highest proliferation concern, e.g., North Korea and Iran, will hardly be prepared
to conclude or accede to such treaties. For an indefinite period of time,
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interdictions involving those States and their shipping and aviation will have to be
based upon the rules and principles identified in this article. In view of their highly
delicate character they should, however, be conducted in a most cautious and re-
stricted manner.
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V
Limits on the Use of Force in Maritime
Operations in Support ofWMD
Counter-Proliferation Initiatives
Craig H. Allen*
We could have other missile crises in thefuture—different kinds, no doubt, and under
different circumstances. But ifwe are to he successful then, ifwe are going to preserve our
own national security, we will need friends, we will need supporters, we will need coun-
tries that believe and respect us and will follow our leadership.
Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir ofthe Cuban Missile Crisis 1
Introduction
On May 31, 2003, President Bush invited a number oflike-minded States to
join in a Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) to counter the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and prevent them from falling into the
hands of rogue regimes and terrorist organizations. 2 In the following year, the
United States, together with eight NATO allies3 and Australia, lapan, and Singa-
pore, participated in a series of PSI planning sessions, experts' meetings, exercises
and operations to develop and refine the initiative. On September 4, 2003, the PSI
participating States adopted a Statement of Interdiction Principles (reproduced in
* Judson Falknor Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law, Seattle,
Washington. After the paper was submitted, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a
new instruction which superseded CJCS Inst. 3 12 1.01A on which this article was based.
Limits on the Use ofForce
Appendix I), in which they agreed to "take specific actions in support of interdic-
tion efforts regarding cargoes ofWMD, their delivery systems, or related materi-
als."
4 The "specific actions" are to include vessel boardings at sea and in port. All
such boardings are to be conducted in compliance with applicable international
and national laws. 5 Soon after the PSI was released, three open registry nations,
Panama, Liberia and the Marshall Islands, which collectively represent more than
half of the world's shipping capacity by tonnage, entered into bilateral agreements
with the United States that will allow the United States to conduct PSI boardings of
vessels flagged in those States while in international waters.6 Cyprus, Croatia and
Belize soon entered into similar agreements. By the time of the first anniversary
meeting of the PSI States in Krakow, Poland on May 31 2004, sixty-two States had
signaled their support for the PSI and the Russian Federation had joined the origi-
nal group of core participants. 7 The 9/11 Commission embraced the PSI and rec-
ommended that it be extended. 8 In addition, the United Nations Security Council
legitimated the core principles of the PSI by unanimously passing Resolution 1540
(reproduced in Appendix II), calling on all States to criminalize possession of
WMD by, or the transfer or transport ofWMD to, non-State actors. 9 The resolu-
tion stopped short ofconferring on non-flag-States any new interdiction authority
over vessels engaged in transportingWMD and delivery systems on the high seas. 10
A proposal to add WMD interdiction authority to the 1988 Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA) 11
is presently under consideration. 12
As the PSI matures, maritime boardings under the Statement of Interdiction
Principles may present a number of practical and legal issues. The first, an impor-
tant but non-legal issue, is the safety of the boarding teams, who will be exposed
not only to the risks associated with boarding potentially noncompliant vessels at
sea (rather than in the comparative safety of a port), but might now also face the
risk of exposure to radiological, biological or chemical materials and explosive de-
vices. The second issue, which is related to the first, concerns the adequacy of
boarding platforms, equipment and trained personnel to conduct the necessary
detection, surveillance, screening, boarding, searching and seizure of vessels, car-
goes and crews, while also carrying out the multitudinous other missions already
imposed on the armed forces. 13 The third issue that could be presented in some
cases concerns the scope of a State's authority to board and search foreign vessels in
its ports and coastal waters, or to permit other States to conduct boardings in their
coastal waters, and the authority of States other than the flag State to intercept, in-
terrogate, board and seize vessels on the high seas, with or without consent of the
flag State or master of the vessel or the authority of a UN Security Council resolu-
tion. The fourth area requiring examination will arise in cases where illicit WMD
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or missile delivery materials are discovered during a boarding, and concerns the
handling and disposition of those materials and the possible actions to be taken
against the vessel and the owner and crew found to be involved in transporting
WMD. The final issue—and the subject of this paper—concerns the legal limits on
the use of force in carrying outWMD interception operations. Analysis ofsome of
these questions has taken on added urgency in light of the fact that some US critics
ofthe 1982 UN Convention on the Law ofthe Sea 14 have urged the US Senate not to
consent to accession to the treaty, in part because in the critics' opinion the terms
of the treaty would undermine the PSI. 15
Depending on the vessel's location, flag and type, the threat level presented, and
the goals of the mission, maritime detection, interception and enforcement opera-
tions in support of the PSI may involve a variety of Department of Defense (DoD)
and/or Department ofHomeland Security (DHS) platforms and personnel. At-sea
measures to intercept vessels suspected of transporting WMD by DoD or DHS
could potentially be carried out under one or more of the following frameworks:
(1) boardings conducted pursuant to consent by the vessel's flag State, the coastal
State or vessel master; (2) maritime interception operations (MIO) to enforce em-
bargoes imposed under the operative terms of a resolution by the UN Security
Council or similar authority; 16 (3) "expanded" maritime interception operations
(E-MIO); 17 (4) maritime law enforcement operations (MLE); 18 (5) the peacetime
right of approach and visit; 19 (6) the customary law of countermeasures (self-
help);20 (7) the right of individual or collective self-defense; or (8) the belligerent's
right of visit and search for contraband under the law of neutrality.
Vessel interceptions and boardings by naval vessels are generally carried out by
visit, board, search and seizure (VBSS) teams drawn from the US Maritime
Forces. 21 Boarding teams from US Navy platforms may include Navy, Marine
Corps and Coast Guard personnel. Coast Guard interception and boarding teams
may also operate from Coast Guard boats or cutters or from allied naval vessels. In
most cases, Coast Guard law enforcement detachments (LEDETs) on naval vessels
serve under the operational or tactical control of the cognizant Coast Guard com-
mand authority when conducting boardings. 22 In cases not calling for law enforce-
ment measures, however, the LEDET may operate under DoD control, under the
Coast Guard's statutory authority to provide assistance to other agencies.23
Experience has shown that interceptions and boardings by Navy and Coast
Guard units occasionally require the use of force to overcome noncompliance or
in self-defense. A number of standing and situation-specific documents promul-
gated by competent authorities establish doctrine and provide guidance applica-
ble in situations involving the use of force during interception and boarding
operations by DoD and Coast Guard units. 24 At the same time, international law
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and US municipal law impose limits on the use of force. Which laws and doctrines
apply will depend on the particular situation, though some principles apply in vir-
tually all situations. This article examines the legal limits on the use of force in
maritime interception and law enforcement operations. It first provides the reader
with an introduction to the nature of maritime interception and boarding opera-
tions, before turning to an examination of the international and US authorities re-
garding the use of force at sea. It then applies those authorities to situations that
might arise in the course ofWMD maritime interception operations.
Nature ofMaritime Interception and Boarding Operations
WMD maritime interception operations by the United States can be traced back at
least as far as the 1962 quarantine proclaimed by President Kennedy and enforced
by the US Navy to halt the shipment of Soviet offensive missiles to Cuba. 25 Navy
doctrine notes that the term "quarantine" was later dropped from the planning ter-
minology in favor of maritime interception operations. 26 Contemporary maritime
interception operations by the Navy are characterized by: ( 1 ) the source of their le-
gal authority (usually a UN Security Council resolution); (2) the principle of pro-
portionality between means and ends; (3) the principle of impartiality;27 and (4) a
commitment to effectiveness. 28 Only the National Command Authorities
("NCA") (the President or Secretary of Defense) can authorize US forces to con-
duct MIO. 29 Once the NCA approves US participation, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff designates the combatant commander for the relevant geographic
area to carry out the MIO. 30 The authorization will address the level of force that
may be used to carry out the MIO, the cargo or ships within the MIO prohibition,
the geographic limits of the operation and the disposition of any cargo or ships
found to be in violation of the governing resolution. Planning such operations is
inevitably influenced by political constraints and resource limits.
Typically, the interception of a vessel suspected of transportingWMD or deliv-
ery systems will be based on an intelligence finding which is later developed
through surveillance and reconnaissance, before moving to the "stop-and-search"
phase of MIO. 31 For example, a vessel observed loading suspicious cargo in a port
might later be tracked by satellite, aircraft, radar, surface ship, submarine, or sea-
bed sensors. When the vessel is encountered by an intercepting vessel or aircraft, it
will be visually inspected for evidence of identity and flag. Visual surveillance
might be followed by a radio inquiry, to determine or confirm its name, registry,
homeport, last port, next port, cargo and passengers. 32 The information obtained
can then be checked against available information and intelligence databases. The
vessel's registry might also be confirmed with the flag State (if cooperative), and its
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claimed next port of call might be contacted to determine whether the vessel has
filed an advance notice of arrival and a copy of its cargo manifest. If suspicions re-
main, the vessel may be ordered to heave to and stand by for a boarding.
A VBSS team33 consisting ofNavy and perhaps Marine Corps and Coast Guard
LEDET personnel may be sent over by small boat or helicopter. If the MIO on
scene commander concludes the boarding will be opposed or non-compliant,34
the VBSS team may be augmented by special operations forces. 35 SEAL and Marine
Corps Maritime Special Purpose Force (MSPF) members assigned to helicopter
assault force teams are trained to fast-rope from helicopters to the deck of the
ship (vertical take-downs), engage and neutralize any hostile forces aboard, and
gain control of the vessel. 36 Throughout the boarding, supporting helicopters
hover overhead, with snipers stationed to provide cover to the boarding team.
Alternatively, special operations personnel may "breach" the suspect vessel by
small boat. 37
When the suspect ship is under control, a chemical, biological and radiological
(CBR) team and/or explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team might be placed
aboard to sweep the vessel before the VBSS boarding begins. Once the VBSS team is
aboard, all personnel on the boarded vessel are accounted for by the VBSS security
team, and the sweep team conducts an initial safety inspection (ISI) to confirm the
boarding can be conducted safely. 38 The VBSS team members then examine the
vessel's registry and cargo documents. Under some circumstances, the boarding
may extend to a search of all man-sized spaces, and an inspection of the cargo. In
rare cases, the vessel may be diverted to a port or other sheltered location for a
more detailed examination. 39 Diversion may be necessary to search a vessel trans-
porting containerized cargo since at-sea container inspections are at best diffi-
cult.40 If the boarding team has grounds for inspecting such cargo, the better alter-
native is often to divert the vessel to a port. Diversion may also be ordered ifcontra-
band is discovered. If evidence of a crime is discovered in the course of a visit,
boarding or search personnel with law enforcement authority (the Coast Guard
LEDET or foreign law enforcement agents) may be called on to arrest the offenders
and seize the vessel and cargo.
Authorityfor and Limits on the Use ofForce in
Maritime Interceptions and Boardings
Any given approach and boarding operation on a vessel to intercept WMD or de-
livery systems could combine elements of the maritime interception and maritime
law enforcement doctrines. Depending on the response by the master and crew of
the suspect vessel, such operations can also raise questions regarding the source of
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the applicable rules on any use of force by the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast
Guard members of the team. 41 The authority to conduct an interception and
boarding42 must be distinguished from the authority for using force in such opera-
tions. The authority to use force in an interception, boarding, search and seizure
may derive from (1) a State's right under customary international law and the
State's municipal law to use force as necessary to carry out law enforcement ac-
tions; (2) a UN Security Council resolution providing such authority;43 (3) the
State's inherent right of self-defense recognized in Article 51 of the UN Charter;44
or (4) the unit's or individual's right of self-defense. Depending on the circum-
stances, the exercise of force may be governed by international law, the laws of the
boarding State (the constitution, statutes and regulations) and any doctrine and
guidance promulgated by the service or services carrying out the operation. The
common denominator running through all those authorities is the mandate that
any action taken must be necessary to achieve a legitimate end and is reasonable
under the circumstances. As Chief Justice John Marshall opined in a Hovering Act
case two centuries ago, other States will oppose measures that are unreasonable,
but if a State's enforcement measures are "reasonable and necessary to secure their
laws from violation, they will be submitted to."45
US Doctrines on Use ofArmed and Police Force
In addition to limits on the use of force under international law and the Constitu-
tion and statutes of the United States (discussed below), members of the DoD and
DHS must comply with applicable directives regarding the use of force issued by
their command authorities.46 At the outset, a distinction must be made between
rules of engagement (ROE) and rules and policies on the use of force.47 As more
fully explained below, ROE are generally established by appropriate national and
subordinate command authorities to guide the armed forces in the use of force in
carrying out the national and homeland defense missions. The rules on the use of
force (RUF) for DoD elements and the Coast Guard Use of Force Policy (CGUFP)
are established by competent authorities to provide guidance on the use of force in
carrying out law enforcement and other civil support missions in support ofhome-
land security that do not call for the traditional use ofarmed force. It is also impor-
tant to recognize that not every use of force by a member of the armed forces
constitutes an application of "armed force" under the UN Charter and the law of
armed conflict. 48 The focus of this article is on "police" force directed against pri-
vate vessels or individuals who may be involved in transporting WMD, not
"armed" force against the territorial integrity or political independence ofa State.49
The article takes the position that it is the mission, not the uniform worn by the
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actor, that determines how the force should be classified and which doctrine con-
trols that use of force.
Rules ofEngagement (ROE)
Rules of engagement are "directives that a government may establish to delineate
the circumstances and limitations under which its own naval, ground and air
forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with enemy forces." 50 Ade-
quate ROE appropriate to the situation are vital to mission success and protection
of United States and allied assets. Even so, readiness, training and implementation
deficiencies can prove devastating, as was learned in the 1983 terrorist bombing of
the Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, 51 and re-learned following the al Qaeda
attack on USS Cole in 2000. 52 Members of the armed forces are well aware that any
failure to obey controlling ROE is punishable as an orders violation under the Uni-
form Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). 53 Additionally, a service member who vio-
lates the applicable ROE may lose affirmative defenses to assault or homicide
charges under the UCMJ. 54 However, the fact that official conduct may have vio-
lated an internal agency directive does not mean the conduct was unreasonable un-
der the Fourth Amendment or a violation of international law. 55
Although much of the ROE doctrine and guidance is classified, a few general
comments can be made. The ROE applicable to a given situation is typically drawn
from national and subordinate command authorities, and may include rules pro-
mulgated by joint or combined command authorities. The three commonly cited
bases for ROE are national policy objectives, operational requirements and the rel-
evant law. The ROE include the Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE), which in-
cludes both self-defense and mission accomplishment rules, and any supplemental
rules of engagement for specific operations, missions or projects. 56 The SROE ap-
ply to military operations outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States,
even during peacetime. 57 The ROE also govern actions to be taken by US forces
during military homeland defense (HD) operations in the territorial jurisdiction of
the United States. 58 ROE do not apply to members of the armed forces when con-
ducting military assistance to civil authorities missions, including missions in sup-
port of civil law enforcement agencies (discussed below). 59 Under some
circumstances the SROE are also applicable to Coast Guard units.60
Naval units participating in multinational operations might find themselves op-
erating under limitations imposed by the UN Security Council, 61 the NATO Rules
of Engagement62 or some other form of combined ROE.63 Like other ROE, the
rules for naval units participating in multinational operations will include mission
accomplishment and self-defense ROE. 64 The need for common ROE doctrine in
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such operations has long been recognized;65 however, the challenges of developing
ROE for multinational forces can be daunting.66
ROE must conform to the relevant international and national law.67 "Interna-
tional law" includes applicable international human rights laws in peacetime and
international humanitarian law during an armed conflict. In should be noted that
for strategic, operational and policy reasons the applicable ROE may well be, and
frequently are, more restrictive than international or national law would require.
In most cases, compliance with the ROE should constitute compliance with the ap-
plicable law. An exception to that rule ofthumb might arise in operations governed
by ROE prepared at a multinational level. Such combined ROE must of course
comply with all relevant international law; however, the national laws of any given
participant might be more restrictive. Potentially, a service member's action might
be found to have been in compliance with the combined ROE, but not with the
member's more restrictive national laws. Such disparities are best avoided through
careful ROE drafting and implementation training.68
The SROE make it clear that they do not limit a commander's inherent author-
ity and obligation69 to use all necessary means available and to take appropriate ac-
tion in self-defense of the commander's unit and other US forces in the vicinity. 70
Self-defense is limited by the principles of necessity and proportionality. 71 The cur-
rent ROE provisions on self-defense direct that:
When the use of force in self-defense is necessary, the nature, duration, and scope of
the engagement should not exceed that which is required to decisively counter the
hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent and to ensure the continued protection ofUS
forces or other protected personnel or property.72
Program-specific doctrine may supplement or amplify the rules set out in the
SROE. 73 For example, to address the need for naval security personnel to deter-
mine whether approaching vessels possess a hostile intent in the post-Cole envi-
ronment, the Secretary of Defense and Chief of Naval Operations have
promulgated directives authorizing the use ofwarning shots against such threats. 74
DoD Rules for the Use ofForce (RUF)
In addition to its principal national security mission, the Department of Defense
has long provided support to civilian law enforcement agencies and to civil author-
ities.
75 However, in part because the Posse Comitatus Act of 1879 (PCA) prohibits,
with some exceptions, the direct use of the armed forces (other than the Coast
Guard) to enforce US laws,76 the use of force by members of the armed forces
within the territory of the United States is restricted.
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Under the Joint Doctrine for Homeland Security (under development at the
time this was written), DoD identifies two homeland security (HS) mission areas:
homeland defense (HD), with air, land and maritime components, and civil sup-
port (CS). 77 CS includes military assistance to civil authorities (MACA), which is
further broken down into military assistance for civil disturbances (MACDIS),
military support to civil authorities (MSCA) and military support to civil law en-
forcement agencies (MSCLEA).
The SROE recognize that not all situations involving the use of force are armed
conflicts under international law. 78 DoD has now promulgated Rules for the Use of
Force (RUF) that address selected DoD mission areas not calling for the traditional
use of armed force. RUF refer to directives issued to guide US forces on the use of
force during CS operations in the territorial jurisdiction of the United States in
support of the HS mission area. The use offeree by US military forces deployed on
CS missions within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States is not governed
by ROE. DoD forces deployed on CS missions are instead bound to adhere to the
RUF. 79 RUF directives applicable in MACA operations may take the form of mis-
sion execute orders, deployment orders, memoranda of agreement, or plans. 80
Those RUF may be established by the deployment order or memorandum of
agreement, or by the Chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction on the "Rules
on the Use of Force by DoD Personnel Providing Support to Law Enforcement
Agencies Conducting Counterdrug Operations in the United States." 81 RUF are re-
strictive, detailed and sensitive to political concerns, in recognition of the fact that
the CS mission area is characterized by restraints on weapons, tactics and levels of
force. RUF are subject to change during operations. As a result, DoD policy directs
military commanders to consult with their judge advocates to draft written RUF
guidance and design and implement an appropriate RUF training program, to en-
sure military forces under their command understand the RUF procedures.82
USCG Use ofForce Policy (CGUFP)
Congress has long recognized that effective maritime enforcement of laws and
treaties requires that the Coast Guard be authorized to use force when necessary to
carry out its enforcement of laws and treaties mission. Two federal statutes ex-
pressly address the use of force by the Coast Guard. The first, 14 U.S.C. § 637,
which was amended in 2004, addresses the use offeree to stop a vessel "liable to sei-
zure or examination" by the Coast Guard. 83 The second, 14 U.S.C. § 89, establishes
the general law enforcement authority of Coast Guard boarding officers and au-
thorizes such officers to "use all necessary force to compel compliance." In exercis-
ing the authority conferred by either statute, Coast Guard personnel and, in some
85
Limits on the Use ofForce
situations, supporting DoD platforms and personnel, must comply with the Coast
Guard's Use of Force Policy (CGUFP).
The CGUFP is set out in the agency's Maritime Law Enforcement Manual,
which is designated "for official use only."84 The CGUFP must be adhered to by all
of the following while conducting Coast Guard missions, exercising the right of in-
dividual self-defense, and in situations where the SROE do not apply: (1) all Coast
Guard personnel (military, civilian and contract security), (2) all Coast Guard ves-
sels and Coast Guard aircraft specifically authorized by the Commandant of the
Coast Guard to use force, (3) all non-Coast Guard personnel onboard a Coast
Guard unit, (4) all non-Coast Guard units or personnel operating under Coast
Guard tactical control (TACON) or operational control (OPCON). 85 Coast Guard
personnel follow the CGUFP even when the Coast Guard is not the lead federal
agency.86 Coast Guard personnel do not, under any circumstances, apply foreign
use of force policies. 87 US Navy units operating under Coast Guard OPCON or
TACON conducting law enforcement support operations follow the CGUFP for
employing warning shots and disabling fire. Under those circumstances, the provi-
sions of 14 U.S.C. § 637 (discussed below) extend to the naval unit.88 Navy units
follow the SROE and/or mission specific ROE or RUF for all other purposes. 89
The CGUFP includes provisions for the use of force against noncompliant ves-
sels and against individuals. The provisions applicable to the use of force against
individuals take the form of a "use of force continuum" that distinguishes between
non-deadly force and deadly force. Deadly force is defined as any force that is likely
to cause death or serious physical injury.90 Only that force reasonably necessary
under the circumstances may be used. Force shall not be used where assigned du-
ties can be discharged without the use of force. However, there is no duty to retreat
to avoid law enforcement situations justifying the use of force, including deadly
force. Like the SROE, the CGUFP emphasizes that covered personnel always have
the inherent right to use all available means necessary to defend themselves or an-
other from physical harm. 91
The CGUFP provisions applicable to the use of force against noncompliant
vessels92 address both the conditions for, and modalities of, using force to stop a
vessel in a law enforcement situation. The provisions do not apply to vessel-on-
vessel use of force in self-defense.93 In applying the CGUFP it is important to recog-
nize that US practice differs in some respects from the practices of other nations.
Some States categorically reject the use of force to stop noncompliant vessels for
minor offenses or for offenses not involving public safety, such as fisheries viola-
tions. Other States apply the twin principles of necessity and proportionality in de-
termining whether the use of force is appropriate to overcome a vessel's non-
compliance. It is also important to recognize that in the United States any use of
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force, other than in self-defense, generally requires case-specific approval by the
operational or tactical commander, who might well decline to approve the use of
force even in situations where it would be permitted under the CGUFP.
Under the CGUFP and 14 U.S.C. § 637, warning shots are considered a "signal"
to a vessel to stop, not a use of force. 94 Warning shots are only used after other sig-
naling methods have been tried without success. Warning shots are not used
against aircraft or under circumstances where their use might endanger any person
or property. Generally, warning shots are not used unless the enforcement units
have the capability to deliver disabling fire if the warning shots are ignored. Dis-
abling fire is the firing ofordnance at a vessel with the intent to disable it, with min-
imum injury to personnel or damage to the vessel. Under the CGUFP, disabling
fire is to be discontinued when the vessel stops, is disabled, enters the territorial sea
of another State, or the situation changes in a manner that introduces substantial
risk to those aboard the noncompliant vessel.95
14 U.S.C. § 637 (reproduced, with 2004 amendments, in Appendix III) ex-
pressly authorizes disabling fire under limited circumstances and provides for an
indemnity of vessel commanding officers called on to use disabling fire. 96 Dis-
abling fire may be used against vessels subject to "examination" or "seizure." Dur-
ing the so-called "Rum War" ofthe Prohibition era, the Coast Guard used warning
shots and disabling fire on numerous occasions to interdict vessels attempting to
smuggle alcohol into the United States. 97 The need for forcible interdiction mea-
sures arose again in the late 1970s, as Coast Guard and Navy units ranging in size
from 82-foot patrol boats to 530-foot cruisers responded to a surge in maritime
drug smuggling operations.98 Air and surface assets trained and equipped for as-
signment to the Coast Guard's Operation New Frontier99 employ relatively novel
means of stopping noncompliant vessels. The operation, which employs cutter-
deployable, specially equipped high-speed over-the-horizon (OTH) boats and
Coast Guard Helicopter Interdiction Tactical Squadron (HITRON) MH-68A
("Sting Ray") helicopters, establishes a coordinated method to chase down and, if
necessary, forcibly disable "go-fast" vessels engaged in unlawful activity.
US Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the Use of Force
Enforcement actions within the United States, including its territorial sea, or
those involving US vessels beyond the territorial sea, or involving US nationals on
foreign vessels beyond the territorial sea, are constrained by the US Constitu-
tion. 100 When the Constitution applies, it is clear that Congress cannot by statute
(e.g., 14 U.S.C. § 637 or 14 U.S.C. § 89) authorize what the Constitution forbids. 101
Nevertheless, the US Supreme Court has recognized that application of the consti-
tutional standards to maritime searches and seizures authorized by Congress
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might vary from applications to similar actions carried out under the differing con-
ditions prevailing on land. 102 The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution pro-
vides that the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated and that no
warrant authorizing such a search or seizure shall be issued in the absence of prob-
able cause. 103 The Fifth Amendment further provides that the government may not
deprive any person of their life, liberty or property without due process of law. 104
Both amendments potentially play a role in maritime interdiction and enforce-
ment actions. 105 Constitutional violations may lead to suppression of evidence,
dismissal of charges and even suits for damages against the officers responsible for
the violations. To ensure compliance with the constitutional limits, the Supreme
Court has repeatedly emphasized the duty of law enforcement agencies to provide
their officers with use of force training. 106
The Fourth Amendment seizure provision may be triggered by the seizure of a
person, a vessel or property or papers on the vessel. Plainly, the Fourth Amend-
ment applies to the actual arrest of a person by a law enforcement officer. An arrest
must be based on probable cause and it must be conducted in a reasonable manner.
"Excessive" force is by definition unreasonable. Allegations of excessive force dur-
ing a detention or arrest typically arise in suits for damages against an enforcement
officer, 107 or the officer's employing agency. On occasion, a defendant charged
with assaulting a law enforcement officer will assert in defense an argument that
excessive force by the enforcement officer justified self-defense measures in re-
sponse. 108 Where a defendant was subjected to "torture, brutality, and similar out-
rageous conduct" rising to the level that violates due process the court might even
dismiss the charges against the defendant. 109
Actions by law enforcement officers that fall short ofan actual arrest may never-
theless rise to the level ofa "seizure" implicating the Fourth Amendment. 1 10 For ex-
ample, the Supreme Court has held that an "investigatory stop," although not an
arrest, is a seizure subject to the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness require-
ment. However, such stops may be justified by a "reasonable suspicion" falling
short of the probable cause that would be needed for an arrest. 111 An officer con-
ducting a so-called "Terry stop" may forcibly detain the individual if necessary. 112
The Supreme Court has made it clear, however, that any use of force by the govern-
ment to effect a seizure must be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 113 As a
result, the reasonableness test is the standard by which a claim of excessive force in
any seizure (including mere investigatory stops) will be measured. 114 In defining
the contours of the reasonableness test the Supreme Court recognized: "police offi-
cers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are
tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary
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in a particular situation." 115 Accordingly, the Court held, the reasonableness ofthe
officer's beliefas to the appropriate level of force should be judged by that on-scene
perspective. 116 The Court has articulated a three-part balancing test that turns on
the severity ofthe crime at issue, whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to
others and whether the suspect was actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade
arrest by flight. 117 If an officer reasonably, but mistakenly, believes that a suspect is
likely to fight back, the officer is justified in using more force than might in fact be
needed. 118
The Supreme Court has held that the reasonableness requirement for searches
under the Fourth Amendment does not apply to actions by US law enforcement
personnel acting outside US territory, when the action is taken against a non-
national of the United States. 119 Moreover, the reasonableness of foreign searches
involving US nationals or vessels is judged by reference to the law of the place
where it was conducted. 120 Some writers argue that the Fourth Amendment might
still apply extraterritorially to a case alleging excessive force in the seizure of a non-
national. 121 Extraterritorial conduct by law enforcement officers amounting to
"deliberate and unnecessary lawlessness" has on one occasion led the court to dis-
miss the charges against the defendant. 122 Alternatively (or additionally), such con-
duct may be analyzed under the applicable international human rights laws
discussed below and the principles of State responsibility.
International Law Limits on the Use of Force
Earlier, this article highlighted the distinction between the two common usages of
the term "force." It was suggested that when the UN Charter speaks of "force" in
Articles 2(4) and 41, 123 it is referring to military force (aggressive and defensive; in-
dividual and collective) by one State or its proxies against another State. The term
is also used, in a very different context, to refer to the means used by authorized
government vessels and their agents to compel individuals to comply with enforce-
ment actions. 124 Such "police force" is not directed against a State and does not
constitute "armed force," nor does it violate the LOS Convention provisions re-
serving the seas for "peaceful purposes" 125 and requiring States to refrain from the
use of force in any manner inconsistent with the UN Charter. 126 Nonetheless, it is
possible that some acts conducted in the course ofa law enforcement action against
a vessel might be construed as an act of aggression; 127 perhaps even a casus belli in
former times. 128 It is also important to bear in mind that international law imposes
stricter limits on the use of force against aircraft than against vessels. Use of force
against civil aircraft while in flight would likely violate the Montreal Convention
protocol and federal law. 129
89
Limits on the Use ofForce
The exercise of law enforcement authority outside the territorial limits of the
State is limited under international law. 130 Under international law, the use of force
in actions not amounting to armed conflict may be authorized or limited by
treaty, 131 such as a bilateral boarding agreement 132 or the 2005 Protocol to the SUA
Convention, 133 customary international law and general principles of law. For the
most part, international law is directly implicated only in incidents involving con-
duct directed against the nationals, vessels or aircraft of another State. 134 Interna-
tional human rights law, including the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), 135 may apply even to conduct by a State directed at one of
its own nationals. 136 Article 7 of the ICCPR, in language closely paralleling the
Eighth Amendment of the US Constitution, prohibits torture and cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment. Article 9, echoing the Fifth Amendment,
provides that no one shall be subjected to "arbitrary" arrest or detention, nor may
the State deprive them of their liberty except on such grounds and in accordance
with such procedures as are established by law.
When an interception and boarding is carried out under authority of a multilat-
eral or bilateral agreement, the agreement itself may authorize or limit any use of
force. Such is the case with the PSI boarding agreements entered into by the United
States. 137 Similarly, the draft SUA Protocol includes an express provision on the use
of force during any action authorized within its framework. 138 Any use of force
other than in self-defense is therefore restricted to measures authorized by the
treaty, as modified by any later case-specific verbal agreements. 139 The interplay of
conventional and customary law on the use of force in maritime law enforcement
operations is demonstrated by three leading cases. The first case, concerning the
Vm Alone, arose under a bilateral boarding treaty, but also briefly examines the use
of force under customary law.
The Vm Alone (1929)
The starting point for examining the international law limits on the use of force
against a foreign vessel by maritime law enforcement authorities is the arbitration
commission decision in the dispute arising out of the sinking of the auxiliary-pow-
ered schooner Vm Alone on March 22, 1929. 140 The dispute arose after the Coast
Guard cutter USCGC Wolcott intercepted the British flag (Canadian registered)
vessel Vm Alone on March 20, 1929, anchored between 8 and 15 miles off the coast
of Louisiana (the distance offshore was disputed by the parties). A 1924 treaty be-
tween the United States and Great Britain authorized the United States to board
British flag vessels suspected of liquor smuggling while in close proximity to the US
coast. 141 Both governments agreed that the Vm Alone was "unquestionably" a no-
torious smuggling vessel, which transported liquor from Belize and the Bahamas
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for delivery to contact boats offthe US coast, while staying just outside the US terri-
torial sea. 142 The contact boats then ran the liquor ashore, in violation of the Na-
tional Prohibition Act. When the cutter Wolcott approached, the master of Ym
Alone, asserting the US Coast Guard had no jurisdiction over his vessel, weighed
anchor and began to flee southwest toward Mexico. The Wolcott fired across the
vessel's bow and into the rigging, but the Ym Alone continued to flee. Over the next
two days, the Wolcott followed the vessel in hot pursuit, eventually enlisting the as-
sistance oftwo other Coast Guard cutters, the Dexter and the Hamilton. On March
22, 1929, after the chase had taken the vessels more than 200 miles from the US
coast, the cutter Dexter closed in on the Ym Alone and once again ordered the vessel
to heave to for boarding. After the master refused, the Dexter fired across the ves-
sel's bow then into the sails and rigging. The Dexter then ceased fire and once again
ordered the vessel to stop or it would be sunk. According to the Coast Guard, the
master of the Ym Alone then brandished a pistol and told the Dexter that he would
forcibly resist any attempt to board his vessel. The Dexter then resumed fire, this
time into the hull of the Ym Alone, sinking the vessel about thirty minutes later.
The master and crew ofthe Ym Alone jumped into the water as the vessel sank. The
Coast Guard recovered all but one of the crewmen. That crewman, a French na-
tional, drowned before he could be recovered.
The arbitration panel appointed by the United States and Canada concluded
that, assuming the United States had jurisdiction over the Ym Alone under the 1 924
treaty; the Coast Guard was justified in using "necessary and reasonable force for
the purpose of effecting the objects of boarding, searching, seizing and bringing
into port the suspected vessel; and ifsinking should occur incidentally, as a result of
the exercise ofnecessary and reasonable force for such purpose, the pursuing vessel
might be entirely blameless." 143 The commissioners went on to conclude that the
cutter's act of intentionally sinking the Ym Alone was not justified under either the
1 924 treaty or any other principle of international law. 144 Three observations are in
order. First, the commission resolved the case under what they understood to be
the prevailing international law standard. Second, the "reasonable and necessary
force" standard articulated by the commissioners applied to all phases of the inter-
ception, from boarding through seizure. 145 Finally, the commission did not at-
tempt to flesh out its "reasonable and necessary" standard, other than to draw
distinction between a sinking that was incidental and one that was intentional, nor
did it explain whether the nature of the suspected offense (suspicion of liquor
smuggling) was a factor to be considered in weighing the necessity or proportion-
ality ofthe force used. It was sufficient for the commissioners to determine that the
Coast Guard's decision to intentionally sink the Ym Alone under the circumstances
exceeded that standard.
91
Limits on the Use ofForce
The Red Crusader (1961)
Another commonly cited use of force case arose out of a 1961 enforcement action
against the British fishing vessel Red Crusader by the Danish frigate Me/5
Ebbesen. 146 On May 21, 1961, the trawler Red Crusader and several other fishing
vessels were sighted near the Danish Faeroe Islands. The parties disputed the Red
Crusader s exact position and whether it was engaged in fishing. Upon sighting the
Red Crusader, the Niels Ebbesen signaled it to stop by signal searchlight and siren.
When those signals went unheeded, the Dane fired a blank 40 mm warning shot
across the Red Crusaders bow. The Red Crusader then stopped, and the Niels
Ebbesen sent over a boarding party. The master of Red Crusader was notified that
his vessel was under arrest and that he was to follow Niels Ebbesen into port. A two-
man custody crew was placed aboard Red Crusader. After initially complying with
the Danish frigate's instructions, the master of the Red Crusader changed his mind,
locked up the custody crew and attempted to flee with its embarrassed hostages.
When the Red Crusader s attempted flight became apparent to the commanding
officer of the Niels Ebbesen, the frigate fired two 127 mm warning shots (one astern
and one to starboard), accompanied almost immediately by a sound signal (Morse
Code "K") to stop. Two minutes later, it fired warning shots ahead ofand to port of
the Red Crusader, again closely followed by a whistle signal to stop. Fifteen minutes
later, while Red Crusader continued to flee, the Niels Ebbesen fired solid (non-ex-
plosive) shots at the vessel's scanner, mast, masthead light, hull and stem, while in-
terspersing further warnings by loudhailer to stop. The vessel was damaged, but
not sunk, and no one was injured. Britain protested the Danish action. The Com-
mission ofEnquiry later appointed by the two governments to investigate the mat-
ter determined that:
In opening fire at 03.22 hours up to 03.53 hours, the Commanding Officer of the Niels
Ebbesen exceeded legitimate use of armed force on two counts: (a) firing without
warning of solid gun-shot; (b) creating danger to human life on board the Red
Crusader without proved necessity, by the effective firing at the Red Crusader after
03.40.
The escape of the Red Crusader in flagrant violation of the order received and obeyed,
the seclusion on board the trawler ofan officer and rating ofNiels Ebbesen, and Skipper
Wood's refusal to stop may explain some resentment on the part of Captain Selling.
Those circumstances, however, cannot justify such violent action.
The Commission is of the opinion that other means should have been attempted ,
which, if duly persisted in, might have finally persuaded Skipper Wood to stop and
revert to the normal procedure which he himself had previously followed. 147
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The commission did not specify what "other," non-deadly means would have been
appropriate in this fisheries enforcement action. Nor did it categorically rule out
the use of force that might create a danger to human life in cases of "proved neces-
sity."
148
Interestingly, the commission was also called upon to examine the propriety of
the conduct of the British naval vessel HMS Troubridge, which intervened in the
confrontation. The Danish government initially protested that Troubridge had in-
terfered with legitimate law enforcement measures by Denmark when Troubridge
interposed herself between the other two vessels. Although Denmark withdrew
parts of the question from the commission, the commission nevertheless offered
its opinion that Troubridge "made every effort to avoid any recourse to violence be-
tween Me/5 Ebbesen and Red Crusader." 149 The commission went on to opine that
"[s]uch an attitude and conduct were impeccable." 150 The two governments later
agreed to mutually waive all claims and charges arising out of the incident. 151
The M/V Saiga (1997)
The most recent decision to examine the international law limits on the use of
force in a maritime law enforcement boarding was issued in 1999 by the Interna-
tional Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) in the "M/V Saiga" (No. 2) Case. 152
The suit—the first case brought before the new ITLOS—was initiated by the flag
State, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines ("St. Vincent"), against the coastal State,
the Republic of Guinea. The dispute arose out the forcible arrest by Guinea of the
St. Vincent flag vessel Saiga. Saiga was a coastal tanker that refueled fishing vessels
at sea. On the day before the incident Saiga had delivered gas oil to three fishing
vessels in waters 22 miles offshore from Guinea. Saiga then moved to a position
just outside the Guinean exclusive economic zone to await the arrival of several
more vessels. At about 0800 on October 28, 1997, Saiga was, in the words of the
Tribunal, "attacked" by Guinean patrol boat P35 for an alleged violation of cus-
toms laws. Armed officers from P35 then boarded the Saiga, seized the vessel and
arrested the master and crew, firing their weapons at various times in the process.
Saiga was taken to Conakry where the master was detained and the crewmembers'
travel documents were confiscated. Two crewmen who were injured by gunfire
during the boarding were later allowed to travel to Dakar for medical treatment.
The Tribunal's first ruling in the matter concerned St. Vincent's application for
prompt release of the Saiga and its crew upon the posting of reasonable security. 153
The second decision concerned the merits and addressed a number of issues, in-
cluding the use of force by the Guinean enforcement vessel. St. Vincent argued that
Guinea's use of force in stopping and boarding the vessel was excessive and unrea-
sonable. 154 St. Vincent pointed out that the Saiga was an unarmed tanker that was
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almost fully laden with gas oil. The vessel was riding low in the water (and therefore
easily boarded) and was capable of a speed of no more than ten knots. The crew of-
fered no resistance. St. Vincent also called the Tribunal's attention to the fact that
P35 fired live ammunition, using solid shots from large-caliber automatic weap-
ons. In response, Guinea asserted that the P35 crew's actions were neither unrea-
sonable nor unnecessary because the Saiga refused all visual, auditory and radio
signals to stop. In its ruling, the Tribunal explained that:
Although the Convention does not contain express provisions on the use of force in the
arrest of ships, international law, which is applicable by virtue of article 293 of the
[LOS] Convention, requires that the use offorce must be avoided as far as possible and,
where force is unavoidable, it must not go beyond what is reasonable and necessary in
the circumstances. Considerations ofhumanity must apply in the law of the sea, just as
they do in other areas of international law. 155
The Tribunal concluded that the Guinean patrol vessel fired live ammunition at
the Saiga without first issuing any of the signals and warnings required by interna-
tional law and practice. Once aboard the Saiga, Guinean enforcement personnel
fired their weapons indiscriminately, despite the fact that the crew of the Saiga of-
fered no resistance and did not threaten the boarding team. In the process, two of
the Saiga crewmembers were seriously injured and vital equipment in the vessel's
radio room and engine room was damaged. The tribunal ordered the government
of Guinea to make reparations to the vessel's flag State. It relied in part on the I'm
Alone and Red Crusader cases as the basis for its ruling and held that Guinea's use of
force before and after the boarding was excessive and endangered human life. 156
In ruling against Guinea, the Tribunal also cited the enforcement provisions in
the 1995 Straddling Fish Stocks Agreement, 157 which was not in effect at the time of
the decision, and in any event would not have been controlling in this dispute. Ar-
ticle 21 of the Straddling Fish Stocks Agreement provides a mechanism for States
other than the flag State to exercise fisheries enforcement authority over foreign
vessels on the high seas. Article 22 calls on parties conducting enforcement mea-
sures under Article 21 to ensure that their duly authorized fisheries inspectors
"avoid the use of force except when and to the degree necessary to ensure the safety
of the inspectors and where the inspectors are obstructed in the execution of their
duties." 158 The Tribunal concluded that Article 22 "reaffirmed" the "basic princi-
ple concerning the use of force in the arrest of a ship at sea." 159 Because the above
quoted Article 22 provision was later incorporated into the bilateral WMD board-
ing agreements with Liberia and the Marshall Islands (discussed below), the Tribu-





Dire warnings on the continued use of deadly force in maritime interdiction and
enforcement actions demonstrate a need for further development and clarification
on the international limits on such actions. 160 It is clear that customary law prohib-
its firing into a vessel without warning. Additionally, using gunfire to intentionally
sink a fleeing vessel suspected of smuggling illegal liquor, at least without first at-
tempting to disable it, violates the established rule that force must be necessary and
reasonable. Such gunfire would almost certainly pose a threat to the lives of those
aboard. 161 But the full contours of the legal limits on the use of police force at sea
remain unclear. 162 In contrast to US law, international law has so far failed to rec-
ognize explicitly that the level of force that is reasonable and appropriate under the
circumstances will vary according to the nature of the violation and the impact al-
ternative enforcement approaches will have on the legal regime's effectiveness. 163
Force levels appropriate in interdicting a vessel engaged in narcotics trafficking
might well be inappropriate to one suspected ofviolating fisheries laws in a coastal
State's EEZ. 164 And the community interest in interdicting a WMD shipment un-
der circumstances that threaten international peace and security could justify force
levels that would be deemed excessive in response to a minor pollution incident.
To be accurate, any contemporary statement of customary law must also account
for a significant amount of State practice that is not easily reconciled with the broad
statements made by the ITLOS in the M/V Saiga case. Finally, maritime use of force
norms should be reexamined periodically in light of the progressive development
in the law of State responsibility.
In their text on the Law ofthe Sea, Professors Churchill and Lowe take the posi-
tion that international law, as articulated by the arbitral tribunal in the Ym Alone
Case, permits States to use only the "minimum force" necessary to compel compli-
ance. 165 That position is generally consistent with the Basic Principles on the Use of
Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials adopted by the United
Nations 166 for enforcement operations ashore. Drawing on Article 3 of the UN
Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, 167 the Basic Principles state that
"law enforcement officials may use force only when strictly necessary and to the ex-
tent required for the performance of their duty." It generally argues against the use
of firearms and asserts:
Governments and law enforcement agencies should develop a range ofmeans as broad
as possible and equip law enforcement officials with various types of weapons and
ammunition that would allow for a differentiated use of force and firearms. These
would include the development of non-lethal incapacitating weapons for use in
appropriate situations, with a view to increasingly restraining the application ofmeans
capable of causing death or injury to persons. For the same purpose, it should also be
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possible for law enforcement officials to be equipped with self-defensive equipment
such as shields, helmets, bullet-proof vests and bullet-proof means of transportation,
in order to decrease the need to use weapons of any kind. 168
The commentary accompanying the Code of Conduct "emphasizes that the use of
force by law enforcement officials should be exceptional." Although the Basic Prin-
ciples are not binding in themselves, an argument can be made that when the UN
Security Council authorizes enforcement measures under Article 41, with the pro-
viso that such measures shall be carried out "in conformity with international stan-
dards," the applicable standards might be construed to include the Basic Principles
and Code ofConduct documents if the measures taken are in the nature of law en-
forcement actions.
Use ofForce in Maritime PSI Interception Operations
The law applicable to the use of force in maritime operations to intercept WMD
and their delivery systems will vary according to the legal basis for the action. The
limits on the use of force to interdict the shipment of an operational WMD under
circumstances amounting to an imminent act of "armed aggression" within the
meaning of Article 51 of the UN Charter, or the belligerent's right of blockade or
visit and search under the laws of armed conflict and neutrality, will differ from
those for enforcing a UN Security Council embargo, exercising a peacetime right of
visit, conducting maritime law enforcement operations with respect to a vessel
within the enforcing State's jurisdiction, or while acting with the consent ofthe flag
State, coastal State or vessel master. The use of force without legal justification or in
a manner that is unreasonable may lead to State responsibility under international
law or liability under the State's municipal laws. 169 And, of course, any attempt in
peacetime to assert jurisdiction or control over a warship or government-owned
vessel used only on government non-commercial service would constitute a seri-
ous breach of international law. 170
The starting point in any examination of the use of force by US Maritime Forces
during MIO and E-MIO operations is the applicable ROE. 171 However, because
most ROE doctrine is classified, this analysis will focus on the relevant interna-
tional and US laws and to some extent the Navy MIO Doctrine and CGUFP, both
of which are unclassified. The authority to use force other than in self-defense is
derivative. Force may only be legitimately employed under circumstances where
the interdicting vessel (or aircraft) has the lawful authority to compel a vessel to
submit to its jurisdiction or control. If the vessel or aircraft has jurisdiction to en-
force applicable laws or a right to exercise some measure of control over a vessel, as
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in an exercise of the right of approach and visit, the vessel or aircraft also has the
right to use reasonable force if necessary to compel compliance. For example, a
warship justified in exercising a right of visit (an "examination" under 14 U.S.C. §
637) has the correlative right to use the necessary and reasonable force to compel
compliance. 172
If theWMD interception operation is carried out pursuant to a resolution ofthe
Security Council, the measures available for enforcement derive from the resolu-
tion itself and any other applicable basis for asserting jurisdiction and control,
along with the relevant mission accomplishment ROE. It is not uncommon, how-
ever, for Security Council resolutions to omit specific provisions on the use offorce
to enforce them. In construing and implementing the enforcement provisions of a
Security Council resolution, it may be helpful to refer to the provisions of the Vi-
enna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) for guidance, even though they
are not directly applicable to Security Council resolutions. 173 Article 31 of the
VCLT instructs that a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with
the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in their context and in light of its ob-
ject and purpose. The ordinary meaning ofthe terms used in a Chapter VII resolu-
tion by the Security Council may in some cases be determined by recourse to
earlier resolutions by the Council, 174 analogous treaties, and any statements by
States regarding their understanding of those terms. It should also be borne in
mind that the primary object and purpose of any resolution issued under Chapter
VII is to maintain or restore international peace and security. 175 Accordingly, any
interpretation of the resolution should serve those ends. All members of the UN
have an obligation to "accept and carry out" the decisions ofthe Council, in accor-
dance with the Charter, giving such resolutions universal force. 176 Article 32 of the
VCLT permits recourse to "supplementary" means of interpretation and the cir-
cumstances of the treaty's conclusion to confirm the meaning determined by ap-
plying Article 31 or to determine the meaning if application ofArticle 31 leaves the
meaning ambiguous or obscure or leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or
unreasonable. In some cases, an Article 32 approach to interpreting resolutions
might justify resort to the record ofany debate within the Security Council regard-
ing the content and meaning of the resolution. In cases where the Council indi-
cated in the resolution that it remains seized of the matter, recourse may always be
made to the Council for clarification or supplementary guidance.
In consensual boardings the use of force other than in self-defense must gener-
ally be authorized by the consenting State. Operations conducted under authority
of a bilateral boarding agreement with either the flag State or a coastal State in
whose waters the vessel is located must comply with any limitations imposed by the
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agreement. 177 The boarding agreements with Liberia and the Marshall Islands in-





All uses of force pursuant to this Agreement shall be in strict accordance with the
applicable laws and policies of the Party conducting the boarding and applicable
international law.
2. Each Party shall avoid the use of force except when and to the degree necessary to
ensure the safety of Security Force Officials and vessels or where Security Force
Officials are obstructed in the execution of their duties.
3. Only that force reasonably necessary under the circumstances may be used.
4. Boarding and search teams and Security Force vessels have the inherent right to
use all available means to apply that force reasonably necessary to defend themselves
or others from physical harm.
5. Whenever any vessel subject to boarding under this Agreement does not stop on
being ordered to do so, the Security Force vessel should give an auditory or visual
signal to the suspect vessel to stop, using internationally recognized signals. If the
suspect vessel does not stop upon being signaled, Security Force vessels may take
other appropriate actions to stop the suspect vessel. 178
As noted earlier, paragraph 2 of this article mirrors the use of force provision in the
Straddling Fish Stocks Agreement, which the International Tribunal for the Law of
the Sea concluded "reaffirmed" the "basic principle on the use of force in the arrest
of a ship at sea." 179 However, one important feature distinguishes boardings under
the WMD boarding agreements with Liberia and the Marshall Island from those
conducted under the Straddling Fish Stocks Agreement. The WMD boarding
agreements expressly provide that the "authorization to board, search and detain
includes the authority to use force in accordance with Article 9 of this Agree-
ment." 180 No such authority is included in the Straddling Fish Stocks Agreement.
Article 9 of the Liberia and Marshall Islands agreements applies by its own terms
only to operations carried out under authority of the agreement. Article 9 does not
control in boardings carried out under an alternative basis of authority, such as a
right of approach and visit, or boardings conducted while the vessel is located in
waters over which a coastal State has jurisdiction. 181
The WMD boarding agreement with Panama takes the form of an amendment
to an existing arrangement providing for cooperation in counter-narcotics detec-
tion and interdiction. The Panama agreement differs in several respects from the Li-
beria and Marshall Islands agreements. Like parallel provisions in the agreements
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with Liberia and the Marshall Islands, Article X of the agreement with Panama pro-
vides that the "authorization to board, search and detain includes the authority to
use force." 182 However, Article XVII of the Panama agreement, which defines the
limits on the use of force, differs in several respects. Article XVII draws on language
common to bilateral counter-narcotics cooperative agreements (rather than the





All uses of force by a Party pursuant to this Supplementary Arrangement shall be
in strict accordance with applicable laws and policies of that Party and shall in all
cases be the minimum reasonably necessary under the circumstances, except that
neither Party shall use force against civil aircraft in flight.
2. Nothing in this Supplementary Arrangement shall impair the exercise of the
inherent right of self-defense by law enforcement or other officials of the Parties. 183
Article XVII does not include the paragraph common to Article 22 of the Strad-
dling Fish Stocks Agreement and Article 9 of the Liberia and Marshall Islands
WMD boarding agreements. It is also noteworthy that the agreements the United
States concluded with Liberia and the Marshall Islands expressly include authority
for boardings to be conducted by the US Navy, while the PanamaWMD boarding
agreement contemplates that, except in emergencies, boardings will be carried out
only by "law enforcement" officials. 184
Non-Forcible Measures to Stop and Board
SQ3: "You should stop or heave to; I am going to board you." 185
As mentioned earlier, when a PSI interception and boarding is undertaken under
authority of a Security Council resolution, questions regarding the use of force
must begin with the authorizing resolution (see discussion above). The resolution
will serve as the foundation for the National Command Authorities' MIO authori-
zation and the vessels' operational tasking directives and ROE. Those documents
should provide clear directions on the use ofwarning shots and disabling fire, and
perhaps vertical take-down procedures if such a capability exists. 186 All such guid-
ance must conform to the relevant principles of international and national law.
It is well established that under international law force may be used only when
necessary. The necessity for using force can only be established by demonstrating
that lesser means were attempted and failed to produce the needed compliance,
or that those lesser means would have been impossible or futile under the circum-
stances. The sequence of measures short of actual force must begin with an
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identification of the enforcing vessel and its intentions. 187 In the M/V Saiga Case,
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea identified at least two steps an
enforcing vessel must take before using force against a noncompliant vessel. 188
First, the vessel must be given an auditory or visual signal to stop using interna-
tionally recognized signals. 189 If the signal is not heeded, the enforcing vessel is
justified in firing one or more warning shots across the bow of the vessel in a
manner likely to attract attention. Only if the signals and warning shots go un-
heeded is the enforcing vessel justified, as a last resort and after further warning
the noncompliant vessel, in using disabling fire. 190 Given the history of tribunals
imposing on the enforcing State the burden of proving any use of force was nec-
essary and reasonable, warnings given before firing warning shots or disabling fire
should be recorded by videotape and audiotape when practicable. Prudent com-
manding officers will also require their crew to document the legal bases for tak-
ing interdiction or enforcement action against the suspect vessel before using
force against the vessel.
When it applies, 14 U.S.C. § 637 requires the enforcing vessel to display its pre-
scribed ensign, pennant or other identifying insignia. 191 The suspect vessel is sig-
naled by visual, auditory and electronic means. Traditional "visual" means include
flag hoist and Morse Code flashing light signals taken from the International Code
of Signals, such as the SQ3 signal quoted above. 192 Auditory signals may be given by
loudhailer or megaphone and supplemented by siren or whistle signals to attract
the attention of those on board the suspect vessel. If necessary, the enforcing ves-
sel's intent may also be demonstrated by uncovering, readying and manning the
ship's weapons (without training them on the suspect vessel). Throughout the en-
counter, the enforcing vessel transmits radiotelephone calls to the suspect vessel
over frequencies all vessels are required to monitor. The calls, which are commonly
transmitted in English and any other language commonly used by vessels in the
area or using internationally recognized signals for the International Code,
informs the suspect vessel of the enforcing vessel's intent to board.
If the signals and radio calls are ignored or the suspect vessel otherwise refuses to
stop to permit boarding, the enforcing vessel may pursue one or more options in a
progressive sequence. The Coast Guard MLEM prescribes a four-step approach for
stopping noncompliant vessels. The sequence begins with "command presence,"
progresses to "low-level" and then "higher-level" tactics, and finishes, if necessary,
with "disabling fire." 193 The Navy MIO Doctrine adopts a similar approach. It pre-
scribes—subject to the applicable ROE and tasking orders—an ordered sequence
of levels of force to be used against noncompliant vessels that escalates, ifnecessary,
from "nonviolent" signals and maneuvers, to "deterrence" measures (warning
shots), to a "show offorce" (including disabling fire), and finally to "full force." 194
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A variety of low-level force tactics designed to compel a fleeing vessel to stop
have been tried over the years, including low level passes by aircraft; physically
blocking or even "shouldering" the fleeing vessel; directing fire hose streams into
the fleeing vessel's exhaust stack to flood the engine; deploying nets, lines and other
devices designed to entangle the vessel's propellers; and severing the vessel's fuel
line. Low-level tactics are seldom successful in persuading a determined
noncompliant suspect, particularly on merchant vessels of the size likely to be
transportingWMD. Moreover, some of the tactics might even expose the pursuing
vessel or a nearby support vessel to added risks. For example, if the fleeing vessel
circles or doubles back, any nets and lines deployed in the water earlier to entangle
the fleeing vessel might endanger the pursuing vessel as it turns to continue the
pursuit.
If low-level tactics fail to induce the suspect vessel to comply, they may be fol-
lowed by warning shots. Until recently, the federal statute governing the Coast
Guard's use of force against noncompliant vessels expressly required that warning
shots always be fired before the enforcing vessel employed disabling fire. Any fail-
ure to first fire warning shots might have stripped the commanding officer of the
indemnity provided by the statute. However, a 2004 amendment to 14 U.S.C. § 637
introduced an exception to the requirement. The amended statute no longer re-
quires that warning shots be given before disabling fire if the person in command
ofthe enforcing vessel "determines that the firing of a warning signal would unrea-
sonably endanger persons or property in the vicinity ofthe vessel to be stopped." 195
It is important not to read too much into the 2004 amendment. To meet the stan-
dards set by international law for the use of force in maritime enforcement actions,
the use of disabling fire without prior warning shots would still have to be preceded
by an effective means ofwarning the fleeing vessel that force will be used against the
vessel if it fails to comply with the enforcing vessel's orders. 196
The United States has long taken the position that a warning shot is a signal.
Warning shots are not directed against the vessel or any person on board and do
not constitute a use of force. Although international law is largely silent on the
manner for firing warning shots, the CGUFP provides detailed guidance for Coast
Guard platforms (and DoD platforms under Coast Guard TACON or OPCON).
The CGUFP specifies the need for prior authorization from the operational or tac-
tical commander, the visual, auditory and electronic warnings to be given to the
vessel before firing the warning shot, the position and posture of the crew on the
enforcing vessel, the choice of weapon and ammunition and the direction of fire
relative to the suspect vessel. 197 Like the CGUFP, the Navy MIO Doctrine provides
specific direction on pre-fire warnings, the choice of weapon and ammunition
and the weapon targeting method. 198 The general directions set out in the MIO
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Doctrine must be applied consistently with the mission accomplishment ROE and
operational tasking directives.
The use of warning shots to stop a vessel for boarding constitutes a "seizure" of
the vessel in the constitutional sense and must therefore comply with the Fourth
Amendment standard of reasonableness. The Court ofAppeals for the Second Cir-
cuit applied the reasonableness standard to a case involving the Coast Guard's use
ofwarning shots against a Panamanian drug trafficking vessel on the high seas. The
USCGC Tamaroa intercepted the 210-foot Panamanian mothership Roondiep fifty
miles off Cape Cod and, with the consent of Panamanian authorities, ordered the
vessel to heave to for boarding. 199 The Roondiep refused, and after twice warning
the vessel by radio, Tamaroa fired warning shots across the vessel's bow using a .50
caliber machine-gun. The Roondiep eventually stopped and in the boarding that
followed the team discovered a large quantity of marijuana in the hold. The defen-
dants appealed their convictions on grounds that the boarding and seizure violated
the Fourth Amendment. After first rejecting the Government's argument that Pan-
ama's consent provided an independent constitutional basis for the boarding, the
Court of Appeals concluded that the interception was a reasonable investigatory
stop and therefore did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 200 The Court then
turned to the warning shots:
The firing of warning shots to stop the Roondiep was not unreasonable, since
reasonable force may be used if needed. The Roondiep had for some twenty minutes
refused to stop upon request. The Coast Guard' firing of warning shots into the water
in front of the ship appears to have been the least drastic way to force the ship to stop,
and the shots were directly attributable to the Roondiep's refusal to submit to an
authorized request to stop.201
It is not clear whether the court considered the warning shots a use of force, rather
than just one of several acts to consider in determining whether the Coast Guard's
seizure was reasonable under the circumstances. However, the court went on to
hold that "the firing ofwarning shots appears to have been no more intrusive than
the circumstances required to get the Roondiep to stop."202 Accordingly, the Coast
Guard's actions were held to be reasonable.
Use of Force to Stop and Board
SQ1: "You should stop or heave to; otherwise I shall open fire on you."203
The effectiveness of maritime legal regimes has long been a matter of concern. 204
Even the most carefully crafted regime will fail to produce the desired public order
if compliance is poor. Compliance is best achieved by a coordinated system of en-
forcement that detects, interdicts and punishes violators, thereby deterring future
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violations. Any regime that allowed a violator to escape interdiction and punish-
ment by simply registering the vessel with a closed or uncooperative flag State that
refuses all requests to board is unlikely to be effective against a determined adver-
sary. As one experienced commentator observed, MIO patrols would be ineffective
if the patrol vessels lack the right to use force if necessary to stop ships. 205 The late
Professor Myres McDougal observed:
The authority to prescribe law, to make law, if it is to have any meaning must carry with
it the authority to apply the law, decide what it is in particular instances, and to enforce
it Mr. Burke and I have collected the authorities on this for every type of area. It is
our conclusion that you can be reasonably sure that states are authorized by
international law to employ force when it is necessary to apply any law which they are
authorized to make for the protection of their various exclusive interests. A
comparable competence is established for the protection of the inclusive interests. . .
.
The principal point ... is that, by and large, the maintenance of order upon the oceans
is a function of the application of force by the ships of nation-states.206
It has been shown that the legitimacy ofusing force to stop a vessel subject to the
enforcing State's jurisdiction or control is well established under international
practice, treaty law and US law.207 Although some condemn the use of force in fish-
eries and pollution enforcement actions as unreasonable and anachronistic, the
need to preserve the authority to use force to compel compliance with the WMD
non-proliferation regime is not so easily dismissed. Accordingly, at the interna-
tional level a balance must be struck between the common interest in preserving
freedom of navigation and limiting the use of force against vessels and their crews
on the one hand, and the need to address the threat to international peace and se-
curity posed by the proliferation ofWMD and delivery systems into the hands of
rogue regimes and renegade non-State actors. As Professor Shearer recognized
when he put the Ym Alone decision in perspective in an earlier Blue Book series
article:
[T]he proportionality principle requires the enforcing State to weigh the gravity of the
offense against the value of human life. Rum-running . . . did not strike the
[
uYm
Alone"] commissioners as sufficient to warrant such drastic action. They did not have
to consider other cases. It is suggested that fisheries, revenue, immigration and other
regulatory offenses would fall into the same category. So might pollution offenses. This
is not only because sending a vessel with dangerous cargoes or wastes on board to the
bottom might only compound the danger, but because of the Convention scheme . .
.
under which the flag State can be required to take enforcement action against the
delinquent vessel escaping immediate arrest. Other cases might justify the use of more
vigorous, and perhaps ultimately deadly, force, such as piratical vessels, vessels carrying
arms to dissidents in the enforcing State, or craft carrying large quantities ofdangerous
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drugs. These cases might be argued to have the character of self-defense or self-
preservation more than of enforcement of regulatory laws.208
At the same time, any decision to use force at this early stage—to get aboard a sus-
picious vessel—must take into account that in most such cases the enforcing vessel
will not yet have probable cause to believe the vessel is engaged in illegal activities
or activities that give rise to a right of self-defense or self-help.
It has also been shown that use of force in MLE boardings may raise constitu-
tional and statutory questions under US law. As with the firing of warning shots,
the use of disabling fire by the Coast Guard to seize a vessel at sea must comply with
the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard. As the US Supreme Court ex-
plained in Graham v. Connor, a case involving the use of force against an individ-
ual, not a vessel, the court will consider the severity of the crime at issue, whether
the suspect poses an immediate threat to others, and whether the suspect is actively
resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight. 209 The reasonableness stan-
dard, along with the governing international law standards, was applied to an inci-
dent involving the use of disabling fire in a joint Navy-Coast Guard counter-
narcotics boarding off the Bahamas. In the interdiction, the USS Kidd (DDG-993),
operating with a deployed Coast Guard LEDET, fired warning shots then .50 cali-
ber machine-gun disabling fire to stop a stateless vessel on the high seas (the inci-
dent was the first use of disabling fire by a Navy ship in a counter-narcotics
operation). Once aboard, the boarding team discovered over 57,000 pounds of
marijuana on the vessel. 210 On an appeal by the defendants of their conviction on
drug trafficking charges, the court concluded that "the boarding and the seizure
were not in conflict with United States statutes, international treaties or conven-
tions, or the Constitution." 21 ] Nothing in the court's decision suggests that the use
of disabling fire to stop a fleeing vessel under those circumstances violates the
Fourth Amendment.
When the on scene commander or commanding officer has determined that a
suspect vessel will present either an opposed boarding or a noncompliant board-
ing the full range of use of force options described above may come into play. 212
Those options may include the Coast Guard's "higher level" tactics213 and dis-
abling fire. "Disabling fire" refers to use of weapons to disable the ship without
risk to the crew. The use of disabling fire by Navy and Coast Guard vessels con-
ducting MLE operations is constrained by a variety of sources, including 14 U.S.C.
§ 637, as amended in 2004, the CGUFP set out in the MLEM, any applicable bilat-
eral boarding agreement and tasking directives by OPCON or TACON. If dis-
abling fire is used, the enforcing vessel's method and choice of ammunition are
limited by both service doctrine and international law. In the M/V Saiga Case, for
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example, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea held that in its use of
disabling fire the enforcement vessel should make every effort to ensure that life is
not endangered. 214 Service doctrines typically require that the enforcing vessel at-
tempt to disable the noncompliant vessel with smaller caliber weapons. Such a se-
quence was followed by the Coast Guard cutter USCGC Boutwell in 1988 when it
encountered the converted Panamanian supply ship Encounter Bay 600 miles off
the coast ofWashington. Boutwell first fired sixty .50 caliber machine-gun rounds
into the drug trafficking vessel without any immediate effect. The Encounter Bay
crew decided to comply with the boarding demand when Boutwell threatened to
switch to the vessel's deck gun.215
Despite the general acceptance accorded to the use of disabling fire against ves-
sels trafficking in drugs, as a practical matter few commanding officers or com-
mand authorities are likely to be anxious to shoot at vessels suspected of
transporting nuclear, biological or chemical weapons or precursors. Moreover,
they will recognize that the typical merchant ship is often able to survive even pro-
longed disabling fire by the weapons and ammunition allowed by the use of force
doctrines. For example, in a 1990 interception of the 250-foot Panamanian
freighter M/V Hermann suspected of transporting drugs, the Coast Guard cutter
USCGC Chincoteague, with the consent of the flag State, fired over 130 rounds
from the vessel's 20 mm gun and 600 rounds from an M-60 machine-gun into the
vessel's engine spaces and rudder post. 216 Despite the two-hour assault by
Chincoteague, they were unable to disable the vessel before it entered the territorial
sea of Mexico, at which point the Chincoteague was legally bound to discontinue
the pursuit.
An effective alternative means of overcoming the suspect vessel's noncompli-
ance or even opposition—often without endangering the crew or potentially dan-
gerous cargo on the suspect vessel—is available if the enforcing vessel has the
capability of deploying a helicopter-borne special operations force boarding
team. 217 A vertical take-down may obviate the need for disabling fire against a
noncompliant vessel and may therefore best meet the "reasonable and necessary
force" test.
The efficacy of the vertical take-down alternative was demonstrated in the 2002
interdiction of the M/V So San by Spanish naval forces acting under the leadership
of Spain's former Prime Minister Aznar. In response to United States and British
intelligence, the Spanish frigate Navarra, operating in support of Operation En-
during Freedom and seeking to prevent the escape of al Qaeda and Taliban forces
from Afghanistan, intercepted the So San in the Indian Ocean approximately 600
miles from the Horn ofAfrica. 218 No ship named So San appeared in any of the ves-
sel registries. The vessel was flying no flag at the time ofapproach and displayed no
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indication of its State of registry or homeport. In fact, a North Korean flag on its
funnel had been painted over, as were the Korean characters for So San. The master
of the vessel provided only cursory answers to radio questions from the Navarra.
He indicated that his vessel was registered in Cambodia and was carrying a cargo of
cement to Yemen. The government of Cambodia could only confirm that the ship
matched the description of a vessel registered in Cambodia under a different
name. 219 Concluding that the failure to fly a flag or display a name, together with
the unverifiable claim of Cambodian registry, constituted reasonable grounds for
suspecting that the ship was without a nationality (i.e., stateless), the Spanish frig-
ate chose to exercise the internationally recognized right of a warship to "visit" a
vessel on the high seas. 220 The right of visit entitles a warship to send over a boat or
aircraft to verify the ship's right to fly its flag. 221 The So San captain refused to slow
down or to allow Navarra to board. Navarra then fired warning shots in an attempt
to stop the So San, but the warnings were ignored. In fact, the So San increased its
speed, making it impossible to board the ship by small boat. After a six-hour stand-
off, Navarra prepared a special operations team of Spanish Marines to conduct a
non-compliant boarding. To facilitate a vertical takedown, snipers on the Navarra
first shot away the guy wires on the So Sans main mast that would have endan-
gered the team when they fast-roped from the helicopter to the deck of the ship.
Their path cleared, the Spanish team was able to get aboard and secure the vessel
for the right of visit boarding. Most legal experts agree that the circumstances justi-
fied a right ofvisit boarding. 222 And none ofthose who concluded the boarding was
legitimate questioned the Spanish decision to shoot out the vessel's obstructing cables.
Had the Spanish lacked a vertical take-down capability, and therefore been forced
to choose between resorting to disabling fire or forgoing the boarding, it is not clear
whether the command authorities would have authorized disabling fire.
Use of Force to Divert, Arrest and/or Seize
It bears repeating that each progressive step in an interdiction from approach to
seizure must be grounded in lawful authority. The authority to order a vessel to di-
vert must be distinguished from a detention or formal seizure of the vessel. 223 Simi-
larly, the mustering or temporary detention of persons aboard a vessel to facilitate
a boarding must be distinguished from the arrest of persons whom a law enforce-
ment officer has probable cause to believe committed a crime within the enforcing
State's jurisdiction. The amount of force that may be "reasonable" for one form of
seizure might be seen as unreasonable if used in another context.
Even a cursory inspection of the international and national legal regimes appli-
cable to WMD, their precursors and delivery systems will reveal they are riddled
with gaps (the UN Security Council recognized as much when it passed Resolution
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1540). As a result, a boarding team could find that the presence or transport of
WMD components or delivery systems turned up by their laborious search do not
violate any laws enforceable by the boarding State. 224 For example, once aboard the
M/V So San, the Spanish boarding team uncovered fifteen SCUD missiles225 and
conventional (high explosive) warheads, along with parts to make eight more mis-
siles and 23 barrels of chemicals (nitric acid) buried beneath tons of bagged ce-
ment. The missiles, which were sold by the government of North Korea to Yemen,
were not listed in the vessel's cargo manifest. Yet the legal analysts ultimately con-
cluded that no applicable international law prohibited the sale or shipment of
SCUD missiles from North Korea to Yemen. 226 Accordingly, there was no legal ba-
sis for seizing the missiles, or taking further actions against the vessel or crew. The
So San was released, to deliver its cargo to Yemen.
In circumstances where neither the vessel nor any of its crew has violatedWMD
possession or transportation laws enforceable directly by the boarding State, the
boarding State may nevertheless find that one or more individuals aboard the ves-
sel are suspected of having committed an offense that falls within the extradite or
prosecute provision of an applicable international treaty. Such clauses are com-
mon in multinational terrorism conventions. Boarding teams and their com-
manders must recognize that their power (and duty) to detain such persons is
limited. The treaty obligation to prosecute or extradite is generally triggered only
when a person suspected of committing an offense under the treaty is within the
"territory" of a contracting party. 227 Such a provision would not justify apprehen-
sion of a person on a foreign vessel for extradition to a third State. 228 On the other
hand, the flag State may be under such an obligation if it is a party to a treaty requir-
ing extradition. 229 Such cases—like those involving asylum requests—call for care-
ful handling by the enforcing vessel's chain of command within the context of
established interagency consultation procedures.
Assuming the authority to divert, detain arrest or seize exists, the question arises
regarding what force may be used to carry out those actions. Vessels employed in
MIO or E-MIO operations must consult their mission accomplishment ROE and
operational tasking directives. The reader will also recall that the Vm Alone com-
missioners articulated an international law "necessary and reasonable force" stan-
dard that applies to all steps in the encounter, including the boarding, search and
seizure and bringing the vessel into port. 230 For Coast Guard boarding officers en-
gaged in maritime law enforcement operations, 14 U.S.C. § 89 authorizes such offi-
cers to use all force necessary to compel compliance. That statutory authority must
be applied within the limitations imposed by the constitutional provisions dis-
cussed above and the CGUFP. The CGUFP imposes limitations on the use of
deadly force that are similar to, but more restrictive than, those in the Model Penal
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Code. Section 3.07 of the MPC begins by addressing the use ofany force (deadly or
non-deadly) in making an arrest. It provides that force is justifiable if the arresting
officer believes its use is immediately necessary to effect the arrest. The MPC then
imposes limits on the use of deadly force, providing that deadly force is not justifi-
able unless: (1) the arrest is for a felony; (2) the arresting officer believes that the
force employed creates no substantial risk of injury to innocent persons; and (3)
the arresting officer believes that the crime for which the arrest is made involved
conduct including the use or threatened use of deadly force or the officer believes
there is a substantial risk that the person to be arrested will cause death or serious
bodily injury if his apprehension is delayed. 231
The CGUFP is more restrictive than the MPC and better comports with the
1985 Tennessee v. Garner test described above. 232 While the MPC is cast in the dis-
junctive, requiring only that the felony for which the arrest is being made involve
the threat or use of deadly force or that there be a substantial risk that the person
being arrested will cause death or serious bodily injury if apprehension is delayed,
the CGUFP only authorizes the use of deadly force to effect an arrest if there is
probable cause to believe that "the suspect has committed a felony involving the
use or threatened use ofdeadly force" and the "suspect is armed, or otherwise poses
an imminent threat ofdeath or serious physical injury to any person."233 A separate
provision of the CGUFP authorizes the use of force, including deadly force, when
necessary to protect hazardous materials or deadly weapons from theft, sabotage or
unauthorized control. 234 In addition, the boarding team has the inherent right to
use force when necessary in self-defense.
Use of Force in Self-Defense
Throughout the approach and boarding it is important to distinguish the use of
force to carry out the boarding, search and seizure from the use of force in self-
defense. Regardless of the stage of the approach and boarding, the intercepting
forces maybe faced with actions requiring the use of force in self-defense. The ROE
identify four levels of self-defense: individual self-defense (which includes defense
of others), unit self-defense, national self-defense, and collective self-defense. 235
Individual self-defense is the act of defending oneself or another person by using
force. Unit self-defense is the act of defending a particular unit of US forces, or
other US forces in the vicinity, against a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent.
Responses to a ramming or attempted ramming of a Coast Guard or DoD vessel, or
vessel under Coast Guard TACON, would be governed by the SROE on unit self-
defense. 236 National self-defense is the act of defending the United States and, in
some circumstances, US citizens and their property, and/or US commercial assets.
Collective self-defense refers to the act of defending designated non-US forces or
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designated foreign nationals and their property from a hostile act or demonstrated
hostile intent.
The SROE and CGUFP recognize the inherent right of an individual and a unit
to act in self-defense, subject to the twin constraints of necessity and proportional-
ity.
237 The definitions of necessity and proportionality in the self-defense context
differ from parallel provisions in mission accomplishment ROE. "Necessity" for
the use of force in self-defense exists when a hostile act occurs or when a force or
terrorist exhibits hostile intent.238 "Proportionality" in the self-defense context re-
fers to measures that are reasonable in intensity, duration and magnitude to the
perceived or demonstrated threat, based on all the facts known to the commander
at the time. 239 The SROE make it clear that "all necessary means available" may be
used in self-defense. 240 Although the meaning of that phrase is classified, it can be
said that when the hostile force no longer represents an imminent threat, the right
to self-defense ends. Mission accomplishment ROE written to supplement the
SROE do not limit the commander's inherent authority and obligation to act in
self-defense.241 Intentionally sinking the Ym Alone (discussed above) was held to be
excessive as an enforcement measure for a non-violent crime (smuggling alcohol).
For those familiar with the ruthless determination of some modern traffickers in
narcotics and illegal arms it is easy to imagine a circumstance in which it might be
necessary to intentionally sink a trafficking vessel in self-defense.
The authority to exercise national or collective self-defense is generally more re-
strictive.242 The doctrine of unit self-defense is well established. In the Marianna
Flora, the Supreme Court recognized that a warship has no duty to flee or wait until
she is crippled before defending herself with force. Writing for the Court, Justice
Story held that the warship commander's duty under such circumstances is plain:
it is to "oppose force to force, to attack and to subdue the vessel."243 Justice Story
went on to explain that the commander:
had the flag of his vessel to maintain, and the rights of his cruiser to vindicate. To have
hesitated in what was his duty to his government called for on such an occasion, would
have been to betray (what no honourable officer could be supposed to indulge) an
indifference to its dignity and sovereignty.244
The Court then upheld the boarding and seizure of the approached vessel, not for
piracy but for the very act of firing on a US warship without legal justification. 245
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently extended that principle, hold-
ing that a threat to open fire on the Coast Guard if its agents attempted to board
provided independent grounds for seizing the vessel. 246
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The "no-duty-to-retreat" rule has been incorporated into Coast Guard doc-
trine, though it also acknowledges that under some circumstances temporary with-
drawal might prove to be the wiser alternative, to provide time for the arrival of
additional assets or personnel or to reduce tensions. 247 Similarly, under the SROE
guidelines on "de-escalating the situation," when time and circumstances permit, a
hostile force should be warned and given an opportunity to withdraw or cease any
threatening activities. 248
Conclusion
UN Security Council Resolutions 1 373 and 1 540 provide stark warning ofthe grave
threat to international security posed by global terrorism and the proliferation of
WMD and their delivery systems. For some, the resolutions also demonstrate that
the presumption in the 1945 UN Charter that nation-States will hold a monopoly
on the large-scale use of force must be reevaluated. It is too soon to predict whether
those resolutions will eventually serve as the basis for new crimes of universal juris-
diction or progressive development ofthe right ofapproach and visit under the law
of the sea. In the meantime, while the Security Council monitors progress on the
implementation of its terrorism and counter-proliferation resolutions, nations
participating in the PSI and those cooperating with them will move forward with a
pragmatic and adaptive program to counter the growing threat posed by the con-
junction of global terrorism andWMD proliferation. Given the physical nature of
most WMD and delivery systems of concern and the likely routes they will follow
from their sources to intended users, the PSI must include a maritime interception
component if it is to succeed. To be effective, maritime interception must include
provisions for using reasonable force when necessary to overcome non-compli-
ance. As both a legal and practical matter, the enforcing vessel cannot simply con-
tinue a pursuit indefinitely. 249 Even an enforcing vessel with unlimited fuel and
patience—and no other pressing mission—must terminate its pursuit if the pur-
sued vessel enters the territorial sea of a third State, unless that State consents to an
enforcement action in its waters or such action is authorized by an applicable reso-
lution of the UN Security Council. 250
International law and the national laws of the States participating in PSI mari-
time operations impose limits on the use of force. Through the Statement of Inter-
diction Principles, the PSI participants have pledged to conform their operations
to international and national law. The exact contours ofthat law have yet to be fully
defined. For example, customary law has yet to expressly acknowledge that as the
threat to international or national security increases higher levels of force in en-
forcement measures may be justified. Cases involving the use of force in fisheries
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enforcement are inapposite where the danger of ineffective enforcement is not
merely over-fishing, but rather permitting nuclear, biological or chemical weapons
to come into the possession of a rogue regime or terrorist group. Even if the law
were fully developed, it would not lessen the need for use of force policies and case-
by-case decision-making grounded in informed risk assessment and management
principles. The risk of using disabling fire against a vessel carryingWMD or com-
ponent materials, and the low probability of success, cast serious doubt on whether
such measures are likely to be employed. Accordingly, innovative methods, such as
vertical take-downs or breaches of non-compliant vessels by small boat, may be-
come an increasingly common feature of maritime interception operations. Both
options expose the boarding team members to greater risk from the nature of the
operation and potential opposition by the boarded vessel; however, the risk to
global security posed by a course of passive inaction is likely to be even greater.
A given PSI interception may implicate national defense, homeland security
and/or law enforcement mission responsibilities. Accordingly, US maritime forces
and their legal advisers must be prepared to apply what are often subtle distinctions
among three distinct but sometimes overlapping systems of rules governing the use
of force at sea. Policy makers and planners for PSI participating States must bear in
mind that in framing a use of force approach for what will often be a combined op-
eration they must strive to fashion an approach that recognizes that national atti-
tudes on the use of force in maritime boardings may differ, even when they are
grounded in universally applicable Security Council resolutions. The execution of
those use of force policies will also shape and influence customary law on the use of
force and on State responsibility in the years to come.
Ill




Interdiction Principles for the Proliferation Security Initiative
PSI participants are committed to the following interdiction principles to establish
a more coordinated and effective basis through which to impede and stop ship-
ments ofWMD, delivery systems, and related materials flowing to and from states
and non-state actors of proliferation concern, consistent with national legal au-
thorities and relevant international law and frameworks, including the UN Secu-
rity Council. They call on all states concerned with this threat to international
peace and security to join in similarly committing to:
1. Undertake effective measures, either alone or in concert with other
states, for interdicting the transfer or transport ofWMD, their delivery
systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors of
proliferation concern. "States or non-state actors of proliferation
concern" generally refers to those countries or entities that the PSI
participants involved establish should be subject to interdiction activities
because they are engaged in proliferation through: ( 1 ) efforts to develop
or acquire chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons and associated
delivery systems; or (2) transfers (either selling, receiving, or facilitating)
ofWMD, their delivery systems, or related materials.
2. Adopt streamlined procedures for rapid exchange of relevant
information concerning suspected proliferation activity, protecting the
confidential character of classified information provided by other states
as part of this initiative, dedicate appropriate resources and efforts to
interdiction operations and capabilities, and maximize coordination
among participants in interdiction efforts.
3. Review and work to strengthen their relevant national legal authorities
where necessary to accomplish these objectives, and work to strengthen
when necessary relevant international law and frameworks in
appropriate ways to support these commitments.
4. Take specific actions in support of interdiction efforts regarding cargoes
ofWMD, their delivery systems, or related materials, to the extent their
national legal authorities permit and consistent with their obligations
under international law and frameworks, to include:
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a. Not to transport or assist in the transport of any such cargoes to or
from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern, and not to
allow any persons subject to their jurisdiction to do so.
b. At their own initiative, or at the request and good cause shown by
another state, to take action to board and search any vessel flying
their flag in their internal waters or territorial seas, or areas beyond
the territorial seas of any other state, that is reasonably suspected of
transporting such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of
proliferation concern, and to seize such cargoes that are identified.
c. To seriously consider providing consent under the appropriate
circumstances to the boarding and searching of its own flag vessels by
other states, and to the seizure of such WMD-related cargoes in such
vessels that may be identified by such states.
d. To take appropriate actions to ( 1 ) stop and/or search in their internal
waters, territorial seas, or contiguous zones (when declared) vessels
that are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes to or from
states or non-state actors of proliferation concern and to seize such
cargoes that are identified; and (2) to enforce conditions on vessels
entering or leaving their ports, internal waters or territorial seas that
are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes, such as requiring
that such vessels be subject to boarding, search, and seizure of such
cargoes prior to entry.
e. At their own initiative or upon the request and good cause shown by
another state, to (a) require aircraft that are reasonably suspected of
carrying such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of
proliferation concern and that are transiting their airspace to land for
inspection and seize any such cargoes that are identified; and/or (b)
deny aircraft reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes transit
rights through their airspace in advance of such flights.
f. If their ports, airfields, or other facilities are used as transshipment
points for shipment of such cargoes to or from states or non-state
actors of proliferation concern, to inspect vessels, aircraft, or other
modes of transport reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes,
and to seize such cargoes that are identified.
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Appendix II




Affirming that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as
their means of delivery,** constitutes a threat to international peace and security,
Reaffirming, in this context, the Statement of its President adopted at the Council's
meeting at the level of Heads of State and Government on 31 January 1992 (S/
23500), including the need for all Member States to fulfil their obligations in rela-
tion to arms control and disarmament and to prevent proliferation in all its aspects
of all weapons of mass destruction,4
Recalling also that the Statement underlined the need for all Member States to re-
solve peacefully in accordance with the Charter any problems in that context
threatening or disrupting the maintenance of regional and global stability,
Affirming its resolve to take appropriate and effective actions against any threat to
international peace and security caused by the proliferation of nuclear, chemical
and biological weapons and their means of delivery, in conformity with its primary
responsibilities, as provided for in the United Nations Charter,
Affirming its support for the multilateral treaties whose aim is to eliminate or pre-
vent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and the impor-
tance for all States parties to these treaties to implement them fully in order to
promote international stability,
Welcoming efforts in this context by multilateral arrangements which contribute to
non-proliferation,
Affirming that prevention of proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological
weapons should not hamper international cooperation in materials, equipment
and technology for peaceful purposes while goals ofpeaceful utilization should not
be used as a cover for proliferation,
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Gravely concerned by the threat of terrorism and the risk that non-State actors**
such as those identified in the United Nations list established and maintained by
the Committee established under Security Council resolution 1267 and those to
whom resolution 1373 applies, may acquire, develop, traffic in or use nuclear,
chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery,
Gravely concernedby the threat of illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical, or biologi-
cal weapons and their means of delivery, and related materials,** which adds a new
dimension to the issue of proliferation of such weapons and also poses a threat to
international peace and security,
Recognizing the need to enhance coordination of efforts on national, subregional,
regional and international levels in order to strengthen a global response to this se-
rious challenge and threat to international security,
Recognizing that most States have undertaken binding legal obligations under trea-
ties to which they are parties, or have made other commitments aimed at prevent-
ing the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, and have taken
effective measures to account for, secure and physically protect sensitive materials,
such as those required by the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear
Materials and those recommended by the IAEA Code ofConduct on the Safety and
Security of Radioactive Sources,
Recognizing further the urgent need for all States to take additional effective mea-
sures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and
their means of delivery,
Encouraging all Member States to implement fully the disarmament treaties and
agreements to which they are party,
Reaffirming the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts,
Determined to facilitate henceforth an effective response to global threats in the
area of non-proliferation,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Decides that all States shall refrain from providing any form of support to non-
State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport,
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transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of
delivery;
2. Decides also that all States, in accordance with their national procedures, shall
adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-State actor to
manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear,
chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, in particular for
terrorist purposes, as well as attempts to engage in any of the foregoing activities,
participate in them as an accomplice, assist or finance them;
3. Decides also that all States shall take and enforce effective measures to establish
domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological
weapons and their means of delivery, including by establishing appropriate
controls over related materials and to this end shall:
(a) Develop and maintain appropriate effective measures to account for and
secure such items in production, use, storage or transport;
(b) Develop and maintain appropriate effective physical protection
measures;
(c) Develop and maintain appropriate effective border controls and law
enforcement efforts to detect, deter, prevent and combat, including through
international cooperation when necessary, the illicit trafficking and brokering
in such items in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation
and consistent with international law;
(d) Establish, develop, review and maintain appropriate effective national
export and trans-shipment controls over such items, including appropriate
laws and regulations to control export, transit, trans-shipment and re-export
and controls on providing funds and services related to such export and trans-
shipment such as financing, and transporting that would contribute to
proliferation, as well as establishing end-user controls; and establishing and
enforcing appropriate criminal or civil penalties for violations of such export
control laws and regulations;
4. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of
procedure, for a period of no longer than two years, a Committee of the Security
Council, consisting of all members of the Council, which will, calling as
appropriate on other expertise, report to the Security Council for its examination,
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on the implementation of this resolution, and to this end calls upon States to
present a first report no later than six months from the adoption of this resolution
to the Committee on steps they have taken or intend to take to implement this
resolution;
5. Decides that none of the obligations set forth in this resolution shall be
interpreted so as to conflict with or alter the rights and obligations of State Parties
to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention and
the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention or alter the responsibilities of the
International Atomic Energy Agency or the Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons;
6. Recognizes the utility in implementing this resolution of effective national
control lists and calls upon all Member States, when necessary, to pursue at the
earliest opportunity the development of such lists;
7. Recognizes that some States may require assistance in implementing the
provisions of this resolution within their territories and invites States in a position
to do so to offer assistance as appropriate in response to specific requests to the
States lacking the legal and regulatory infrastructure, implementation experience
and/or resources for fulfilling the above provisions;
8. Calls upon all States:
(a) To promote the universal adoption and full implementation, and, where
necessary, strengthening of multilateral treaties to which they are parties,
whose aim is to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, biological or chemical
weapons;
(b) To adopt national rules and regulations, where it has not yet been done,
to ensure compliance with their commitments under the key multilateral non-
proliferation treaties;
(c) To renew and fulfil their commitment to multilateral cooperation, in
particular within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency,
the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Biological
and Toxin Weapons Convention, as important means of pursuing and
achieving their common objectives in the area of non-proliferation and of
promoting international cooperation for peaceful purposes;
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(d) To develop appropriate ways to work with and inform industry and the
public regarding their obligations under such laws;
9. Calls upon all States to promote dialogue and cooperation on non-
proliferation so as to address the threat posed by proliferation of nuclear, chemical,
or biological weapons, and their means of delivery;
10. Further to counter that threat, calls upon all States, in accordance with their
national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, to
take cooperative action to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical or
biological weapons, their means of delivery, and related materials;
11. Expresses its intention to monitor closely the implementation of this
resolution and, at the appropriate level, to take further decisions which may be
required to this end;
12. Decides to remain seized of the matter.
* The 4955th Meeting was closed.
** Definitions for the purpose of this resolution only:
Means ofdelivery: missiles, rockets and other unmanned systems capable of deliv-
ering nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, that are specially designed for such
use.
Non-State actor: individual or entity, not acting under the lawful authority of any
State in conducting activities which come within the scope of this resolution.
Related materials: materials, equipment and technology covered by relevant multi-
lateral treaties and arrangements, or included on national control lists, which
could be used for the design, development, production or use of nuclear, chemical




14 U.S.C. § 637
Stopping vessels; immunity indemnityforfiring at or into vessel
(a) (1) Whenever any vessel liable to seizure or examination does not stop on
being ordered to do so or on being pursued by an authorized vessel or authorized
aircraft which has displayed the ensign, pennant, or other identifying insignia
prescribed for an authorized vessel or authorized aircraft, the person in command
or in charge of the authorized vessel or authorized aircraft may, after a gun has
been fired by the authorized vessel or authorized aircraft as a warning signal fire at
or into the vessel which does not stop.
(2) Before firing at or into a vessel as authorized in paragraph ( 1 ), the person in
command or in charge of the authorized vessel or authorized aircraft shall fire a
gun as a warning signal, except that the prior firing of a gun as a warning signal is
not required if that person determines that the firing of a warning signal would
unreasonably endanger persons or property in the vicinity of the vessel to be
stopped .
(b) The person in command of an authorized vessel or authorized aircraft and all
persons acting under that person's direction shall be indemnified from any
penalties or actions for damages for firing at or into a vessel pursuant to subsection
(a). Ifany person is killed or wounded by the firing, and the person in command of
the authorized vessel or authorized aircraft or any person acting pursuant to their
orders is prosecuted or arrested therefor, they shall be forthwith admitted to bail.





it is a Coast Guard vessel or aircraft; or
(2) it is a surface naval vessel or military aircraft on which one or more
members of the Coast Guard are assigned pursuant to section 379 of title 10t
or.
* As amended in 2004 by PUB. L. No. 108-293, § 205 (2004). Underlined sections were added in
2004. Strikeouts indicate sections deleted in 2004.
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(3) subject to subsection (d), it is a naval aircraft that has one or more
members of the Coast Guard on board and is operating from a surface naval
vessel described in paragraph (2).
fd) ( 1 ) The inclusion of naval aircraft as an authorized aircraft for purposes of this
section shall be effective only after the end of the 30 -day period beginning on the
date the report required by paragraph (2) is submitted through September 30,
{2} Not later than August 1, 2000, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the
Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the
Committee on Armed Services of the Senate a report containing
(A) an analysis of the benefits and risks associated with using naval air-
craft to perform the law enforcement activities authorized by subsection
{B} an estimate of the extent to which the Secretary expects to imple -
ment the authority provided by this section; and
{G} an analysis of the effectiveness and applicability to the Department
of Defense of the Coast Guard program known as the "New Frontiers"
program.
(d) Report- The Commandant of the Coast Guard shall transmit a report annually
to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate and
the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of
Representatives describing the location, vessels or aircraft, circumstances, and
consequences of each incident in the 12-month period covered by the report in
which the person in command or in charge of an authorized vessel or an
authorized aircraft (as those terms are used in section 637 of title 14, United States





Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis 123 (1969).
2. See 2004 Report of the Secretary-General, Oceans and the Law of the Sea, at 40-41, para. 162,
U.N. Doc. A/59/62 (2004).
3. NATO members participating in the PSI since its inception include France, Germany, Italy,




4. Interdiction Principles for the Proliferation Security Initiative, Sept. 4, 2003, para. 1 , available
at http://www.state.gOv/t/np/rls/fs/23764.htm.
5. Id. para. 4.
6. See Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government ofthe Republic of Liberia Concerning Cooperation to Suppress the Proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction, Their Delivery Systems, and Related Materials By Sea, Feb. 11,
2004 [hereinafter United States-Liberia Bilateral WMD Boarding Agreement], at http://
www.state.gOv/t/np/trty/32403.htm; Amendment to the Supplementary Arrangement Between
the Government ofthe United States ofAmerica and the Government ofthe Republic ofPanama
to the Arrangement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government ofthe Republic ofPanama for Support and Assistance from the United States Coast
Guard for the National Maritime Service of the Ministry of Government and Justice, May 12,
2004 [hereinafter United States-Panama Bilateral WMD Boarding Agreement], at http://www
.state.gov/t/np/trty/32858.htm; Agreement Between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the Republic of the Marshall Islands Concerning Cooperation
to Suppress the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Their Delivery Systems, and
Related Materials by Sea, Aug. 13, 2004, [hereinafter United States-Marshall Islands Bilateral
WMD Boarding Agreement], at http://www.state.gOv/t/np/trty/35237.htm.
7. Wojciech Moskwa, Bush Seeks to Broaden Fight Against Spread of WMD, REUTERS, June 1,
2004, available at http://www.reuters.com/newsArticle.jhtml?type=politicsNews&storyID
=530982 1 &src=rss/ElectionCoverage&section=news.
8. Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United
STATES 381 (2004). The commission concluded the "PSI can be more effective it if uses
intelligence and planning resources ofthe NATO alliance. Moreover, PSI membership should be
open to non-NATO countries. Russia and China should be encouraged to participate." The PSI
was always open to non-NATO States. And well before the commission entered its final report,
Russia had already joined the PSI and China appeared to have no interest in joining.
9. U.N. Security Council Res. 1540, U.N. Doc. No. S/RES/1540 (2004). In Resolution 1373, the
Council had earlier called on all States to, inter alia, act to eliminate the supply of weapons to
terrorists. U.N. Security Council Res. 1373, para. 2(a), U.N. Doc. No. S/RES/1373 (2001).
10. Reportedly China agreed to support the resolution only after a provision that would have
permitted interdiction at sea was removed. Warren Hodge, Ban on Weapons ofDoom is Extended
to Qaeda-Style Groups, NEW YORK TIMES, Apr. 29, 2004.
11. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 221, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 101-1 (1989), reprinted in 27
International Legal Materials 672 (1988).
12. Calvin M. Lederer, Developments Involving the Convention on the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Affecting Maritime Navigation, 2004 YEARBOOK OF THE COMITE MARITIME
INTERNATIONAL 45, 50. See also Counter-Proliferation: Practising to Provoke, THE ECONOMIST,
Sept. 20, 2003, at 41.
13. The commanding officer of a US Navy cruiser described the typical MIO tempo of
operations in the Persian Gulf this way: "During MIO, a single Navy ship can expect to run boat
ops 15 to 18 hours a day, provide three to four six-man security teams, two 12-man (VBSS)
teams, and in general ride herd on an average of 10 to 15 merchant ships daily." Chris Nichols,
SWO Life: Operation Enduring Freedom and Philippine Sea (CG-58), SHIPMATE, Mar. 2002,
available at http://www.usna.com/News_Pubs/Publications/Shipmate/2002/03/SWO.htm.
14. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/
122 (1982), 1833 U.N.T.S. 3; S. TREATY DOC. 103-39 (1994), reprinted in 21 INTERNATIONAL
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LEGAL MATERIALS 1261 (1982) [hereinafter LOS Convention]. The United States is not yet a
party.
15. For testimony rebutting those claims, see Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Report on
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, S. EXEC. REP. No. 108-10, at 49, 64, 97,
103 & 11 1-12 (Mar. 11,2004).
16. The term "maritime interception operations" has taken on a variety of meanings over time.
It was originally used in a narrow sense to refer only to naval operations taken to enforce the UN
Security Council resolutions imposing embargoes. The Navy now defines MIO as the "legitimate
action ofdenying suspect vessels access to specific ports for import or export of prohibited goods
to or from a specified nation or nations, for purposes of peacekeeping or to enforce imposed
sanctions." See US Navy, Maritime Interception Operations, ^ 1.5.12, NTTP 3-07.1 1/CGP 3-
07. 1 1 ( 2003 ) [ hereinafter Navy MIO Doctrine] . The Navy MIO doctrine does not apply to naval
blockades in time of war. Id. U 1.3. In fact, Navy doctrine acknowledges there are "crucial
differences between MIOs and belligerent acts of interdiction such as blockade and visit and
search during international armed conflict." See US Navy, Naval Doctrine for Military
Operations Other-Than-War, H 3.2.2.1, NWP 3-07 (1998) [hereinafter Navy MOOTW
Doctrine].
17. "Expanded MIO," when authorized by the Secretary of Defense, are designed to intercept
targeted personnel or material that pose an imminent threat to the United States. E-MIO may
involve multinational forces and may be implemented even when sanctions have not been
imposed. See Navy MIO Doctrine, supra note 16, ^ 1.5.6.
1 8. The Coast Guard defines "law enforcement" as "all Coast Guard functions or actions carried
out pursuant to the legal authorities described in" the Maritime Law Enforcement Manual. See
US Coast Guard, Maritime Law Enforcement Manual, 1 4.A.2, COMDTINST M16247.1C
(2003) [hereinafter Coast Guard MLEM].
19. See LOS Convention, supra note 14, art. 110.
20. "Countermeasures" are directed at another State to coerce the State to comply with
international law. Historically, they included both non-forcible and forcible counter-measures.
Forcible countermeasures are now limited by the United Nations Charter. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF the United States § 904(2) (1987) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT]; Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.) 1949 I.C.J. 4, 35 (Apr. 9) (rejecting the U.K.
argument that it had a right to intervene and clear mines in the Albanian territorial sea to
facilitate innocent passage ofU.K. warships). See also Professor Heintschel von Heinegg's article,
The Proliferation Security Initiative: Security vs. Freedom of Navigation, which is Chapter IV in
this volume, at 56. As Professor McDougal pointed out in an earlier Blue Book volume, the use of
force in law enforcement activities does not constitute forcible self-help. See Myres S. McDougal,
Authority to Use Force on the High Seas, in READINGS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM THE NAVAL
WAR COLLEGE REVIEW 1947-1977, at 551, 557-58 (Richard B. Lillich & John Norton Moore
eds., 1980) (Vol. 61, US Naval War College International Law Studies).
21. The term "US Maritime Forces" includes the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard. See
Navy MOOTW Doctrine, supra note 16, at 1-1.
22. See 10 U.S.C.A. § 379 (West 2005).
23. The fact that a given boarding is conducted under the MIO/VBSS framework does not
indicate the nature or scope of the boarding or the legal authority on which it relies. Similarly,
the fact that a Coast Guard LEDET accompanies a Navy VBSS team does not necessarily indicate
the boarding falls within the maritime law enforcement rubric. See Navy MIO Doctrine, supra
note 16, H 2.2.4. The Memorandum of Understanding Between the Department of Defense and
Department of Transportation [now Homeland Security] on the Use of USCG Capabilities and
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Resources in Support of National Military Strategy (Oct. 3, 1995) defines five categories of the
Coast Guard that may be made available to support the National Military Strategy, including,
inter alia, maritime interception operations, peacetime military engagement and coastal sea
control.
24. The actions may also trigger an operational report (OPREP) or situation report (SITREP)
message reporting requirement. See Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3150.05
(series); Chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs ofStaffManual 3150.3 (series); Office ofthe Chiefof Naval
Operations Instruction 3100.6 (series).
25. Proclamation No. 3504, 27 FEDERAL REGISTER 10,401 (Oct. 23, 1962). The Proclamation
authorized the use of force only in cases of failure or refusal to comply, after reasonable efforts
had been made to communicate directly with the vessels, or in cases of self-defense, and then
only to the extent necessary.
26. See Navy MOOTW Doctrine, supra note 16, at 3-2 n.4. NATO prefers the phrase Maritime
Interdiction Operations (MIOPs). In the United States "interdiction" is defined as activities
designed to "divert, disrupt, delay or destroy" the adversary's potential to inflict harm before it
can be used effectively against friendly forces. See Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-03, Joint
Interdiction Operations (1997).
27. The principle of impartiality is also manifested in the 1982 LOS Convention's articles
banning discrimination. See, e.g., LOS Convention, supra note 14, arts. 24(1 )(b), 25, 26, 42(2),
52(2) & 227.
28. Navy MIO Doctrine, supra note 16, at 3-3. The principle of impartiality does not require
that all vessels be stopped. Effectiveness is measured by the extent to which MIO furthers
compliance with the sanctions.
29. Id. at 3-4.
30. Id.
31. Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance are part of the larger integrated JC4ISR
approach, which also includes joint command, control, communications and computing. See
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-32, Command and Control of Joint Military
Operations, at App. A (Second Draft, 25 June 2003), available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/
jel/ddrraafftt_pubs/3_22sd.pdf.
32. Enforcement vessels will no doubt recognize the security risks posed by requiring vessels to
transmit sensitive information by radio transmissions that are easily intercepted by other vessels
or shore stations.
33. VBSS team members attend individual and team training to learn boarding procedures,
vessel control tactics, levels of force, take-down procedures and search techniques. Team
members are trained in non-lethal and lethal use of force techniques. See generally Navy MIO
Doctrine, supra note 16, If 4.3.1 & App. H.
34. The Navy distinguishes between "opposed" boardings and "noncompliant" boardings, the
former of which present a higher risk. See id. J 1.5. Special operations forces are always used in
opposed boardings, and may be used in noncompliant boardings. Ship's force VBSS teams are
not authorized to conduct opposed boardings, id. ^ 6.1, or noncompliant boardings on vessels
with high freeboard. Id. ^ 6.6.
35. Special operations forces may be drawn from a SEAL or MSPF team. The MSPF element
within Marine expeditionary units (special operations capable) provides the direct action
capability and carries out the VBSS mission in support of maritime interception operations. See
Navy MOOTW Doctrine, supra note 16, ^ 3.2.2.5. On naval vessels without an embarked MEU,
similar support may be available from a Marine security force battalion or one of its fleet
antiterrorism security teams (FAST).
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36. The effectiveness of this approach was demonstrated by a team of Navy SEALs and Marines
that conducted a vertical take-down in the widely-studied interdiction of the Iraqi cargo ship Ibn
Khahiun in the northern Arabian Sea in 1990. See Lois E. Fielding, Maritime Interception:
Centerpiece of Economic Sanctions in the New World Order, 53 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 1191,
1192 (1993); see also Robert E. Marabito, Maritime Interdiction: Evolution of a Strategy, 22
Ocean Development and International Law 301 (1991).
37. Navy MIO Doctrine, supra note 16, 1j 6.6.2. "Breaching" refers to boarding by small boat
without the cooperation of the boarded vessel, and may require overcoming passive measures to
obstruct the boarding. It is considered "extremely dangerous." Id.
38. Id. 15.6.2.2.
39. Diversions have been directly addressed in the context of the belligerents' right of visit and
search. See SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICTS AT
SEA 32, «1 121 (Louise Doswald-Beck, ed. 1995). At the time the Manual was written, some
concluded that a right to compel diversion had not yet ripened into a rule of customary law. See
Louise Doswald-Beck, Current Developments: The San Remo Manual on International Law
Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea, 89 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 192, 202
(1995).
40. Navy VBSS and Coast Guard LEDET teams have implemented a number of innovations to
overcome the difficulties of at-sea container inspections, including the use of sophisticated
climbing equipment and techniques. See Navy MIO Doctrine, supra note 16, Annex D, U D.5.
41. The choice of rules can be even more complex if the operation includes military or law
enforcement personnel from other nations. See NavyMIO Doctrine, supra note 16, Ifll 2.4 & 2.5.
42. The legal authorities on which WMD interception operations may be founded are beyond
the scope of this article.
43. See Alfred H.A. Soons, Enforcing the Economic Embargo at Sea, in UNITED NATIONS
Sanctions and International Law 307-24 (Vera Gowlland-Debbas et al. eds., 2001).
44. Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993. See also Dieter
Fleck, Rules ofEngagement for Maritime Forces and the Limitation of the Use ofForce Under the
UN Charter, 31 GERMAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 165 (1988). For an analysis of the
self-defense arguments, see Michael Byers, Comment, Policing the High Seas: The Proliferation
Security Initiative, 98 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 526-^45 (2004). The French
commentators Dupuy and Vignes and their Iranian contributor Djamchid Momtaz argue
against a right of self-defense on the high seas. RENE-JEAN DUPUY & DANIEL VIGNES, A
Handbook on the New Law of the Sea 412-14 (1991).
45. Church v. Hubbard, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 187, 235 (1804).
46. See, e.g., US Navy Regulations (1990), arts. 0915 (use of force against another State) & 0914
(violations of international law and treaties).
47. It is sometimes said, even in introductory use of force training sessions, that there is little or
no meaningful difference between the SROE, the RUF and the CGUFP. Staffjudge advocates and
law specialists must be alert to correct such simplistic assertions and their tendency to blur vital
distinctions between the doctrines. The more difficult challenge will be to justify the need for
multiple doctrines and the potential to inject confusion into one of the commander's most
important planning and operational decisions.
48. The distinction is implicit in the UN Security Council's Resolution 221 imposing an
embargo on the former Rhodesia. Although not explicitly stated, the resolution was issued under
Article 41 of the UN Charter, which is limited to measures not including the use of armed force.
Nevertheless, the Council authorized the enforcing State to use force to compel compliance with
the embargo. See U.N. Security Council Resolution 221, para. 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/221 (1966)
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(authorizing the United Kingdom to "prevent, by the use of force if necessary" the arrival of
tankers in (Portuguese controlled) Beira). By Resolution 217 issued the year before, the Council
had imposed an "embargo on oil and petroleum products" to Rhodesia. See U.N. Doc. S/RES/
217 (1965), para. 8.
49. See PHILIP C. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 162 (1952). Judge Jessup took the
position that a use of armed force violates Article 2(4) of the Charter only if it is directed against
the territorial integrity or political independence of a State.
50. See Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of
Military and Associated Terms, (Apr. 12, 2001, as amended through June 9, 2004) (emphasis
added) [hereinafter DoD Dictionary].
5 1
.
Despite the fact that the US embassy in Beirut had been bombed just six months earlier, the
United States had not taken any additional precautions at the Beirut barracks, nor, reportedly,
had the on scene commander requested an ROE review or revision. The incident raised serious
questions about why, in such a high-risk environment, the sentries' weapons were not loaded.
52. Bruce Berkowitz, The New Face of War: How War Will be Fought in the 2 1st
CENTURY 1 17 (2003) (reporting that the safety of the Cole "depended totally on a handful of
twenty-year-old sailors armed with unloaded M-16s, squinting into the noonday sun and trying
to figure out why two guys in a skiff were waving at them as they approached").
53. Perhaps the best known case concerned General John LaVelle, USAF, commander of the
Seventh Air Force in Viet Nam in 1971, who was relieved ofcommand and demoted for charges
relating to violations of applicable ROE and reporting requirements. See BERKOWITZ, id. at 151.
More recently, an Illinois Air National Guard pilot received non-judicial punishment under
Article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice for, inter alia, violating the rules of
engagement during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. The flag officer who imposed
the punishment found that the pilot "blatantly ignored the applicable rules of engagement and
special instructions." See U.S. Pilot Found Guilty in 'Friendly Fire" Incident, CNN.COM NEWS,
July 6, 2004, at http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/07/06/pilot.friendly.fire/.
54. Self-defense is an affirmative defense under the Uniform Code of Justice. Rule for Courts-
Martial (R.C.M.) 916(e), Manual for Courts Martial (2002). A similar rule applies in cases
brought before the International Criminal Court (ICC). To prevail on a defense of self-defense
before the ICC, the conduct must have been a "reasonable" response to an imminent and
unlawful use of force. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, art.
31(l)(c), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9, reprinted in 37 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 999
(1998) (the United States is not a party). The Rome Statute also limits the defense ofobedience to
orders. Responsibility for crimes falling within the Rome Statute is excluded only if the person
acting under a legal obligation to obey orders (1) did not know the order was unlawful, and (2)
the order was not manifestly unlawful. Id. art. 33.
55. See United States v. Hensel, 699 F.2d 18, 28, 29 ( 1st Cir.), cert, denied, 461 U.S. 958 (1983).
56. See Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Standing Rules of Engagement for U.S. Forces, CJCS
Inst. 3121.01 (series). The SROE replaced what were known as the "Peacetime Rules of
Engagement." Most of the 2000 version (CJCS Inst. 3 12 1.01A) is classified, with the exception of
Enclosure A, which sets out the SROE for self-defense [hereinafter CJCS 3 12 1.01 A]. Typically,
ROE for joint operations are included in Appendix 8 (Rules of Engagement) to Annex C
(Operations) of the applicable operation plan or operation order.
57. See CJCSI 3121.01A, supra note 56, Encl. A, U 1(a) (SROE are applicable during "all military
operations, contingencies, terrorist attacks, or prolonged conflicts outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States"). An exception is made for US forces under the operational
control of a multinational force. Id. J 1(c).
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58. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-26, Joint Doctrine for Homeland Security, at III- 1 3,
(Mar. 26, 2004 draft) [hereinafter Joint Doctrine for Homeland Security].
59. Id. at IV- 17. See also William J. Fenrick, Legal Limits on the Use of Force by Canadian
Warships Engaged in Law Enforcement, 18 CANADIAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 113-
45(1980).
60. See Coast Guard MLEM, supra note 1 8, ^ 4.E. 1 , which provides that Coast Guard units shall
adhere to the SROE under the following conditions: ( 1 ) when the unit (wherever located and
even if conducting a Coast Guard mission at the time) determines that it must take action in
defense of itself or other US forces in the vicinity; (2) when the unit is under the tactical control
of the DoD (for any purpose) when operating outside US territory (seaward of the 12 NM
territorial sea); or (3) when engaged in national self-defense, as authorized by an authority
designated in the SROE. The SROE authority to exercise "national self-defense" in the absence of
express authorization does not currently extend to the Coast Guard. Id. at 4-3.
61. See Navy MIO Doctrine, supra note 16, H 2.6.1. Naval doctrine acknowledges that the
sanctioning body's resolution prescribes the level of force authorized in conducting MIO.
However, "the wording is often ambiguous." Id. Accordingly, MIO units must also rely on
national interpretations of the resolution and the ROE.
62. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Rules of Engagement, MC362 (1999).
63. US forces operating under the OPCON or TACON of a multinational force commander
follow the mission accomplishment ROE of the multinational force ifauthorized by the National
Command Authorities; however, they always retain the right to use necessary and proportional
force for unit and individual self-defense in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile
intent, just as they do when under Coast Guard OPCON or TACON. See CJCS Inst. 3 12 1.01 A,
supra note 56, Encl. A, ffl| l.c & l.f.
64. See Navy MIO Doctrine, supra note 16, Ifll 2.4 & 2.5.
65. Richard Zeigler, Ubi Sumus? Quo Vadimus? Charting the Course of Maritime Interception
Operations, 43 NAVAL LAW REVIEW 1 (1996).
66. Mike Spence, Lessons for Combined Rules of Engagement, U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE
PROCEEDINGS, Oct. 2000, at 56-60 (observing that dealing with ROE is difficult enough when
only one nation's armed forces are engaged; however, problems multiply rapidly when
consistent ROE must be developed for multinational forces).
67. It is the policy of the United States that the armed forces of the United States will comply
with the "law of war" during all armed conflicts, however, such conflicts may be characterized.
The "law of war" encompasses all international law for the conduct of hostilities that is binding
on the United States or its individual citizens. See Secretary of Defense, DOD Directive 5100.77,
DoD Law ofWar Program, Dec. 9, 1998; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Implementation of the
DOD Law of War Program, CJCS Instruction 58 10.0 IB, Mar. 25, 2002.
68. See Navy MOOTW Doctrine, supra note 16, at 3-2.
69. For the obligation, see Article 0914 of the US Navy Regulations (1990):
On occasions when injury to the United States or to citizens thereof is committed or
threatened in violation of the principles of international law or in violation of rights
existing under a treaty or other international agreement, the senior officer present . .
.
shall take such action as is demanded by the gravity of the situation. In time of peace,
action involving the use of force shall be taken only in consonance with the provisions
of [Article 0915].
Article 0915 limits the use of force against another State to cases of self-defense against hostile
acts or hostile intent directed against the unit and, when appropriate, in defense of US citizens,
their property and US commercial assets in the vicinity.
126
Craig H. Allen
70. CJCSI 3 12 1.01 A, supra note 56, End. A, at A-3. "Hostile act" and demonstrated "hostile
intent" are defined at A-5. See generally Richard J. Grunawalt, The JCS Standing Rules of
Engagement: A Judge Advocate's Primer, 42 AIR FORCE LAW REVIEW 245 (1997). See also Mike
Palmer, Unwrapping the ROE Axle, U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, May 2004, at 58
(highlighting the inherent and independent force of self-defense ROE from mission
accomplishment ROE).
71. CJCSI 3121.01A, supra note 56, End. A, at U 5.f.
72. Id. End. A, at 18(2).
73. See, e.g., Navy MIO Doctrine, supra note 16, Annex D, 1 D.3.1 ("boarding team threat
standing rules of engagement" for MIO boardings).
74. See Secretary of Defense Directive of 16 May 2003; Chief of Naval Operations message
3 1 1903Z July 2003. DoD considers warning shots a signal to an approaching vessel to stop; they
do not constitute a use of force.
75. See Joint Doctrine for Homeland Security, supra note 58, at GL-13.
76. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1385 (West 2005). See also Annotation, Construction and Application ofPosse
Comitatus Act (18 U.S.C.A. § 1385), and Similar Predecessor Provisions, Restricting Use of United
StatesArmy and Air Force to Executive Laws, 141 AMERICAN LAW REPORTS, FEDERAL271 (2003).
Although the PCA directly addresses only the Army (and later the Air Force), Congress directed
the Secretary ofDefense to promulgate regulations prohibiting the Navy and Marine Corps from
directly participating in civilian law enforcement activities. 10 U.S.C.A. §§ 371-382 (West 2005).
77. Joint Doctrine for Homeland Security, supra note 58, at 1-13 to 1-15. Navy civil support
missions include measures to combat terrorism, counter-narcotics operations, national security
special events, critical infrastructure and key asset protection, support for natural and manmade
disasters response operations and for chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high yield
explosive (CBRNE) consequence management.
78. CJCSI 3 12 1.01A, supra note 56, End. A, 1 l(i). The Naval Doctrine for Military Operations
Other-Than-War distinguishes MOOTW involving the use/threat of force (combat) from
MOOTW not involving the use/threat of force (noncombat). See Navy MOOTW Doctrine,
supra note 16, at 1-2. Such operations often overlap with what are now referred to as Security and
Stability Operations (SASO). MIO and counter-proliferation measures are categorized as
MOOTW. Id. at 1-3 &1 3.2.2.
79. W.atIV-17toIV-18.
80. Joint Doctrine for Homeland Security, supra note 56, at GL-14.
81. Id. at IV- 18. The applicable instruction is CJCSI 3 12 1.02A, May 31, 2000. The instruction
does not apply to US military units or personnel while under OPCON or TACON of the Coast
Guard in support of counter-narcotics operations. Such units instead follow the SROE or
CGUFP. See CJCSI 3121.02A, supra note 56, ffl[ 3.c & 3.e.
82. Joint Doctrine for Homeland Security, supra note 56, at IV- 18.
83. The amended version is reproduced (in redline format) in Appendix III of this article.
84. Coast Guard MLEM, supra note 18, at 1-6. Portions of the MLEM are not releasable to
foreign governments. Id. Chapter 4 is titled "Use of Force Policy and the Standing Rules of
Engagement." Additional guidance is contained in the U.S. Coast Guard, Maritime Counter
Drug and Alien Migrant Interdiction Operations (AMIO), COMDINST M16247.4/NWP 3-07.4
(2000).
85. "Operational control" is the authority to direct all aspects of military operations and
training necessary to accomplish the mission. "Tactical control" is mission-specific or task-
specific. It is defined as the command authority over assigned or attached units made available
for tasking that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movement or maneuvers
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within the operational area necessary to accomplish the missions or tasks assigned. Operational
control includes tactical control. See DoD Dictionary, supra note 50.
86. Coast Guard MLEM, supra note 1 8, ^ 3.C. 1 .a. 1
.
87. W.14.B.l.a.
88. 14 U.S.C.A. § 637(c) (West 2005). By the terms of the statute, it applies to naval surface
vessels (or aircraft) on which one or more members of the Coast Guard are assigned pursuant to
10U.S.C. §379.
89. Coast Guard MLEM, supra note 18, at ^ E.2.
90. W.1]4.B.3.b. See a/so MODEL PENAL CODE §3. 11 (2) (1985) [hereinafter MPC]. The Model
Penal Code serves as a template for defining the elements of crimes and defenses for many
jurisdictions and sets out several defenses to what would otherwise be crimes involving the use of
force. The Code is not legally binding.
91. Coast Guard MLEM, supra note 18, at 4-4.
92. The CGUFP does not distinguish between "opposed" boardings and "noncompliant"
boardings. See Coast Guard MLEM, supra note 18, U 4.A.3.
93. See id. 1 4.B.3.b.5.
94. The CGUFP prohibits warning shots other than against noncompliant vessels. Id. ^ 4.B.2.d.
95. Id. at 4-14. Note that disabling fire is permitted even when there is a risk of "minimum"
injury, but it will be discontinued if there is a "substantial" risk of injury. As phrased, the
"substantiality" qualification apparently refers to the probability of risk, not its magnitude.
96. Note that the statute provides for an indemnity, not immunity. The indemnity also extends
to those acting under that commanding officer's direction for any penalties or actions for
damages arising out of the action. 14 U.S.C.A. § 637(b) (West 2005).
97. See, e.g., The I'm Alone Arbitration (Can. v. U.S.), 3 UNITED NATIONS REPORTS OF
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL AWARDS 1609 (1933) (use of disabling fire); Ford v. United States,
272 U.S. 593 (1924) (warning shots); United States v. 63 Kegs of Malt, 27 F.2d 741 (2d Cir. 1928)
(warning shots); The Vinces, 20 F.2d 164 (E.D.S.C. 1927) (warning shots and disabling fire).
98. See CHARLES M. FUSS, SEA OF GRASS: THE MARITIME DRUG WAR 1970-1990, at 69, 70, 1 16,
159, 193 & 248 (1996). On October 10, 1980, the USCGC Point Francis became the first US vessel
to use disabling fire against a drug smuggling vessel.
99. See U.S. Coast Guard, Operation New Frontier Procedures Manual, COMDTINST
M3 120.2 (2003) (public access is restricted because the manual is designated for official use
only).
100. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, § 721, comment c & note 2.
101. In United States v. Hensel, 699 F.2d 18 (1st Cir. 1983), the court construed 14 U.S.C. § 89
and its legislative history and concluded that Congress did not intend that the statute would
authorize the Coast Guard to conduct searches that would violate international law. Id. at 27.
102. See United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983) (holding that Fourth
Amendment was not violated when customs officers boarded a US vessel, pursuant to their
authority under 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) to go on board any vessel at any place in the United States
and examine the vessel's documents without any suspicion of wrongdoing); see also United
States v. Flores-Montano, 542 U.S. 149 (2004) (holding that Fourth Amendment does not
require Customs officer to have "reasonable suspicion" to conduct a non-destructive search of a
vehicle's fuel tank when vehicle crossed US border).
103. U.S. CONST, amend. IV.
104. U.S. CONST, amend. V.
105. The Constitutional safeguards apply to interceptions and boardings even when the
boarding does not have a law enforcement purpose.
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106. See, e.g., Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989); Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115
(1992).
107. See, e.g., Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) (holding that officer had qualified immunity
to suit for alleged excessive force); Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228 (1 1th Cir. 2003).
108. For example, a defendant charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 111 (forcibly assaulting,
resisting or impeding certain federal officers designated in 18 U.S.C. § 1114) might assert in
defense that the defendant's use of force against the officer was justified by the officer's use of
excessive force against the defendant. A person is not justified in resisting arrest by force on the
ground that the arrest is unlawful. See MPC, supra note 90, § 3.04(2)(a)(i).
109. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, All U.S.
1001 (1975). The Supreme Court has ruled that the illegality of a defendant's detention cannot
deprive the government of the opportunity to prove his guilt. United States v. Crews, 445 U.S.
453,474(1980).
110. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). But see United States v. Draper, 536 U.S. 194(2002)
(holding that, under the circumstances presented, the presence of three police officers on a bus
that was stopped did not constitute a seizure of the persons on the bus).
111. Whenever a law enforcement officer has acted in a way that denies a person the freedom to
walk away, a Fourth Amendment "seizure" has occurred. Terry, 392 U.S. at 16. The
reasonableness of the officer's suspicion is determined by a "totality of the circumstances" test.
United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002). The Fifth Circuit has held that the "reasonable
grounds" standard applicable to a right ofapproach boarding (under Article 1 10 ofthe 1982 LOS
Convention) satisfies the "reasonableness" test under the Fourth Amendment. See United States
v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1083 (5th Cir. 1980) (applying Article 22 of the former 1958
Convention on the High Seas).
1 12. United States v. Gomez, 633 F.2d 999, 1006 (2d Cir. 1980).
113. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7-12 (1985) (holding that the use of deadly force to stop a
fleeing suspect is only reasonable ifthe officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses
a significant threat of death or physical injury to the officer or others). See also MPC, supra note
90, § 3.07(b).
114. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989).
115. Id. at 397.
116. Mat 396.
117. Id.
118. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 205 (2001).
119. United States v. Verdugo-Uriquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 274-75 (1990); see also Zadvydas v.
Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (confirming it is "well established that certain constitutional
protections available to persons inside the United States are unavailable to aliens outside of our
geographic borders"). Some treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation (FCN) extend
"national treatment" to nationals of the other State. Such treaties have been held to be self-
executing. Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924) (holding that the FCN treaty
between the United States and Japan "operates of itself without the aid of any legislation").
120. United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 491 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that a foreign search is
reasonable if it conforms to the requirements of foreign law). But see United States v. Bin Laden,
132 F. Supp.2d 168, 186-87 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding that Fifth Amendment protections
relating to self-incrimination apply to the use, in a US court, of a statement obtained in a foreign
custodial interrogation by US government agents because the Fifth Amendment "violation"
occurs when the statement is used at trial, not when it was obtained).
121. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, § 722, comment m & note 16. In Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S.
466 (2004), the Court held that the Guantanamo Bay Navy Base in Cuba, over which the United
States exercises "complete jurisdiction and control" under the lease, falls within the territorial
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jurisdiction of the United States for purposes of applying the habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. §
2241. Accordingly, a federal court with venue may determine whether the detainees are being
held in custody in violation of the Constitution or the laws or treaties of the United States. The
Supreme Court's holding so far does not extend to detentions at other overseas locations that are
not under the "plenary and exclusive jurisdiction" of the United States.
1 22. United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 274-75 (2d Cir. 1974). In Ker v. Illinois, 1 19 U.S.
436 (1886), however, the Court held that a defendant who was forcibly abducted in Peru for trial
in the U.S. was not entitled to have the charges dismissed on grounds that his right to due process
was violated. See also Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 ( 1952); RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, § 433.
1 23. Acting under Article 4 1 of the Charter, the Council cannot authorize "armed force." Armed
force may only be authorized under Article 42. For some, that raises the question whether police
force can be used to enforce council resolutions adopted under Article 41; however, the Security
Council appears to have answered the question in the affirmative in its embargo resolutions
against the former Rhodesia. See Soons, supra note 43, at 321.
124. See Louis Sohn, Peacetime Use of Force on the High Seas, in THE LAW OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS 38 (Horace B. Robertson, Jr. ed., 1991) (Vol. 64, US Naval War College
International Law Studies).
125. LOS Convention, supra note 14, art. 88.
126. Id. art. 301.
127. In 1974 the United Nations General Assembly attempted to define "aggression" by
resolution. According to the Assembly's resolution, aggression is the use of armed force by a
State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence ofanother State, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as defined by the
resolution. U.N. General Assembly, Resolution 3314 (XXIX) of Dec. 14, 1974, G.A.O.R. 29th
Sess., Supp. No. 31 (A/9631), at 142 [hereinafter Aggression Resolution]. For a discussion of the
US position on defining "aggression" under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, see UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN
International Law 2000, at 286-91 (2001).
128. Britain's seizure ofUS merchant vessels was a principal cause ofthe War of 1812. Similarly,
President Wilson sought a declaration of war after German submarines sank US merchant
vessels at a time when the United States had declared its neutrality in World War I. Today,
however, any response must be consistent with Articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter, as
construed by the International Court of Justice in the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
against Nicaragua decision and the Oil Platforms case. Military and Paramilitary Activities
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27) (merits), reprinted in 25 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
MATERIALS 1023 (1986); Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. (Nov. 6) (merits), available
at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iop/iopframe.htm. See also William H. Taft IV, Self-
Defense and the Oil Platforms Decision, 29 YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 295 (2004)
(criticizing the court for its excursion into obiter dictum and criticizing the court's treatment of
the armed attack and self-defense issues). Under the General Assembly definition, an "attack by
the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or marine or air fleets of another State"
constitutes aggression. Aggression Resolution, supra note 127, art. 3(d). The definition appears
to be limited to attacks on warships and naval auxiliaries. However, in its dispute with Canada
over Canada's seizure of the F/VEstai on the high seas in 1995, Spain argued that Canada's use of
warning shots to stop the vessel constituted a use of force in violation of Article 2(4) of the
Charter. Fisheries Jurisdiction (Sp. v. Can.), 1998 I.C.J. 432, 465 (Dec. 4) (declining
jurisdiction). See also D. P. O'CONNELL, II, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 804 (Ivan A.
Shearer ed., 1984). However, nothing in the decision by the International Court of Justice in that
case or by the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea in the M/V Saiga case discussed below
suggests that either tribunal considered the use of military weapons in stopping and boarding a
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vessel to be an "armed attack" or an act of unlawful "aggression" in violation of Article 2(4) of
the UN Charter or a violation of Article 301 of the LOS Convention.
129. See Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation,
Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, T.I.A.S. No. 7570 ("Montreal Convention"); Protocol Relating to
an Amendment to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, Montreal, May 10, 1984,
reprinted in 23 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 705 (1984). The United States is not a party
to the 1984 protocol, presumably out of concern over its provisions for compulsory ICJ
jurisdiction. Article 3 bis of the protocol requires States to refrain from using weapons against
civil aircraft in flight. See also Aircraft Sabotage Act of 1984, codified in part at 18 U.S.C. § 32
(criminalizing attacks on civil aircraft). Congress later made provisions for immunity in cases
involving US assistance to foreign enforcement officials. See 22 U.S.C.A. § 2291-4. See also
Phillip A. Johnson, Shooting Down Drug Traffickers, in LIBER AMICORUM PROFESSOR JACK
GRUNAWALT 79 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 1998) (Vol. 72, US Naval War College International
Law Studies).
130. See, e.g., LOS Convention, supra note 14, art. 73 (limiting enforcement measures available
to coastal States in the EEZ). See also Continental Shelf (Tunis, v. Libya), 1982 I.C.J. 18, 230 (Feb.
24) (Oda, J. dissenting) (predicting that disputes arising out of Article 73 enforcement activities
will likely be excluded from the LOS Convention's compulsory dispute settlement provisions by
virtue of Article 298 of the convention).
131. See Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions ofthe United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, Dec. 4, 1995, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.164/
37 (1995), S. TREATY DOC. NO. 104-24 (1996), reprinted in 34 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
MATERIALS 1542 (1995) [hereinafter the Straddling Fish Stocks Agreement]. Article 22 of the
agreement limits the use of force in fisheries enforcement actions.
132. See, e.g., United States-Liberia Bilateral WMD Boarding Agreement, supra note 6, art. 4(5)
& art. 9.
133. Protocol of2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety
ofMaritime Navigation, art. 8, para. 2 (adding Article 8bis to the SUA Convention), adopted Oct.
17, 2005, IMO Doc. LEG/CONF.15/DC/1 [hereinafter 2005 Protocol to the SUA Convention"].
The new 2005 Protocol article provides that:
When carrying out the authorized actions under this article, the use of force shall be
avoided except when necessary to ensure the safety of its officials and persons on board,
or where the officials are obstructed in the execution of the authorized actions. Any use
of force pursuant to this article shall not exceed the minimum degree of force which is
necessary and reasonable in the circumstances.
134. See United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 870 (5th Cir.) ("the boarding of a vessel on the
high seas by its flag state is not an international event. The consequences are solely a domestic
matter. The boarding of a foreign vessel is, of course, a matter of international concern that
might call for more restraint on the part of the boarding state."), cert, denied, 442 U.S. 832
(1979).
135. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter ICCPR]; see also Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. The United States
ratified the ICCPR in 1992 subject to five reservations, four understandings and four
declarations. See S. REP. 102-123 (1992); 138 CONG. REC. 8070 (1992).
136. See ICCPR, supra note 135, art. 2(1) (requiring States-parties to protect the defined rights of
all individuals "within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction"); see also RESTATEMENT, supra
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note 20, § 701. Application might turn on reservations and exceptions entered and the extent to
which the convention is deemed to be self-executing.
1 37. See, e.g., United States-LiberiaWMD Boarding Agreement, supra note 6, art. 4(5) & art. 9.
138.2005 Protocol to the SUA Convention, supra note 133, art. 8bis, para. 7.
139. It is beyond the scope of this article whether an individual would have standing in a US
court to object to enforcement actions by the United States that went beyond or were in
contravention of an applicable bilateral boarding agreement with the flag State.
140. The diplomatic correspondence, claims and briefs exchanged between the two
governments are reprinted in DEPARTMENT OF STATE, ARBITRATION SERIES No. 2 (vol. 1-7),
I'm Alone Case (1931-1935) [hereinafter I'm Alone Case]. The interim decision is also reported
in the "I'm Alone" Arbitration (Can. v. U.S.).
141. Convention for the Prevention of Smuggling of Intoxicating Liquors (United States-Great
Britain), Jan. 23, 1924, reprinted in I'm Alone Case, supra note 140, vol. I, annex B. Article II of
the Convention provided the US jurisdiction to board British vessels beyond US waters when
within a distance from the coast the target vessel could traverse in one hour. Article IV provided
for arbitration of disputes.
142. Under customary law, by acting as a "mothership" supplying contraband to contact boats
in violation ofUS laws, the Vm Alone might be said to be "constructively present" in US waters.
The constructive presence doctrine is implicit in Article 111 of the 1982 LOS Convention and
Article 23 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas, both ofwhich in describing the right of hot
pursuit recognize that pursuit may be commenced if the pursued vessel "or one of its boats" is in
the pursuing State's territorial sea or internal waters. See also MYRES S. McDOUGAL & WILLIAM
T. BURKE, PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 909-1 1 (1962, rev. 1987). Under the narrow view of
the doctrine, a vessel is only constructively present when it works with its own boats to violate
coastal State law. Under the broader view, the contact boats used to shuttle the illicit cargo to
shore need not be from the mothership. See ROBIN R. CHURCHILL & A. VAUGHAN LOWE, THE
LAW OF THE SEA 215-16 (3d ed. 1999).
143. Joint Interim Report of the Commissioners, the I'm Alone Case ( 1933), supra note 140, vol.
6, at 5.
144. Id. Initially, the Commission concluded only that the intentional sinking was not justified
by any provision of the 1924 treaty. Later, in their final report, they added that the sinking was
not justified "by any principle ofinternational law." Ultimately, compensation was denied to the
owners on the ground that they were US nationals, but the arbitrators ordered the United States
to apologize and pay $25,000 in compensation to the United Kingdom for its insult to the UK
flag. Joint Final Report of the Commissioners, the I'm Alone Case (1935), supra note 140, vol. 7,
at 3-4.
145. Part V of the LOS Convention, which governs enforcement of marine resource laws in the
EEZ, similarly limits "enforcement measures" available to the coastal State to those "necessary";
but it appears to take a broad view of necessity. Article 73 provides that the coastal State is
authorized to "take such measures, including boarding, inspection and judicial proceedings, as
may be necessary to ensure compliance with the laws and regulations adopted in conformity with
this Convention." LOS Convention, supra note 14, art. 73 (emphasis added). This is functionally
equivalent to the standard in 14 U.S.C. § 89 ("All necessary force to compel compliance"). Spain
took a narrower view of Article 73 in its dispute with Canada over the 1995 seizure of the F/V
Estai. Spain's counsel suggested in oral argument that because Article 73 does not expressly
authorize the use of force, any use of force would violate international law. Fisheries Jurisdiction




146. The Red Crusader Case (U.K. v. Den.), Comm'n of Enquiry, Mar. 23, 1962, 35
INTERNATIONAL LAW REPORTS 485 (1962). The two governments agreed to establish a
commission of enquiry to determine the vessel's location at the time of interception.
147. Id. at 499 (emphasis added).
148. The use of the phrase "proved necessity" suggests that the burden of proof was on
Denmark.
149. This conclusion may mean nothing more than that if the fleeing vessel's flag State
intervenes and persuades the vessel to stop, the use of force is no longer necessary. Had the
British intervention permitted Red Crusader to escape, it is not clear the British intervention
would have been excused.
150. Id. at 500.
151. Id.
152. The M/V "Saiga" (No. 2) Case (St. Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea) (Int'l Trib. Law
of the Sea 1999) (merits), 120 INTERNATIONAL LAW REPORTS 143, reprinted in 38
International Legal Materials 1323 (1999) [hereinafter The M/V Saiga].
153. Prompt release actions maybe brought under Article 292 of the LOS Convention to obtain
the release of a vessel and crew upon payment of reasonable security.
154. The M/V Saiga, supra note 152, U 153.
155. W.I 155.
156. Id. 1 153.
157. Straddling Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 131, art. 22.
158. Id. art. 22(1 )(f). Before extending the Article 22 limits outside the fisheries enforcement
context it might be useful to consider that some fisheries enforcement regimes do not even
permit boarding officers to be armed while conducting boardings. See, e.g., Northwest Atlantic
Fisheries Organization (NAFO), Conservation and Enforcement Measures, art. 24(8),
NAFO FC Doc. 04/1 Serial No. N4936, available at http://www.nafo.ca/activities/FRAMES/
AcFrFish.html. Unarmed boardings would be unrealistic for vessels that might be engaged in
trafficking in narcotics, weapons or humans, and any use of force policy must recognize the
differing risk levels presented in the various contexts.
159. The M/V Saiga, supra note 152, U 156.
160. See Tim Zimmermann, IfWorld War III Comes, Blame Fish, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT,
Oct. 21, 1996, at 59-60. The article reports that "fish are the reason that Russians are shooting at
Japanese, Tunisians are shooting at Italians, and a lot of people are shooting at Spaniards." It
goes on to report that three Thai fishermen were shot dead by Vietnamese maritime authorities,
two Spaniards were injured by gunfire from a Portuguese patrol boat, Iceland authorized the use
offeree to exclude Danish fishermen from its waters, and a Malaysian naval vessel fired on a Thai
fishing boat, killing the master and his 14-year-old son. The United Kingdom dispatched naval
frigates to protect British fishing boats during the several "cod wars" with Iceland from 1958 to
1976. See also O'CONNELL, supra note 128, at 1071-72 n.67 (collecting cases and protests
involving the use of force against US vessels and those of other States).
161. The use of force to intentionally sink a vessel with persons aboard would constitute "deadly
force" (force that is likely to cause death or serious physical injury). The standards for the use of
deadly force are much more stringent than those applicable to stopping a noncompliant vessel.
162. Recent decisions by the International Court ofJustice highlight the importance ofclarifying
the burden and quantum of proof in such cases. See Oil Platforms, supra note 128 (Higgins, J.,
Separate Opinion,
ffl| 30-39), reprinted in 42 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1334 (2003). In
the S.S. Lotus case, the tribunal ruled that France, as the State challenging Turkey's exercise of
jurisdiction, had the burden of proving that Turkey's action violated an applicable rule of
international law. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9 (Sept. 7).
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163. The LOS Convention prescribes an effectiveness standard for enforcement. See, e.g., LOS
Convention, supra note 14, art. 94(1) (establishing flag State's duty to "effectively" exercise its
jurisdiction and control).
164. For example, in 1964, the United States protested an incident that occurred 16 miles off the
Soviet coast in which a Soviet vessel fired on the unarmed American merchant vessel Sister
Katingo, apparently because the American vessel failed to clear customs before departing the
Soviet port. The United States also protested a 1969 incident in which a Peruvian gunboat fired
on an unarmed US tuna boat located 40 miles off the Peruvian coast, breaking the tuna boat's
mast and radio antenna. The United States argued there was no justification under international
law for firing on an unarmed fishing vessel. See O'CONNELL, supra note 128, at 1071-72 n.67.
165. CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 142, at 461; see also O'CONNELL, supra note 128, at 1071-
74 (also relying on the Vm Alone case).
166. Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, U.N. Doc.
E/CN. 15/ 1996/ 16/Add.2 [hereinafter Basic Principles]. The Basic Principles declare themselves
to be non-derogable, even in times of public emergency. Id. para. 8. Although the Basic
Principles developed by the UN Economic and Social Council are not legally binding, the
European Court of Human Rights treats them as if they were. See, e.g., Ocalan v Turkey [2003]
Eur. Ct. H.R. 46221/99, 1 196.
167. UN Code ofConduct for Law Enforcement Officials, adopted by the UN General Assembly
Resolution 34/169, Dec. 17, 1997, U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/169 (1997) [hereinafter Code of
Conduct].
168. Basic Principles, supra note 166, para. 2. The European Court of Human Rights held that
the Government of Turkey bore responsibility for failing to equip its security forces with non-
lethal force equipment when they responded to a large internal civil disturbance, leaving the
forces no alternative to the use ofdeadly force. Giilec v. Turkey, [1998] Eur. Ct. H.R. 21 593/93, 1flj
71,73,83.
169. As noted above, under Articles 297 and 298 of the LOS Convention certain disputes
concerning law enforcement or military activities may be exempt from the Convention's
compulsory dispute settlement procedures. See LOS Convention, supra note 14, arts. 297 & 298.
Private suits for damages may be subject to the defenses ofsovereign immunity or the act of State
doctrine. See, e.g., Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989)
(dismissing suit by tanker owner for damage to vessel by Argentine naval gunfire). The act of
State doctrine applies only to the State's acts within its territory, not to those occurring on the
high seas.
170. See LOS Convention, supra note 14, arts. 95 & 96.
171. Navy MIO Doctrine, supra note 16, ffl| 2.4 & 2.5.
172. See, e.g., HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 180 n.89 (Richard H.
Dana ed, 8th ed. 1866) (George G. Wilson rev. ed. 1936) (the "right to stop a foreign vessel and
visit her must carry the right to use the requisite force, if the exercise ofthe right is resisted. If not,
it is not a right in any sense worth disputing").
173. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1 155 U.N.T.S. 331, reprinted in 8
International Legal Materials 679 (1969). The United States is not a party.
174. For example, a WMD shipment to a suspected terrorist organization being transported by
sea in the Persian Gulf area might implicate one or more resolutions on WMD proliferation,
global terrorism and State-specific embargoes.
1 75. See U.N. Charter, supra note 44, arts. 24( 1 ), 39 & 1 ( 1 ).
176. Id. art. 25. The means by which a decision of the Council is to be "carried out" are not
defined; however, they must be "in accordance with" the Charter, including the purposes and
principles articulated in Articles 1 and 2.
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177. Such boarding agreements are lex specialis and therefore control in any disputes between
the parties. However, such agreements must be compatible with the LOS Convention. See LOS
Convention, supra note 14, art. 293(1).
178. See United States-Liberia BilateralWMD Boarding Agreement, supra note 6, art. 9; United
States-Marshall Islands Bilateral WMD Boarding Agreement, supra note 6, art. 9.
179. The "M/V Saiga," supra note 152, 1 156.
180. See United States-Liberia Bilateral WMD Boarding Agreement, supra note 6, art. 4(5).
181. The boarding agreement expressly preserves the right of the parties to exercise the right of
approach and visit under international law. See id, art. 4(4).
182. Supplementary Arrangement Between the Government of the United States of America
and the Government of the Republic of Panama to the Arrangement Between the Government
ofthe United States ofAmerica and the Government of the Republic ofPanama for Support and
Assistance from the United States Coast Guard for the National Maritime Service ofthe Ministry
of Government and Justice, Feb. 5, 2002, art. X, 2002 U.S.T. Lexis 51, available at http://
www.state.gOv/t/np/trty/32859.htm. Any use of force must comply with Article XVII of the
agreement.
183. Id. art. XVII.
184. See id. art. 1(6) (a). The Panama Agreement permits WMD boardings by "auxiliary
personnel" only when law enforcement personnel are not available. See United States-Panama
Bilateral WMD Boarding Agreement, supra note 6, art. 1, para. 4 (revising Article XV of the
existing agreement).
185. U.S. National Imagery 8c Mapping Agency, International Code of Signals for Visual, Sound,
and Radio Communications, NIMA Publ'n 102 (1969, rev. 2003), at 83 [hereinafter NIMA
Publication 102].
186. Navy MIO Doctrine, supra note 16, U 2.4. In general, mission accomplishment ROE in
MOOTW are more restrictive than in war. See Joint Doctrine forMOOTW, supra note 1 6, ^j I- 1
.
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The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is one of a number of measures
taken by the international community in response to the heightened con-
cern over terrorism since the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001.
The PSI is essentially part of a preventative strategy to deny weapons of mass de-
struction (WMD) to terrorist organizations by ensuring such weapons cannot be
moved freely across the world's oceans. This article will seek to consider the impli-
cations for the law of the sea, particularly the operation of the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1 generated by the PSI, and the possible implica-
tions of its vigorous pursuit.
Content ofthe PSI
The PSI was announced in Krakow, Poland on May 13, 2003 by President George
W. Bush. 2 It initially was a cooperative venture between eleven States, 3 but has
gradually widened its support base to include a number of additional States, in-
cluding Russia.4 In addition to this direct support, the PSI received tacit approval
from States attending an international conference directed at international
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security arrangements. This was demonstrated at the first anniversary meeting in
Krakow on May 3 1 and June 1, 2004, which was attended by over sixty States. 5
The thrust ofthe PSI is to prevent the proliferation ofWMD by sea, land and air,
although within the scope of this article, only the maritime aspect of the Initiative
will be considered. The PSI is not a treaty, but rather a statement of intention on
the part of participating States, and, of itself, it does not create formally binding in-
ternational law obligations. Participating States have agreed to abide by a set of in-
terdiction principles, set out in a formal Statement. The interdiction principles
indicate States will undertake effective measures to combat the proliferation of
WMD, delivery systems or related materials;6 cooperate on information exchange
and coordination of activities to combat such proliferation; 7 and review domestic
and, if necessary, international law to strengthen these efforts. 8
In terms ofspecific circumstances when interdiction will take place, the PSI pro-
vides a number of instances, and these are worth extracting:
Take specific actions in support of interdiction efforts regarding cargoes of
WMD, their delivery systems, or related materials, to the extent their
national legal authorities permit and consistent with their obligations under
international law and frameworks, to include:
a. Not to transport or assist in the transport of any such cargoes to or from
States or non-State actors of proliferation concern, and not to allow any
persons subject to their jurisdiction to do so.
b. At their own initiative, or at the request of and good cause shown by
another State, to take action to board and search any vessel flying their flag in
their internal waters or territorial seas or areas beyond the territorial seas of
any other State that is reasonably suspected of transporting such cargoes to
or from States or non-State actors of proliferation concerns, and to seize
such cargoes that are identified.
c. To seriously consider providing consent under the appropriate
circumstances to the boarding and searching of its own flag vessels by other
States and to the seizure of such WMD-related cargoes in such vessels that
may be identified by such States.
d. To take appropriate actions to (1) stop and/or search in their internal
waters, territorial seas, or contiguous zones (when declared) vessels that are
reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes to or from States or non-State
actors of proliferation concern and to seize such cargoes that are identified;
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and (2) to enforce conditions on vessels entering or leaving their ports,
internal waters or territorial seas that are reasonably suspected of carrying
such cargoes, such as requiring that such vessels be subject to boarding,
search, and seizure of such cargoes prior to entry.
e. At their own initiative or upon the request and good cause shown by
another State, to ( 1 ) require aircraft that are reasonably suspected ofcarrying
such cargoes to or from States or non-State actors of proliferation concern
and that are transiting their airspace to land for inspection and seize any such
cargoes that are identified; and/or (2) deny aircraft reasonably suspected of
carrying such cargoes transit rights through their airspace in advance ofsuch
flights.
f. If their ports, airfields, or other facilities are used as transhipment points
for shipment of such cargoes to or from States or non-State actors of
proliferation concern, to inspect vessels, aircraft, or other modes oftransport
reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes, and to seize such cargoes that
are identified. 9
These principles fall into a number of specific categories, in relation to shipping.
Firstly, PSI States agree to undertake measures to prevent shipments ofWMD, and
to cooperate with other participants to achieve this end. Ships suspected of carry-
ingWMD destined for non-State actors may be stopped and searched in three cir-
cumstances: where the ship flies the flag of a participating State in the PSI, either by
the flag State itself, or in cooperation with other PSI States; where the ship is along-
side in a port ofa PSI participating State; and, where the ship is present in the inter-
nal waters, territorial sea or contiguous zone of a participating State. As is evident
in e. and f. above, similar provisions exist for aircraft, although only at airfields of a
PSI State, or the national airspace of a PSI State.
These categories were effectively widened in 2004, with bilateral agreements be-
tween the United States on the one hand, and Liberia and Panama on the other,
with a view to permitting US vessels to stop and search suspect vessels flagged in the
latter two countries. 10 Liberia and Panama will not function as PSI States, but, in
certain circumstances, they have agreed to allow the United States to inspect their
flag vessels. 11 Subsequently, similar agreements have been concluded with a num-
ber of other States, including Belize, Croatia, the Marshall Islands, and Cyprus. 12
The PSI has also been the subject of consideration by the United Nations Secu-
rity Council. On April 28, 2004, the Security Council unanimously adopted Reso-
lution 1540 on the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
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to non-State actors. The Resolution provided that States could take all measures
consistent with international law to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, and that States were under an obligation to ensure that such weapons
did not fall into the control of non-State actors. Significantly, there is no reference
to interdiction of vessels, 13 so the Resolution falls short of the range of measures
contemplated within the PSI; however it is clear the Resolution would render the
shipping ofweapons in the circumstances contemplated to be addressed by the PSI
unlawful.
Legal Justifications for Interdiction under the PSI
The PSI draws its legal support from a number ofbases, some ofwhich are straight-
forward and some that are more contentious. For this reason, it is necessary to con-
sider each in turn. These will be done without reference to the positions of the PSI
States per se, as they have largely simply asserted that the PSI itself is consistent with
international law. 14
Flag State Jurisdiction
One of the oldest and most settled matters within the law of the sea is the notion
that a flag State retains jurisdiction over a vessel flying its flag. 15 This provides the
basis for the identification of jurisdiction and legal authority over ships in waters
beyond national jurisdiction. This principle is acknowledged in the Law of the Sea
Convention, and is reinforced by the requirement that where a ship owner seeks to
change the registration of their ship, this can only take place in port. 16 This ensures
that at sea, the flag State of a ship remains singular and constant, giving certainty in
identification of the applicable law and authority aboard.
The use of flag State jurisdiction under the PSI is entirely valid, as flag States
clearly have the power to regulate affairs aboard vessels flying their flag, 17 and
therefore can direct masters of such vessels to comply with lawful directions. Ac-
cordingly, a flag State could direct a vessel flying its flag to heave to and be boarded
by another PSI State's nationals, submit to search and make for a designated port in
a PSI State. 18 With the authorization of the flag State, all the participating nations
in the operation could be assured of the legality of their actions.
Port State Interdiction
The second approach to interdiction under the PSI is found through the medium
of port State jurisdiction. A coastal State's ports are part of its internal waters, or at
least can be made so under the Law of the Sea Convention. 19 Since the restrictions
on assertion of the coastal State's jurisdiction over vessels exercising a right of
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innocent passage in the territorial sea do not apply to internal waters, the coastal
State has a virtually unfettered jurisdiction to apply its law to ships visiting its ports,
or to deny entry to its ports to foreign vessels if it chooses.
Historically, there have been some restrictions upon the port State from apply-
ing its laws to vessels that are alongside in its internal waters. With the exception of
sovereign immunity, which will be considered separately, these restrictions derive
largely from customary international law. For example, traditionally, vessels call-
ing at a port as a result of distress are not subjected to the law of the coastal State. 20
Similarly, States generally do not apply their labor laws to vessels calling at their
ports, or interfere with matters that are generally regarded as internal to the opera-
tion of the vessel.21
It is unlikely that any of these restrictions existing in international custom
would withstand the right of a coastal State to take steps to deal with a risk to its
own security, or that of its allies, in its own port. Whether knowingly or not, in cir-
cumstances in which the visiting vessel poses a threat to the security of the coastal
State, it would seem absurd that the State would not be able to address that threat
within its own territory. Flag States have generally shown no objection to efforts by
port States to take measures against vessels to curb the international drug trade,
and the consequences in the context of the PSI for a failure to prevent a shipment
reaching its destination are even higher.
On this basis, Port State efforts to implement the PSI would, with the caveat
of respect for sovereign immune vessels, seem to be on very solid ground, and
there would seem to be no difficulty in its implementation to vessels alongside in
a PSI State. 22
Territorial Sea and Archipelagic Waters Interdiction
One matter of significant concern surrounding the PSI relates to freedom of navi-
gation. The Law of the Sea Convention provides substantial guarantees with re-
spect to freedom of navigation, and the operation ofthe PSI to restrict the freedom
of certain vessels to allow search and possible seizure of cargo presents a significant
challenge. To place this challenge in context, it is useful to summarize the develop-
ment and content ofcurrent arrangements in the law ofthe sea with respect to free-
dom of navigation.
Freedom of navigation has its origins in Hugo Grotius' response to the Spanish
and Portuguese claims of control over the oceans and territories outside of Europe
by virtue of the Papal Bull23 and Treaty of Tordesillas. 24 These documents pur-
ported not only to give control over territory outside of Europe, but also provided
for exclusive seaborne trading rights in the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans. 25
In reaction to this assertion, Grotius produced his seminal work, Mare Liberum,
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asserting that the oceans were incapable of appropriation by States, and that the
ships of any State could journey anywhere on the world's oceans. 26
In the modern law of the sea, freedom of navigation was equally perceived as
important, and this status is reflected in the now superseded 1958 Geneva Conven-
tions on the law of the sea. Article 14 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and
Contiguous Zone guaranteed a right of innocent passage to vessels, which was
non-suspendable for waters in international straits, and Article 23 indicated ex-
plicitly that such rights were available to warships.27 Freedom of navigation on the
high seas was guaranteed in Article 2 of the Convention on the High Seas,28 with
Article 3 of the Continental Shelf Convention ensuring that the status of waters
above a State's continental shelf remained as high seas, therefore enjoying freedom
of navigation. 29 These efforts had been prefaced by the International Court of Jus-
tice in 1949 in the Corfu Channel Case, which confirmed the right of innocent pas-
sage, available even to warships, passing through "straits used for international
navigation."30 The Court was also prepared to state that foreign vessels, including
warships, during peacetime had a right of innocent passage through all interna-
tional straits.
The current 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea maintains the approaches
found in the Corfu Channel Case and the 1958 Geneva law ofthe sea conventions. It
deals with navigation in two distinct contexts. First, it examines freedom ofnaviga-
tion in the territorial sea and archipelagic waters. Three passage regimes are estab-
lished in these waters: innocent passage, transit passage and archipelagic sea lanes
passage. It then considers freedom of navigation in areas beyond national sover-
eignty in Article 87. 31
The regime of innocent passage deals with navigation by ships only in the terri-
torial sea of a coastal or archipelagic State and archipelagic waters of an
archipelagic State, and as noted above, it retains the same approach as that used in
the Territorial Sea Convention and the Corfu Channel Case. Article 17 of the Law of
the Sea Convention grants ships the right of innocent passage through the territo-
rial sea, while the remaining articles in Subsection 3(A) of the Convention indicate
how the right is circumscribed. Essentially, vessels are required to transit in a con-
tinuous and expeditious fashion, on the surface of the ocean. Such passage cannot
be impeded, except on a non-discriminatory and temporary basis for essential se-
curity purposes.32
The coastal State has ability to regulate certain matters with respect to a vessel




The coastal State may adopt laws and regulations, in conformity with the
provisions of this Convention and other rules of international law, relating
to innocent passage through the territorial sea, in respect of all or any of the
following:
(a) the safety of navigation and the regulation of maritime traffic;
(b) the protection of navigational aids and facilities and other facilities or
installations;
(c) the protection of cables and pipelines;
(d) the conservation of the living resources of the sea;
(e) the prevention ofinfringement ofthe fisheries laws and regulations ofthe
coastal State;
(f) the preservation of the environment of the coastal State and the
prevention, reduction and control of pollution thereof;
(g) marine scientific research and hydrographic surveys;
(h) the prevention of infringement of the customs, fiscal, immigration or
sanitary laws and regulations of the coastal State.
Upon their face, these controls do not provide a basis for a coastal State to assert
jurisdiction over a passing vessel in its territorial sea for the purposes of the PSI.
The matters Article 2 1 permits regulation of are clearly restricted to matters per-
taining to the safe navigation of the ship, the protection of the surrounding marine
environment, and the maintenance of customs, fiscal, sanitation (health) and im-
migration controls ofthe coastal State. Unless there was a clear intention to illegally
importWMD into the coastal State, which could be accomplished when the vessel
came alongside in any case, there is no authority drawn from Article 2 1 to assist
coastal States to implement the PSI.
Other articles within the Law of the Sea Convention may be of more utility. Ar-
ticle 19 requires that a ship's passage cannot be prejudicial to the peace, good order
or security of the coastal State. A range of activities that fall outside this require-
ment are explicitly listed, including "any other activity not having a direct bearing
on passage."33 Clearly the delivery ofWMD to terrorists may well be highly preju-
dicial to the peace, good order and security of a coastal State, and an argument
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could be made that such a passage is therefore not innocent, and the restrictions on
coastal State authority over the passing vessel are removed.
On the other hand, there may be goods on board of which the master and crew
know little or nothing, and their only relationship with terrorists comes from an
anonymous and unremarkable bill of lading. In these circumstances, it may seem
unduly harsh to argue the vessel's right of innocent passage is open to question.
However, the awareness of the crew does not render the vessel's cargo safe, nor
make it any less of a security threat. The possible lack of knowledge of the crew
should be a factor in their interaction with the boarding party, but should not be
the determining factor in the ability of a coastal State to intercept the vessel.
The ability of a coastal State to close territorial waters for essential security
purposes on a temporary basis will not assist the PSI. Such closures are to be non-
discriminatory in their application, and clearly this is not possible with the PSI. The
PSI's objective is to interdict suspect vessels, not to institute what resembles a
blockade and compel the inspection of every passing ship. Further, Article 25(3) is
intended to clear areas of the sea temporarily, not to authorize an inspection re-
gime. 34
Coastal State criminal jurisdiction, which would usually encompass prepara-
tions to undertake terrorist activities, can also be exercised under Article 27 of the
Law of the Sea Convention for vessels passing through the territorial sea. This can
occur in four circumstances:
(a) if the consequences of the crime extend to the coastal State;
(b) if the crime is of a kind to disturb the peace of the country or the good
order of the territorial sea;
(c) if the assistance of the local authorities has been requested by the master
of the ship or by a diplomatic agent or consular officer of the flag State; or
(d) if such measures are necessary for the suppression of illicit traffic in
narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances. 35
Of these categories, only (a) and (b) will be of direct relevance to the PSI, since if
the master or flag State seeks assistance as in (c), there is no issue of legality. For (a)
and (b), it may be conspiracy to commit a terrorist act and preparatory steps to-
wards such an act, the consequences ofwhich might extend to the coastal State, or
disturb its peace or good order that are the criminal matters. However, the materi-




For transit passage and archipelagic sea lanes passage, the same concerns apply,
save that such passage cannot be interrupted for any reason, not even the essential
security concerns of the coastal State. This would make the stopping of a vessel in
an international strait or archipelagic sea lane of greater significance. Further, the
categories of applicable coastal State law to such vessels, as described in Article 42,
are more limited than those for innocent passage. However, Article 39 does require
vessels to refrain from any violation of the principles of the United Nations Char-
ter, as in Article 19, so the above discussion there would similarly be applicable. 36
Interception in the Contiguous Zone
The PSI also includes interdiction within the contiguous zone of a participating
coastal State. This raises additional issues with respect of freedom of navigation.
While vessels in the territorial sea are obliged to observe the regime of innocent
passage or be subject to the wider law of the coastal State, the contiguous zone is
unfettered by such concerns.
Beyond the territorial sea, the Law of the Sea Convention also confirms there is
freedom of navigation for all vessels. Article 87 provides:
1. The high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked.
Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by
this Convention and by other rules of international law. It comprises,
inter alia, both for coastal and land-locked States:
(a) freedom of navigation;
(b) freedom of overflight;
(c) freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, subject to Part VI;
(d) freedom to construct artificial islands and other installations
permitted under international law, subject to Part VI;
(e) freedom of fishing, subject to the conditions laid down in section 2;
(f) freedom of scientific research, subject to Parts VI and XIII.
2. These freedoms shall be exercised by all States with due regard for the
interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas,
and also with due regard for the rights under this Convention with
respect to activities in the Area.
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The impact of this provision finds its way into the regime of the EEZ by virtue of
Article 58, which expressly incorporates rights of freedom of navigation and over-
flight. While a coastal State has additional jurisdictional reach in the contiguous
zone, it is part of the EEZ and the navigational freedoms which exist on the high
seas and the EEZ apply there as well.
In terms of jurisdiction, under Article 33(1) of the Law of the Sea Convention
the contiguous zone grants a coastal State power over four types of activity:
In a zone contiguous to its territorial sea, described as the contiguous zone,
the coastal State may exercise the control necessary to:
(a) prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws
and regulations within its territory or territorial sea;
(b) punish infringement ofthe above laws and regulations committed within
its territory or territorial sea.
Were WMD destined to be imported into the coastal State for use in a terrorist
attack, it would seem to fall clearly within the rubric of prevention of infringement
of customs and possibly immigration laws and regulations37 under Article 33. The
coastal State could therefore argue a right to stop, search, and seize was necessary to
uphold its customs laws, and prevent the delivery ofhighly dangerous and undesir-
able materials to its territory.
A more difficult situation arises where theWMD are destined for another State.
It would not be open to a coastal State to assert its customs laws were to be in-
fringed by a passing vessel carrying WMD, as the vessel's master might never have
had any intention to enter the territorial sea of the coastal State. It would seem an
unreasonable expansion of Article 33 to have it include not mere prevention of in-
fringement ofcustoms of the coastal State, but ofother States as well. This is partic-
ularly the case given the freedom of navigation guaranteed for vessels in the
contiguous zone, as a foreign flag vessel will have breached no law of the coastal
State, and should be entitled to transit through the zone without interference.
Self-Defense and the Use of Force
Utilizing the PSI, based on application ofthe doctrine of self-defense and the use of
force in international law raises a number of issues. Among these issues are
whether the transfer ofWMD might amount to a preparatory act to the use of force
that might permit intervention by the PSI States, and whether the interdiction of
suspected WMD vessels amounts to a use of force in the sense it is used in the
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United Nations Charter. In order to explore these effectively, it is necessary to con-
sider the doctrine of self-defense in international law, and the use of force.
Contemporary international law is predicated on the notion that the use of the
force should be extremely limited, in an effort to promote international peace
and security. One of the most significant changes to the international law sur-
rounding armed conflict over the past 150 years has been the effective abolition of
the right of States to use force against others in pursuance of their territorial or
diplomatic aims. This restriction is explicitly restated in the United Nations
Charter in Article 2(4): "All Members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political inde-
pendence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of
the United Nations." This ban is only modified by the authorization to use force
when approved by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the United Nations
Charter in order to preserve international peace and security, or, with notifica-
tion to the Security Council, in the exercise of a right of individual or collective
self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter.38
One issue for the PSI is whether interdictions of vessels constitute an unautho-
rized use of force. In stopping and searching a vessel, there may be the necessity to
use force, in circumstances where the vessel refuses to heave to and its crew resists
the boarding. If the flag State is not a PSI State, and has not given its consent to the
boarding, it is likely that some degree of force will have to be used to take control of
and search the suspect vessel.
However, it is important to note that the prohibition on the use of force con-
tained in Article 2(4) of the Charter is not a blanket restriction on the use of force,
but rather is a prohibition ofthe use of force "against the territorial integrity or po-
litical independence ofany State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Pur-
poses of the United Nations." Clearly the PSI does not infringe the territorial
integrity of a State, unless the ship was considered part of its territory, which in this
context would seem inappropriate. Even if a State can exercise prescriptive and en-
forcement jurisdiction over its vessels on the high seas, it cannot exercise its en-
forcement jurisdiction within the territorial sea of another State. The ship can
hardly be said to be integral to the territory of its flag State, if the State cannot un-
dertake efforts to enforce its law in certain locations. Similarly, the political inde-
pendence of a State is unlikely to be threatened by unusual instances of vessels
being stopped and boarded in the territorial sea of another State.
The key issue is whether such a boarding would be inconsistent with the Pur-
poses of the United Nations. Certainly the United Nations is dedicated to the
maintenance of international peace and security, and this is not inconsistent with
the stated aims of the PSI. This is underscored by the fact that the Security Council
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has considered the PSI and has adopted Resolution 1540, which supports some as-
pects of its operation. What is needed is a careful and considered approach to the
issue of boardings pursuant to the PSI to ensure there is never any question that
they are being undertaken in a fashion that would run afoul of the principles of the
United Nations.
If force can be used, there is also a requirement it be in proportion to the inter-
ference with the sovereignty of the State concerned. 39 This concept finds support in
the Caroline Principles,40 and also has been used by the International Court of Jus-
tice: "[T]here is a specific rule whereby self-defense would warrant only measures
which are proportional to the armed attack and necessary to respond to it, a rule
well established in customary international law."41
In the case of the PSI, it is submitted the level of force used is relatively slight. A
ship after it has been boarded and searched, can be permitted to continue on its
way,42 and if wrongfully detained, be the subject of a compensation claim by the
flag State against the detaining State. In proportion to the potential harm of an at-
tack which WMD would cause, the interference with the flag State is minimal.
Anticipatory Self-Defense
The controversial doctrine of anticipatory self-defense is also potentially of appli-
cation. The doctrine is based on the notion that the use ofWMD leads to such de-
structive consequences for the State liable to imminent attack, that it ought to be
able to utilize conventional weapons to remove the threat. Waiting until an actual
attack may effectively be too late, as the State attacked might be largely destroyed or
have millions of its citizens killed. In response, a small-scale conventional attack to
remove the threat, it can be argued, is a reasonable compromise.
The response to this notion is that it is predicated on the imminent attack ofone
State on another, an event that may never occur. The possession ofweaponry and a
climate of international tension do not necessarily demonstrate an intention to
launch a hostile and devastating attack in the near future.43 Further, the use of an-
ticipatory self-defense would not seem to advance international peace and security,
as it uses the suspicion of an imminent attack, rather than the reality of such an at-
tack, as the justification for the use of force. There does not appear to be any sup-
port for the concept directly within the United Nations Charter.44
Anticipatory self-defense is supported by relatively few States in international
law, and there are few instances of State practice relying upon it, at least since the
end ofWorld War II.45 One of the more direct examples of it came on June 7, 1981,
with the Israeli attack upon the Iraqi nuclear facility at Osiraq, outside of Baghdad.
Israel had argued that the facility would have given Iraq the ability to manufacture
nuclear weapons in the near future, and it was the most likely target for the use of
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such weapons.46 Most of the international community rejected Israel's position,
including a large number of the PSI States,47 and there has been no change in this
viewpoint evident in the international community since 1988. Concerns that the
doctrine was too fluid with difficulties of what might be judged as imminent,48
harmful to world peace in potentially authorizing unprovoked attacks on States
suspected of having WMD they might wish to use, and capable of misapplication
by States seeking an excuse to attack their neighbors are cited for the lack ofany rise
in support for anticipatory self-defense. 49 While academic opinion on the issue is
divided, there is a not insubstantial volume ofscholarship against the validity ofthe
doctrine.50
In theory, the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense could be adapted to the in-
terdiction of vessels. A PSI State could argue that the shipping ofWMD to a terror-
ist organization would lead to attack by that terrorist organization on the PSI State
or its allies, and therefore stopping and boarding suspect vessels and removing
WMD would be incidental to aiding in the defense of that State from an imminent
attack, albeit at some undefined point of time in the future, and not necessarily on
the State itself.
It is submitted that such an argument would not be acceptable to the bulk of the
international community, including most of the PSI States. The uncertainty as to
the date and location of a terrorist attack would make it difficult to meet the re-
quirement ofthe imminent nature ofthe threat. The international repugnance sur-
rounding the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense would be sufficient to ensure
that none of the PSI States would seek to use it to justify their PSI activities, if any
other ground was available.
Necessity
One approach to the PSI that could be used to justify interdiction of vessels is the
doctrine of necessity. Necessity has been the subject of consideration by interna-
tional legal scholars for some decades, and is neatly dealt with in the International
Law Commission's Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts. Article 25 of the Draft Articles provides that an otherwise unlawful
act of a State can be justified if it meets two criteria: (a) the act was the only means
ofsafeguarding an essential interest ofthe State against a grave and imminent peril;
and (b) the act does not seriously impair an essential interest of the State towards
which the obligation existed. 51 This principle has more than just the imprimatur of
the International Law Commission to support its status within public interna-
tional law. The identical predecessor of Article 25, Article 33 of the Draft Articles
on State Responsibility,52 was cited with approval by the International Court of
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Justice in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project case,53 and was itself cited with ap-
proval by the International Tribunal for the Law ofthe Sea in M/V Saiga (No. 2). 54
When applied to the PSI, necessity can provide a justification for actions that
might otherwise be unlawful at international law. While it is clear that much of the
PSI in relation to interdiction is valid, such as the interception of vessels flying the
flag of a PSI State, or where there is a treaty between the flag State and the PSI
States, such as between Liberia, Panama and the United States, some aspects of its
operation maybe problematic. The interception of a vessel, flagged in a third State,
government operated and on a non-commercial charter, while exercising a right of
innocent passage, is one example where the legality of the stop and search of a sus-
pect vessel presents difficulties.
In such a situation, a PSI State could note that the only way to prevent the transit
ofWMD to a non-State actor would be to stop a vessel en route at sea in its waters,
meeting the first of the criteria in Article 25. Certainly the possession ofWMD by
hostile terrorists would amount to a "grave and imminent peril" to the State. On
the second criterion, provided the vessel was released and allowed to continue, al-
beit without its deadly cargo, the essential interests ofthe flag State would not be se-
riously impaired.
The PSI States have not shown much enthusiasm for utilizing necessity as a
means to legitimize possible operations under the Initiative. This may be the case
for a number of reasons. First, the Draft Articles remain contentious, and there
might be a reluctance by some PSI States to show direct support for part of a docu-
ment about which they have serious reservations. Second, to rely upon the concept
of necessity would be a tacit admission that some contemplated actions under the
PSI are unlawful. As the Initiative is designed to combat unlawful behavior, and is
seeking to gain as much support from the international community as possible, it
may not be politic for the PSI States to indicate that the PSI might in certain cir-
cumstances encompass unlawful action. This would be particularly the case for the
United States, Britain and Australia, where the lawfulness of the intervention in
Iraq by the "Coalition of the Willing" has become a major political issue, and the
governments ofthose three States might be unwilling to highlight the lawfulness or
otherwise of future measures in the global "war on terror."
A present unwillingness to utilize arguments based on necessity would not nec-
essarily preclude their use in the future to justify an interception. In the face of the
aftermath of action against a third State vessel, where WMD had been found, the
PSI States would seemingly have a strong argument that even if other justifications
for interdiction had failed, necessity would cure the legitimacy of their action.
Whether necessity would operate to provide such protection in the event WMD
were not found is not so simple, as without WMD in the mix, it is difficult to
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construct what the "grave and imminent peril" to the interest of the coastal State
might be.
Security Council Resolution 1540
Another possible justification for the PSI might be derived from Security Council
Resolution 1540. As already noted in the context of self-defense, one of the legiti-
mate ways for a State to utilize force against another is through the adoption of a
resolution by the Security Council, authorizing the use of force. The Council may
make such a resolution pursuant to Chapter VII ofthe United Nations Charter, if it
feels the application of force would assist in combating a threat to international
peace and security. 55
However, while the Security Council could pass a resolution seeking to search
and detain vessels suspected of carryingWMD bound for non-State actors, as such
vessels would clearly constitute a threat to international peace and security, it has
not done so to the present point in time. Resolution 1540 extols States not to per-
mit the transit ofWMD to non-State actors, but it does not create any positive duty
upon States to undertake interdiction of such vessels. Indeed, the resolution only
goes so far as to authorize actions which are "consistent with international law."56
The PSI States may contend that the Initiative is of itself lawful, and therefore is
consistent with Resolution 1540, which appears to be the case, but it does not pro-
vide for an explicit authorization ofinterdiction that would otherwise be unlawful.
One additional point in relation to Security Council Resolution 1540 can be
made. Were an unlawful interdiction to take place, andWMD discovered to be on
board, even if the interdiction was unlawful, the presence ofWMD would mean
the flag State was in material breach ofa Security Council resolution. While not ad-
vocating the adoption oftwo international wrongs making a right into the lexicon,
one imagines that the issue of the interdiction would be regarded as secondary at
the political level, in comparison to the tremendous risk to international peace and
security posed by the shipment itself.
Interaction of the PSI with the Law of the Sea Convention
Sovereign Immunity
One great challenge to the operation of the PSI comes from the operation of the
doctrine of sovereign immunity. The doctrine is one of great age and significance
within the law of the sea, requiring that warships and government vessels on non-
commercial service be considered inviolate at international law. A warship is ex-
empt from the operation of law of a port State or coastal State, unless its com-
mander voluntarily permits the application ofsuch law. Ifthe warship breaches the
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law of a coastal State, no sanction can be imposed directly on it, nor can it be
stopped or boarded. The only measure permitted is an order directing the immedi-
ate departure of the vessel from the territorial waters of the coastal State. Any harm
it may have caused can only be the subject of international claim.
The rules with respect to sovereign immunity of vessels have their origins back
in history well prior to the 20th century. An attempt at codification of the old rules
took place in the 1920s, and led to the adoption of the International Convention
for the Unification of Certain Rules concerning the Immunity of State-owned
Ships. 57 Article 3(1) of that Convention provides that warships, State-owned ves-
sels on non-commercial service, hospital ships, fleet auxiliaries, and other vessels
are to receive immunity in respect of claims brought against them. Such protection
is confirmed in the Law of the Sea Convention, which provides explicit protection
for such vessels on the high seas in Articles 95 and 96, and in the context of the ter-
ritorial sea in Part II, section 3(C). These provisions make it clear that only flag
States have jurisdiction over sovereign immune vessels, and that in the event of the
vessel breaching an applicable law of the coastal State, there is flag State responsi-
bility for such breaches, but the only action permissible against the vessel itself is to
require it to leave immediately. 58
Interference with a sovereign immune vessel, without the consent of the flag
State, would amount to a clear breach of international law. For PSI States, this has
the potential to be a serious problem. While it is unlikely that a State would ship
WMD to non-State actors on a warship, there is a possibility of a State-owned ves-
sel, on non-commercial service being used in such a fashion, particularly in the
case of a communist State where most vessels will be State-owned. While the Eng-
lish courts have been prepared to look behind the activity a vessel is engaged in to
determine its status,59 a third State actively engaged in supplyingWMD to terror-
ists is likely to claim sovereign immune status.60
It is submitted that the potential use of sovereign immune vessels to shipWMD
to non-State actors represent the greatest challenge posed by the PSI to the law of
the sea. Such vessels cannot, under international law, be interfered with by port
States or coastal States without the consent of the flag State or the master. The PSI
States will have a difficult decision to make in considering whether to act against
such a vessel and thereby potentially undermine the status of their own naval ves-
sels elsewhere in the world.
Freedom of Navigation
Of distinct concern is the impact of the PSI on security notifications. A number of
States have asserted that prior to entry into their territorial waters, foreign flagged
vessels are obliged to give notice of their passage.61 Most restrict this to foreign
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warships, but some, notably North Korea, require it in the case of any foreign ves-
sel. The reason most frequently cited for such action is that it is incidental to the se-
curity of the coastal State, and a transiting foreign warship passing close to the
littoral State without prior warning represents a security threat. There is no author-
ity in the Law of the Sea Convention to support such an interpretation.
For the maritime powers, this could set an awkward precedent. The PSI would
be encouraging them to stop and search vessels that posed a security risk because of
the possible presence ofWMD on board. A similar description, from the point of
view of China or North Korea could describe a US, British or French warship in
their territorial waters. The warship might be carrying WMD, in the form of nu-
clear weapons, and may also be seen as a threat to the coastal State's security. In
comparison to stopping and searching the vessel, the requirement of a warning
seems relatively modest, and in time, this may provide support to the security
warning advocates. Such a result would not be a desirable one to the maritime
powers, most ofwhom are PSI States.
In its present form, with the lack of a binding treaty, and the reiteration that it is
consistent with international law, the PSI does not erode the position of the mari-
time powers with respect to security notification. Unless and until an actual inter-
ception, without some other ground based on flag or port State control, takes place
and the maritime powers assert the legality of their actions, those States seeking se-
curity notification will remain without concrete action upon which to base their
objections.
Military Exercises
The issue of military activities, including surveillance, in the exclusive economic
zone (EEZ) ofanother State is one not directly dealt with in the Law ofthe Sea Con-
vention. 62 While the Convention makes it plain that military exercises and weap-
ons testing in the territorial sea of a coastal State would be contrary to the regime of
innocent passage, there is no equivalent restriction articulated with respect to other
maritime zones. However, neither is there any specific authorization with respect
to such activities, which are not included within the Article 87 of the Law of the Sea
Convention list of freedoms.
The lack of direct reference to military activities is not fatal to the case for the
conduct of such exercises in the EEZ of another State. The rights listed in Article
87(1) are by no means an exhaustive list, and are merely specifically enunciated ex-
amples. This is explicit in the use ofthe phrase "inter alia." Further, the freedoms of
the high seas are described as being subject to the conditions set down in the Con-
vention and "other rules of international law." The use of this language makes it
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clear that the Law of the Sea Convention is not intended to be the only source oflaw
in relation to the use of the high seas or EEZ.
If the case for freedom to undertake military exercises in another State's EEZ can
be made, it is clearly subject to some qualification. For this the crux of the issue will
essentially turn on the meaning of the phrase "with due regard." This qualification
is applied to high seas freedoms generally in Article 87(2), and it would seem logi-
cal that one must have due regard to the rights of others while navigating through
the EEZ.63
One issue that could be relevant in assessing the legitimacy of interdiction under
the PSI in the contiguous zone relates to whether passage by a suspect vessel might
constitute a threat to international peace and security, and therefore be illegitimate
and capable of being intercepted. The Law of the Sea Convention provides limited
assistance through Article 88 which provides: "The high seas shall be reserved for
peaceful purposes."
A wide reading of this provision would, in theory, see great limitation of the uses
of warships on the high seas, and the potential circumscription on all military ac-
tivities, particularly when read with the Preamble, which invokes the Convention's
role in the furtherance of peace and security in the world,64 suggesting only peace-
ful uses ofthe sea are permissible. By extension this could be drawn into the EEZ, as
Article 58 adopts the high seas freedoms in the Convention, and explicitly includes
Article 88 in this list.65 Similarly, the provisions with respect to marine scientific re-
search under Part XIII of the Convention indicate that marine scientific research
can only be undertaken for peaceful purposes. 66 A case could be made that military
activity from the high seas or another State's EEZ were incompatible with the Law
of the Sea Convention.
Such an interpretation has not been favored by many States or publicists.67 The
San Remo Manual on Armed Conflicts at Sea, which sought to update and consoli-
date the law of armed conflict at sea, makes it clear that armed conflict at sea can
take place on the high seas, and, in certain circumstances, in the EEZ of a neutral
State.68 The Manual provides that belligerents must have due regard to the uses to
which another State may wish to put its EEZ and avoid damage to the coastal State.
If the motivation for interception is international security, then an argument
may be placed in the hands of those States that claim military exercises cannot le-
gitimately take place in their EEZs. Such States have typically observed that foreign
military activity prevents them from utilizing their EEZ and is a threat to the secu-
rity of the sovereign rights they possess in the EEZ. If security concerns can over-
ride navigational rights under the PSI, these States may have a stronger case to
argue that security and due regard are inconsistent, and that permission should be
sought to exercise in the EEZ. This is particularly the case in so-called "security
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zones" that may be attached to the contiguous zones of some States. These have
been the subject of protest by the United States and other maritime States.69
Conclusion
The PSI represents a practical solution to the threats posed by the changed security
environment since the 9/11 attacks. By virtue of the speed and manner of its intro-
duction, it is yet to be structured into formally binding obligations within interna-
tional law. Were it to be implemented, to the full extent indicated in its interdiction
principles, it could be justified, albeit not without difficulty under international
law. However, the implications of that justification would create challenges which
the law of the sea would struggle to accommodate, and might create precedents
which would undermine key principles the maritime powers would not wish to see
damaged.
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PART IV
CURRENT ISSUES IN OCCUPATION LAW

VII
Is There a "New" Law of
Intervention and Occupation?
Leslie C. Green*
At least since the seventeenth century international law has accepted as a fun-
damental principle that all States are equal, none enjoying sovereignty over
any other. This principle has found expression in Vattel's famous aphorism:
Since men are by nature equal, and their individual rights and obligations the same, as
coming equally from nature, Nations, which are composed of men and may be
regarded as so many free persons living together in a state of nature, are by nature equal
and hold from nature the same obligations and the same rights. Strength or weakness
in this case, count for nothing. A dwarf is as much a man as a giant is; a small Republic
is no less a sovereign State than the most powerful Kingdom. 1
As a consequence it has come to be accepted that a State is free to treat its nation-
als as it pleases without interference from others, a principle which finds expres-
sion in the domestic jurisdiction clause of the Charter of the United Nations:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state
or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present
Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application ofenforcement measures
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under Chapter VII [relating to acts of aggression and threats to or breaches of the
peace]. 2
Nevertheless, both doctrinal writings and States, especially the more powerful,
have asserted a right of intervention and even occupation in "exceptional"
circumstances.
International law recognizes two forms ofoccupation of the whole or part of the
territory of one State by the forces or governmental representatives of another.
Occupatio pacifica is the basis of acquiring title to territory. 3 For the purpose of this
paper, the term is used for the situation that takes place when the occupied entity
has agreed to the occupation or it has been imposed without the use of force by an
occupier or as a result of a multilateral treaty, although the threat to resort to force
may be the deciding factor that induces the occupied entity to agree to the occupa-
tion. Occupatio bellica ensues during or at the end ofan armed conflict and, gener-
ally speaking, is contrary to the wishes of the State occupied or is acquiesced in
since there is no other option available to that State.
Examples ofoccupation pursuant to agreement maybe seen in the treaties relat-
ing to the independence of the successor principalities of the Ottoman Empire
—
Bulgaria, Montenegro, Roumania and Serbia—initiated by the 1878 Treaty of
Berlin. In the case of Bulgaria, a provisional administration was established which:
[S]hall be under the direction of an Imperial Russian Commissary until the
completion of the Organic Law. An Imperial Turkish Commissary, as well as the
Consuls delegated ad hoc by the other Powers, signatory of the present Treaty, shall be
called to assist him so as to control the working of the provisional regime. In case of
disagreement amongst the Consular Delegates, the vote of the majority shall be
accepted, and in case of a divergence between the majority and the Imperial Russian
Commissary or the Imperial Turkish Commissary, the Representatives of the
Signatory Powers at Constantinople, assembled in Conference, shall give their
decision.4
Article VII, in turn, provides that:
The provisional regime shall not be prolonged beyond a period of nine months from
the exchange of the ratifications of the present Treaty. When the Organic Law is
completed the election of the Prince of Bulgaria shall be proceeded with immediately.
As soon as the Prince shall have been installed, the new organization shall be put into
force, and the Principality shall enter into the full enjoyment of the autonomy.
To some extent this procedure seems to foretell the type of arrangement that
followed the operations against Afghanistan and Iraq at the beginning of this
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century. 5 The succession clauses in the Treaty of Berlin guaranteed protection to
religious and other minorities in each ofthe States concerned, but they did not pro-
vide for any form of direct sanction in the event of non-observance. In this, they
differed from the view expressed by some ofthe "fathers" of international law, who
envisaged the possibility of intervention by force, even resulting in occupation al-
legedly on humanitarian grounds in favor of an oppressed people. Thus, Grotius
was of the opinion that:
The fact must also be recognized that kings, and those who possess rights equal to those
of kings, have the right of demanding punishments not only on account of injuries
against themselves or their subjects, but also on account of injuries which do not
directly affect them but excessively violate the law of nature or of nations in regard to
any persons whatsoever. . . . Truly, it is more honourable to avenge the wrongs of
others rather than one's own, in the degree that in the case of one's own wrongs it is
more to be feared that through a sense ofpersonal suffering one may exceed the proper
limit or at least prejudice his mind. . . . [Kjings, in addition to the particular care of
their own state, are also burdened with a general responsibility for human society. . .
.
The final and most wide-reaching cause for undertaking wars on behalf ofothers is the
mutual tie of kinship among men, which of itself affords sufficient ground for
rendering assistance. ... If, further, it should be granted that even in extreme need
subjects cannot justifiably take up arms [against their sovereign] . . . , nevertheless it
will not follow that others may not take up arms on their behalf.6
Not all the "fathers" of international law would agree with Grotius in his view
concerning the right of a State to punish another for committing crimes against
natural law. Among these was Vattel who asked:
Did not Grotius perceive that ... his view opens the door to all the passions of zealots
and fanatics, and gives to ambitious men pretexts without numbers7? . . . [However, i]f
there should be found a restless and unprincipled Nation, ever ready to do harm to
others, to thwart their purposes, and to stir up civil strife among their citizens, there is
no doubt that all the others would have the right to unite together to subdue such a
Nation, to discipline it, and even to disable it from doing further harm. . . . [But n]o
foreign State may inquire into the manner in which a sovereign rules, nor set itselfup as
judge of his conduct. . . . If he . . . treats his subjects with severity it is for the Nation to
take action; no foreign State is called on to amend his conduct and to force him to
follow a wiser and juster course But if a prince, by violating the fundamental laws,
gives his subjects a lawful cause for resisting him; if, by his insupportable tyranny, he
brings on a national revolt against him, any foreign power may rightfully give
assistance to an oppressed people who ask for its aid To give help to a brave people
who are defending their liberties against an oppressor by force of arms is only the part
of justice and generosity. . . . But this principle should not be made use of so as to
authorize criminal designs against the peace of Nations As for those monsters who
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under the name of sovereigns, act as a scourge and plague of the human race, they are
nothing more than wild beasts, ofwhom every man may purge the earth.8
This last comment calls to mind President Bush's reference to certain States as con-
stituting an "axis of evil."9
Pufendorfwould not go as far as Grotius in granting a third State the right to in-
tervene on behalf of foreign nationals, he nevertheless granted that right if the sub-
jects themselves had good cause to revolt, 10 and, while he was critical of those:
[W]ho say, that, when the king has degenerated into a tyrant, he can be stripped of his
command and punished by the people . . . [but] no one should believe, however, that
we grant a boundless licence to princes, and deliver over to them their subjects, from
whom we have taken away every faculty offighting back, like cattle to their pleasure, we
are altogether of the opinion that, if, indeed, even an absolute prince should assume a
mind utterly hostile towards his subjects, and openly seek their destruction without the
appearance of justice, his subjects can rightly employ against him also the means
customarily used against an enemy for the sake of defending their own safety. . . .
[A]ssuredly, absolute princes can be punished neither for not running the state to suit
the people, nor for private misdeeds. . . . But after they have assumed the person of
enemies [by their actions against their people], the evils which, perchance are inflicted
upon them by the right of war do not have the character of a punishment properly so
called. . . .
n [T]he safest principle to go on is, that we cannot lawfully undertake the
defence of another's subjects, for any other reason than they themselves can rightfully
advance, for taking up arms to protect themselves against the barbarous savagery of
their superiors. . . . 12 [F]inally, when there is no other reason, common descent alone
may be a sufficient ground for our going to the defence of one who is unjustly
oppressed, and implores our aid, ifwe can conveniently do so. 13
To a great extent the military operations undertaken by the United States and the
United Kingdom against Iraq in 2003 were based on this type of reasoning, al-
though the plea for intervention came not from oppressed inhabitants, but from
political exiles. However, the subsequent occupation received general support, at
least in the early days.
By the nineteenth century respect for sovereignty was so highly regarded that
writers generally were only willing to concede a right of intervention and possible
occupation in the most exceptional ofcircumstances. Phillimore pointed out that:
Intervention by one Christian State on behalf of Religion has . . . been practised and
cannot be said, in the abstract, to be a violation of International Law. But what kind of
Intervention? By remonstrance, by stipulation, by a condition in a Treaty concluding a
war waged on other grounds. It may, perhaps, be justly contended that the principle
might be pushed further; and that in the event ofpersecution of large bodies of men, on
account of their religious belief, an armed intervention on their behalf might be as
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warrantable in International Law, as an armed intervention to prevent the shedding
of blood and protracted internal hostilities. . . . [N]o writer of authority upon
International Law sanctions such an intervention, except upon the case of a positive
persecution inflicted avowedly upon the ground of religious belief. 14
Hall too was equally restrictive of the right:
International law professes to be concerned only with the relations of states to each
other. Tyrannical conduct of a government towards its subjects, massacres and
brutality in a civil war, or religious persecution are acts which have nothing to do
directly or indirectly with such relations. On what ground then can international law
take cognizance ofthem? Apparently on one only, if it be competent to take cognizance
of them at all. It may be supposed to declare that acts of the kind mentioned are so
inconsistent with the character of a moral being as to constitute a public scandal, which
the body ofstates, or one or more states as representative ofit, are competent to suppress
[Intervention for the purpose of checking gross tyranny or of helping the efforts of a
people to free itself is very commonly regarded without disfavour. Again, religious
persecution, short of a cruelty which would rank as tyranny, has ceased to be
recognised as an independent ground of intervention, but is still used as between
Europe and the East as an accessory motive, which seems to be thought by many
persons as sufficiently praiseworthy to excuse the commission of acts in other respects
grossly immoral. . . . [S]entiment has been allowed to influence the more deliberately
formed opinion ofjurists . . . [who] have imparted an aspect of legality to a species of
intervention, which makes a deep inroad into one of the cardinal doctrines of
international law [that of sovereign independence] . . . and which by the readiness to
which it lends itself to the uses of selfish ambition becomes as dangerous in practice as
plausible in appearance. It is unfortunate that publicists have not laid down broadly
and unanimously that no intervention is legal, except for the purpose of self-
preservation, unless a breach of the law as between states has taken place, or unless the
whole body of civilised states has concurred in authorising it. Intervention, whether
armed or diplomatic, undertaken either for the reason or upon the pretext of cruelty,
or oppression, or the horrors of a civil war, or whatever the reason put forward,
supported in reality by the justification which such facts offer to the popular mind,
would have had to justify themselves, when not authorised by the whole body ofcivilised
states unless accustomed to act together for common purposes, as measures which, being
confessedly illegal in themselves, could only be excused in rare and extreme cases in
consideration ofthe unquestionably extraordinary character ofthefacts causing them, and
of the evident purity and motives of the intervening state}
5
Westlake, almost foretelling modern views based on respect for human rights
and popular indignation, commented that:
Intervention in the internal affairs of another state is justifiable . . . when a country has
fallen into such a condition of anarchy or misrule as unavoidably to disturb the peace,
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external or internal of its neighbours, 16 whatever the conduct or policy of its
government may be in that respect In considering anarchy and misrule as a ground
for intervention the view must not be confined to the physical consequences which
they may have beyond the limits of the territory in which they rage. These are often
serious enough The moral effect on the neighbouring population is to be taken into
account. Where these include considerable numbers allied by religion, language or race
to the population suffering from misrule, to restrain the former from giving support to
the latter in violation of the legal rights of the misruled state may be a task beyond the
power of their government, or requiring it to resort to modes of restraint irksome to its
subjects, and not necessary for good order if they were not excited by the spectacle of
miseries which they must feel acutely. It is idle to argue in such a case that the duty of
the neighbouring peoples is to look on quietly. Laws are made for men and not for
creatures of the imagination, and they must not create or tolerate for them situations
which are beyond the endurance, which we will not say ofaverage human nature, since
laws may fairly expect to raise the standard by their operation, but of the best human
nature at the time and place they can hope to meet with. 17
Today it is increasingly the case that popular feeling at large, and not merely in
neighboring States, may be so outraged that a demand for intervention either by
the United Nations or some other international organization is made, as has been
the case in, for example, the Sudan with regard to the treatment of Darfur. 18
It has not only been writers who, before the outbreak of World War I and the
establishment of the League of Nations, were prepared to condemn the actions of
particular States and even to advocate intervention or occupation. In his 1904 an-
nual message, for example, President Theodore Roosevelt stated:
[T]here are occasional crimes committed on so vast a scale and of such peculiar
horror as to make us doubt whether it is not our manifest duty to endeavour at least to
show our disapproval of the deed and our sympathy with those who have suffered by
it. The cases must be extreme in which such a course is justifiable . . . [and] in extreme
cases action may be justifiable and proper. What form the action shall take must
depend upon the circumstances of the case; that is, upon the degree of the atrocity
and upon our power to remedy it. The cases in which we would interfere by force of
arms . . . are necessarily veryfew. Yet it is not to be expected that a people like ours . .
.
which shows by its consistent practice its belief in the principles of civil and religious
liberty and of orderly freedom ... it is inevitable that such a nation should desire
eagerly to give expression to its horror on an occasion like that of the massacre of the
Jews in Kishenef,
19
or when it witnesses such systematic and long-extended cruelty
and oppression ofwhich the Armenians" have been the victims, and which have won
for them the indignant pity of the civilised world.
21
The commitment of the United States to the principle of humanitarianism has




Humanitarian intervention maybe defined as the justifiable use offorce for the purpose
of protecting the inhabitants of another state from treatment so arbitrary and
persistently abusive as to exceed the limits within which the sovereign is presumed to
act with reason and justice [However, t]he right ofthe sovereign state to act without
interference within its own territory, even though it be no more than a presumption, is
of such importance to the well-being of international society, that the states in their
wisdom, as evidenced in their practice, have been jealous of admitting the pleas of
humanity as a justification for action against a sister state; and we find that intervention
on this ground has been rather rigidly limited to specific cases, and conditioned in each
of them upon the existence of a certain state of facts. It is true that the appreciation of
the facts and the determination as to the existence ofthe justifying situation still remains
to a certain degree a matter entrusted to the conscientious discretion of the intervening
state; nevertheless, the general and salutary attitude of suspicion with which every
intervention upon the ground of humanity is regarded serves as a rough check upon its
abuse. The counterpoise which serves as the sanction to prevent aggression and
subsequent conquest under the guise of humanitarian intervention is perhaps to be
found in the general readiness of states to act in defense of the balance ofpower and in
order to preserve the society of independent states.22
In the light of these comments the reader might be justified in assuming that a
right of intervention leading to possible occupation is, in certain circumstances,
recognized in customary international law. However, whether this is the case or
not, such action is, as Stowell asserted, a matter of discretion, and by 1938, despite
the evidence of atrocities in Nazi Germany, reaction was largely "platonic"23 lead-
ing Professor H. A. Smith of London University to complain:
[I]n practice we no longer insist that States shall conform to any common standards of
justice, religious toleration and internal government. Whatever atrocities may be
committed in foreign countries, we now say that they are no concern of ours. Conduct
which in the nineteenth century would have placed a government outside the pale of
civilised society is now deemed to be no obstacle to diplomatic friendship. This means,
in fact, that we have now abandoned the old distinction between civilised and
uncivilised states.24
In so far as occupatio pacifica as a result oftreaty is concerned, reference might be
made to Article III of the 1903 Agreement between the United States and Cuba for
the lease to the former of an area of Guantanamo "for the time required for the
purpose ofcoaling and naval stations" and "during the period ofoccupation by the
United States . . . the United States shall exercise complete jurisdiction and control
over and within said areas
"25 In a 1933 decision the Cuban Supreme Court held
that "the territory ofthat Naval Station is for all legal effects regarded as foreign." 26
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Nevertheless, problems arose when the United States armed forces sent num-
bers of individuals captured in Afghanistan for detention at the Guantanamo naval
base, labeling them, since there was no "war" declared, even though supporters of
the Taliban as distinct from members of al-Qaeda, carried their arms on behalf of a
de facto governing authority, as "enemy combatants" rather than "prisoners ofwar."
The United States, maintained that as such, regardless of the terms of the Geneva
Convention relating to the treatment of prisoners of war,27 they could be detained
indefinitely, denied access to counsel, and permitted no means ofchallenging their
confinement or clarifying their status or alleging mistaken identity. 28 However,
this situation was challenged at the end of 2003 by a detainee by way of habeas cor-
pus proceedings, and in Gherebi v. George W. Bush and Donald H. Rumsfeld the
government claim was rejected by the majority of the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit:
[W]e simply cannot accept the government's position that the Executive Branch
possesses the unchecked authority to imprison indefinitely any persons, foreign
citizens included, on territory under the sole jurisdiction and control of the United
States, without permitting such prisoners recourse ofany kind to any judicial forum, or
even access to counsel regardless of the length or manner of their confinement. ... In
our view, the government's position is inconsistent with fundamental tenets of
American jurisprudence and raises most serious concerns under international law.29
The Court cited, by way of explanation, Article 5 of the Prisoners ofWar Conven-
tion, 1949,30 as well as Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights to which the United States31 is a party: "Anyone who is deprived of his lib-
erty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in
order that a court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention
"
The United States argued to the court that while it exercised "complete jurisdic-
tion and control" over Guantanamo naval base, it continued to recognize the "con-
tinuance and ultimate sovereignty in Cuba," distinguishing the rights pertaining to
"territorial jurisdiction" from those pertaining to "sovereignty"32 leading the court
to point out that the "United States has exercised 'complete jurisdiction and con-
trol' over the Base for more than a century now, with the right to acquire . . . any
land or other property therein by purchase or by exercise of eminent domain with
full compensation to owners thereof." 33
The court further noted that the United States has "also treated Guantanamo
Bay as if it were subject to American sovereignty: we have acted as if we intend to
retain the Base permanently, and have exercised the exclusive right to use it as we
wish, regardless of any restrictions contained in the lease or continuing Treaty."34
The court determined that:
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[B]y virtue of the United States' exercise of territorial jurisdiction over Guantanamo,
habeas jurisdiction lies in the present case. . . . [W]e conclude that, at least for habeas
purposes, Guantanamo is part of the sovereign territory of the United States. Both the
language of the Lease and continuing Treaty and the practical reality of U.S. authority
and control over the Base support that answer. . . . [T]he United States exercises total
dominion and sovereignty, while Cuba retains simply a contingent reversionary
interest that will become effective only if and when the United States decides to
relinquish its exclusive jurisdiction and control, i.e. sovereign domain over the
territory. . . . [T]he United States possesses and exercises all the attributes of
sovereignty, while Cuba retains only a residual or reversionary interest, contingent on a
possible future United States' decision to surrender its complete jurisdiction and
control. . . . [W]e conclude that Lease and continuing Treaty must be construed as
providing that Cuba possesses no substantive sovereignty over Guantanamo during
the period ofthe U.S. reign. All such sovereignty during that indefinite and potentially
permanent period is vested in the United States. . . . Sovereignty may be gained by a
demonstration of intent to exercise sovereign control on the part of a country that is in
possession of the territory in question and has the power to enforce its will.35
These statements by the court are fully in accord with the traditional view under
customary international law ofthe effect ofoccupation and there is nothing new or
innovative about them. And the State which exercises sovereignty is entitled to all
the rights accompanying sovereignty, as well as being burdened with all the obliga-
tions.36
As a further instance of occupatio pacifica byway ofagreement the situation cre-
ated by the arrangements made in 1960 at the time of the grant of independence to
Cyprus, whereby Britain retained full sovereignty over two areas of the island as
military bases may be cited. 37
It may happen that part of a State's territory is occupied by a victor in accor-
dance with a peace treaty after a war. In such a case, the borderline between
occupatio pacifica and occupatio bellica may be somewhat blurred. However, when
such an occupation takes place, the wartime rights and obligations of the occupant
are not normally relevant. Under the 1919 Treaty ofVersailles for example, Article
426 provides:
As a guarantee for the execution of the present Treaty by Germany, the German
territory situated west of the Rhine [the Rhineland and the Ruhr], together with the
bridgeheads, will be occupied by Allied and Associated troops for a period of fifteen
years from the coming into force of the present Treaty.38
Provision was also made, depending on compliance by Germany with the terms of
the Treaty, for the gradual withdrawal of the occupying forces. 39
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A somewhat different policy was adopted after World War II because of the un-
conditional surrender of both Germany40 and Japan.41 In so far as Germany was
concerned, the victorious Allies—France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
the United Kingdom and the United States—divided the country into four sepa-
rate zones governed by military officers, with Berlin divided into four sectors each
allocated to one of the four powers. To all intents and purposes Germany, as a
State, had ceased to exist by virtue of debellatio42 and the zones, both separately and
severally, were under the full sovereignty and administration of the occupying
powers, which only formally ended with the establishment and recognition of the
Federal and People's Republics, respectively. In so far as Japan was concerned, the
situation was somewhat different. There was no suggestion that the State had
ceased to exist and the Emperor remained as titular Head of State, although the ac-
tual government was in the hands of General Douglas MacArthur as Supreme
Commander for the Allied Powers. He ruled with virtually absolute power. Al-
though ostensibly acting on behalf of the Allied Powers, MacArthur remained sub-
ject to the authority of the President of the United States. This situation prevailed
until the adoption of the Peace Treaty with Japan in 1951.43 Article 6(a) of the
Treaty provides, in part, that all "occupation forces of the Allied Powers shall be
withdrawn from Japan as soon as possible after the coming into force ofthe present
Treaty, and in any case not later that 90 days thereafter. . .
."
Although by Article 1 of the Peace Treaty "the Allied Powers recognize the full
sovereignty of the Japanese people over Japan and its territorial waters," the Con-
stitution of Japan,44 drawn up in 1947 under the auspices of MacArthur's occupa-
tion, remained in force. Article 9 of the Constitution provided:
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese
people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of
force as a means of settling international disputes.
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as
well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the
state will not be recognized.
The occupation of Japan was similar to that of the occupation of the Rhineland in
that both followed the unconditional surrender of the defeated State and the as-
sumption of absolute power by the victors. There was no suggestion that the occu-
pier was in any way limited by the rights granted to an occupier in accordance with
the law of war.
Reference might also be made to the position ofAustria following World War II.
Austria had been annexed by Germany in 1938 and was regarded as part of
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Germany.45 Recognition ofthe annexation was withdrawn by virtue ofthe Moscow
Declaration.46 Nevertheless, Austria was not treated in the same fashion as other
States unlawfully occupied by Germany. In 1946, an agreement was concluded be-
tween the four major Allied Powers (United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union
and France) and Austria47 that established a four-power Commission with compe-
tence for the whole ofAustria, but with each of these powers a virtual sovereign oc-
cupant in its own zone. By Article 1 of that accord, the Austrian Government and
all subordinate Austrian authorities were bound to carry out all instructions re-
ceived from the Allied Commission, so much so that "the Austrian authority ... is
no more than an executive arm of the occupying Power."48 Although the anschluss
had ceased to be recognized, in 1955 a peace treaty was agreed to with Austria,49 Ar-
ticle 20 of which stipulated that the 1946 Agreement was terminated and that the
Agreement on Zones of Occupation was to terminate on the withdrawal of all
Allied forces by the end of that year.
Occupatio bellica involves occupation during the actual conduct of hostilities or,
after these have ceased prior to any arrangement being made for the future of the
territory in question. In such cases, reference must be made to the laws and cus-
toms of war. Already in ancient India:
Customs, laws and family usages which obtain in a country should be preserved when
the country has been acquired. . . . Having conquered his foe, let him not abolish or
disregard the laws of that country A king should never do such injury to his foe as
would rankle in the latter's heart.50
More important from our point of view, particularly since it became the model
for much ofEurope, is the Lieber Code51 prepared by Professor Lieber ofColumbia
University and propounded by President Lincoln during the American Civil War.
Here, we find a number of regulations affecting the rights of enemy civilians of
which we need cite just a few:
Art. 23. Private citizens are no longer murdered, enslaved, or carried off to distant
parts, and the inoffensive individual is as little disturbed in his private relations as the
commander of the hostile troops can afford to grant in the overruling demands of a
vigorous war.
Art. 25. In modern regular wars of the Europeans, and their descendants in other
portions of the globe, protection of the inoffensive citizen of the hostile country is the
rule; privation and disturbance of private relations are the exception.
Art. 33. It is no longer considered lawful - on the contrary, it is held to be a serious
breach of the law of war - to force the subjects of the enemy into the service of the
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victorious government, except the latter should proclaim, after a fair and complete
conquest of the hostile country or district, that it is resolved to keep the country,
district, or place permanently as its own and make it a portion of its own country.
Art. 35. Classical works of art, libraries, scientific collections, or precious instruments,
such as astronomical telescopes, must be secured against all avoidable injury, even
when they are contained in fortified places whilst besieged or bombarded.52
Art. 36. Ifsuch works of art, libraries, collections, or instruments belonging to a hostile
nation or government, can be removed without injury, the ruler of the conquering
state or nation may order them to be seized and removed for the benefit of the said
nation. The ultimate ownership is to be settled by the ensuing treaty of peace. In no
case shall they be sold or be given away by the armies ofthe United States, nor shall they
ever be privately appropriated, or wantonly destroyed or injured.
Art. 37. The United States acknowledge and protect, in hostile countries occupied by
them, religion and morality; strictly private property; the persons of the inhabitants,
especially those of women: and the sacredness of domestic relations. Offenses to the
contrary shall be rigorously punished. . .
.
Art. 39. The salaries of civil officers of the hostile government who remain in the
invaded territory, and continue the work of their offices, and can continue it according
to the circumstances arising out of the war - such as judges, administrative or public
officers, officers of city or communal governments - are paid from the public revenue
ofthe invaded territory, until the military government has reason wholly or partially to
discontinue it. . .
.
Art. 44. All wanton violence committed against persons in the invaded country, all
destruction of property not commanded by the authorized officer, all robbery, all
pillage or sacking, even after taking place by main force, all rape, wounding, maiming,
or killing of such inhabitants, are prohibited under the penalty of death, or such other
severe punishment as may seem adequate for the gravity of the offense. . .
.
Art. 47. Crimes punishable by all penal codes, such as arson, murder, maiming,
assaults, highway robbery, theft, burglary, fraud, forgery, and rape, ifcommitted by an
American soldier in a hostile country against its inhabitants, are not only punishable as
at home, but in all cases in which death is not inflicted, the severe punishment shall be
preferred. . .
.
There is no need here to examine the Brussels Declaration of 187453 or the Oxford
Manual of 188054 since the former was never ratified, while the latter was drawn up
by members of the Institute of International Law and had no official standing.
Moreover, their contents were fully taken into consideration at the Hague
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Conference of 1899, which produced Hague Convention II 55 with respect to the
Laws and Customs ofWar on Land, which was itself replaced at the 1907 Confer-
ence by Convention IV. 56 It is the latter Convention which governed the law on oc-
cupation until its application was extended in 1949 by the Fourth Geneva
Convention,57 as possibly supplemented by the various principles now accepted as
part ofthe international law concerning the protection ofhuman rights, in particu-
lar the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights58 and the 1966 International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 59 Since the Geneva Conventions apply "to
all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between
two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not
recognized by one of them,"60 it may be said as a general statement that:
[T]he law of belligerent occupation is applicable whenever one State occupies, in the
course of an armed conflict, territory which was previously under the control of a
hostile party to that conflict, irrespective ofwhether the displaced power was the lawful
sovereign of that territory.61
But, this is only true of conflicting States which are parties to the Conventions, al-
though the principles embodied in 1907 have been held to be part of customary
law62 and would, therefore, be applicable in any armed conflict. Moreover, the
Martens Clause, set forth in the Preamble of Hague Convention IV of 1907, pro-
vides, in pertinent part, that:
[I]n cases not included in the Regulations [annexed to the Convention] . . ., the
inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the
principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established among
civilized peoples, from the laws ofhumanity, and the dictates ofthe public conscience.
In its advisory opinion on nuclear weapons, the International Court of Justice
made clear that the Martens Clause is relevant even today, and "the fundamental
rules [laid down in the Hague and Geneva Conventions] are to be observed by all
States whether or not they have ratified the conventions that contain them, because
they constitute intransgressible principles of international customary law."63
Since it is now established that the principles embodied in the Hague Regula-
tions and the Geneva Conventions, at least to the extent that they are in accordance
with accepted customary law, are of general application binding on all, it is neces-
sary to draw attention to some of the basic principles relating to occupation. The
underlying principle in Hague Convention IV is to be found in Article 43:
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The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the
occupant, the latter shall take all measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as
possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the
laws in force in that country.
The effect of this provision may be seen from the statement by the United States
Military Tribunal in the Hostages Case:
The status of an occupant of the territory having been achieved, international law
places the responsibility upon the commanding general ofpreserving order, punishing
crime and protecting lives and property within the occupied territory. His power of
accomplishing these ends is as great as his responsibility. But he is definitely limited by
recognized rules of international law.64
This does not mean, of course, that the occupying power must maintain in force le-
gal provisions that run counter to morality or basic principles underlying its own
way of life, so that the Powers occupying Germany after its unconditional surren-
der were fully entitled to abrogate such German legislation as the Nazi "racial"
laws, or, as has happened more recently, the cancellation of discriminatory legisla-
tion directed at women.
Other relevant provisions ofHague Convention IV include Article 45 ("It is for-
bidden to compel the inhabitants of occupied territory to swear allegiance to the
hostile Power"), Article 46 ("Family honour and rights, the lives of persons, and
private property, as well as religious convictions and practice, must be re-
spected ..."), Article 50 ("No general penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, shall be in-
flicted upon the population on account of the acts of individuals for which they
cannot be regarded as jointly and severally responsible"), and Article 55 ("The oc-
cupying State shall be regarded only as administrator and usufructuary of public
buildings, real estate, forests, and agricultural estates belonging to the hostile State,
and situated in the occupied country. It must safeguard the capital of these proper-
ties, and administer them in accordance with the rules of usufruct").
The law with regard to occupatio bellica was greatly expanded with the adoption
of the 1949 Geneva Convention IV. This did not replace the provisions of the 1907
Convention, expressly stating that it is "supplementary" thereto.65 This Conven-
tion is primarily directed to protecting the rights of civilians in occupied territory,
limiting the rights ofthe occupant in so far as such civilians are concerned. Article 4
provides that "Persons protected by the convention are those who, at a given mo-
ment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of . . . a[n] occupa-
tion, in the hands of a[n] Occupying Power ofwhich they are not nationals." It has
been said of this Convention that:
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The emphasis is . . . upon the preservation of minimum humanitarian standards,
through the prohibition of reprisals and collective punishments against the civilian
population of the occupied territory, hostage-taking, torture, inhuman and degrading
treatment, deportation, slave labour, wholesale seizure of property, and compulsion to
perform work of military value. Both the Hague Regulations and the Fourth Geneva
Convention also forbid the exploitation of the economy of the occupied territory for
the benefit of the occupant's own economy. In exercising its power to determine such
matters as exchange rates, the amount of money in circulation in the occupied
territory, and the terms and conditions of trade, the occupying power must seek to
provide for the good economic government of the occupied territory and not merely
feather its own nest.66
As important as these humanitarian provisions are, perhaps even more signifi-
cant is the provision in Article 1 that the Convention is to apply "in all circum-
stances," while by Article 2, which is common to all four of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, Convention IV is to apply:
[T]o all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between
two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state ofwar is not recognized
by one of them. [It] shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the
territory of a High Contracting Party even if the occupation meets with no armed
resistance.
The provisions in Geneva Convention IV are applicable from the opening of the
conflict or of the occupation and:
[I]n the case of occupied territory [its] applications . . . shall cease one year after the
general close ofmilitary operations; however, the Occupying Power shall be bound, for
the duration ofthe occupation, to the extent that such Power exercises the functions of
government in such territory by the provisions of [certain specified Articles relating to
the status and treatment of civilians]. Protected persons whose release, repatriation or
re-establishment may take place after such dates shall meanwhile continue to benefit
by the present Convention.67
By Article 27, the rights guaranteed by Convention IV are to be enjoyed by all
"without any adverse distinction based ... on race, religion or political opinion,"
and women are to be protected against "any attack on their honour." To ensure
that protected persons enjoy their rights under the Convention, Article 29 provides
that the "Party to the conflict in whose hands protected persons may be, is respon-
sible for the treatment accorded to them by its agents, irrespective ofany individual
responsibility which maybe incurred " Article 31, in turn, states that "no physi-
cal or moral coercion shall be exercised against protected persons, particularly to
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obtain information from them or from third parties." Moreover, Article 32 pro-
vides that it is prohibited to take:
[A]ny measure ofsuch a character as to cause the physical suffering or extermination of
protected persons in [the] hands [of any High Contracting Party]. This prohibition
applies not only to murder, torture, corporal punishment, mutilation and medical or
scientific experiments not necessitated by the medical treatment of a protected person,
but also to any other measures of brutality, whether applied by civilian or military
agents.
It is important to note that, in accordance with Article 8, protected persons may
not agree to give up their rights under the Convention either "in part or entirety."
Similarly, Article 47 declares that:
[Protected persons who are in occupied territory shall not be deprived, in any case or
in any manner whatsoever, of the benefits of the present Convention by any change
introduced, as the result of the occupation of a territory, into the institutions or
government of the said territory, nor by any agreement concluded between the
authorities ofthe occupied territories and the Occupying Power, nor by the annexation
by the latter of the whole or part of the occupied territory.
This raises nice questions regarding, for example, the Israeli actions with regard to
territories under the control of the Palestine Administration Authority; although
Israel contends that since it has never ratified the Fourth Convention it is not
bound thereby. Moreover, it has argued that since the territories in question were
never under the authority of any recognized sovereign they are merely "adminis-
tered," rather than "occupied"—whatever that distinction might be. However,
Prime Minister Sharon has acknowledged, in connection with his undertaking to
withdraw from parts ofthe territory in question, that they are in fact "occupied." In
this connection it might be of interest to draw attention to the following comment
in the British Manual of the Law ofArmed Conflict: "Whether the administration
imposed by the occupying power is called a military government or civil govern-
ment is not important. The legality of its acts will be determined in accordance
with the law of armed conflict."68 The United States Army manual, The Law of
Land Warfare, is to the same effect:
It is immaterial whether the government over an enemy's territory consists in a
military or civil or mixed administration. Its character is the same and the source of its
authority is the same. It is a government imposed by force, and the legality of its acts is
determined by the law of war.69
182
Leslie C. Green
In the light of these statements, it would appear that the inclusion in the admin-
istration of civilian nationals of the occupied territory would not alter the situa-
tion. It might be questioned, therefore, whether the administrations that, under
the supervision of occupying authorities, have been established in the Kosovo re-
gion of Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq are truly in line with the requirements of
the Convention, for they purport to govern regardless ofthe provisions ofthe Con-
vention or the customary law concerning occupation. In each of these instances,
regardless of the installation of "local" administrations, the occupation, even
though government might be conducted through local surrogates however de-
scribed, has continued and appears likely to do so for some time, despite the hold-
ing of local elections. A comment by Professor Greenwood is relevant:
Although it is obviously difficult to apply the law of belligerent occupation in a
prolonged occupation, that law is not thereby rendered inapplicable. Prolonged
occupation raises many questions to which the Hague Regulations and the Fourth
Geneva Convention provide no express answers. In particular, there is a need for
change on a far greater scale during a prolonged occupation simply because of the way
in which circumstances change over time. Nevertheless, there is no indication that
international law permits an occupying power to disregard provisions of the
Regulations or the Convention merely because it has been in occupation for a long
period, not least because there is no body oflaw which might plausibly take their place
and no indication that the international community is willing to trust the occupant
with carte blanche. Any changes, it is suggested, must take place within the framework
of the Hague Regulations and the Fourth Geneva Convention, the principles ofwhich
are flexible enough to accommodate at least some of the needs of a prolonged
occupation The longer the occupation lasts, the greater the degree ofchange which
is likely to be required but changes should still be made only in accordance with the
broad principles [to be found in the Regulations and Convention].70
It must be borne in mind, when considering the Israeli situation, which was Profes-
sor Greenwood's particular concern when making this comment, that Israel has re-
fused to ratify Geneva IV and is only bound by those provisions of the Convention
which give expression to customary law.
In so far as the Israeli situation is concerned, while the tendency has been until
recently to describe the contested Palestinian lands—the West Bank region, also
described as Judea and Samaria—held by Israel as "administered territories" 71 to
which the Fourth Convention does not apply, Israeli courts, when called upon to
consider the legality of actions by military authorities in those territories, have not
always taken such a narrow approach, pointing out as early as 1968 that the Mili-
tary Commander's legislative powers derive from the actual occupation and not
the Convention, but the judge stated:
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[T]he State of Israel observes the provisions of the convention in practice. And since it
is guided by the convention, inasmuch as the latter embodies humanitarian principles
of civilized nations, I shall assume that I must have recourse to the convention as being
ofbinding force Any Order made by the Commander is presumed to be valid, and
its validity can only be impugned if the Order is on the face of it so unreasonable and
exceptional and contrary to the most basic principles of natural justice and
international morality accepted by civilized nations, that it stands to be rejected and the
Military Court [set up under security Provisions Order issued by the Military
Commander of the Region] by virtue of its inherent authority must disregard it as
being enacted out ofmalice and arbitrariness rather than the achievement ofany lawful
purpose. . . 72
The "Military Court" referred to in this opinion was established under security
Provisions Order issued by the Military Commander of the Region. Establishment
of such military courts is consistent with Geneva Convention IV. 73
As to the 1907 Hague Regulations, the Israeli judicial position is very clear. As
was pointed out by the Supreme Court in 1982:
The rights of a resident in the area under military government vis-a-vis the military
commander - rights subject to judicial review in a court of law of the occupying state -
stem from the rules governing belligerent occupation in customary international law
and contractual international law, insofar as they have been assimilated into the
internal law of the occupying state by a valid internal act of legislation. In respect of
Israel's belligerent occupation, and in the absence of legislation which internalizes the
principle [sic] norms of the laws ofwar relating to belligerent occupation, (the rules in
force) are those included in the Hague Regulations. . . . Even though the Hague
Regulations serve as an authority in this respect, the accepted attitude - which has also
been accepted by this Court - is that the Hague Regulations are declarative in nature
and reflect customary international law, applicable in Israel without an act of Israeli
legislation.
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The Fourth Geneva Convention, not having been ratified by Israel, has never
been the subject of Israeli legislation. However, as has just been noted, the courts
will apply those parts ofthe Convention which it considers to be purely humanitar-
ian in character and part of international customary law. It is for this reason that Is-
rael applies the Hague Regulations appended to Convention IV of 1907, even
though it contends there is no war since there is no State enemy, merely groups of
"terrorists," like the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, who are not enti-
tled to be treated as prisoners ofwar and are, therefore, not protected by the Third
Geneva Convention.75
Among the activities of the Israel military administration claimed to be contrary
to both the Hague Regulations and Geneva Convention IV is the destruction of the
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homes of civilians who are related to an alleged terrorist. In the 1985 case of Degalis
v. Military Commander ofthejudea and Samaria Region, Judge Ben-Dror pointed
out that the goal of the 1945 Defence (Emergency) Regulations permitting such
demolition:
[Wjas a deterrent effect, and this effect should apply not only to the terrorist alone, but
also to the family living with him. A demolition of a terrorist's house cannot be
considered a 'collective punishment' because the house about to be demolished is
connected to the terrorist, and not to people unconnected with the matter. In cases
such as this the High Court usually instructs the respondent [the Military
Commander] to consider other deterrent measures, such as merely sealing off the
terrorists' houses. However, the final decision on the nature of the measure to be
adopted lies within the respondent's competence according to Regulation 1 19, and due
to the gravity of the acts performed by the petitioners' relatives, the sanction of
demolition of their houses seems quite a reasonable one.76
The conclusion to be drawn from these Israeli judicial decisions is that it matters
little whether the occupying power regards the territory under administration as
"enemy" or "terrorist" or by some other nomenclature. For Israel, at least, the law
to be applied is made up of the occupation provisions of the Hague Regulations,
together with those provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention which are hu-
manitarian in their purpose and as such are to be observed regardless of legislation
ratifying the Convention.
The difference between the Israeli occupation and those that have occurred later
lies in the fact that the former is the result of conflict following Israel's creation and
has been conducted between Israel and forces that, for the main part, do not owe
allegiance to any other State. The later occupations have all involved States, all of
which are members of the United Nations, and have followed an intervention not
of the normal conflict type, but have been based on some other ground, often in
disregard of the terms of the Charter of the United Nations. It is necessary, there-
fore, to pay some attention to the basis for the intervention and the consequent
occupation.
Before doing so, however, reference must be made to some apparent occupa-
tions under the auspices of the United Nations which have nothing inherently to
do with the law of armed conflict, and, consequently, not with the law concerning
occupation. There have been a number of incidents in which the members of the
United Nations, particularly of the Security Council, have become concerned at
the manner in which conflicting racial or tribal groups within a country, frequently
one that has only recently achieved its independence, have indulged in outrageous
behavior, or in which it has been feared the local hostilities might eventually
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involve some third power. In such circumstances the United Nations has autho-
rized the raising of a "peacekeeping" force which has been stationed in the affected
territory with a view to bringing an end to hostilities by acting as an interposition
force between rival groups. 77 This has happened, for example, in Cyprus, Korea, Is-
rael, Somalia, Rwanda, 78 Kampuchea, and East Timor, to name but a few. How-
ever, these forces do not operate as occupiers, and the law, whether it is that of the
Hague or of Geneva, has no relevance. That these forces are there as a matter of lo-
cal tolerance may be seen from the manner in which the UN force in Gaza was
withdrawn at the request of Egypt, the host country, in 1967. 79
The intervention by peacekeepers in Haiti tends to stand in a position of its own,
for in this case it has been alleged that the United States, which provided the bulk of
the peacekeeping force, virtually forced Aristide, the democratically elected presi-
dent of the country, to depart and arranged for his removal (Aristide asserts that
the United States forcibly removed him), which, if true, is clearly an action interfer-
ing with local government contrary to customary international law. The United
States denied doing so. While there was some indication that this action may have
been popular at the time, by October 2004 agitation was taking place calling for his
return.
Before considering the legal status of such interventions it must be pointed out
that by Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter all Members "shall refrain in their in-
ternational relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity
or political independence ofany state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations." Further, as was indicated at the very beginning of
this article, paragraph 7 of the same Article provides:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state
or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present
Charter; but this Principle shall not prejudice the application ofenforcement measures
under Chapter VII.
Chapter VII is concerned with "Action with respect to Threats to the Peace,
Breaches ofthe Peace, and Acts ofAggression." Prima facie, this would suggest that,
unless ill treatment of nationals by one State constituted a direct threat to the well-
being of another, no State or the United Nations itself would have a right to inter-
vene on behalf of those persecuted. The situation might be altered by virtue of the
existence of treaty obligations concerning human rights undertaken by the perse-
cutor, although it must be borne in mind that none ofthe presently existing treaties
in this field confers a right of direct intervention on any other party to such treaties.
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In accordance with the law of treaties, unless the treaty specifically creates such a
right, by both customary and conventional law, breach of a treaty does not give pri-
vate citizens any right recognized and enforceable by international law,80 and the
various treaties concerned with human rights have not created such a right
expressis verbis. The only other recourse to a national would depend upon the State
party to the treaty and alleged to be in breach of it having created such a right under
its national law. The only right accruing to other parties to the treaty would be by
way of damages, provided it could prove that its own interests had in fact been ad-
versely affected by the conduct objected to.
The first case that calls for consideration arose out of the dissolution of the
Socialist Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and the conflicts which began in
1991. These conflicts were both international, as for example, between Croatia
and Serbia, and non-international, as for instance, between Bosnia and Bosnian
Serbs seeking to join Serbia. In accordance with customary international law, an
established government is entitled to take such action as it deems necessary to sup-
press a revolt, free from any active intervention by any other State, and it would
appear from Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter, free from intervention by the
United Nations. In addition, in this particular instance it is important to note that
all of the parties concerned in the Yugoslav fighting accepted the provisions of
Protocol II of 1977. 81
By Article 3 of the Protocol, non-intervention by third States, whatever the cir-
cumstances, is condemned emphatically:
1. Nothing in the Protocol [including Part II concerning Humane Treatment] shall be
invoked for the purpose of affecting the sovereignty of a State or the responsibility of
the government, by all legitimate [it does not say "reasonable"] means, to maintain or
re-establish law and order in the State or to defend the national unity and territorial
integrity of the State.
2. Nothing in the Protocol shall be invoked as a justification for intervening, directly or
indirectly, in the armed conflict or in the internal or external affairs of the High
Contracting Party in the territory of which the conflict occurs.
Of course, States, for example the United States, which had not become a party to
the Protocol, would not be bound by this provision. It would, however, be bound
by the well-established principle of non-intervention under customary law and re-
affirmed in the Charter.
Apart from the conflicts between Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia, a major conflict
took place in the Serb remnant, particularly as between the Serb authorities and the
Albanian population that constituted a majority in Kosovo. The attempt by the
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Serbs to reassert their authority resulted in atrocities on both sides, with wide-
spread allegations that the authorities were carrying out extensive policies of "eth-
nic cleansing" involving expulsions, killings and mass rapes ofthe Albanians. Some
would argue that "ethnic cleansing" was a sanitized term for genocide. Article II of
the Genocide Convention of 1948 defines genocide as meaning:
[A]cts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial
or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 82
It can hardly be denied that slaughtering the men, and forcing women and children
to flee their homes and take to the hills in winter without adequate food or cloth-
ing, would fall within this definition. While the Convention elevated genocide to a
crime, it made little provision for its punishment, nor did it give any party a right to
intervene to terminate acts of genocide being committed by some other party. In
any case, byfailing to describe what was going on by the treaty term would suggest that
no such right could be asserted.
Nevertheless, when Serbia rejected a proposal that a force of North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) personnel be admitted and that a plebiscite under
NATO supervision be held on Kosovo's future after three years of interim govern-
ment, and followed this rejection with increased pressure upon the Kosovar Alba-
nian population, NATO indicated that military action against the Serbs was
inevitable and in July 1999 NATO began a bombing campaign. This is not the
place to discuss the NATO intervention83 either in accordance with the United Na-
tions Charter or the North Atlantic Treaty84 itself. Suffice it to say that Article 5 of
the Treaty defines the geographic area of its competence, which does not include
the former State of Yugoslavia, and requires an armed attack against a signatory
for the obligations of the Treaty to come into effect. It is difficult to appreciate how
a non-international conflict in Yugoslavia, not a member of NATO, in any way
threatened the security of any NATO member. NATO, however, maintained that
its intervention was not in any way politically directed with the aim of breaking up
what remained of the former Yugoslavia or to recognize an independent Kosovo,
but was purely humanitarian, directed at terminating the ethnic cleansing and other
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atrocities committed by the Serbs against the Muslim Albanian population, and to
enable the latter to return home in safety and enjoying the same rights as all other
Serbian citizens in the area. Here we have an approach that is reminiscent of provi-
sions to be found in the 1878 Treaty of Berlin. Article XXXV thereof provides:
In Serbia the difference of religious creed and confession shall not be alleged against
any person as a ground for exclusion or incapacity in matters relating to the enjoyment
of civil and political rights, admission to public employments, functions, and honours,
or the exercise of the various professions and industries, in any locality whatever. The
freedom and outward exercise of all forms of worship shall be assured to all persons
belonging to Serbia, as well as to foreigners. And no hindrance shall be offered either to
the hierarchical organization of the different communions, or to their relations with
their spiritual heads.
While it is true that there is no established right of intervention, whether leading
to occupation or not, in customary international law, one cannot ignore the fact
that international law is a developing process. The Preamble to the United Nations
Charter affirms "faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of
the human person, in the equal rights ofmen and women and of nations large and
small." This has led to the adoption of a variety ofinstruments reaffirming the exis-
tence of and support for human rights. With few States presuming to oppose these
assertions, there is a tendency to assert that there is now, ifnot a.jus cogens, at least a
developing customary law in this field binding upon and enforceable by all. Given
this trend, it may be contended that the NATO intervention is legally justifiable.
What may be more difficult to support is the continued presence ofNATO forces
and a UN administrator in the territory now that "peace" has officially been re-
stored, and purportedly free elections have been held in Serbia. However, the form
of those elections and the persons permitted to run for office have all been vetted
and approved by the non-local internationally imposed administrator. While there
is no official occupation in existence and no suggestion that the area is under the
umbrella of the Fourth Geneva Convention, the members of the "occupying"
forces are immune from the local jurisdiction, and there appears to be little effort
made by the sending State authorities to try their personnel in accordance with
their own national law for offenses committed against local inhabitants. 85
It remains to discuss the situation in both Afghanistan and Iraq, particularly as
the United States has taken the lead in dealing with both these countries and con-
tinues to do so, and remains somewhat indifferent to the view of other States offer-
ing support in seeking to restore order.
On September 11, 2001, three hijacked American aircraft were used as destruc-
tive weapons against the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in
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\\ ashington, D.C., while a fourth plane was likely prevented by its passengers from
crashing into the White House itself. The immediate reaction of the United States
Government was to declare a "war against terrorism," without any indication as to
the State against which this war was to be waged. There was strong evidence to in-
dicate that the attacks had been organized by al-Qaeda, a group of Islamic funda-
mentalists led by Osama bin Laden, a renegade Saudi citizen, who had been
responsible for a number of prior attacks against United States and other western
interests. There was also evidence to indicate that bin Laden was in Afghanistan
where he maintained or financed a number of terrorist training camps. Afghani-
stan was at that time administered by an Islamic fundamentalist administration
(the Taliban) that constituted the country's de facto government, although it was
not internationally recognized. The Taliban authorities were called upon to arrest
bin Laden and surrender him to the United States for trial. When they refused to
do so, the country was attacked by US forces, supported by the United Kingdom
and others.
There was no declaration of war and, despite the fact that Taliban fighters were
representative of their "government" and as such distinguishable from al-Qaeda,
the United States refused to recognize them as legitimate combatants entitled to
treatment when captured as prisoners of war. Instead they were described as "en-
emy combatants," a classification not known to the law of armed conflict, which
regards all captured enemy personnel belonging to an organized force as prisoners
of war. If not clearly recognizable as entitled to be described as such, they are enti-
tled to be treated as if they were prisoners ofwar until such time as their status has
been clarified by a tribunal. 86 It is true that the supporters of the Taliban adminis-
tration were not easily identifiable as members of a regular force, but they were cer-
tainly no less identifiable that those constituting the Northern Alliance, which
purported to be the remnant of the government overthrown by the Taliban. More-
over, in view of the camouflage worn by many members ofmodern armed forces
—
as well as by many, particularly younger, civilians—it may well be difficult to iden-
tity- these too, especially those members who participate in undercover missions
wearing civilian or other dress, as distinct from national uniform, whether in place
of or additional to their regular uniform. 87 Having displaced the Taliban, the
United States treated as an ally the Northern Alliance as representatives of the gov-
ernment displaced by the Taliban, and subsequently selected personnel from
among its members, together with some tribal leaders, to form a council to elect a
government under the leadership of an individual acceptable to the United States.
In the meantime the latter was able to persuade some third States to assist in the
administration and rebuilding ofAfghanistan, and, as in Kosovo, some of the mili-
tary supervisory activities have been undertaken by NATO—although there has
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been no attempt to explain how such an activity so far from the North Atlantic area
falls within NATO's competence. At no time has it been suggested that there is an
occupation or that there is any room for any of the Geneva Conventions to be
applied.
Moreover, a new development in the practice of occupation has been intro-
duced in Afghanistan. A number of armed western security personnel, often ex-
servicemen, who may well be described as mercenaries and therefore illegal com-
batants,88 have been recruited to assist the occupying authority and the Afghan ad-
ministration in protecting commercial interests, usually western in character. Such
personnel have no interest in or concern for restrictions imposed by the Hague or
Geneva Conventions and their activities go largely unchecked by either the allied or
Afghan authorities.89
Despite the existence ofan acceptable Afghan administration and the participa-
tion of other States, the United States has removed captured personnel from Af-
ghanistan to Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, where it has a naval base leased in virtual
perpetuity from the Cuban government. 90 Among the captives are members of the
Taliban, who, it may be suggested, were legitimately engaged in combat on behalf
of their government against the United States "invader," and who might be re-
garded, prima facie, as entitled to Third Convention protection, instead of being
denied, until recently,91 any form of independent legal protection. Also among the
Taliban captives are non-Afghan Muslims who volunteered to defend a Muslim
administration against rebels or foreign forces seeking to overthrow that adminis-
tration. It may be suggested that they were entitled to the same treatment as the
French Foreign Legion, the LaFayette Squadron or any American who joined the
allied forces in either World War before the United States itselfbecame a belliger-
ent. Even when these captives have held the nationality of one of the American al-
lies, as have a number from Britain or Pakistan, the United States has declined to
treat them as in any way protected by the law of armed conflict nor, with rare ex-
ceptions, has it been prepared to hand them over to their own government for
treatment in accordance with their national law. Moreover, it would seem that
where some detainees are concerned no details as to name or even place of deten-
tion are known.92
In practice, despite the existence of a nominally independent government, Af-
ghanistan is under effective US occupation since it would appear that the "govern-
ment" acts only with the consent of the United States, even though the latter
contends that any actions taken by them against local "terrorists" (a term which is
being used somewhat indiscriminately both in Afghanistan and Iraq even against
those who might be more correctly described as "insurgents") are only undertaken
at the request or with the consent of the Afghan administration. Both the United
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States and the Afghan authorities deny that an occupation exists, and the United
States has indicated that it will withdraw if requested after the Afghan election
which is due to take place shortly. Until then, it is the United States that is seeking
to ensure that conditions exist for such an election to be held.
At least in so far as Afghanistan is concerned, it is possible to argue that the pro-
tection offered by the Taliban to the al-Qaeda terrorist movement with the latter's
threats and actions against third States was enough to regard the Taliban as an ally
ofOsama bin Laden's supporters and, as such, sufficient as a coconspirator to war-
rant action against it. Additionally, the Taliban governmental authority was ex-
tremely restrictive and in virtual denial of all human rights, particularly where
women were concerned, although this argument was not originally of any major
significance.
In the case of Iraq, no similar contentions could be put forward. Instead refer-
ence was made to the United Nations resolutions terminating hostilities at the end
of the conflict with Iraq consequent upon its invasion of Kuwait. By Resolution
687,93 which was adopted in 1991, Iraq was required to get rid of all its chemical
and biological weapons as well as its weapons ofmass destruction and to submit to
international inspection to ensure compliance with these requirements. After 9/11,
the United States contended that Iraq was not fulfilling its obligations and was not
cooperating with the United Nations inspectors. When the Security Council failed
to take the further action desired by the United States, the latter, supported by the
United Kingdom, launched a military offensive against Iraq, while adding to its
complaint the assertion that Saddam Hussein, president of Iraq, was a partisan of
al-Qaeda and even claimed that Iraq was party to the September attacks on the
United States, a claim for which there appears to have been no substantive evidence
whatever. The United Kingdom added the complaint that Iraq was in breach of ev-
ery international obligation concerning human rights and that the administration
should be overthrown even on this ground alone.
As in the case ofAfghanistan, there was no support from the United Nations nor
was there any declaration ofwar. 94 The actual combat operations were not of great
duration, the Iraqi armed forces soon surrendered, and President Bush proclaimed
that the operation was successfully terminated. In that case, in accordance with the
Third Geneva Convention,95 all prisoners ofwar other than those held for potential
trial as war criminals must be released, an obligation only partly complied with.
Further, the United States declared that Saddam Hussein and many of his leading
military, political and scientific advisers had committed war crimes during the first
GulfWar following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, as well as crimes against human-
ity, particularly against dissident Iraqi nationals. There was again no suggestion
that these latter were to be treated in accordance with the Geneva Conventions,
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although Saddam at least was permitted to see International Committee of the Red
Cross representatives. Moreover, the United States arranged for Saddam and some
of the others to be handed over to the new Iraqi administration for trial, thus rais-
ing the possibility of trials by vengeance, even though it was asserted that proper
precautions would be taken to ensure that they receive a fair trial.
With the overthrow of the government, the United States, without acknowledg-
ing that it was an occupant subject to the restrictions imposed by the Hague or
Geneva Conventions, became the governing authority in Iraq, appointing a United
States citizen as supreme governor, although he was later replaced by an American-
sponsored Iraqi interim administration, with the United States making clear which
local politicians it would not tolerate. The United States signed an agreement with
this administration undertaking to withdraw from Iraq should the Iraqi govern-
ment request it to do so. In the meantime, the United States remained the supreme
authority for security purposes and agreed not to undertake offensive operations
against "terrorists," even though some of those so described might more properly
be considered as insurgents. It must be kept in mind that the overthrow ofSaddam
Hussein and his government and the disbandment by the occupant of the Iraqi
armed forces did not mean that all support for the legitimate Iraqi government had
terminated, particularly as many of these forces found themselves without pros-
pects of employment. Many of them did in fact continue operations of a warlike
character against both the "invading" military forces and representatives of the
Iraqi administration. Subsequently the United States began allowing members of
the former Iraqi forces, after proper vetting, to rejoin the newly-created Iraqi
armed or police forces.
When it became clear that Iraq had no weapons ofmass destruction and had de-
stroyed under United Nations supervision its chemical and biological weapons, a
fact later confirmed by the head of the United States Iraq Survey Group in his Final
Report,96 the United States and its allies changed the balance of their arguments
concerning the invasion and subsequent occupation. It now seemed that the most
important aim of their operations was to bring democracy to Iraq, sometimes
claiming that this would prove an example for other Middle East States, the gov-
ernments ofmany ofwhich were dictatorial in character. This claim that the spread
of democratic governments everywhere the United States and its allies consid-
ered it to be desirable—even absent United Nations approval if this could not be
obtained—is reminiscent ofpolicies pursued by the Concert ofEurope in the nine-
teenth century.
In both Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States, backed by its allies, has sup-
ported its nominee in the local administration in organizing an election under
American protection. The presumption appears to be that with an election, even
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though local conditions might not make it feasible to be held throughout the occu-
pied area, a new era will be created with a popular government taking over, one
that will fully respect human rights, will not constitute a threat to any neighbor and
will not seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction or others now considered
contrary to international law.
This view that the introduction of the trappings of democracy to a society that
has never known it and the history of which is riven with local lustings for power,
hatreds and jealousies is the answer to all problems and the way to a future peaceful
existence for all is similar to the situation that existed particularly in former British
colonies in Africa during the disassembling of empire. At that time the attitude
seems to have been,
[Y]ou are now independent. We are giving you a building that looks like a London
railway terminus which is your legislature. In addition, we are providing you with a
ceremonial chair which is the 'Speaker's Chair', although the man who sits in it does not
speak. There will be a person dressed somewhat like Little Lord Fauntleroy known as the
Speaker, who will sit in the Speaker's Chair from which he is not allowed to speak. Then
we will present you with an ornamental mace as a symbol of the Speaker's authority, but
which must not be used as you were accustomed historically to use a mace. Finally, we
will give you a presentation copy of Erskine May's Parliamentary Procedure and you will
hold an election. After this, the world will know that you are a democracy.
Unfortunately, the years since those "heady" days have shown how artificial these
hopes were. There is no reason to assume that the situation in either Afghanistan or
Iraq will be any different.
While there may be good grounds for arguing that the operations against the
former Yugoslavia and in Kosovo, together with the invasions ofboth Afghanistan
and Iraq are contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and the obligations of
the members, and are thus illegal, it should be noted that there has been no attempt
in that organization to condemn any of them, not that there could have been any
decision by the Security Council to this effect in view ofthe vetoes that would have
been exercised by the United States and the United Kingdom. 97 It must, however,
be noted that the governments responsible for the invasions have sought to justify
their interventions on the basis of the need to protect and assert human rights. In
this endeavor, they argue, they have done nothing contrary to the principles relat-
ing to humanitarian intervention discussed earlier in this paper, particularly when
the international community as such has failed to take action collectively. In their
case, this contention is strengthened by the generally accepted view that respect for




In these instances, however, since the enforcing powers maintained that they
were present only for the good of the country affected and the welfare of the world,
they, or at least the United States, tended to argue that their opponents were not
entitled to the protection of the law. For the main part, however, military person-
nel captured in Iraq have, while in detention, been treated in accordance with the
regulations concerning prisoners ofwar, subject to the exceptions respecting some
members of both the United States and United Kingdom forces responsible for
holding and interrogating Iraqi military and civilian detainees.98 Given the circum-
stances in which the invasions took place, the existence of interim governments in
both Afghanistan and Iraq and the tendency to describe all opponents as terrorists,
it is perhaps not surprising that the occupying authorities have not been too con-
cerned about the application of the Hague or Geneva Conventions. It would ap-
pear, therefore, that by and large there has been no "new" law ofoccupation, but an
application of behavior conditioned by the circumstances of the case.
For the future, perhaps, and to avoid the controversies that these operations
have given rise to, the writer may be permitted to refer to a proposal he first put for-
ward in 1994:
When a government is unwilling or unable to protect, or persistently infringes the
human rights of large segments of its population, or the government structure has so
disintegrated that law and order have virtually ceased to exist, it may then well be time
for the United Nations to take over the administration until such time as normal
conditions have been restored. . . . However, it would perhaps be more desirable that
this be done not on an ad hoc basis - nor by a group of States assuming such authority
unto itself- but on the basis of a permanent United Nations body made up of trained
personnel from a variety of countries and regions. . . . The members of such
administrative or governing commission should not be drawn from nationals of the
great powers among whom, despite the end of the cold war, political rivalries and
manoeuvering is still likely to take place."
At the same time, it would be necessary to establish rules, probably by way ofa con-
vention somewhat similar to Geneva Convention IV, indicating the manner in
which persons in the country taken over are to be treated.
Such a proposal would be met by opposition from the great powers since it is
suggested they be left out of the administration to be established, while they might
well be called upon to assist in its financing and in the training of personnel over
whose activities they would have no control. In addition, opposition would almost
certainly be forthcoming from some of the smaller newly independent and devel-
oping countries which are jealous of their sovereignty and are aware that they are
more likely to be the "victims" of such a procedure than any other State. However,
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if such a policy were adopted, there might be less doubt as to the legal basis for the
intervention and consequent occupation, and a more substantial foundation for
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VIII
Current Issues in Occupation Law:
2003 Civilian Deaths in Baghdad
Fred Abrahams*
This article documents and analyzes civilian deaths caused by US forces in
Baghdad from the end ofmajor combat operations in May 2003 until Octo-
ber of that year. It is based on field research conducted in Iraq in September and
October 2003 for Human Rights Watch. During that time, the author interviewed
the witnesses to civilian deaths, family members ofthe deceased, victims who were
non-lethal casualties, Iraqi police, lawyers and human rights activists, US soldiers,
US Army judge advocates stationed in Iraq, and members of the United States-led
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), responsible at the time for governing Iraq.
The research revealed many cases of upstanding and legally respectful work by
the US military in Iraq's capital. Many soldiers and commanders were aware of
their obligations as an occupying power under international humanitarian law and
took appropriate measures to fulfill those obligations. At the same time, there were
disturbing cases during the period under review in which soldiers used force in an
excessive or indiscriminate manner, sometimes resulting in the death of Iraqi civil-
ians. Many of these cases went uninvestigated, contributing to an atmosphere of
impunity.
Clearly Iraq was and remains a hostile environment for US troops, with daily at-
tacks by Iraqis or others opposed to the United States and coalition forces. But such
* Senior Researcher for Human Rights Watch.
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an environment does not absolve the military from its obligations under interna-
tional law to use force in a restrained, proportionate and discriminate manner, and
only when strictly required. Soldiers and commanders found to have used or toler-
ated the use of excessive or indiscriminate force must face appropriate administra-
tive or criminal action.
Conditions in Iraq have changed a lot since the second half of 2003, particularly
with the growth of the insurgency and the transfer of power to the Iraqi govern-
ment and security forces. But the concerns about civilian casualties remain, both in
Iraq and as a lesson for military occupations.
Numbers
United States military and coalition forces in Iraq keep meticulous records of sol-
diers killed in duty, providing daily accounts to the press, 1 but they do not keep sta-
tistics on civilian deaths. In response to a Human Rights Watch request for
information about civilian casualties, the coalition's press office sent this reply:
It is tragic that civilians have died as a result of our operations and we are fully aware
that every time a civilian is caught in the line of coalition fire, we potentially lose allies
among the Iraqi population. In terms of statistics, we have no definitive estimates of
civilian casualties for the overall campaign. It would be irresponsible to give firm
estimates given the wide range of variables. For example, we have had cases where
during a conflict, we believed civilians had been wounded and perhaps killed, but by
the time our forces have a chance to fully assess the outcomes of the contact, the
wounded or dead civilians have been removed from the scene. Factors such as this
make it impossible for us to maintain an accurate account. 2
While the coalition claims an accurate account of civilian deaths is impossible to
obtain, Human Rights Watch collected data from a variety ofsources for a database
of post-war civilian casualties in Baghdad. Given its vast resources, the US military
should be able to do the same, and not doing so suggests that civilian deaths are not
of paramount concern.
Based on the data collected, US soldiers in Baghdad killed ninety-four civilians
between May 1 and September 30, 2003, in legally questionable circumstances that
merit an investigation. Human Rights Watch researchers did not verify each of
these individual allegations but, taken as a whole, they reveal a pattern of alleged
unlawful deaths that should prompt concern and investigations.
More concretely, based on interviews with witnesses and family members, Hu-
man Rights Watch confirmed the deaths of twenty Iraqi civilians in Baghdad in le-
gally questionable circumstances between May 1 and September 30, 2003. Eighteen
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of these deaths are documented in the Human Rights Watch report, Hearts and
Minds: Post-war Civilian Deaths in Baghdad Caused by U.S. Forces (Hearts and
Minds), 3 published in October 2003. In addition, Human Rights Watch collected
data on civilian deaths by US forces from the Iraqi police, human rights organiza-
tions, Western media and US military statements on the topic. In total, Human
Rights Watch estimated the US military in Baghdad killed ninety-four civilians in
questionable circumstances in the period May to September 2003.4
While this article does not present all the individual cases of civilian deaths doc-
umented in Hearts and Minds, it is worth looking at the pattern they reveal;
namely, a disturbing trend by US forces of over-aggressive tactics, indiscriminate
shooting in residential areas and a quick reliance on lethal force. In some cases, US
forces faced a legitimate threat, which gave them the right to respond with force.
But that response was sometimes disproportionate to the threat or inadequately
targeted, thereby harming civilians or putting them at risk.
Categories ofExcessive Force
In Baghdad, civilian deaths can be categorized in three basic incident groups. First
were deaths that occurred during US military raids on homes in search of arms or
members of armed groups. The US military said in the fall of 2003 that it was im-
plementing less aggressive tactics, and was increasingly taking Iraqi police on raids.
But Baghdad residents in late 2003 still complained of aggressive and reckless be-
havior, physical abuse, and theft by US troops. When US soldiers encountered
armed resistance from families who thought they were acting in self-defense
against thieves, they sometimes resorted to overwhelming force, killing family
members, neighbors or passers-by.
Second were civilian deaths caused by US soldiers who responded dispropor-
tionately and indiscriminately after they had come under attack at checkpoints or on
the road. Human Rights Watch documented cases where, after an improvised explo-
sive device detonated near a US convoy, soldiers fired high caliber weapons in mul-
tiple directions, injuring and killing civilians who were nearby. While the threat in
those cases was often real, the indiscriminate response put civilians at risk.
Third were killings at checkpoints when Iraqi civilians failed to stop. At the time
the research was conducted in the fall of 2003, US checkpoints constantly shifted
throughout Baghdad. They were sometimes not well marked, although sign visibil-
ity was improving. A dearth ofArabic interpreters and poor understanding of Iraqi
hand gestures added to the confusion, with results that were sometimes fatal for
civilians. Soldiers sometimes shouted conflicting instructions in English with their
guns raised: "Stay in the car!" or "Get out of the car!"
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In all of these scenarios, US soldiers were sometimes arrogant and abusive. They
were seen putting their feet on detained Iraqis' heads—a highly insulting offense.
Male soldiers sometimes touched or even searched female Iraqis, also a culturally
unacceptable act, although female soldiers or searchers were increasingly
deployed.
Of course, not all soldiers behaved in this way. Human Rights Watch met many
US military personnel who dealt respectfully with Iraqis and were working hard to
train police, guard facilities and pursue criminals in difficult conditions. Some of
these soldiers expressed frustration at the lack of sensitivity shown by their col-
leagues. "It takes a while to get the Rambo stuff out," one officer said.
A Case Study: The Checkpoint in al-Slaikh
On the evening of August 7, 2003, soldiers from the Alpha Company, 2nd Battal-
ion, 3rd Field Artillery Regiment of the 1st Armored Division conducted a weap-
ons search in the Tunis district of Baghdad's al-Slaikh neighborhood. According to
residents, troops blocked the main street at two points with armored vehicles as
soldiers went through homes and shops. One checkpoint was established on the
corner of Bilal Habashi Street and Street 5.
Around 9:15 p.m., a transformer blew on one of the electrical poles nearby. The
electricity in the immediate area was out, although it is not clear whether this was
because of the blown transformer or whether the lights had been out before the ex-
plosion. Two cars drove down Bilal Habashi Street, apparently unaware ofthe check-
point. The first car with three young men approached the checkpoint at a high speed,
music blaring. Soldiers yelled at the driver to stop and fired warning shots, a witness
said, but when the car passed the checkpoint, the soldiers opened fire. Two men sur-






Azawi, was killed. Behind him, a car
with six members of the al-Kawwaz family was fired upon without warning before
it reached the checkpoint. The father and three children were killed. 5
Car One: The Killing ofSaifRa^ad 'AH Sa^id al- ^Azawi, 20
As US soldiers were searching homes and shops in the neighborhood—around
9:00 p.m.—Saif Ra vad Ali Sa v id al- vAzawi, age 20, asked his father for permission
to borrow his blue Opel station wagon. A student at the industrial high school, Saif
was excited by successful exam grades he had just received. 6 His father agreed so
Saif picked up two friends, "Abbas Shihab Ahmad al-Amary and
v
Ali Hussain al-
Juburi, and drove off to visit a third friend named Ahmad.
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According to "Abbas al-Amary, the three young men were driving home around
9:30 with the music playing loud. "The district had electricity but before we arrived
at the top of the side street which takes us home there was a dark area," he said.7
A resident of the neighborhood who lives and works near the corner of Bilal
Habashi Street and Street 5 had a better view from the front of his tire repair shop.
Ahmad Abd al-Samad Fatuhi said that Saif s car was moving fast and the music was
loud. The soldiers warned him to stop, he said, but he did not slow down. He told
Human Rights Watch:
At that time, the electricity in the district was cut off and the interior light of Saifs car
was turned on, which prevented him from seeing outside clearly. He was accompanied
by two other passengers, it seems that they were his friends. The Americans gave Saif a
warning to stop the car by one of the African-American soldiers who yelled "Stop!
Stop!" but Saif did not stop the car because I think he was afraid of hijackers. As I
mentioned earlier, the area was dark and without electricity. After that, one of the
American soldiers started to shoot warning shots at the ground, but Saif did not stop
the car and he penetrated the American checkpoint. The result of this action was an
immediate shooting at Saifs car, which led to Saifs death and to the injury of his two
friends. 8
This account was confirmed by another resident, Muhammad Sa vd NAdil al-
Bayati, interviewed separately. He said:
I saw Saifs car driving very fast. He was accompanied by two other people in the car.
The person in the backseat had his head out the sun roof, the inside lights were on and
the stereo was playing loudly. I shouted at him loudly: "Saif stop! There is a checkpoint
there! There is an American checkpoint ahead!" but he did not hear me because he was
driving very fast. I shouted at him, "the Americans will shoot you—there is an
American checkpoint!" but he did not stop.9
The passenger,
v
Abbas al-Amary, said that none of the men in the car had seen
any signs to indicate a checkpoint or any soldiers asking them to stop. Before they
understood they were at a checkpoint, he said, they had come under fire from US
troops:
Suddenly Saifs car was fired on and another car which was behind us [see al-Kawwaz
family below] I could not see where the shooting was coming from. I was sitting in
the back seat of the car because when the shooting started I lowered my head. The
shooting was full-automatic and the source of the gunfire was more than two machine
guns. It continued for several minutes. After it stopped, I raised my head, I saw Saifs
face because he was on the side, and his face was opposite me. As I said, I was in the
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middle of the back seat. I started shouting and so did our friend pAli] but Saif did not
reply. We realized he had passed away. 10
On the side of the street, Muhammad Sad Adil al-Bayati was also hit by a bullet
in the right leg, suggesting that the shooting was not targeted exclusively on Saif s
car. He was hiding behind a parked car, he said, but was shot when he tried to crawl
home. 11
According to both the passenger al-Amary and the witness Fatuhi, US soldiers
approached Saif s car and pulled the two surviving men out. The car was burning
and Saifs body was inside, but no one tried to put the fire out or to take the body
from the wreck. Al-Amary explained what happened next:
They came to the car and opened the front and the back doors of the right side, pointing
guns to our heads. They took us out of the car and told us through an interpreter to shut
up. Ali and I begged the interpreter to take Saif from the car but the interpreter said
"Shut up, it's nothing to do with you." After they removed us from the car, they made us
lay down on our stomachs on the ground. After five minutes, they took us to another
place ten to fifteen meters away from the car where the American vehicles were parked.
While they took me there I saw the front of Saifs car burning—the engine was burning.
Again I asked the interpreter to take Saif from the car, but the interpreter did not reply.
They left Saif in the car while we were lying on the ground. 12
Abbas al-Amary and his friend Ali al-Juburi were eventually put in a truck. A
wounded man and young girl from the other car joined them, and all four were
taken to a US military base. The man and girl, both from the al-Kawwaz family,
were taken to another room, and "Abbas and Ali soon learned that they had died.
While all this was happening, Saif s father had no idea his son had been killed.
Around 9:30 p.m., when he returned home from evening prayers, he went looking
for Saif. Neighbors told him that US troops had killed several people in cars and
that one of the cars was burning. He told Human Rights Watch:
I was horrified and rushed to see. I found the car there with no American troops. The
car was completely burnt—nothing could identify it except a small iron box, which
contains the car's spare parts. I knew the car was ours and Saifs corpse was charcoal.
They killed an honest, peaceful young man who wanted to live in peace. 13
Ali al-Jaburi and Abbas al-Amary were held and interrogated for two days at
the base,
v
Abbas said. They received medical treatment for their light wounds. In
total, they were held for more than one month, first at a center near the Shaab
Stadium, then at the airport, and finally at a juvenile facility in al-Salihiyya before
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being released by a judge at the al-Adhamiyya court. According to Abbas al-
Amary, the judge said they were free to go because no charges had been filed.
Car Two: The Killing of
K





al-Karim al-Kawwaz, 19, ^Ula ^Adil "Abd al-Karim al-Kawwaz, 17, and Mirvat
K
Adil ^Abd al-Karim al-Kawwaz, 8
Around 9:20 p.m. on the same evening, August 7,
v
Adil Abd al-Karim al-
Kawwaz began the short drive home from his in-laws' house. His pregnant wife,
Anwar Kadhim Jawad, was in the front seat and their four children sat in the back.
By 9:30, Adil and three of his children were dead.
Anwar Jawad told Human Rights Watch what happened:
The Americans were stopping cars. There were no signs. We came close to them and
the Americans began to shoot. Their cars had no lights on. There were two tanks. Our
car had its lights on. We were 100 meters away. I heard nothing first—we were
astonished by the shots. My husband was shouting but they were shooting I saw the
bullets flying. It was the first time I had seen someone get shot and I saw my husband
get hit on the left. 14
According to Ahmad Fatuhi, the neighborhood resident who witnessed the
shooting, US soldiers opened fire on the car without warning. "The car's front
lights were dimmed," he said. "The Americans opened fire on that car without any
warning or signal to stop the car, and they killed four members of one family." 15
Haidar Adil al-Kawwaz, age 19, and Ula Adil al-Kawwaz, age 17, were killed
instantly. Their father Adil Abd al-Karim al-Kawwaz, age 42, and his daughter
Mirvat Adil al-Kawwaz, age 8, were badly wounded but still alive. US soldiers took
them from the car and brought them to a military base in a truck, together with the
two survivors from the first car, "Abbas al-Amary and Ali al-Juburi. Both Adil and
Mirvat died, either there or perhaps at a hospital where they were taken that night.
A Human Rights Watch researcher inspected the al-Kawwaz family car on Sep-
tember 26, 2003, a 1984 white Volkswagen Passat. The car had twenty-eight bullet
holes on the front and left side, including four in the front windshield.
Anwar Jawad, who gave birth to a babyboy named Hassan one week after the in-
cident, was summoned to visit the US military on September 24. Two officers, who
she thought were named Colonel William Rabena and Colonel Peter Mansoor, of-
fered her $1 1,000. 16 A document she signed said she received the money "as an ex-
pression of sympathy." 17 The family is requesting formal compensation as well.
US military authorities conducted an investigation to determine whether sol-
diers from the Alpha Company, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Field Artillery Regiment of the
1st Armored Division had acted inappropriately by shooting at the two cars.
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According to the military coalition's public affairs office, as well as US Army judge
advocates assigned to Combined Joint Task Force 7, then the organisation running
the US military's efforts in Iraq, the shootings were considered a "regrettable inci-
dent," but it was determined that the soldiers had "acted in accordance with the
rules of engagement." 18 It is unclear how this was determined in the case of the al-
Kawwaz car, which was fired upon without warning.
Training and Transition from Combat
In late 2003, a fundamental problem in Baghdad was that combat troops were
asked to perform law enforcement and policing tasks for which they were not ade-
quately trained or attitudinally prepared. Of the cases documented in Hearts and
Minds, for instance, eight Baghdad incidents resulting in sixteen civilian deaths in-
volved either the 82nd Airborne Division or the 1st Armored Division. Many ofthe
soldiers from these divisions had fought their way into Iraq, and were then asked to
switch quickly from warriors to police who controlled crowds, pursued thieves and
rooted out insurgents. According to soldiers and commanders, there was inade-
quate training and equipment for these Stability and Support Operations (SASO)
and an inadequate supply of Arabic interpreters.
The problem was explained in detail by an unnamed US infantry commander in
an After Action Report filed April 24, 2003, since declassified. "After less than 48
hours after the first battlefield engagement," the commander said:
Members of this company team were tasked to conduct checkpoint operations
southwest of al-Najaf. With no training, soldiers were expected to search vehicles,
interact with civilians with no CA [Civil Affairs] or PSYOPS [Psychological
Operations] support, detain EPW's [Enemy Prisoners of War], and confiscate
weapons. Less than 48 hours after this, the unit was again heavily engaged in combat
operations. The radical and swift change from combat operations to SASO and back to
combat operations over and over again causes many points of friction for the soldiers
and their leaders. 19
With the exception of a class given to the platoon leaders, there were no formal
classes or training conducted by Civil Affairs personnel prior to the operation. Sol-
diers received no training on checkpoint operations or interacting with civilians.
The commander also noted that the unit's limited supply of construction and
barrier materials for checkpoints was exhausted by the time they had reached
Baghdad. Soldiers had to use "destroyed cars, flower pots, bicycle racks, and what-
ever else was available for force protection."20 Interpreters, he wrote:
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[W]ere not available to the company team at any point during the operation. These
interpreters are critical to the team's ability to interact with civilians, discern their
problems, and broadcast friendly unit intentions. Often times the unit had crowds and
upset civilians to deal with and absolutely no way to verbally communicate with
them. 21
The report emphasized the "fundamental shift in attitude" demanded of the
troops as they shifted from combat to law enforcement tasks:
The soldiers have been asked to go from killing the enemy to protecting and
interacting, and back to killing again. The constant shift in mental posture greatly
complicates things for the average soldier. The soldiers are blurred and confused about
the rules of engagement, which continues to raise questions, and issues about force
protection while at checkpoints and conducting patrols. How does the soldier know
exactly what the rule of engagement is? Soldiers who have just conducted combat
against dark skinned personnel wearing civilian clothes have difficulty trusting dark
skinned personnel wearing civilian clothes.
Other officers reflected the above concerns. In an interview published on a US
Army-related website, a second lieutenant from the 82nd Airborne Division de-
scribed the complications of Iraq's post-war scene:
Pulling the trigger against groups of fedayeen was easy compared to this post-war
environment where we are still taking casualties daily. Understanding why one village
waves and blows kisses at you while the next one down the road sets up ambushes and
IEDs is not as easy as friendly/enemy, don't kill/kill. We are ambassadors with our
thumbs on the selector lever and always scanning for a set-up. It's so hard to help and
interact with a people when you trust no one. Getting your soldiers to understand the
need to be hot/cold, on/off, at war/at peace with only milliseconds between the two is
very challenging.22
An article from the August 10, 2003, newsletter of the 1st Armored Division
based in Iraq described how platoon leaders were adapting urban operations be-
cause the tasks in Iraq—patrols, raids and checkpoints—were different from the
combat exercises for which they had trained. " [I]n Iraq, civilians are not merely an
occasional presence, as urban terrain training often depicts civilians," the author
wrote, "instead, interactions with civilians often comprise the entire mission."23
"Our mentality as soldiers is combat," said Lieutenant Lucas Hale, who was try-
ing to modify urban combat techniques (Military Operations in Urban Terrain, or
MOUT) in the field. "We don't deal with civilians well as a whole. But in Iraq, you
have to understand that 99 percent of the people [we encounter] are simple people
who just want to get on with their lives."24
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US judge advocates and CPA legal officials who spoke with Human Rights
Watch in the fall of 2003 were sympathetic to these concerns, and they agreed that
not all combat troops had received adequate training for post-war tasks. Special in-
structors were brought in to assist the 1st Armored Division, they said. "They must
come to terms with this kind of environment," Australian Colonel Mike Kelly said,
"Policing requires a different skill set."25
According to the judge advocates, the US Marines performed better in the
peacekeeping role because they were "quicker to adapt." And Military Police were
better trained for crowd control, checkpoints and other peacekeeping tasks. In
general, they said, the biggest problems were in Baghdad due to the intense urban
environment and the high level of armed resistance. Clearly this was before the
later fighting in Falluja and Najaf and the insurgency's development in central and
western Iraq.
Accountability
Coalition forces in Iraq are not subject to Iraqi law. According to Coalition Provi-
sional Authority Regulation Number 17, coalition personnel are "immune from
local criminal, civil and administrative jurisdiction and from any form of arrest or
detention other than by persons acting on behalf of their parent states."26
Given the absence of Iraqi legal structures to hold coalition forces accountable,
it is incumbent on the occupying powers of the participating countries to investi-
gate all allegations of abuse, and to punish those found to have violated domestic
military codes, international humanitarian law, or human rights standards. Both
the laws of war and non-derogable human rights standards require the investiga-
tion of suspicious or apparently unlawful killings, even during times of armed
conflict.
In 2003, the United States military did not fulfill that obligation. The lack of
timely and thorough investigations into questionable incidents created an atmo-
sphere of impunity, in which soldiers felt they could pull the trigger without com-
ing under review.
Specifically, as ofOctober 1, when Human Rights Watch completed its research,
there were no known criminal investigations into cases of alleged use of excessive
or disproportionate force by US soldiers in Iraq. The US military said it had com-
pleted five administrative investigations above the division level, all ofthem under
the authority of the Deputy Commanding General in Iraq, but the findings ofthese
investigations raised serious concerns. In four of the five investigations, soldiers
were found to have operated within the rules ofengagement. In the fifth case, a he-
licopter pilot and his commander faced disciplinary action for trying to tear down
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a Shia banner in Sadr City in Baghdad, an incident that provoked a violent clash
with demonstrators on August 13.
Human Rights Watch conducted its own investigation into two ofthe five cases,
and found evidence to suggest that soldiers had used excessive force, including
shooting a person who had his hands in the air and beating a detainee. There are
also many questionable civilian deaths for which no investigation had taken place.
The most notable example is the killing of up to twenty people by the 82nd Air-
borne Division in Falluja on April 28 and 30, documented in a June 2003 Human
Rights Watch report, Violent Response: the U.S. Army in al-Falluja. 27
Iraqis rarely knew the unit of soldiers responsible for inflicting casualties.
Through its own research or media reports, however, Human Rights Watch identi-
fied at least the military division, ifnot the specific unit, in eight incidents involving
sixteen civilian deaths. Of these, the 82nd Airborne Division was involved in four
incidents in which seven civilians were killed and the 1st Armored Division was in-
volved in four incidents in which nine civilians were killed. Four civilians were
killed in an operation by Task Force 20, a combined CIA-Army special forces team
established to capture Iraq's former rulers, but it is not clear if they were responsi-
ble for the shooting.
The following is a list of civilian casualties in Baghdad in the year 2003 for which
the specific US military unit is known:
82nd Airborne Division
• Mardan Muhammad Hassan and Farah Fadhil al-Janabi on September 1 in
Mahmudiyya killed by soldiers from the 3rd Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry
Regiment. 28
• Iraqi guards Raad Fahd Shallal, Sa
v





Aday killed on July 10 in the al-Bayya
v
neighborhood. 29




Uday Ahmad Mustafa killed on July 10 behind the Baya'a Police Station/al-
Dora Patrol Station. 31
1st Armored Division
• Ali Muhsin, killed on August 1 1 by the 1st Battalion, 36th Infantry. 32
• Lt.
v
Ala' Ali Salih and Sgt. Muhammad Hilal Nahi, killed on August 9 on the
Abu Ghraib road by soldiers from the 1st Battalion, 41st Infantry of the 3rd
Brigade. 33
• Izhar Mahmud Ridha killed on August 1 in the al-Mansur neighborhood by
soldiers from the 3rd Brigade. 34
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• Soldiers from Alpha Company, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Field Artillery






id al- Azawi when he failed to stop at
a checkpoint. In a second car, soldiers killed Adil
v
Abd al-Karim Abd al-Karim
al-Kawwaz and three of his children, Haidar,
v
Ula and Mirvat. 36
Recommendations
Since late 2003, the US military has taken some steps to reduce civilian deaths in
Iraq. Checkpoints became more clearly marked and combat troops received addi-
tional training for police tasks. Iraqi police and military were more frequently es-
corting US soldiers on raids, or conducting those raids themselves, and over the
past year the Iraqi security forces have assumed the burden of policing tasks. Ac-
countability has apparently improved after the abuse scandal at Abu Ghraib.
But more initiatives are required. One basic step is to continue improving the
language and cultural training to teach soldiers hand gestures used and understood
by Iraqis and essential Arabic words and phrases, which would minimize confu-
sion at checkpoints or during raids.
The US military's rules of engagement are not made public due to security con-
cerns, but Iraqi civilians have a right to know the guidelines for safe behavior. The
coalition should mark all checkpoints clearly, for instance, and inform Iraqis
through a public service campaign ofhow to approach checkpoints and how to be-
have during raids.
US soldiers and other coalition forces should also be better trained to defuse
tense non-combat situations without resorting to lethal force. Lethal force should
be used only when necessary to meet an imminent threat to life and only in propor-
tion to the actual danger presented in conformity with international standards.
To properly perform post-conflict policing, US soldiers need adequate supplies
of non-lethal crowd control devices like tear gas and rubber bullets. Efforts to en-
hance communication with local communities should be intensified, starting with
adequate provision of interpreters.
When civilian deaths do occur, they should be documented and investigated.
Military authorities should keep records, observe and analyze trends related to spe-
cific units and commanders, as well as tactics, in order to minimize civilian
casualties.
Of central importance are prompt investigations of and punishment for all in-
appropriate or illegal use of force, as required under international law. In 2003 US
soldiers operated with a large degree of impunity in Iraq. Knowledge that they will
be held accountable will be a helpful restraint on the excessive, indiscriminate, or
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Media reports of abuse of enemy prisoners of war (EPW) and Security
Detainees in Iraq, as well as other reports questioning certain interroga-
tion techniques employed to gain intelligence from those in the custody of the
United States have raised concerns regarding the adequacy of the guidance dealing
with such matters provided to U.S. Army personnel. This article addresses the cur-
rent U.S. Army regulatory and doctrinal guidance relevant to the treatment and in-
terrogation ofEPW and Security Detainees.
Before turning to this subject, however, I would like to briefly focus on an event
that occurred at The Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School (LCS), in
Charlottesville, Virginia. In the summer of 2004, the LCS hosted its annual Non-
commissioned Officer Conference, at which Army paralegals from around the
world gathered to discuss ongoing issues. One ofthe highlights of this conference is
always the presentation ofan annual award to an outstanding junior paralegal. The
award winner, this year, had the looks of a recruitment poster—early 30s, a college
graduate, jump qualified. In fact, he was a Jump Master. As he accepted his award,
he expressed thanks to his colleagues, of course, and saluted all of the good legal
work that they had accomplished—and then he related this story. While he was in
* Colonel, JA, US Army (Ret.).
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Iraq, he had served as a Convoy Commander. In fact, he had served in this capacity
well over 50 times. On one such occasion, the convoy became stalled in traffic and,
as the vehicles were sitting at a dead halt, a grenade was dropped from an overpass.
At that moment, every weapon in the convoy swung in that direction. What fol-
lowed next, he said, made him exceptionally proud to be an American soldier serv-
ing in Iraq. For, even though every weapon had been pointed at the overpass, not a
single shot was fired. Why not? Because, he said, a target could not be identified.
The personnel in that convoy had complied with the Rules of Engagement. Not a
single round was fired. And, I would submit that such behavior is the norm—not
the exception.
Do accidents occur? Are crimes committed? Are investigations conducted? Are
crimes prosecuted and defended equally aggressively? In each instance, the answer
is yes. Yet, ifone focuses only on the negative, such as the abhorrent conduct at Abu
Ghraib, one loses sight ofthe fact that the overwhelming majority ofU.S. personnel
serving in Iraq consistently do the right thing—simply because it is the right thing.
Mistakes are made, crimes are committed, investigations may take an apparently
overly extended period of time to complete. But, again, I would submit that the ac-
tions taken by those servicemen in that convoy, on that particular day in Iraq, as re-
lated by that junior enlisted soldier, represent the norm—not the exception.
Turning now to the subject at hand: the current Army regulatory and doctrinal
guidance dealing with the treatment and interrogation of EPW and Security De-
tainees is found in several Army publications. In terms of their application to the
situation in Iraq, each publication begins with a premise with which essentially ev-
ery public international lawyer would agree. Almost all individuals present in Iraq
are subject to either the Third or Fourth Geneva Convention. 1 Thus, with respect
to EPW taken captive in Iraq, the process is a relatively simple one. Ifthe individual
was a member of the Iraqi armed forces, he was entitled to Prisoner ofWar status.
As such, he was to be afforded the numerous rights and privileges accorded by the
Third Convention. In terms of the interrogation of EPW, this, again, is a very
straightforward matter. Article 17 provides:
Every prisoner of war, when questioned on the subject, is bound to give only his
surname, first names and rank, date of birth, and army, regimental, personal or serial
number, or failing this, equivalent information.
No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on
prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of
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war who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to unpleasant or
disadvantageous treatment of any kind.
Clearly, coercing EPW into divulging information is forbidden.
Although the Third Convention is clear and unequivocal in its requirements for
the humane treatment of EPW and the prohibition of coercive interrogations,
some have contended that the law is somewhat less certain with respect to Security
Detainees. I disagree. The first issue that must be addressed in this regard is the
manner in which an individual might become a Security Detainee in Iraq. That is,
how does an individual lose his status as a "protected person" under Article 4 ofthe
Fourth Convention2—a status that carries with it a broad range of protections and
safeguards? The answer is found in the fact that Article 5 ofthe Fourth Convention
enables the Occupying Power to arrest and detain individuals who pose a security
threat. 3 Article 78, in turn, enables the Occupying Power to detain or to incarcerate
those arrested under the authority of Article 5. These individuals, then, are no lon-
ger protected persons; they are, in fact, Security Detainees.
Again, there have been those who have argued that once an individual loses his
status as a protected person, he essentially loses those protections accorded him
under the Fourth Convention. This, ofcourse, is simply not true. Even with respect
to the interrogation of Security Detainees, Article 5 clearly indicates that such indi-
viduals must be treated humanely.
The U.S. Army provides both regulatory and doctrinal guidance regarding the
treatment and interrogation of EPW and Security Detainees. This guidance has
been criticized by some as being unclear or that, given their "nuanced" nature, the
relevant regulatory provisions are subject to varying interpretations. Contrary to
such assertions, however, it is my view that there is simply no lack of clarity, no lack
ofprecision with respect to the relevant regulatory requirements. Army Regulation
1 90-8, Enemy Prisoners ofWar, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other De-
tainees,4 addresses the treatment of both EPW and Security Detainees. Paragraph
l-5(a)(l) provides:
All persons captured, detained, interned or otherwise held in U.S. Armed Forces
custody during the course of a conflict will be given humanitarian care and treatment.
The inhumane treatment of EPW, civilian internees, and retained personnel is
prohibited and is not justified by the stress of combat or by deep provocation.
Paragraph l-5(b) further notes:
All prisoners will receive humane treatment without regard to race, nationality,
religion, political opinion, sex or other criteria. The following acts are prohibited:
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murder, torture, corporal punishment, mutilation, the taking of hostages, sensory
deprivation, collective punishment, execution without trial by proper authority, and
all cruel and degrading punishment.
Additional guidance on the issue of the treatment of EPW and Security De-
tainees is found in Army Field Manual 3-19.40, Military Police Internment/Resettle-
ment Operations? Specifically, paragraphs 5-1 and 5-2 state that physical torture or
moral coercion must not be used in connection with civilian internees and Security
Detainees. They must be protected against violence, insult, public curiosity, bodily
injury, reprisal, and sexual attack.
The photos of abused prisoners at Abu Ghraib generated much of the initial at-
tention focused on the treatment and interrogation ofthose individuals held by the
United States, and the issue of interrogation, in particular, has continued to be a
matter of intense media scrutiny. Army Field Manual 34-52, Intelligence Interroga-
tion,6 deals with both EPW and Security Detainees. This FM provides that "EPWs,
captured insurgents, civilian internees, other captured, detained or retained per-
sons, foreign deserters, or other persons . . . are protected by the Geneva Conven-
tions." 7 It further states that "the [Geneva Conventions] and U.S. policy expressly
prohibit acts of violence or intimidation, including physical or mental torture,
threats, insults or exposure to inhumane treatment as a means of or aid to interro-
gations. Such illegal acts are not authorized and will not be condoned by the U.S.
Army." 8 Very importantly, it also goes on to say that violations of these prohibi-
tions are criminal acts, punishable under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.9
The Intelligence Interrogation manual specifically addresses prohibited interro-
gation techniques. It provides that "physical or mental torture or coercion revolve
around eliminating the source's free will, and are expressly prohibited by the
[Geneva Conventions]." 10 Torture is defined as "the infliction of intense pain to
body or mind to extract a confession or information, or for sadistic pleasure." 1 ' Ex-
amples of physical torture cited in the FM include: electric shock; infliction of pain
through chemicals or bondage; forcing an individual to stand, sit or kneel in ab-
normal positions for prolonged periods of time; food deprivation; and any form of
beating. Cited examples of mental torture include mock executions, abnormal
sleep deprivation, and chemically induced psychosis. "Coercion" is defined as:
actions designed to unlawfully induce another to compel an act against one's will ... to
include: threatening or implying physical or mental torture to the subject or to his
family or others; intentionally denying medical assistance or care in exchange for
information or cooperation; and, finally, threatening or implying that rights




Questions have been raised as to whether the Intelligence Interrogation manual
accurately reflects both the domestic and international law obligations of the
United States. I can assure you that it does. Twelve years ago, the International and
Operational Law Division ofthe Office ofThe Judge Advocate General ofthe Army
conducted an intense legal review of FM 34-52 and produced a 12-page, single-
spaced, legal opinion detailing the manner in which US legal obligations were to be
set forth in this publication.
Once again, I would submit that the regulatory and doctrinal guidance relevant
to the treatment and interrogation of EPW and, very importantly, Security De-
tainees, is quite clear, and it should be well understood as to those actions that
can—and cannot—be taken. Equally clear is the fact that, if an interrogator en-
gages in proscribed activities, he or she is subject to prosecution under the Uniform
Code of Military Justice. This is precisely what U.S. Army military intelligence per-
sonnel are taught. The Intelligence Collection manual, published in 1992, provides
carefully considered, thoughtful, and lawful guidance, guidance that has never
been modified.
Some have suggested that, given the nature of the "Global War on Terrorism,"
detainee interrogation techniques that obviously go well beyond those sanctioned
in current Army doctrine should be permitted. I would object to the use ofsuch in-
terrogation methods for a number of reasons. First, once you cross that interroga-
tion Rubicon dictated by both international and domestic law, you immediately
subject individual service members to potential civil and criminal litigation. I am
unconvinced that any form of a "necessity defense" argument would protect these
individuals from prosecution under either the Uniform Code ofMilitary Justice or
in an international forum. Second, instructing military intelligence personnel to
now engage in questionable interrogation techniques would contravene 30 to 40
years of previous training. Third, as the Intelligence Collection manual observes,
"Revelation of use of torture will bring discredit upon the US and its armed forces,
while undermining domestic and international support for the war effort." Finally,
there is the matter of reciprocity. Once the United States condones actions that go
beyond those always considered to reflect accepted international norms, these
practices will almost automatically become, in my view, the benchmark for inter-
rogation methods deemed suitable for use by both State and non-State actors. For
all of these reasons, it is critically important that the United States continue to ad-
here to the humanitarian treatment standards set forth in the Geneva Conventions
and other relevant international agreements.
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One of the main challenges for the commander of a military operation out-
side his national territory is to deal with the international laws that should
apply to the operation and the constraints his own nation may impose upon him.
Such limits stem from political aims, diplomatic convenience, economic interest,
international image, media opportunity, budget priorities, force structure and the
national law jurisdiction applicable to the area of operations. For the commander
of a multinational force the challenges are even greater because he is subject to ad-
ditional constraints coming from the international organization he is working for,
the international organizations he is working with and the national caveats each
contingent of his force brings with them. The legal constraints influence his auton-
omy and command action during the conflict, but, most importantly, they affect
post-war operations when he becomes the target of scrutiny—and often criticism.
While the military code of conduct and the customs of war are embedded in mili-
tary education and can help guide the commander's action, the legal constraints af-
fecting war or peace support operations are sometimes ambiguous. The latter must
be known and studied, with the support of legal advisors, but, unfortunately, they
are largely neglected in military education and during the specific pre-deployment
Lieutenant General, Italian Army.
Liberation and Occupation: A Commander's Perspective
training. In many countries, the military education systems include them only in
the formal program, but then they are skipped because there is something "more
important" to do or they are left in the hands of boring lawyers that simply list the
litany of what you cannot do.
In particular, in many Western war colleges or military academies no one
teaches how to handle a post-war situation. Strategy and tactics refer only to com-
bat situations. Management deals only with our own military organization and
units. A little bit ofmanagement is devoted to civil-military cooperation (CIMIC),
but because of the emphasis given to peace support operations rather than to post-
war management, CIMIC is perceived more as a candy bar distribution initiative
than a military methodology to control the post-war situation. Military control
over civil institutions is a blasphemy for democratic armies and nowadays every
nation and army pretends to be democratic. I am old enough to remember the
warning posters of the occupying powers after World War II: "Tomorrow the dis-
tribution of food will be suspended" and "Public gathering is prohibited. Of-
fenders will be arrested," signed Captain Charlie or Kurt or Martini. Nowadays
captains are not even given the authority to ask questions and the generals who ask
questions are not entitled to any answers. I also belong to the generation that
planned for military control over civilian administrations in case of internal in-
surgency. I remember the plans to replace civil authorities, to exercise censor-
ship, limit individual liberties and so on. Those times are gone and, we all hope,
for good.
Our democratic system is strong and the military does not have to plan for the
assumption of power. However, while war is still very much present and alive, we
in the West have avoided and, at the same time, subverted the idea of war. During
the last ten years we have avoided the reality ofwar. We invented operations "other
than war"—humanitarian intervention, international police operations, peace
support operations, with their aggregate of peacekeeping, peace enforcing, peace
making, and so on. We invented hundreds of expressions in order to avoid the
word "war" or to soften its meaning. In the United States and other parts of the
world, e.g., China, there was the opposite phenomenon. The same word was largely
abused and everything became a "war," including market competition, family
quarrels and social endeavors. The result was again an illusion because when war
resumed in its traditional form as confrontation and violence, often asymmetric
and non-linear, many people did not recognize it. War on terror in many countries
is still considered to be the equivalent ofthe war on inflation, or the war on corrup-
tion, or the war on drugs.
The "Global War on Terror" and its many forms suggest a vision of Star Wars,
with the Empire striking back and Luke Skywalker saving the Galaxy or similar
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fantasies, instead of inspiring the idea of a worldwide disaster. This substantial
elusion has also disrupted our awareness about wartime responsibility; the conse-
quence has been the separation of military operations from pre- and post-conflict
management. Contrary to what was taught to junior officers at military schools
fifty years ago, the armies of the democratic West today are told to limit themselves
to combat operations. They are taught to deal with "army-like" threats and leave
"internal" security problems to the civil authorities responsible for law enforce-
ment. I have seen national caveats forbidding the employment of soldiers to quell
public unrest. Subsequently, when they were caught in the middle of civil disorder,
the soldiers did not know how to respond. There are many NATO nations that do
not agree with the use of their soldiers in anti-crime, anti-extremism or even anti-
terrorism roles. We all have seen our officers and professional soldiers witnessing,
without taking action, the looting of national museums, public and private prop-
erty, or ethnic minority assets; saying that they are not policemen.
The separation between military and civil powers is necessary, but not before
the security situation is stabilized and real democratic and effective institutions, a
functioning judicial system and reliable law enforcement resources are in place.
Whoever rushes in to declare the end of military operations (or even the end ofthe
war) and transfers the responsibilities for public order to immature local authori-
ties or to inefficient international organizations or to puppet governments is not
responding to security and reconstruction requirements, but only to nearsighted
and narrow-minded political interests. Such a rush is conducive to instability, cre-
ates civil-military disconnects and increases risks for the forces in the area ofopera-
tions. The fact ofthe matter is that modern military operations do not end with the
cessation ofcombat. Victory is no longer defined just by successful military opera-
tions, if it ever was. The aims of modern operations are purely political and this is
true down to the platoon level and lower. Therefore, until the political aims are
achieved, victory cannot be declared.
Furthermore, the occupation of a foreign territory is not the end of an opera-
tion but the beginning of another phase of the same effort. Modern wars and oper-
ations are not undertaken to acquire territory or sovereignty. In particular, the
annexation of a territory is no longer the aim of the modern Western democracies
which tend, instead, to respect the integrity and the sovereignty of foreign coun-
tries no matter how mean their political regime and their social behavior might
be. 1 Modern operations are undertaken more to further ideals and interests than
for territorial acquisitions, even if that territory has valuable resources or can be-
come a profitable marketplace. Therefore, the military have specific responsibili-
ties that cannot be ignored by simply declaring the end of combat. This is
especially the case in the absence of a safe and secure environment to support such
223
Liberation and Occupation: A Commander's Perspective
a declaration or if the same "victorious" forces are continuously suffering attacks.
We cannot say that we have won the battle in the field against the opposition
forces while the civil authorities have lost the battle to create a basis for democrati-
zation, peace, reconstruction, development and social enhancement. We all have
lost our common war.
Unfortunately this artificial and hasty separation between supposedly military
and civilian responsibilities is a critical factor in the failure of modern operations
or, at least, leads to lengthy and inconclusive operations, delays, and a waste of
money, time, effort and human lives. It leads the military to concentrate on mili-
tary objectives with little concern for post-war problems related to possible side ef-
fects and so-called "collateral damage." In the meantime it gives the civilian
authorities an alibi for their failure in reconstruction. They can put the blame on
the military and use extensive war damage, the lack of internal stability and even
popular unrest stemming from economic difficulties as an excuse. From the mili-
tary standpoint, and under the influence of this civil-military "separation," the op-
erations tend to be planned and executed to:
• Achieve absolute military supremacy even when it is not necessary. Today
there are no symmetric threats that can challenge the US and Western military
supremacy. There is not a lack of military power to cope, but an excess ofpower to
manage. Terror is achieving some results only because it is not a military threat
and because it is completely asymmetric. In addition, terror directly affects a
political class and an international leadership largely unfit and untrained to cope
with this problem.
• Make no distinction between combatants and noncombatants. 2 If war is
mistakenly considered a "police operation" or a "humanitarian effort" there is no
enemy but only a "criminal." However, dealing with a criminal is different from
dealing with a "just enemy." Here begins the main contradiction of our times.
While avoiding the idea ofwar and eluding its reality, the military forces still have
training, ethics and procedures related to war—a classic, traditional, symmetric,
old fashion, destructive war. Our armies are completely different from police
forces. And rightly so. But many situations that militaries have to face are not that
different from international law enforcement. In order to cope with this
ambiguity, many military units attempt to change their ethics and code of
conduct. Unfortunately, when the ethics ofwar change, the applicable rule of law
changes as well and often with undesirable consequences. The majority of our
soldiers know how to deal with the enemy, a traditional combatant, but do not
know how to deal with criminals. So we tend to abuse the terms "criminal" or
"terrorist" in order to enhance the aggressive behavior and determination of our
224
Fabio Mini
soldiers, but at the same time this lowers our ethical threshold. If the definition of
enemy is unclear, "criminal" can become a potential enemy, even if legally
belonging to the category of noncombatant.
• Destroy all infrastructure (factories, roads, power plants, bridges,
communications, government facilities) with little concern for safeguarding
essential infrastructure needed by the country to recover quickly. Some
infrastructure is safeguarded but only if useful to the subsequent military
occupation. This generally creates the impression that the "real aims of the war"
are other than humanitarian undertaken in the pursuit of international justice.
• Selectively overthrow rogue regimes and dictators. There are many dictators
and rogue regimes that do not "benefit" from our military attention. Instead,
some of them benefit from our protection, while the current "bad guys" have, at
times, conveniently been our best allies—all ofthem. This also gives an erroneous
perception of the aims of war.
• Carry on preventive operations in the sense that they come first but do not
prevent crises, losses or damages. In our Western terminology, "prevention" has
assumed the meaning of crisis and war avoidance. A war to prevent another
similar or worse war is not perceived as true prevention. It is an "anticipation" of
an event whose necessity is not yet defined or proven—a scenario. Our societies,
following a legalistic approach, do not accept war as a preventive measure and the
use of force can be gradually applied only ifbalanced against a threat that is visible,
immanent and imminent. Scenarios are not threats and worst-case scenarios
cannot lead international policy as a matter of routine. In our legalistic approach,
intelligence is not evidence. This set of perceptions further limits possible
solutions and adds suspicion about the legality of the military use of force.
• Carry on operations in the complete absence of an achievable political and
economical "end state." Here "achievable" refers to a result planned as an
outcome of a pre-determined period of time and clearly allocated resources
(including those for security). While democratization, liberty, rule of law, and
reconciliation are good ideas and ideals, in areas where peoples have lived through
hardship and economic or ideological slavery for centuries, they are not political
end states "achievable" through a defined and predetermined foreign military
intervention. That is why many military operations appear endless and useless.
• Show force and pursue humiliation both of the antagonist and the allies. If
the enemy is a "criminal," the ethics of combat suffer and humiliation becomes a
tool to exercise superiority. When humiliation becomes a tool, it is difficult to
confine it to the enemy. It is also easily applied to allies and friendly forces.
Refusing an offer of help because "this operation is too sensitive" or "too
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technological," or "bound to secrecy" is perceived as a humiliation by many allies.
Not sharing essential intelligence, abuse of the "blue eyes only" criteria and
sharing uneven responsibilities can become a humiliation in the event of difficult
missions and indefinite risk.
On the other hand, the transitional civil administrations (either under interna-
tional or national and local control) that are so eager to intervene after the military
operations, tend to:
• Apply the same set of measures to all situations and to every kind of local
society. The drawers of the international planners seem to contain only one "road
map" or one list of "benchmarks" or a single "eight-point plan," and these are
used indifferently for East Timor, Kosovo, Palestine or Iraq. Hundreds of
international experts are paid huge sums ofmoney for their consultancy and then
the output is the same plan over and over, often repeating the same mistakes and
making some new ones because differences of social, cultural and economic
environment are not taken into account.
• Establish a Western-style democracy regardless of its compatibility with the
existing culture and development needs. Western-style democracy, which is based
on the ideals of liberty and freedom of expression of the will of the people, is the
product of two bloody and lengthy conflicts: the American and the French
revolutions. In both cases, it took hundreds of years to attain the full benefits of
democracy, and now this model, which is far from perfect and which requires the
continuous checks and balances provided by the different branches of
government and the ultimate control of periodic elections, is imposed on
populations that neither understand the system nor really want it. Additionally,
the main corollary of modern democracy, "the market democracy," has, in many
cases, a devastating effect on immature, archaic or former socialist societies.
• Dissolve existing social institutions (welfare, health care, wages, local
councils, family systems, etc.) with no acceptable or efficient alternatives. Often
the existing network of institutions and set of customs is the only organizational
glue surviving after the war. The people know where the hospitals are and what to
do to get there. They know what belongs to whom and why. They know what is
legal and illegal according to their own old set of rules. The rapid change of social
structures and age old points of reference gives the impression, and sometimes the
reality, of anarchy.
• Divide et impera (divide and rule). This principal is often applied when there
are ethnic or religious differences within a society. Additionally, these differences
are exploited when they exist among other States in the region. The result is that
where the crisis stemmed from religious or social hatred, coexistence between
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diverse ethnic or religious groups becomes impossible. In the meantime the basic
social infrastructures are unified under the control of foreign powers and they
soon prove ineffective.
• Change standards (legal system, standards of living, social relations) and
disband existing organizations (army, police, judicial).
• Impose an ambiguous rule oflaw often based on alien law methodology and
culture. For example, the Balkans used to have a mixed system of socialist and
Roman law. The new international administration introduced many English
common law-based regulations that were often perceived as unfair and frequently
incomprehensible to local judges, lawyers and the people.
• Concentrate on aid and emergency assistance but not on sustainable
development.
Lessons Learned
All the operations so far conducted by the international community, ifseen as inte-
grated efforts including pre-war, war and post-war phases, have demonstrated that
they can fail, not because of military blunders or lack of power, but because of:
Dimensional Disconnect. The preparation and conduct of the war is global while
the post-war management is local; or vice versa (unilateral war and multilateral
post-war management). All operations since the 1991 Gulf War have required a
global engagement. All nations have been asked to unite in the effort of war and
subsequently for peace support operations. However, immediately after the fight-
ing, all solutions of the crises have looked for divisions—the Dayton syndrome.
The new imperatives have been divide, separate, cantonize, decentralize. In so do-
ing, regional security actors have been neglected or seen as part of the problem but
not part ofthe solution. In Afghanistan and Iraq, the trend ofwar was the opposite,
but the multilateral post-war effort still does not include the regional forces and
their responsibilities.
Elusion and Illusion. In this post-Cold War era, we have developed the belief that
the use of military arms is humanitarian; we do not wage war, we ensure peace. We
are good and we produce a "success story" every day. This irenic approach eludes
the concept ofwar and produces many illusions that are present in the behavior of
many military organizations and administrators. Their claims of successes are so
evanescent and groundless that trusting them becomes a real risk.
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Oversimplifications. Politics seems to have lost the sense of complexity it has al-
ways had and that made its management a real art. Instead of understanding com-
plexity and elaborating new approaches to the problems, our political system has
resorted to simplifications and often oversimplification. For example:
• Democracy means elections—the sooner the better. Huge and powerful
international organizations are devoted to this mantra and rush entire
populations that have never had a democratic system into elections. But who are
the candidates? How are the rights and fair representation of minorities
protected? During the crises, whoever gets in power normally has the support of
guns or the protection of foreign forces. In both cases the "free" elections risk
legalizing the change of power and strengthening the power of unknown entities
or individuals.
• Freedom means free markets. Free market means free competition; but what
about local economies that cannot compete? Local resources will never have the
chance to grow independently. In many instances, local and international mafias
will benefit from a market where everything has to be imported and where there
are weak governments or collusive forces facilitating the evasion of taxes and
controls.
• Free economy means a unified currency. The first step international
monetary authorities take is to establish a convertible currency. But converting
what? Coming from where? Acquired through what? What about money
laundering?
• The managers of after-war periods tend to assume that the basics of the
society hit by a crisis have not changed during the war. This is not only an
oversimplification; nothing is less true. War changes almost everything, but in
particular it changes the people. Before, during and after the war entire
generations are lost because of the killed and missing in action, the wounded, the
massacres and reprisals on civilians. Generations of "could be" fathers and
mothers are lost. But during these periods, generations are also lost deprived of
educational opportunities during the war. This compounds the inadequacy of the
education they received from the previous regimes, and the ideological, racial,
ethnic biases oftheir upbringing, biases reinforced by the vicious cycle ofviolence.
• We in the West tend to face the problems only when violence erupts. But in
almost all instances it is already too late. We started dealing with East Timor in
1999, but the crisis started in 1975. The most dramatic genocide in the world (in
terms of the percentage of the existing population) was perpetrated during that
period and nobody seemed to care. Everybody knew that Marshall Tito's death in
1980 would start the dissolution process of Yugoslavia, but from 1980 to 1992 no
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one seemed to care. NATO brought war to Yugoslavia during the Kosovo crisis in
1999, but the problem had started ten years before, in 1989, when Milosevic raised
his nationalistic stance against the province. In those ten years, the Serbs took
away the autonomy Kosovo had enjoyed since 1948, and the Albanian ethnic
groups were forced out of the government and denied an adequate education;
finally resorting to open violence. A Catholic priest in Kosovo once said to me: "it
takes a lifetime to shape a man and 24 hours with a gun in the hands to spoil his
life. All these kids that tasted the power of violence will never be the same." And
those children that lived in constant contact with war relics, unexploded
ordnance, landmines and under the protection of foreign military forces will
never be the same. Generations that are supposed to reshape the future of the
country are simply non-existent or wholly unprepared for the task. An
international observer noted in Western Africa, "The sons are less educated and
more violent than the fathers." This is an equally unfortunate truism in the
Balkans, Afghanistan, East Timor, Somalia, Rwanda, Palestine, Iraq, and
elsewhere visited by the violence ofwar. These are historical defeats for our society
because the "fathers" were raised through colonialism, communism, extremism
and fundamentalism—all manifestations of the "evil" from which we liberated
them. The international community tends to replace every loss with temporary
foreign manpower and in so doing they perpetuate the delay in recovering the lost
generations. Finally, within these societies, there are also lost expectations, lost
hopes, and lost ideals, and these losses aggravate the recovery plan.
• Reconstruction by the few. In all of the after-crisis periods a handful of
international companies are given the task of reconstruction. Normally these
companies belong to the same nations that "donate" the resources for
reconstruction. The money basically returns to those who gave it. The local
manpower is scarcely involved and since such companies are technologically
advanced, their costs tend to be much higher than the average local standards. In
periods of emergency, through so-called international community and then
replacing the governmental structures that existed before the crisis is not ready to
exercise control over the foreign money and over the reconstruction plans.
Therefore the opportunities for speculation, profiteers, black market, crime, tax
evasion and so on are great.
• Another maniacal effort immediately undertaken is "privatization." Former
State-owned enterprises, cooperatives, farms, and industries are disbanded and
thousands of workers laid off. The international administrators do not want to
appear undemocratic and they immediately tend to shape the local economy
according to free market models that it took centuries to develop. Almost
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everywhere, this abrupt effort does not fit a situation where property rights are
unclear, ethnic or religious divisions make it difficult to be fair, and where societal
needs require labor occupation and not unemployment.
• Last but not least, intervenors intervene without defining the desired "final
status" of the crisis area. It is a sign of hypocrisy and inefficiency to give hopes and
fuel expectations that would be difficult to keep. It is also difficult to think that one
model of society could work for every corner of the world. Furthermore, the delay
of the realization of the final status in the absence of a strong, efficient, impartial
and transparent administration supports the creation of failed States, quasi-
States, rogue States and mafia States. The final status must be defined and agreed
upon before the international intervention with clarity and courage. That status
must be compatible with international standards but first and foremost must be
compatible with the local and regional reality. No single hot spot can be dealt with
in isolation from its environment.
Fire and Forget. This tendency is not new, but has regained conceptual support
during the last decade. The military instruments are the only readily available and
organized tools to turn to in emergency situations. The political imperative to "do
something" (which is also a sign of political weakness) finds it easy to resort to mili-
tary action first. Unfortunately, the lack ofcomprehensive planning ofthe pre-war,
war and post-war phases and of any kind of holistic approach makes it also easy to
identify the emergency circumstances, respond to the crisis areas and then forget
them, leaving the military behind. Peacekeeping missions start in the spotlight of
public support and emotion but very soon are neglected and forgotten.
Civil-military Relationship. Another lesson drawn from recent operations is that
the relationship between the military forces and the non-military administration is
always problematic, but it becomes a disaster when the international community
or the sending States allow:
• Multiple chains of command.
• Different reporting lines (national, international, private).
• Different priorities, concepts of secrecy, concepts of reliability (vis-a-vis the
locals).
• Different approaches: emergency vs. sustainable development, bureaucracy
vs. results, local vs. regional, politics vs. administration, success story vs. true
story.
• Uneven access to the political leadership and feedback. International
organizations and corporations have much easier access to the "political masters"
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than do the military commanders. Normally layers of political, diplomatic,
economic, religious and other advisors screen the access of the military to the
decision makers who, often unable to get the military assessment as it has been
stated by the commanders, tend to take the wrong decisions or prefer the always
"good news" stories those advisors want to present.
• Security not to be integrated in the development and reconstruction
strategy. In the minds of many civil administrators and politicians, security is
often confined to "armed protection." The international civil administrations do
not like to see the military around or inside their briefing rooms. Peacekeeping is
mistakenly seen as a pacifistic and idealistic effort and many international civilian
peacekeepers (administrators) come from personal backgrounds of conscientious
objection, anti-military activism, and other "noble" endeavors. Many, of course,
know that without the military it would be impossible to cope with emergency
situations, but many others think it would be better to leave the military home or,
if military forces are absolutely necessary, to send them away as soon as possible
once the initial emergency is in hand. Almost all these administrators do not
include the military aspects of security in the plans they make—roads and bridges
are rebuilt without considering defensive or military requirements; industrial
complexes and plants are rebuilt and managed regardless of their vulnerability to
internal and external sabotage; mines and minerals or other natural resources are
left in the hands of engineers and managers totally unaware of security issues.
Furthermore, the reconstruction plans do not consider the indirect effect a
military presence has on local development and the indirect and direct protection
of minorities and their patrimonial sites. This security factor is either taken for
granted or completely missed. There is always a great push towards a so-called
"de-militarization" or effort to diminish the presence of the military without
having restored an effective security system. A reduction in the foreign military
force is always a great confidence building measure, but it must undertaken only
when accompanied by a real improvement in the security environment, and, most
of all, the diminution of visible aspects of security must be balanced by invisible,
but not less effective, measures of security (intelligence, deterrence, reassurance,
reserve forces, civil-military cooperation, information campaign, psychological
operations and military-to-military cooperation). Finally, the great value that the
military-to-military relationships have in the regional context is very seldom
considered. The occupying military forces are denied opportunities for regional
or wider contacts with the military forces of the area on the assumption that a
relationship with neighboring foreign forces could invade the realm of foreign
policy. In this way a basic and effective tool of cooperation is often neglected.
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The latest international operations have also demonstrated that nobody can act
alone. No matter how powerful and strong a nation, the participation of allies and
friends is always advisable and necessary. Coalitions ofthe willing are not enough if
they exclude traditional partners or potential critics. Critics must be always in-
volved and their views solicited and considered. Furthermore, the single-sided ap-
proach (the military wage war, civilians manage pre-war and post-war) creates
further disconnects and a vacuum of power that is immediately filled by thugs,
criminals and extremists. Without an integrated approach to pre-war, war and
post-war operations, the transition periods, no matter how smooth or short, em-
bed the seeds of failure for the entire operation. It is during these periods that the
major contrasts between military operations and civil administration are most ap-
parent and that both the military and civilian sides are most vulnerable. During the
transitions the huge amount of money that international "solidarity" has poured
into the crisis area cannot be controlled and these monies create enormous possi-
bilities for criminal organizations and other profiteers. It is also during these tran-
sition periods that oversight of the local political system is reduced. Often a
struggle for internal power delays political development.
The "Liberation Syndrome." It is often stated that modern military operations
and wars are not waged just to defeat an enemy but to free a country or a popula-
tion. Of course this is a true statement and it is the only appropriate motivation
that a modern civilization can have to justify war against someone that does not
pose a direct threat to the sovereignty- of our countries nor possess the military ca-
pability or power in whatever form to threaten our basic security'. But the aim of
"liberation" cannot be misused or abused. Liberation is not a status granted by in-
tervening foreign forces or freely claimed by insurgents, but it is acquired through a
self-determination process guided by internationally recognized legal institutions.
Self-determination is a fundamental principle of international law. The United
Nations system is built on the concept of self-determination as expressed in the UN
Charter. The inalienable right of self-determination stands as the very first article
in the two treaties, the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights3 and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 4 both adopted in
1976, which, together with the Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights, 5 comprise
the International Bill of Rights. The right to self-determination may be claimed
and asserted only by the legitimate representative of a people or nation. The real-
ization of the right to self-determination, through the attainment of sovereignty
and legal personality, is governed under international law according to the follow-
ing recognized factual criteria of Statehood: "The State as a person of international
law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a
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defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with
other States."6 In addition to these factual criteria, recognition is an important fac-
tor in the granting of legal statehood. The General Assembly, responsible for ad-
mitting members to the United Nations, is the most authoritative forum for State
recognition, although bilateral recognition by other States is also an important fac-
tor. However, the right to self-determination is not the same as an absolute right of
secession from an established State. The territorial integrity and sovereign equality
of States are also basic principles of international law recognized in the UN Charter
and subsequent treaties. In the 1970 Declaration ofPrinciples of International Law,
the General Assembly affirms that every State must aid in the realization of the
"self-determination of peoples" in accordance with the provisions of the Charter,
but also that "nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authoriz-
ing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair . . . the territorial
integrity or political unity ofa sovereign State." 7 Similarly, the 1961 Declaration on
the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples affirms both the
right of all peoples to self-determination and the principles of territorial integrity
and inviolability of State borders. 8
In the last decade, "liberation," more than an expression of self-determination
of the poor and oppressed, has become a "syndrome" of the powerful. It has also
created dangerous ambiguity in the role of belligerent parties and occupying pow-
ers. The misperception induced by the "politically incorrect" word "occupation" is
greater than the reality, while the "good" word "liberation" fuels many misunder-
standings. These include:
• Liberators are not occupants; they cannot behave like occupying forces
• Immediate liberation. In the minds of the liberated peoples they are free as
soon as the liberating forces assume the control of the territory and come in
contact with them. If small local irregular units happen to have contributed to the
fighting, they become the heroes of the nation and the "freedom fighters." They
demand immediate actions in removing the previous authority, freeing political
prisoners or internees, arresting former officials, disbanding former State
administrative agencies and State security organizations, including intelligence,
law and order and administration. They expect the international community to
allow freedom and rights not previously enjoyed. They expect that power will be
transferred to them without any interference or delay.
• Another perception is that of those who were persecuted by the previous
regime want the power too. They are martyrs. They want the leading positions and
they want revenge.
233
Liberation and Occupation: A Commander's Perspective
• Then there is the perception of the liberating forces. In this modern age
there are no longer wars for territorial control or annexation. Nobody wants to
modify the existing borders. Therefore, unlike the occupying forces of the 19th
century, the so-called liberation forces do not want to control the territory; they
simply want to accomplish whatever objective was set and then go home as soon as
possible. They want to transfer the power to whoever could free them from any
continuing responsibility. The liberators do not feel additional responsibility
towards the "liberated" and are not psychologically prepared to use force against
them; even if the failure to do so would allow the thugs to come into power or if
disbanding the previous administration would mean chaos for decades.
All this is very far from what the reality of the situation requires and far from
what is anticipated by international humanitarian law (IHL). Liberation is a syn-
onym ofself-determination as far as the people or the nation that strive to attain in-
dependence are concerned and it is a form of external "aid" to such an endeavor
when foreign forces intervene. However, no matter the purpose of the conflict, the
status of occupation paradoxically provides a greater legal basis than any other jus-
tification for military presence and best ensures the protection and basic rights of
the civilian population. Let us turn to the case of Iraq and see what occupation
should imply.
The following analysis contains extracts taken from a paper prepared as part of
the International Humanitarian Law Research Initiative. 9 While somewhat
lengthy, it provides an excellent discussion ofthe principles ofIHL in the context of
the military occupation of Iraq.
The Fourth Geneva Convention [1949] and the Hague Regulations [annexed to 1907
Hague Convention IV 1907] regulate the situation of belligerent occupation. They set
forth a series of duties and obligations for the parties involved from Coalition forces to
relief agencies and the Iraqi population itself. Their purpose is to ensure minimal
protection of the civilian population and favor the stabilization of the security and
living conditions in the territory under the control of invading forces.
What is an occupation?
The IHL follows a very practical approach in defining military occupation. It refers to
factual control over a territory or a population. It does not require any form of
declaration or intent of the invading forces. The motives for the presence of foreign
military forces on the territory, be they liberation, self-defence, or enforcing pre-




What is the law of occupation?
From the point of view of IHL, civilians in occupied territories deserve and need
particularly detailed rules of protection The civilians have no obligation of loyalty
towards the occupying power, regardless of the motives of the invading forces. The
only obligations they have relate to their civilian status, i.e., not to participate in
hostilities. . . . [Because of that obligation, IHL prohibits civilians from violently
resisting occupation of their territory and from attempting to liberate that territory by
violent means.] [Conversely,] the occupying power is subject to a series of obligations
pertaining to the administration of the territories it occupies and the population it
controls as a substitute and caretaker for the national authorities.
When does occupation begin?
The criteria for the application of the law of occupation are relatively straightforward.
The law of occupation applies whenever, during an armed conflict, a territory and its
population come under control of the enemy of the State authorities previously
controlling that territory. (See Art. 42 ofthe Hague Regulations and Art. 2(1) and Art. 4
of Fourth Geneva Convention.) The overriding concern of the IHL rules is to regulate
the relationship between the civilian population and the invading forces as soon as the
two are in contact, independently ofthe duration or motives ofthe military operations.
In this context, even a military platoon occupying a village for a period of a few hours,
has obligations to take care of the population (emergency health care, food and water
supplies, etc.), not as a matter of charity but as a duty under the rules of IHL. The
longer this occupation lasts, the more detailed the obligations become. In the case of
Iraq, the fall of the regime certainly creates long-term obligations pertaining to all
spheres of public services, from the maintenance of law and order, the administration
of justice, the supply of food, water, and health services, and the administration of the
Iraqi resources for the benefit of its people.
When does occupation end?
Occupation ends whenever one of the conditions of occupation is no longer met.
1. The international armed conflict has ended.
An agreement has been signed between the parties at conflict bringing to an end the
armed conflict. In general, such agreement will involve the withdrawal of the
occupying forces. There may be situations, however, where the former occupier will
maintain a military presence in the country, with the agreement of the legitimate
government under a security arrangement (e.g. US military presence in Japan and
Germany). The legality of such agreement and the legitimacy of the national
authorities signing it are subject to international recognition, whereby members of the
international community reestablish diplomatic and political relations with the
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national government. In this context, it is in the interest of all the parties involved to
maintain a clear regime of occupation until the conditions for stability and peace are
created allowing the re-establishment of a legitimate national government. A post-
occupation military presence can only be construed in the context of a viable, stable
and peaceful situation.
2. Foreign military forces have withdrawn from enemy territory or are no longer
exerting control over the population of that territory.
In case of an ongoing conflict, the withdrawal of the forces also brings an end of the
applicability of the law of occupation. It implies however that the enemy power has
regained control over its population and territory. The mere withdrawal of troops
from certain conquered places does not end or suspend the application ofIHL rules if it
leaves a vacuum of authority. The control of the territory and the legal duties involved
remain in effect until the front lines have stabilized. Evidently, in the course of a
military campaign where front lines can move back and forth many times and
responsibility over the territory and population is unclear, the implementation of such
rules can become impractical. However, in the case of the collapse of enemy forces, as
in Iraq, the law of occupation applies to territories and populations entering into
contact with invading forces, and remains applicable regardless of further tactical
deployment of troops. In other words, there is no vacuum of authority or
responsibility once troops have moved into a given territory. Obligations for the
maintenance of law and order as well as all other obligations pertaining to occupying
powers are applicable to the Coalition forces as soon as they drive Iraqi forces out of
civilian areas.
In both cases:
• The hand-over of administrative functions to civil servants does not relieve the
Occupying Power of its obligation;
• The set-up of government structures by opposition groups with the continuing
military presence of Coalition forces does not fulfil the conditions for the end of the
occupation. If changes to the Constitution are required, it can only be amended under
its own provisions and procedures or, in exceptional cases, under applicable
international law and procedures. Agreements concluded by the U.S. or the U.K. with
local authorities of the occupied territory or changes introduced by Coalition Forces to
Iraqi institutions or to the government of Iraq cannot deprive protected persons from
the protection offered by IHL (see Article 47 of Fourth Geneva Convention).
• In all cases, the law of occupation applies until one year after the general close of
military operations, and even beyond that date basic rules continue to apply, if the
occupying power exercises the functions of government in the territory. (See Article
6(3) of the Fourth Geneva Convention.) In addition, Protocol I contemplates the
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extension ofthe full application ofoccupation law until the termination ofoccupation.
(See Article 3(b) of Protocol I.).
What are the obligations of the Coalition forces in Iraq?
• In principle, life in the occupied territory must be allowed to continue as normally as
possible. The obligations ofthe occupying power can be summed up as permitting life
in the occupied territory to continue without being affected by its presence. As
authority has passed into the hands of the occupant, it becomes responsible for public
order, safety and welfare in the occupied territory. IHL is strong in protecting the status
quo ante, while weak in responding to new needs of the population of the occupied
territory. The longer the occupation lasts, the more shortcomings of the regime
established by IHL therefore appear. Only international institutions such as the U.N.
or new local authorities established in conformity with the right of the Iraqi people to
self-determination can establish a new political system in Iraq.
The legal implications of this approach are the following:
Regarding internal security, the maintenance of law and order and public welfare
• The occupying power's only protected interest is the security of the occupying
armed forces; it may take necessary measures to protect that security, but it is also
responsible to take all measures in its power to restore and ensure, as far as possible,
public order and safety (see Article 43 of the Hague Regulations). In this context, while
the U.S. is not responsible for every looting occurring in the territory it controls, it
must exercise due diligence to avoid such looting. The claim that its forces are not
sufficient in number or not appropriately trained is not a sufficient excuse;
• Similarly, the U.S. and the U.K. are responsible for ensuring public health and
sanitation (see Article 56 ofthe Fourth Geneva Convention) and the provision of food
and medical supplies (see Article 55 of the Fourth Geneva Convention).
Regarding the administration of justice
• Except concerning the protection of the occupying power's security, local laws
remain in force (see Article 43 of the Hague Regulations and Article 64 of Fourth
Geneva Convention) and local courts remain competent (see Article 66 of the Fourth
Geneva Convention);
• Civilians may only be detained in anticipation of a trial or for imperative security
reasons, which must be individually determined, allowing for a right of appeal (see
Article 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention). Such civil internees benefit from a very
detailed protective regime under the Fourth Geneva Convention (see Arts. 79-135 of
Convention IV);
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• It'civilians commit hostile acts, they may be punished under legislation introduced
by the occupying power, but do not lose their civilian status. They may however lose
their communication rights (see article 5(2) of Convention IV). Unless they directly
participate in hostilities, they benefit from the protection of civilians against effects of
hostilities (see article 51(3) of Protocol I.)
• In no case may a civilian be deported outside the occupied territory (see Article 49
( 1 ) of Fourth Geneva Convention).
Regarding property and resources
• Except when rendered absolutely necessary by military operations, private property
may not be destroyed (see Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention) and it may
only be confiscated under local legislation (see Article 46 of the Hague Regulations).
• The government previously controlling the territory can obviously no longer
administer public property (other than that of the municipalities (see Article 56 of the
Hague Regulations). Such property may therefore be administered by the occupying
power, but only under the rules ofusufruct (see Article 55 ofthe Hague Regulations). If
Iraqi oil wells were government owned, the U.S. may administer them and sell the oil.
According to some opinions, it may use the proceeds not only for the benefits of the
local population, but also, similar to levies, to cover the cost of the occupation (but not
of the whole war) (see Article 49 of the Hague Regulations).
As can be seen, the aim of liberation does not affect the status of occupation nor
alter the relevant obligations. "Fire and forget" is not the kind of responsibility the
IHL assigns to occupying powers. "Fight, pay and leave" is not what the civilian
population can ask for. The criteria set by the law of occupation exactly fit the situ-
ation of Iraq.
Case Studies
Afghanistan. In the case of Afghanistan, the "liberation" by the Coalition was nei-
ther requested nor wanted by the Taliban regime that constituted the government
of that country. The so-called "Northern Alliance" was not a resistance force but
the remnant of a group of warlords opposing the unifying power of the Taliban.
The Taliban regime, which itself pretended to "free" the country from the previous
regime and the mujahideen under the banner ofself-determination, was not recog-
nized by the United Nations. In fact, after the Coalition's "liberation" the same
warlord system of the mujahideen regime that preceded the Taliban has taken over
local power, while the central government is able to perform a sort of loose control
only over Kabul, and that thanks to the presence of US and NATO forces. During
238
Fabio Mini
the mujahideen regime there were around 28 warlords and now there are at least 32
war/drug lords.
Iraq. In the case of Iraq, there will be no liberation until the Iraqi people have effec-
tive, stable and legal (internally and internationally recognized) State institutions.
Unfortunately, they have been prevented from liberating themselves from
Saddam's regime. The assumed and promised popular revolution and participa-
tion in the "liberation" did not take place. It was a gross misperception and a mis-
take of evaluation on the part of many experts, worldwide renowned Islam
scholars, intelligence agencies and naifpoliticians. On the other hand, there was no
attempt to organize the participation ofthe local population in the coalition opera-
tion was not organized, not foreseen and not even symbolically pursued. Perhaps
the most widely remembered symbol ofthe end ofthe Saddam regime was the pull-
ing down of the large statue in central Baghdad. But this was done by a US Marine,
and the small crowd of Iraqis around it was chanting more for the sake ofTV cam-
eras than for joy. Most Iraqis had longed to liberate themselves from the Saddam
regime, but were not given the opportunity to organize their own fight, not even at
a symbolic level. Although coalition leaders brought with them Iraqis that were be-
lieved to be potential leaders, these had no political credibility; they were viewed as
puppets of the Western forces that had imposed hardship on the Iraqis for too long.
Because there was no participation by the Iraqi population, the people had no oppor-
tunity to rid themselves of regime propaganda and the atavist fear of the regime. They
did not have the chance to understand the new situation and finally react.
Paradoxically, like any other peoples that did not have the opportunity to free
themselves from their own dictators, the Iraqis are now freeing themselves from
the "liberators"—the Coalition. Liberation and freedom must be earned through
self-sacrifice and cannot simply be given to them for free by someone else. The sta-
tus of "liberator" is not one recognized by international law and liberation by "lib-
erators" is not a guarantee of democracy or humanity. The Jewish internees of the
Nazi lagers gained their freedom through their own martyrdom; they were already
free in the face of God and in the face of the international community when the
Americans and the Soviets opened the gates of Auschwitz, Buchenwald, Dachau,
etc. Nevertheless, they saw their liberators as angels regardless of whether those
military forces belonged to a Western democracy or a Stalinist regime. The major-
ity of Iraqis view the Coalition forces as liberators, but they know that this recogni-
tion does not give the Coalition any specific right over them, their resources, or
their sovereignty.
The majority of Iraqis recognized the Coalition as an occupying power respon-
sible for restoring and ensuring public order and safety, because they knew they
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were incapable without that assistance of overcoming the resistance forces or even
the criminal gangs that plagued their country. They were willing to postpone the
establishment of their own freedom because of their lack of capability to maintain
security. But ifthe occupying forces prove unable to ensure security or want to give
up their own responsibility as occupying forces in order to appear "liberators," i.e.,
the good guys, they have no useful role to play and should leave. The people them-
selves have the right to free their own country. Therefore, from the legal point of
view, a temporary consensual military occupation is better than an indefinite stay
in the ambiguous status of liberators. Furthermore, as soon as the "occupiers" give
up their legitimate status and want to become just "liberators," ignoring their re-
sponsibility to ensure security and freedom of movement, they can be seen as un-
lawful occupants, making the struggle for liberty, or self-determination, against
them lawful and justified. That's why in the periods of immediate post-conflict, or
even during the phase of active combat against rebels or insurgents, the status of
occupants is better than any other funambulism, at least until security is guaran-
teed and civil institutions are able to control the internal situation. Until that mo-
ment, the coalition forces should retain the status of occupying forces and comply
with their relevant responsibilities under international law. Liberation and occu-
pation is not a matter of self-labeling, but of international obligation.
In the case of a coalition composed of belligerent and non-belligerent nations,
the responsibility of ensuring respect for the norms of international humanitarian
law as occupying forces resides with the individual nations even though the opera-
tional or administrative leadership has been assumed by or delegated to a leading
nation. Although some national forces may not accept the rationale for the war, the
status of occupation is independent from their acceptance or non-acceptance of
that rationale. Their de facto control over part of a territory even by a small unit
render the national forces responsible for the fulfillment of occupying obligations.
In Iraq, it is likely that the so-called supporting nations (Italy, Poland, etc), when
assuming the responsibility of a sector, implicitly assume the obligation of occupy-
ing forces even though that status is specifically recognized by the relevant UN res-
olutions only with respect to the United States and the United Kingdom. On June
28, 2004, the control of Iraq was formally handed over to Iraqi authorities. How-
ever, coalition forces have not changed or given up their de facto control of Iraqi
territory. It is highly questionable whether the nominal control residing in the
hands of the local authorities is sufficient to end the "occupation regime," but cer-
tainly it is not sufficient to amend the obligations that the coalition has towards the
civilian population.
It is clear that in their formal new status of "invited" forces, the national forces
in Iraq cannot have fewer obligations than they did when their status was that of
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occupying forces. Furthermore, Iraqi forces have no power to control the security
situation, lack intelligence and surveillance resources, and do not possess even the
capability to adequately support the Coalition. In fact, the Coalition still has full
control of the security instruments and their apparent status of "supporting" the
local authorities is a fiction. As a matter of fact, the so-called "passage of sover-
eignty" (in reality, according to international law, Iraq never lost its sovereignty) to
the Iraqis has added the Iraqis themselves and their immature, unprepared, inef-
fective security forces to the list ofenemies ofthe criminals and the rebels. The early
disengagement of Coalition forces from the obligations of occupation law, their
desire to regain the fallacious status of "liberators," and their formal transfer of re-
sponsibility of security to the provisional local institutions has ended the regime of
occupation and also the right of resistance that such law recognizes to the Iraqi
armed groups. 10 But it has also relieved the civilian population from their duty to
not engage in violent resistance to the occupation. The formal end of the occupa-
tion has paradoxically increased the risk of legalizing mass rebellion and fueling a
civil war; the rebels can now clearly identify the Iraqi security forces either as col-
laborators of the unlawful occupants or as internal enemies.
Kosovo. In Kosovo, legally speaking, the war against the sovereign State of Serbia
and Montenegro was waged by a regional security organization (NATO) in order
to protect a minority legally and lawfully integrated into a sovereign State, but not
to transfer to such ethnic group the sovereignty over the parts of Serbia, Albania
and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) where they live. "Lib-
eration" in this case and in this phase has the value ofhumanitarian protection and
relief. That is why UN Security Council Resolution 1244 11 authorizing the NATO-
led mission in Kosovo and the UN administration did not foresee any loss ofsover-
eignty by Serbia and Montenegro.
The international administration of Kosovo that followed Operation Allied
Force was often discussed both before and after the war with regard to its applica-
bility to Iraq. Many experts and UN officials wanted to export the "Kosovo model"
to Iraq. In fact several international officials and national military officials were
transferred from Kosovo to Iraq in the early days of the invasion. I can testify from
personal experience that among those international officials there were some good
persons who had performed effectively, but there were others that had failed miser-
ably during their tour in Kosovo. The suggestion of the "Kosovo model" for Iraq
was a serious concern to all those who had lived through that painful, ongoing
peacekeeping process. Kosovo has nothing to do with Iraq and the poor perfor-
mance of the most prominent international organizations there did not justify any
attempt to make a "model" out of it. The Kosovo model becomes even more
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irrelevant when being exported to a completely different situation, culture, men-
tality and set of practical problems. The United Nations may have had little choice
because other models were not available and the donor countries and the interna-
tional organizations had somehow accepted the bureaucracy established in
Kosovo. Because the different circumstances in Iraq were not understood, this de-
cision was not very promising. Iraq required a new and clearly determined ap-
proach; the failure to provide that approach does not bode well for the future.
The United Nations imprimatur has great political value and good diplomatic
value. Worldwide operations or initiatives cannot be effectively undertaken with-
out the consent and the support of the United Nations. That said, in Kosovo, as in
other missions it has undertaken, the United Nations proved completely ineffec-
tive and even dangerous when administering a country or a territory. Kosovo is a
small spot in the Balkans; officially a province of Serbia. It has a territory of 10,000
square kilometers and a population of 2. 1 million. United Nations Interim Admin-
istration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) 12 is, in effect, the governing institution in
Kosovo and is responsible for running this province on behalf of the United Na-
tions. A Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG) is the highest
international authority in that province. NATO, which brought war to Serbia-
Montenegro because of the Kosovo humanitarian crisis, maintains Kosovo Force
(KFOR), an international security force composed ofNATO and non-NATO mili-
tary contingents, in the province. The KFOR commander (COMKFOR) is the sec-
ond ranking international official in Kosovo, but is not subordinate to the SRSG.
Personnel of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
are still, as of the time this article is written, working in Kosovo. Their main hu-
manitarian work is finished and they are reducing their staff and handing over
some responsibilities to the civil administration, but they still provide assistance to
the local minorities.
UNMIK is divided into four sections, which it calls "pillars," as follows:
• Pillar I, under UN management, is responsible for police and justice affairs.
• Pillar II (civil administration), also under UN management, is responsible
for all aspects oforganization ofnormal life; e.g., finance and payment, education,
transportation, health, judicial affairs, UNMIK police, post and
telecommunication, public utilities and many more.
• Pillar III, an institution run by the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE), is in charge of media development,
democratization, police training, and elections/registration.
• Pillar IV, run by the European Union, is responsible for reconstruction,
trade and industry and public utilities.
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The SRSG is responsible to the Secretary-General, but must report to a Contact
Group of eight nations. In theater, a special supervisory mandate is given to the
QUINT Nations (the missions in Pristina, Kosovo of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, France, Italy, the United States and the United Kingdom). In 2002, when I
took over as COMKFOR, UNMIK had 16,000 personnel assigned to it and KFOR
32,000. In the period which followed, UNMIK was to slightly reduce its size, while I
received the task to reduce KFOR to 1 7,000 personnel by the end of2003. Other in-
terlocutors included the staffs of the international non-governmental organiza-
tions (400 non-Kosovars and 3000 Kosovars) and the police force composed of
5000 international police officers and 5000 indigenous personnel.
From the international humanitarian law point ofview, the NATO-led forces in
Kosovo should not have the status of occupation forces. Serbia signed an agree-
ment allowing the foreign military presence on its own territory. However, under
the requirement to use whatever means "to establish a secure environment" 13
KFOR could have acted as a "de facto" occupant rather than a force "allowed" to be
deployed there for a long time. This was prevented by the hurry the UN and NATO
political authorities were in to declare the situation safe and secure. It is also pecu-
liar that NATO and Serbia did not sign a status of forces agreement regarding
KFOR. Instead, the immunity granted to the forces is regulated by the Framework
for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo issued by UNMIK itself.
When I assumed command of the Kosovo Force in October 2002 (three years
after the war), I had the good fortune to be aware of most of my legal limitations
because I had served as Chief of Staff of Joint Forces Command Southern Europe
that had, during the previous two years, been responsible for all operations in the
Balkans. I was also fortunate in that exactly ten years earlier I led a mechanized bri-
gade in the very first phase ofan operation against organized crime in Sicily. At that
time, in the aftermath ofthe assassination oftwo magistrates, the local government
institutions were unable to cope with the distrust of the population and were not
effective in countering organized crime. The Italian Army undertook this opera-
tion with special police powers and deployed in Sicily for nine years before return-
ing full control of the region to civilian law enforcement. When I assumed
command ofKFOR, I thought I understood all of the difficulties related to the rela-
tionship with civil administration and law enforcement. I was also convinced that
NATO forces had "liberated" the Albanian population and that both the Albanians
and the Serbs were under control. During the previous three years there were no
incidents or deliberate attacks against KFOR and the official reporting always de-
picted some improvement.
On taking command, I was also immediately challenged by some unusual legal
aspects of my mandate. The first meeting scheduled after bidding farewell to my
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predecessor was with the Russian Representative at NATO who traveled from
Brussels to Pristina for the sole purpose of complaining about the exclusion of a
Russian liaison officer at some regular meetings with the Serbian Security Forces.
The second meeting was with my ChiefofStaffand the legal advisors to examine an
official complaint presented by Amnesty International in reference to the alleged
mistreatment of two Islamic diplomats by KFOR troops. The two diplomats had
been arrested with clear evidence of conducting illegal activities while allegedly
working for an Islamic NGO. I settled the dispute with the Russians in five min-
utes, but Amnesty International is not satisfied with the answer NATO provided
with regard to the two diplomats and that issue remains open.
I soon discovered that the national caveats (the guidance provided by the partic-
ipating countries with regard to their contingents), previously seen as "political
gadgets" the diplomats like to play with, were directly affecting the mission of the
contingents and limiting their rules ofengagement. Some ofthem were also posing
additional and unnecessary risks to our soldiers. For example, minimum use of
force was allowed only in case of direct attack or hostile intent. The meaning of di-
rect attack is clearly recognizable, but not so hostile intent. Generally speaking, the
national caveats were clear, understandable and justifiable. More problematic was
the interpretation of existing local law, the national law every soldier must respect,
and international law.
Any concerns that I had with potential legal matters and dealing with the differ-
ing national caveats were insignificant when compared to the overwhelming prac-
tical problems associated with carrying out KFOR's responsibilities.
In exercising its responsibility for ensuring a safe and secure environment in
Kosovo, KFOR had passed security tasks related to the protection of sensitive and
patrimonial sites, border control, and freedom ofmovement, to local police forces.
What I discovered after the first couple ofweeks was that the situation was far from
being safe and stable. The endless "successes" that contributed to the rosy picture
were exaggerations, when they were not plain lies. In most cases, when real suc-
cesses were reported, the following failures did not find their way into the reports.
Security was sufficient only regarding KFOR self-protection. The ethnic hatred
precipitating the war was still there and had worsened the situation ofthe minority,
the Serbian population of Kosovo. The Albanian majority was conducting a steady
"Albanization" of the province through blackmail, intimidation, assassination,
and attacks on Serbian citizens and property.
In addition, the reconstruction program was behind schedule with no prospects
of improvement. The final political status of Kosovo was not even being discussed.
The relationship with Belgrade was a disaster, with daily clashes and insults be-
tween the SRSG and a Deputy Prime Minister of Serbia. The transition ofpower to
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the provisional government was not implemented. The local Assembly was rioting
and the ministers wanted only more cars, cell phones and bodyguards. Notwith-
standing three rounds ofdemocratic elections, there was not a functioning govern-
ment. Politically motivated assassinations were a norm. Some extremists had
organized riots, demonstrations and the export of violence to southern Serbia and
northern FYROM.
Many of these security and governance issues stemmed from Kosovo's non-
functioning economy. Unemployment impacted 80% ofthe population, crime in-
fested every field of activity, the decentralization of powers to the municipalities
had not even started, energy infrastructure was under constant sabotage, the judi-
cial system was compromising with the thugs, the UN administration was thinking
more about political games than "administration," extremists had taken over the
control of legal parties and civil protection institutions, schoolteachers were on
strike, and the miners were claiming their jobs. Kosovo was importing every item
and not one single social system had been re-established. Energy production was
below the average requirements for domestic electricity use. No industries, mines,
or farms had been reactivated. The money poured into the province had already
tripled the initial estimate for the full reconstruction. The results of this huge in-
vestment (US $9 billion, without counting the military expenses) brought some
good news for housing and roads, but the rest was a disaster. Nobody knew where
$8 billion of the $9 billion had gone.
War criminals were free to walk the streets and the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), established by the Security Council to
prosecute those who had committed war crimes during the ethnic conflicts of the
1990s, was afraid to indict the Albanians that committed crimes against humanity.
The international police, composed of police officers coming from 80 countries,
was largely ineffective and under continuous threat. Some of them were com-
pletely unaware ofthe local legal system, or ofany kind of legal system for that mat-
ter. Corruption was widespread. The local police were not only ineffective but also
involved in crime through clan and family links. Many of these officers were so-
called "former freedom fighters" who believed this entitled them to claim certain
privileges, but did not impose upon them obligations to carry out their law en-
forcement responsibilities.
The entire system was biased by a diffuse blackmail: "Do not upset the Albanian
population. We liberated them." Kosovo not only was going nowhere; even worse,
there was a real risk that is would become a mafia State. The dangers were, in fact,
greater than they had been two years earlier. It was not more military and law en-
forcement forces that were needed, but a better and tougher use of a few forces
against extremism, terrorism, crime, corruption and inefficiency. The huge
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intelligence asset that existed in Kosovo was oriented towards the wrong threats.
These resources were focused on a supposed military threat from the Serbian Army
and completely overlooked and neglected the destabilizing power of the Albanian
former freedom fighters in the region and in Kosovo. It was clear that the only
threat to the safe and secure environment that KFOR was tasked to create and
maintain came from within Kosovo and not from outside.
It was also clear that dramatic change was required. Within a few months, we
started to arrest war criminals of any ethnicity indicted by the ICTY. Detention
powers were used in a very discrete way and cooperation was improved with a weak
judicial system that was relying on international and local judges. We started
downsizing and changing methods of operations, allowing more cooperation with
and support to the police, more participation in anti-crime operations, and in-
creased utilization of the Over the Horizon NATO-led reserve forces. We built a
comprehensive intelligence database and created a Joint Intelligence Operation
Center, which incorporated all possible sources and all the intelligence agencies
present in Kosovo. Within two months we were able to identify more than 5000
criminal links within the government, the political parties, the social institutions
and within the organization supposedly in charge of civil protection. Nevertheless,
it took our Joint Forces Commander (JFC) and the Strategic Commander six
months to "socialize" a new assessment of the situation with NATO political
authorities.
When the SRSG and I finally had the opportunity to present our views to the
North Atlantic Council the facts on the ground had already proven the accuracy of
our assessment. KFOR had arrested the first Albanians indicted by the ICTY while
two members of the Kosovo Protection Corps, the civilian emergency service
agency established by a 1999 UNMIK regulation, had just blown themselves up in a
terrorist attack against a railway bridge. Attacks against the police stations had in-
tensified, while we were able to disrupt a spring offensive in southern Serbia and
FYROM through the arrest and detention of prominent extremists and criminals.
Through cooperation with the judicial system, we were also able to put the detain-
ees under judicial control.
Unfortunately, as of the time this article is written, all these efforts now seem
useless. The fight in Kosovo is not over yet and inter-ethnic clashes erupted again
in March 2004. Recently, the SRSG, a former prime minister of Finland, a gentle-
man and a highly respected politician, resigned. His frustration with the lack of re-
sults and goodwill on the part of all concerned led to this harsh decision.




1. In the pre-war period when trust was placed in and help given to the wrong
persons and priority was given to the military campaign without integrating war
and post-war requirements;
2. In the war period when the so-called freedom fighters were allowed to assume
power with guns and perpetrate a sort of ethnic cleansing against the minorities;
and
3. In the post-war period when the power of extremists was consolidated
through illegal activities and "democratic elections." Furthermore, the UN admin-
istration was inefficient and plethoric; the international security forces were too in-
dulgent towards the extremists, allowing them to become de-stabilizers and even
criminal clans; and some nations and international organizations, still linked to the
pre-war mentality of the extremists as victims, continued to assist them after the
war by providing assistance and funding.
Conclusions
Because ofa misperceived sense of "democratic" division of responsibility, military
forces tend to be used as legitimate interpreters of the power of invasion, occupa-
tion and liberation only during combat operations. As soon as the fighting ends, or
is artificially declared over, civilian authorities, with no understanding ofthe situa-
tion, assume decision-making responsibility. By the time local civilian rule is estab-
lished and functioning, permanent damage has been done: pre-war structures have
been destroyed by the war or no longer function, and the new structures are biased
by compromise and corruption.
During planning in advance of an operation, it must be determined and made
clear who will direct the civil administration during the war and in its immediate
aftermath, to include the kind of social, economic and security system that will be
put in place, how the regional framework will be affected and what to do in order to
prevent destabilization.
In the last ten years we have tested the system to separate war from pre-war and
post-war. We have identified the actors responsible for each phase as separate enti-
ties. And we have proven that the system does not work! Pre-war is the realm of
politics and diplomacy, but the military could be used much more than as a tool of
diplomacy (coercive diplomacy). The military consequences must be dealt with in
this period by defining the potential risk for our forces and also the destabilizing ef-
fects of war on society.
War is the realm of the military, but political leadership has an important stake
in its execution. Particularly, political leaders must respect the priority of military
operations and ensure that each provides a political value that contributes to the
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resolution of the crisis. What has to be avoided is the use of operations as a substi-
tute for political action or to maintain ambiguity. Politicians cannot ask for short,
surgical operations and then keep them going for years. They cannot camouflage
war-like operations behind other names. Pre-war and war must be connected and
have a unified political-military-diplomatic control center. The time for reaction
during crises is becoming shorter and shorter not because threats are emerging
overnight, but because the international community is very slow in acquiring the
right intelligence, getting an honest and independent assessment, and then decid-
ing what to do without indulging in bureaucratic politics. With fewer and fewer
States maintaining standing armies, the preparation of the military instrument is
becoming more difficult. In the meantime, military strategy and concepts are
growing faster: the major risk of the pre-emptive war doctrine is that it requires
military operations even before diplomacy is ready or has clear ideas on what to do
afterwards. Early operations (pre-emptive) are at their extreme when anticipating
the war before the enemy is recognised or before the friendly forces are ready or be-
fore the objectives are set. During the war, any political request to end military op-
erations, or to pretend they have ended, before a reasonable level of security is
achieved has to be, if possible, contested.
During the last ten years the post-war phase has been the most dangerous and
unfruitful. Decision makers, both State and international, have applied the man-
agement model of divide et imperato to Bosnia and Afghanistan, and it is currently
under discussion for application in Kosovo and Iraq. The international commu-
nity has applied this Roman Empire rule in the most unhistorical way: it has been
applied indifferently to enemies within occupied territories, and, most impor-
tantly, it has been applied to us and to our allies. The Romans used to divide every-
thing that was too big and strong to handle as a whole, but they made sure they
were able to control the separate pieces. For each situation, they had a tool to con-
trol it: force, money, favors, or corruption. Every tool was legitimate. Instead of us-
ing a variety of mechanisms, today the international community focuses on
dividing entities without understanding it is losing any possibility of control. We
have also divided ourselves by not only breaking alliances in order to form coali-
tions, but by dividing the leadership and the tools to exercise power.
We have established a substantial separation between civilians and the military,
between the United Nations and national structures, between governmental and
non-governmental entities, between NATO and the United Nations, between
OSCE and the European Union, and so on. This separation has given birth to a
myriad of chains of command, reporting channels, priorities and differing assess-
ments. The results are that in all situations, from Somalia to Bosnia-Herzegovina,
to Kosovo, to East Timor, Afghanistan and Iraq, international forces are not
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controlling the situation. In fact, in the last ten years we have missed the main
point: the three phases of pre-war, war and post-war are not separate. Any attempt
to keep them separate is artificial and the gaps between them favor the destructive
forces, allowing them to infiltrate and destabilization to prevail.
Another missed point is that conflicts are never limited to the hot spots. The rea-
sons for crises are often very far from the time and space of the hotspot. We cannot
hope to control a crisis just by pouring troops and missiles on the hotspot. We need
to consider the regional balance and the international environment. We also have
to consider the kind of side effects that can be expected in the medium/long term,
and we must be prepared to cope with them. Nowadays, these side effects are rarely
of a nature that the military can control. They are related to the economy, political
balance, strategic resource management, social fields and, lastly, security.
The three phases of pre-war, war and post-war are connected by security. In
each phase there is a subtlety, a slightly different aspect of security, which remains
the prerequisite. In the pre-war period, security is mainly a stability problem.
There is something that threatens it. During combat operations, security is mainly
a primacy problem in order to gain control over destabilizing forces, including the
people for whom we fight. After the war, security is mainly a self-protection and
rule of law problem. Military forces have a prime role to play in every phase, but
they cannot act in isolation or be separated from politics, diplomacy, administra-
tion and reconstruction. Some type of war cabinet must assume control over the
crisis in the very early stages and provide oversight and direction, while respecting
the unity ofcommand. This war cabinet must also provide guidance on what to do
before, during and after actual combat operations. No vacuum of power can be
permitted, no transition can take place if the security requirements are not
achieved, and no transfer of power can be executed if the political and administra-
tive bodies are not ready to take responsibility. My suggestion is very simple,
maybe even simplistic. War cannot be rushed into before all solutions are explored
and attempts to peacefully solve the crisis are made. Politicians and diplomats
must refrain from rushing into war "hoping" that it will solve the problem or just
because "something has to be done."
In the pre-war phase, military forces have the vital role of preparing for war,
while emphasizing to the politicians and diplomats that waging war is not a pre-
ferred option. Military leaders have a duty to highlight all possible options and
their consequences, including the side effects on the economy, social system, re-
gional and global assets. Military forces have a duty to prepare for short, intense
operations that do not annihilate, and for a long, painful, uncertain and costly pe-
riod of insecurity. They have to focus on strengthening their powers of deterrence,
dissuasion, and "reassurance" more than their capability to destroy. Reassurance
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has a focal point in the military because it has to be credible and flexible, but it
comprises both economic aid and confidence building measures. The military
have to be prepared to participate in the temporary territorial administration of
foreign countries, under different cultural situations.
When operations begin, the military should use a reasonable excess of power to
secure major objectives and defeat the enemy forces. They have to "manage" the
excess of power and safeguard basic critical infrastructure needed for post-war op-
erations and reconstruction. After major operations have been completed, they
must be in control of those providing security and must guarantee the necessary
framework for rehabilitation. They must not hand over control to so-called local
police until security is re-established and stability ensured, until a judicial system is
effectively functioning, until freedom of movement is re-established and general-
ized violence is extinguished. In this phase, the military have to resist the desire to
declare their mission completed and depart, the wish ofthe politicians to claim vic-
tory and leave, the desire of the profiteers to transfer power to the civilian agencies
or to the local clans, and the wish of the local population to have the military forces
on the ground as a nice, money spending, non-interfering, gentle "close your eyes
and open your wallet" organization. The military also has the duty to build re-
gional security and therefore they have to engage all regional and international ac-
tors in projects that build regional or wider security. Security in this phase is not
only self-protection or the fight against extremists. Security and stability also entail
economic recovery, reconciliation, return of refugees, prosecution of war crimes,
maintenance oflaw and order, an effective judicial system, employment, resources
management, nation building and regional confidence. Security is also bringing
maturity and social development to the system: you are not free and safe ifyou are
hungry or humiliated.
Does accomplishing these things necessitate a long occupation under military
rule? A difficult and extended period of responsibility for law and order and jus-
tice? A significant share of responsibility over a long and painful period of recon-
struction? In some circumstances, perhaps. Until international law evolves and
becomes more relevant to current circumstances, occupation law must be consid-
ered not as an instrument of invasion or prevarication, but as the only tool avail-
able to clearly assume responsibility for and obligations towards the civilian
population. It is not the best tool we can ask for, but it is a rule of law that will not
mean an endless sequence of uncertainty, lack of control, civil-military separation,
instability, and deaths. It will not allow compromising with the thugs, becoming
guilty by association, and pouring indefinite, infinite and unaccountable resources
into a black hole and, consequently, supporting new failed States, rogue States,
non-States, quasi-States and mafia-States instead ofnew democratic entities. It will
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prevent spreading violence, destabilization, drugs and terror all over the world. It
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Old Laws for New Wars
William K. Lietzau*
Introduction
The President's exercise of his constitutional authority to direct the Secretary
ofDefense to detain enemy combatants and to convene military tribunals to
prosecute war crimes and other crimes triable by military commission 1 is both a
lawful and practical response to the ascendance of terrorism. Though unpredicted
by many, 2 and initially challenged as anachronistic, the exercise of jurisdiction by
military commissions comports both with domestic and international law and can
serve to advance the values that long have animated US national security strategy.
The apocalyptic effects of al Qaeda's attacks of September 11, 2001—the deaths
of thousands of innocent civilians and the immutable gash in the skyline of our
most populous city3—were pale harbingers of the significant changes to be
wrought across the international and domestic landscapes when the United States
initiated the Global War on Terrorism in response. That war, in turn, has intro-
duced legal challenges that perhaps represent the quintessential example of the en-
during impact of the attacks and the US response thereto. That the President
should instigate a metamorphosis of old law to address the unique challenges of
this new war was not surprising. History teaches that changes in the law are often
* Lieutenant Colonel, United States Marine Corps. The remarks contained herein are personal
reflections and do not necessarily represent the position of the US Marine Corps or the
Department of Defense.
Military Commissions: Old Lawsfor New Wars
significant consequences of war. So too, this war on terrorism has challenged and
continues to challenge the limits ofthe constitutive tenets that have defined our in-
ternational and domestic orders throughout the last halfof the 20th century. A fail-
ure to participate thoughtfully and deliberately in fashioning the legal norms that
are being developed—norms that will guide the global community for the next
century—would constitute a missed opportunity of substantial moment.
US post-9/11 counterterrorist activities, particularly in the legal realm, have
been the subject ofmuch criticism. The decision to use military commissions to try
alleged terrorists is a notable example. US efforts to cultivate those changes in ex-
tant law necessary to prosecute the war on terror frequently have appeared uncoor-
dinated and ill-composed in immediate application. But this awkwardness is most
accurately attributed to the fact that the progression in law required to deal with
terrorism highlights both the confluence of what might previously have been
viewed as disparate legal regimes—law enforcement and war—and the lacunae
that reveal themselves in our attempts to merge the boundaries of these separate
disciplines.
Paradigm Shift
To comprehend fully the issues raised by the decision to use military commissions,
one must first recognize the significant strategic and operational shift associated
with the 9/11 response. Historically, the strategy ofthe United States in responding
to terrorism was grounded solely in law enforcement.4 It was widely recognized
and accepted that the magnitude of the 9/11 attacks, coupled with their penetra-
tion of the American homeland, rose beyond mere criminal conduct, amounting
instead to an act of war. 5 The almost exclusive law enforcement responses to past
terrorist attacks would not suffice; the use of military force had become not only a
legitimate option, but also a necessity. The US Congress recognized the changed
nature of the terrorist threat when, on September 14th, it enacted a joint resolution
authorizing the President to use "all necessary and appropriate force against those
nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed,
or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, and harbored
such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international
terrorism against the United States."6
The military response to the events of September 1 1th marked the most signifi-
cant use of military force in response to terrorist acts to date—what had for years
been viewed and addressed as a criminal act now had started a war. This view was not
limited to domestic observers. The use ofmilitary force in Afghanistan in response to
9/1 1 was well received both internationally and domestically. 7 On September 12th,
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the Security Council passed a resolution expressly recognizing the right of the
United States to respond in self-defense. 8 Days later, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) took the unprecedented step of passing a resolution citing
Article 5 of the NATO Charter. 9 Separate resolutions of the ANZUS and Rio Pact
nations similarly condemned the 9/11 attacks as attacks on their respective collec-
tive memberships. 10
Though the need to respond to terrorism via the armed conflict model was
manifest—primarily as a preventive measure—it was undoubtedly attended by
punitive aspects traditionally associated with law enforcement concepts. Similarly,
in crafting the associated new legal paradigm, the United States incorporated ele-
ments of both law enforcement and warmaking. This was no mere academic
choice, but one required by the circumstances at hand. Oliver Wendell Holmes's
observation is appropriately recollected, "the life of the law has not been logic, but
experience." 11 We were and remain clearly at war, but the stated objective of that
war was and is, at least in part, to bring wrongdoers to justice. 12
In theory, an act subordinate to and lawfully consistent with the decision to en-
gage in armed conflict should enjoy support commensurate with that attending the
core decision itself. 13 But that has not been the case. 14 The armed conflict model for
addressing terrorism, most prominently embodied in Operation Enduring Free-
dom, 15 was accompanied by a number of subordinate actions that did not enjoy
such a sanguine reaction within the international community. Issues related to the
detention of alleged terrorists at Guantanamo Naval Base, Cuba, 16 and the pro-
posed plan for prosecuting alleged terrorists before military tribunals 17 are most
conspicuous among those that have been the object of international condemna-
tion. Yet, these decisions are a natural outgrowth ofthe paradigm shift from one of
law enforcement to one ofwar. Legally and logically, military tribunals are a natu-
ral extension of the President's authority as Commander-in-Chief of the armed
forces; they are not a function of the United States' judicial authority as is so often
claimed. 18 Domestic and international criticisms of the President's decisions have
been cloaked in sweeping allegations of illegality. The apprehension animating
those claims, however, is most frequently a misperception of an abuse of judicial
authority or misidentification of policy concerns generated by the imperfect
merger of the two relevant bodies of law. 19
Executive versus Judicial Authority
The first misperception is the most widespread and also the most easily defeated.
Much of this criticism is simply the natural consequence of continuing to address
discrete acts related to the war on terrorism as ifthey fell squarely and solely within
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the law enforcement arena. A response to terrorism framed solely in the law en-
forcement paradigm—particularly when the detention and trial of accused indi-
viduals is involved—invokes a body of law requiring significant procedural due
process and according a suspect or accused a plethora of substantive rights. In ad-
dition, the concept of trials by military commission invokes a feature of domestic
law that itself has been scrutinized substantially: procedures and rights attending
the criminal trials of accused persons in civilian courts have been the subject of ex-
tensive legislation, have been implemented in detail by the executive branch ofour
government, and continue to be the object of considerable judicial scrutiny during
the process.
Critical aspects of a wartime terrorist trial militate against using procedures and
rules of evidence akin to those employed in times of peace in civilian jurisdictions.
Criminal justice systems are not attuned to—nor could they be readily adjusted to
accommodate—unique aspects of the law of war such as the indefinite incarcera-
tion ofenemy combatants for the duration of hostilities. Processing an alleged ter-
rorist through the civilian court system would likely implicate speedy trial and pre-
trial detention review norms that could be completely unworkable during armed
conflict. An alleged terrorist detained for trial in the United States, for example,
would have the right to appear before a federal judge within forty-eight hours of
apprehension. At that juncture the judge would receive evidence to determine
whether there existed probable cause that the crime had been committed, that the
accused had committed it, and that pre-trial detention was necessary.20 But a na-
tion at war cannot be expected to pull military commanders from the battlefield to
present the necessary evidence for such a judicial determination.
War crimes investigators would likely be hamstrung by a civilian court's strict
rules of evidence. Such rules could prove counterproductive from both prosecu-
tion and defense perspectives. For example, it is far less likely that law enforcement
investigators will be able to secure evidence amounting to more than hearsay (in-
admissible in most US courts) or to document the chain ofcustody associated with
the warrantless seizure of evidence from a remote Afghan cave by a military unit
under fire. In civilian courts, these rules are often thought to operate to the detri-
ment of the government, but in a war crimes trial held outside the accused de-
tainee's country of residence, a rule favoring the admission of relevant evidence
without regard to hearsay or established chain of custody might greatly assist the
accused as well.
Another difficulty created by deferring to an extant peacetime criminal justice
system is that the circumstances and evidence associated with a war crimes trial or
trial for acts of transnational terrorism during an ongoing conflict are likely to re-
quire the production and disclosure of intelligence collection methods and
258
William K. Lietzau
sensitive intelligence products to a degree rarely, if ever, encountered during civil-
ian trials. The presentation of classified information in sensitive federal criminal
prosecutions, while not routine, is possible under the Classified Information Pro-
cedures Act of 1980. Those trials are not normally conducted during an armed
conflict, however, when the sensitivity of relevant intelligence information is at its
peak. It is reasonable to presume that the presentation of classified information
under seal and the requirement that defense attorneys submit to security clearance
background checks would affect each and every terrorism case, substantially in-
creasing the scope and volume ofprocedural safeguards required, escalating dramat-
ically the cost ofmounting such prosecutions, and contributing to extensive delay. 21
There also exist a number of civil rights and prophylactic judicial rules that
have no practical currency in a wartime prosecution regime. For example, a
Miranda-like rights advisement is unlikely to be part of the operational doctrine
of US ground troops when they take enemy combatants prisoner;22 and an
exclusionary rule in such instance would do nothing to further the rule of law or
civil liberties of cave-dwelling terrorists. Similarly, statements made by alleged
terrorists during initial interrogations are unlikely to have been preceded by a
rights advisement. Certainly we cannot intend for intelligence debriefers to ques-
tion only those detainees who have waived the right to silence and to consult a
lawyer. And if there is no extant right to a lawyer during the debrief, there is no
value in an exclusionary rule to guarantee compliance. These and like issues invoke
legitimate concerns that have been addressed incrementally over years of practice
in civilian courts.
Conversely, most actions associated with the conduct ofwar are governed by far
less developed legal frameworks—domestically, the President's executive author-
ity in the war-making arena and internationally, the law of armed conflict. It is in
those arenas to which the law ofwar does not speak that hiatuses in the nascent le-
gal paradigm associated with the Global War on Terrorism naturally reveal them-
selves. That these matters have been subject to heavy regulation in the law
enforcement field exacerbates perceptions that the law ofarmed conflict is inappli-
cable or insufficient. Critical sensibilities are understandably influenced by famil-
iarity with the criminal justice system. Those sensibilities yield negative visceral
reactions to war-related actions that are readily, but inappropriately, analogized to
law enforcement. 23
The problem is compounded further by the existence of parallels between the
areas in which war-related decisions may appear to correlate to actions normally
associated with the criminal justice system and criticisms of those very aspects of
the criminal justice system from another camp. Some argue that substantial defi-
ciencies mar our criminal law enforcement system—deficiencies associated with
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an overly charitable extension to criminal defendants ofdue process and other sub-
stantive rights. 24 The relatively flexible and unregulated norms associated with the
law of war may then be seized upon as affording a welcome opportunity to avoid
the overdeveloped procedures of federal criminal practice. The shadow of the OJ
Simpson trial and its sensationalized treatment in the press cast a pall over any
thought of a significant terrorist trial. This backdrop, coupled with the under-
standable need to protect classified intelligence in the national security trial of an
alleged terrorist, may cause some to fear a Republican-led governmental overreac-
tion to the prospect of a media-focused trial. They may also fear use of the intelli-
gence protection rationale as a subterfuge to hold secret proceedings that will
conceal a related erosion of civil liberties or trial-related human rights. 25 This per-
sistent undercurrent lends a patina of credibility to some who would question the
motives of those that elect to proceed within the law of war framework.
All things considered, past experience may prompt the conclusion that there ex-
ists no rubric under which terrorists can be held accountable for their crimes. What
some see as criminal justice deficiencies and others view as appropriate procedural
protections may in fact yield only systemic ineffectiveness when applied to the
problem of international terrorism. The standard "extradite or prosecute" model
simply has not worked, and to the extent it can be made to work in individual cases,
one may question our ability to prosecute any sizeable number of alleged terrorists
in the context of an expensive and over-laden US federal court system.26
Despite the contumely ofsome pundits, military commissions are not the novel
concoction of clever Bush Administration attorneys. Since before the birth of the
United States, "warriors have used such tribunals to determine the guilt or inno-
cence of their fellow warriors for violations of the law of war."27 The Supreme
Court has consistently upheld as constitutional the trials ofbelligerents by military
commission. 28 In establishing military commissions, the President has sought to
navigate adeptly the confluence oflaw enforcement and the law of armed conflict,
and at the same time to fill gaps in our legal landscape in a principled way that fur-
thers the interests of the rule of law.
In addition to being well-grounded legally, the military commission decision
is logically sound as well. President Bush's use of the military instrument in-
volved a prolonged, deliberate, "boots on the ground" operation with the objec-
tive of killing or capturing terrorists and destroying their networks. To then shift
to a law-enforcement paradigm after capture might appease certain human rights
activists in the short-term, but it would create a perverse dynamic on the battlefield
that could undermine the most fundamental tenets ofthe law ofwar. By further ex-
tending the use ofthe military instrument in authorizing the use ofcommissions to
try enemy combatants, President Bush eliminated that potentially absurd dilemma
260
William K. Lietzau
for the US soldier on the battlefield—whether to capture or kill an enemy who
clearly will continue to pose a threat to the United States, and who, in this case,
maintains no affiliation with a parent organization that, in more conventional cir-
cumstances, could direct surrender. 29
Enforcing the Law of War: Military Commissions versus Courts-martial
Almost 50 years ago, Israeli Ambassador to the United States Abba Eban described
international law as the law "the wicked do not obey and the righteous do not en-
force."30 For years, the international law of armed conflict has lacked an enforce-
ment mechanism. 31 The President's Military Order of November 2001 created a
framework for military commissions and set in motion a process to fill this void in
the enforcement of the laws and customs ofwar. 32 Conversely, cynics view the Or-
der and the commissions it establishes as an attempt to circumvent normal crimi-
nal procedures—a kangaroo court that eschews burdensome due process
requirements, providing a mechanism to bring alleged terrorists to justice in a
fashion that favors efficiency over human rights and civil liberties. 33 These con-
cerns are partly a consequence of the changed circumstances associated with ter-
rorism. More simply, however, they reflect that the President's chosen path
regarding the prosecution of alleged terrorists—by military tribunal—has not
been traveled in decades and improvements to that path, although identified as
necessary years ago, have not yet been implemented.
After defining persons subject to the President's Military Order (terrorists and
those who aid and abet them if designated as such by the President), 34 the Order
clarifies that such persons will be held by the Department of Defense and, if tried,
tried by military commission as opposed to some other forum. 35 Lawyers, human
rights groups, and foreign capitals criticized the Order for derogating so substan-
tively and substantially from relevant due process guarantees—regardless of the
war/law enforcement paradigm shift. 36 Critics were somewhat quieted by the Sec-
retary of Defense's implementing order issued four months later,37 but subsequent
steps in the direction of trial, such as the publication of additional implementing in-
structions restoked the anti-commission fires. 38 In the almost three years subsequent
to promulgation of the Order, only eleven individuals have been designated as sub-
ject to its jurisdiction; two ofthese were subsequently transferred to the United King-
dom, their country of citizenship, and released. Although truncated preliminary
hearings have been held in several cases, no trial has yet proceeded to the presenta-
tion of evidence on the merits.39
Delays and difficulties notwithstanding, however, we simply cannot avoid the
mandate to conduct trials. Every United States president who has faced terrorism has
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spoken of bringing its perpetrators to justice.40 Moreover, international crime is
clearly a growth industry, and its law enforcement complement has not kept pace.
It is useful to note that historically, military commissions have been viewed as a
means of injecting a civilized, judicial component into an otherwise uncivilized
chaotic world where killing is authorized and the fog of war often obscures the
moorings of civilization. This military authority41 has been used previously in three
different roles: 1) to try individuals who violate the laws of war; 2) to administer
justice in an occupied territory; and 3) to serve as a general court in an area where
martial law has been declared and the civil courts are closed.42 With respect to the
Global War on Terrorism, we are primarily dealing with the first category of con-
flict-related offenses, but the likelihood that commissions may be needed in the fu-
ture under other circumstances may play into the analysis of whether their
establishment is a worthwhile endeavor.43
From a domestic perspective, the authority to convene military commissions
derives from the President's Article II Commander-in-Chief powers.44 As Justice
Douglas noted, the executive's power "is vastly greater than that ofany troop com-
mander. He not only has full power to repel and defeat the enemy; he has the power
to occupy the conquered country and to punish those enemies who violated the
law of war."45 Congress has also explicitly acknowledged the President's preexist-
ing authority in this regard. A pertinent provision of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ) provides, "The provisions of this chapter ... do not deprive mili-
tary commissions ... of concurrent jurisdiction with respect to offenders or of-
fenses that by statute or the law ofwar may be tried by military commissions
"46
A subsequent provision ofthe UCMJ authorizes the President to adopt regulations
for military commissions.47 Further, in subsequent related legislation, Congress
appears to have taken great pains to ensure continued recognition of the Presi-
dent's authority with respect to military commissions.48 A common cry among
uniformed judge advocates, many of whom have spent years defending the mili-
tary justice system from claims that it is inferior to civilian courts in protecting the
rights of the accused,49 is that military commissions are no longer necessary be-
cause courts-martial now have jurisdiction over the same set of offenses triable by
military commission. 50 Therefore, the argument goes, we now should use the
UCMJ as a guide because it contemplated, or should have, wartime exigencies. At
the outset, we should recognize that the extension of jurisdiction over law of war
violations in the latest rendition ofthe UCMJ is not as revolutionary as some might
think. In enacting the current version of the UCMJ, first introduced in 1950, 51
Congress made a conscious decision to continue including the identical language
found in a 1928 version of a Manual for Courts-Martial,52 which clarified that the
Articles of War did not "deprive military commissions ... or other military
262
William K. Lietzau
tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction with respect to offenders or offenses that by
statute or by the law ofwar may be tried by military commissions ... or other mili-
tary tribunals."53 The 1950 Manual for Courts-Martial also extended that jurisdic-
tion to general courts-martial—but only to the extent that military commissions
already possessed such jurisdiction as a matter of custom. 54 Since adoption of the
UCMJ, no war crime has ever been successfully tried by court-martial. 55 In fact,
during the well-documented trial of Lieutenant William Calley on charges of pre-
meditated murder related to the My Lai massacre, an appellate court noted in a
footnote that there had been some consideration given to trying another alleged
perpetrator for war crimes, "by military commission. . . ." 56
Lack of historical use aside, the real weakness in the argument for the use of
courts-martial to try terrorists—or war crimes in a more general sense—is that
the UCMJ's evolution over the years has weakened its utility in this regard. Since
the end of the Second World War, the UCMJ has been continuously modified,
not to account for expanded jurisdiction involving violations of the law of war,
but in response to perceived due process deficiencies in the forum—the possibil-
ity of trials inadequately sensitive to defendant rights that prevailed during Word
War II and the years immediately thereafter. The response has been to make
courts-martial look very much like federal district courts. 57
What has never been addressed in the court-martial system is the ability to try
war criminals for violations of the law and customs of war. While elements of
crimes have been the subject of extensive drafting and judicial interpretation for all
of the offenses specified in the UCMJ, the Manual for Courts-Martial has made no
attempt whatsoever to define violations ofthe laws ofwar. Similarly, court-martial
procedures fail to contemplate the trial ofany defendant who is not a service mem-
ber; the UCMJ establishes no appellate process for a convicted war criminal and the
Manual for Courts-Martial makes no attempt to modify procedures for the non-
service member accused. Public perception to the contrary, courts-martial are un-
likely to be a panacea for the problems associated with trying terrorists.
Substantive Due Process
In March of 2002, the Secretary of Defense issued basic rules for the conduct of
military commission trials. These rules were the subject of subsequent elaboration
in a series of"Military Commission Instructions." 58 In keeping with the President's
Military Order, these rules mandated a "full and fair trial" 59 purportedly designed
to strike an appropriate balance—a balance that, on the one hand, recognizes the
exigencies associated with warfare, and, on the other hand, demonstrates faithful
adherence to the principles of fairness and due process that animate our domestic
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criminal jurisprudence.60 What the rules did not do is replicate the level of detail or
procedural due process found in other more developed criminal justice systems.
For this, the rules have been vociferously criticized. 61
Anticipating the need for greater evidentiary flexibility, the military commis-
sion rules promulgated by the Department of Defense leave many procedural and
evidentiary determinations in the hands ofthe triers of fact.62 This same policy ani-
mates the International Criminal Court's rules ofprocedure and those of the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.63 Though
similar in nature to the concept of military commissions, they operate under dif-
ferent conditions (e.g., post-hostility), and are hampered by the unique idiosyn-
crasies of their respective international processes. Because the tribunals used to
prosecute 9/11 terrorists will play such an important role in defining available legal
structures for the future, it is imperative that we identify and attach essential due
process elements to the tribunal's conduct, but do so in a way that accounts for
their unique mission.
Military commissions afford defendants several important protections that ad-
here faithfully to immutable principles of fairness and due process that animate
our domestic criminal jurisprudence—protections such as the presumption of in-
nocence, the ability to confront witnesses, and a standard of proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. 64 They also explicitly make available to the government tools such
as closed trials, intelligence shielding protective measures, and relaxed rules ofpro-
cedure and evidence—tools that recognize the national security-related difficulties
associated with war-time prosecutions, e.g., that evidence seized on the battlefield
is unlikely to carry with it a chain ofcustody or a judicially approved warrant neces-
sary to satisfy the reticulated requirements ofjudicial trials; that flexibility is required
to bring criminals to justice while concurrently accommodating the prosecution of a
war; and that war is attended by concomitant operational security concerns and the
imperative to protect intelligence information, methods and sources.65 The rules af-
fect an appropriate balance with a view to providing justice in the context of a war
against terrorism. Whether the balance may be off is open for debate—but it is a bal-
ance that, at present, no other forum has attempted to strike.
Compliance with the Law ofWar
Another common criticism of military commissions is that, admitting the applica-
bility of the law ofwar and the propriety of using military commissions in general,
the incarceration and intended trial of enemy combatants simply violates the law
of war. Here we must look at the law of war itself, and the applicability of various
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provisions. In most cases, specific accusations of noncompliance are based on an
inappropriate application of particular tenets.
Given the eminence of the Geneva Conventions,67 one might think that simply
abiding by their terms—regardless of applicability as a technical matter—is most
consistent with a commitment to the rule of law. Indeed, US military policy ex-
pressed in a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction mandates
"compliance] with the law of war during all armed conflicts, however such con-
flicts are characterized."68 The language regarding conflict characterization refers
to the traditional parsing of international and internal armed conflicts. While
most of the provisions of the Geneva Conventions are applicable to only interna-
tional armed conflicts, military policy is to apply those provisions even if the con-
flict is "not of an international character." One could reason, then, that the
characterization ofthe war on terrorism should not impact US policy as it pertains
to the handling of captured enemy combatants or any other matter. The problem
is that complying with a body of law and applying its provisions are two very dif-
ferent endeavors. While a legal regime might be applicable, a particular provision
may not apply.
By way of analogy, one might elect to comply with safe driving standards re-
gardless of whether the jurisdiction in which one drives effectively applies or en-
forces those standards. Self-imposed compliance does not mandate continuing to
drive 45 miles per hour when the speed limit goes up to 65—even though the lower
limit is arguably safer; applicable standards may change. Viscerally, failing to ac-
cord prisoner ofwar status to enemy combatants is, to some, a decision not to drive
safely. To others, it is a simple recognition of changed circumstances. Many cus-
tomary provisions of the law ofarmed conflict are appropriately rendered applica-
ble as a matter of policy;69 others, however, are dependent on circumstance.
Note that this relationship to circumstance could be a matter of either permis-
sion or prescription/proscription. Absent a required minimum, the authorization
to drive 65 miles per hour does not preclude one's decision to drive slower. If the
particular safety norm at issue involved, for example, on which side of the road one
was to drive, the changed circumstance would require adjustment or head-on colli-
sions would inevitably result. The pertinent provisions of Geneva Convention
(III), which pertains to prisoners of war, detail specific requisite circumstances for
applicability—demonstrating that the rights and regulations associated with pris-
oner ofwar status were not intended to be reflexively applied in all circumstances.
Like the speed limit, however, they are clearly permissive in nature with respect to
denial of prisoner of war status.
Nevertheless, the concern that the Global War on Terrorism has identified a sig-
nificantly sized group that appears to fall largely outside the particularized
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protections ofvarious Geneva Conventions and Protocols70 may indeed be a legiti-
mate concern militating in favor of developing new international norms. A discus-
sion is appropriate, but that discussion should be based on the common
understanding that seizing on the legal regime associated with law enforcement as
the basis for criticizing the treatment ofcaptured enemy combatants is a misguided
application of law by analogy. 71 In addition, useful dialogue can occur only subse-
quent to recognition of the legitimate, but differing perspectives on the current
state of the law ofarmed conflict. We benefit from the insights of Paul Grossreider,
the former Director General of the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC), who in the days following September 1 1th asserted, "with the September
1 1 terrorist attacks, the nature of war is changing. . . . With al Qaeda, we face an
emerging new type of belligerent, . . . transnational networks. To cope with this
change, [the international law ofarmed conflict] must adapt itself for fear of being
marginalized." 72
Nowhere does Geneva Convention (III) preclude, or even discourage, trials by
military commission. Indeed, Article 84 reflects a preference for "military courts"
as that term was broadly understood in 1949. 73 As opposed to mandating a particu-
lar procedure or forum, Geneva Convention (III) requires certain minimum stan-
dards of fairness in the forum choice elected. For example, the prosecution of
prisoners of war must include "essential guarantees of independence and impar-
tiality as [are] generally recognized." 74 The Conventions identify as a grave breach
"willfully depriving a protected person of the rights of a fair and regular trial pre-
scribed in the applicable convention." 75 It is unimaginable that any judicial system
established by the United States would not meet these minimum requirements. So
long as any particular military commission meets those broad fairness require-
ments, it would appear that even prisoners ofwar might be tried in such a forum. 76
A more specifically applicable standard has been established since the 1949
Conventions, however, that provides greater detail regarding minimum trial stan-
dards. Article 75 ofAdditional Protocol I defines that article's applicability as being
to, "persons who are in the power of a Party to the conflict and who do not benefit
from more favourable treatment under the Conventions or under this Proto-
col. . . ,"
77
It then provides, among other things, a moderately extensive list of trial
rights that represent a minimum standard for the due administration of justice. 78
Although the United States is not party to Additional Protocol I, many have
opined that we should accept certain of its provisions, including Article 75, as re-
flective of customary international law. 79 The United States' military commission
rules appear to comply with all requirements of Article 75. Perhaps the only
colorable claim that military commissions, as contemplated, are noncompliant
with the general normative due process standards enumerated in the Geneva
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Conventions is found in the "independence" requirement set forth in Article 84
of the Third Convention. 80 The standard for independence is that which is "gen-
erally recognized." 81 Some may interpret the "independent" requirement as pre-
cluding a military commission's utilization of a trier of fact or lawyer who is
subordinate to the military chain of command. 82 Such a reading, however, would
be inconsistent with State practice since the 1949 Conventions were negotiated.
Military tribunals have always involved military triers of fact, and there is no evi-
dence in the Geneva negotiating records suggesting that anything to the contrary
was intended. 83 Certainly, any such proposition should be forcefully rejected.
The bottom line when assessing the substantive due process accorded accused
terrorists to be tried by military commission is that there is no reason to anticipate
any derogation from fundamental fairness guarantees normally accorded to crimi-
nal defendants. The President's Military Order and the Secretary of Defense's rules
require commissions to provide a "full and fair" trial. Even if there were no other
protections provided by the rules or applicable instructions, military officers con-
stituting a military commission should be expected to follow orders in providing a
full and fair trial. The absence of particular rules, thus permitting pundits to iden-
tify potential abuses that could occur is hardly fodder for a substantial criticism,
though it is likely a natural consequence ofthe slow and deliberate means by which
trials have proceeded. At this juncture, criticism of military commission proce-
dures amounts to nothing more than an attack on worst case hypotheticals.
Nondiscrimination Principle
Another principle ofhumanitarian law ofpotentially even greater impact on future
terrorist trials is that which appears to require nondiscrimination in judicial pro-
ceedings applied to prisoners of war and members of the armed forces of the de-
taining power. 84 To date, the United States has made no statement regarding its
interpretation of the principle's relevance to the trials of alleged terrorists. The
most extreme textual articulation related to this norm is found in Article 102 of
Geneva Convention (III), which states:
A prisoner ofwar can be validly sentenced only ifthe sentence has been pronounced by
the same courts according to the same procedure as in the case of members of the
armed forces of the Detaining Power, and if, furthermore, the provisions ofthe present
Chapter have been observed.85
While arguably not directly relevant to trials currently contemplated (ifonly be-
cause the defendants are not entitled to the protections associated with prisoner of
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war status),86 other potential military commission trials—such as those deriving
from the conflict in Iraq—may involve persons who do meet Geneva Convention
(III) criteria for prisoner ofwar status. 87 Moreover, the norms are worth noting be-
cause they envisage circumstances similar to those found in the law of war para-
digm for trials. And as a matter of policy, the United States has agreed to apply the
principles of the Geneva Conventions to the extent practicable. 88
Some would read the language of Article 102 as precluding the use of military
tribunals were they not also employed to try US troops. Given that no US citizen
may be subject to the President's Military Order or to trial by military commission,
the principle of nondiscrimination would appear to bar the use of military com-
missions to try prisoners of war. 89
The language of Article 102 is ambiguous in several important respects, how-
ever. Probing these ambiguities renders premature and overly simplistic the un-
questioning acceptance that Article 102 bars absolutely the use of military
commissions—even with respect to the trial of prisoners of war protected by
Geneva Convention (III). In particular, it is unclear whether Article 102 applies
only to post-capture offenses, or whether it may apply to pre-capture offenses as
well.90 Second, the language fails to clarify the meaning of either "same courts" or
"same procedure."91
The language ofArticle 102 was carried over from Article 63 of the 1929 Geneva
Convention.92 In the famous post-World War II war crimes trial, In re Yamashita}
that language was interpreted by the US Supreme Court to apply only to post-
capture offenses committed by an individual who already was a prisoner of war.93
While drafters of the 1949 Conventions clearly intended to provide procedural
protections for those accused ofpre-capture offenses, it is not clear that Article 102
was the intended vehicle for those protections. Nothing in the minor verbiage ad-
justments of the 1949 Convention appears to affect this original intended applica-
bility (and terrorism-related trials are likely to involve only pre-capture offenses).
Yet, Geneva Convention (III) not only retained the 1929 language that ultimately
became Article 102, it added a new provision—Article 85—with no parallel in the
1929 Convention. 94 Some view the combination ofArticles 102 and 85 as eviscerat-
ing the Yamashita limitation and requiring that the courts and the procedure uti-
lized be the same for prisoners of war as for the armed forces of the detaining
power—even with regard to pre-capture offenses. 95 Reasoning that the detaining
power's procedures should apply when the detaining power's substantive law is in
play appeals to both logic and fairness. But the claim that future war crimes trials
must exactly mirror courts-martial should not be viewed as dispositive ofthe current
state of the law, particularly given that the text of the 1949 Conventions reflects a
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variety of competing interests.96 And a closer review of Article 85 reveals a more fo-
cused orientation toward post-conviction treatment than to trial rights per se.97
Additionally, a narrower read of Article 102 as requiring nondiscrimination
only in the prosecution of post-capture offenses is consistent with the underlying
theory of prisoner ofwar "assimilation" in the armed force of the detaining power;
that is, once captured, a prisoner of war must obey the rules and regulations that
apply to the armed forces ofthe detaining power.98 Such assimilation has no appli-
cation when the issue is pre-capture, that is, pre-assimilation crimes.99
Setting aside for a moment the colorable argument that Article 102 does not ap-
ply to pre-capture offenses such as those for which terrorists would be prosecuted,
the question persists as to the meaning of "same courts" and "same procedure."
"Same" may be read to mean: what is jurisdictionally available, what has been used
historically, what would likely be used in the future, or some other criteria. Indeed,
no US court has considered the meaning of this term in this context. Although the
"same courts" language may have a straightforward meaning and application when
applied to a detaining power that prosecutes its service members in only one fo-
rum, it is not so straightforward in the case of the United States. Given that the
United States may prosecute members of the armed forces in any number of fora,
including Article III courts, courts-martial, and military commissions, there are
different aspects of "sameness" that may apply.
Article 102 may be read to require only that prisoners ofwar must be sentenced
by any of the same courts that may have jurisdiction over a US service member. 100
Because jurisdiction can be determined without regard to subjective intent, the
greatest degree of clarity and precision inhabits this interpretation. Another read-
ing of Article 102 is that it requires prisoners of war to be sentenced by the same
courts that have historically sentenced US service members. This approach would
look beyond bare jurisdiction to determine what courts and procedures have been
"typically" used and require that prisoners of war be subject to trial by the same
courts and under the same procedures as past trials of US service members. This
analysis illuminates another potential problem, however. While recent history
would militate in favor ofthe court-martial forum for standard military or civilian
offenses, such would not be the case for violations ofthe international law ofarmed
conflict. In fact, law of war violations by service members have only been prose-
cuted, as such, by military commission. 101
Finally, another possible reading is that the cases to which prisoner ofwar pros-
ecutions should be compared are those hypothetical cases that could arise from the
same area or same conflict. Thus, to the extent that the executive evidences intent
to prosecute its service members in a particular manner in a particular conflict,
prisoners ofwar from that same conflict should be subject to those same courts and
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same procedures. The current widespread exercise of court-martial jurisdiction in
contradistinction to historic uses of military commissions for war crimes warrants
some consideration of this possibility. 102
The above discussion of the last two possibilities posed begs the question of
what crime would apply for purposes of conducting the analysis. 103 Certainly the
type of offense must play some role. IfUS soldiers most frequently find themselves
in traffic court to deal with moving violations, does that mean that traffic court is
an appropriate forum for war crimes committed by prisoners of war? If we limit
our review in this regard only to violations of the law of war, we are left either with
the conclusion that violations of the law of war must be tried by military commis-
sions or a determination that future war crimes will be tried by courts-martial. 104
The idea that any "same courts" and "same procedure" procedure analysis must
assume that the crime charged is the same as well is also consistent with the other
relevant provisions in Geneva Convention (III). 105 Assuming this to be the case,
note that Article III courts, courts-martial, and military commissions, each have
certain jurisdictional authority to prosecute war crimes.
Article III courts probably have the narrowest range of authority with respect to
law of war violations, 106 although recent developments with respect to the "mate-
rial support to terrorism" charge may give them equal or better coverage over sub-
stantive conduct of terrorism. 107 Only specified war crimes are chargeable under
the War Crimes Act, including crimes identified as "grave breaches" under the
Geneva Convention. 108 Subject matter jurisdiction extends to aliens (including
prisoners of war) only if the victim of the war crime is a member of the US armed
forces or a national of the United States. 109 The Act also authorizes prosecution of
US service members irrespective of the status of the victim. 110
Were prisoners ofwar to be prosecuted in Article III courts, a pure jurisdictional
understanding of "sameness" would support an argument that the requirements
of Article 102 had been met. That is, because US service members may be tried for
enumerated violations of the laws ofwar in Article III courts, prisoners ofwar also
maybe. Historically, though, US service members have not been tried in Article III
courts for violations of the laws of war or even for crimes that could have been
charged as such.
As previously mentioned, prisoners of war are subject to trial by courts-martial
for violations of the UCMJ committed after establishing prisoner of war status. 111
Additionally, 1 U.S.C. § 8 1 8 appears to establish jurisdiction over a broader group
ofpersons triable under the law ofwar. 112 This could include jurisdiction over pris-
oners of war during the period of time preceding their attainment of prisoner of
war status. 113 The claim that Article 102's nondiscrimination requirement had
been satisfied then could be grounded in jurisdiction or perhaps historical use.
270
William K. Lietzau
Historical use, however, would cut in different directions. On the one hand, al-
though courts-martial have jurisdiction to try violators of the laws of war, they
have not been employed for that purpose since the UCMJ was enacted. On the
other hand, the United States has sent US service members to courts-martial for
crimes that could have been charged as war crimes. 114
Nevertheless, there are other complications attending the court-martial route
worth noting. Because courts-martial have been designed with an emphasis on
prosecution of US service members, certain adjustments to the procedures would
have to be effected to permit the process to function properly in the trial of a pris-
oner ofwar. From a practical perspective, procedures such as rules for membership
on panels 115 and the conduct of pretrial confinement reviews 116 would require
modification to fit the unique circumstances attending prisoners of war. More-
over, one might argue that given the Calley precedent of charging what could be a
war crime as an enumerated offense under the UCMJ, one could not claim that
prosecution of a prisoner ofwar was proceeding under the "same procedures." For
example, for the same factual offense, a US service member would be charged with
murder (subject to the elements of that charge as well as the sentence limitations)
while a prisoner ofwar would be charged with a law ofwar violation (with no enu-
merated elements or sentence limitations). Thus, although the court-martial may
at first seem a comfortable fit with the requirements ofArticle 102, a closer look re-
veals a more complicated and potentially problematic relationship. 117
Finally, assessing military commissions from an Article 102 perspective, we find
they easily fit a jurisdictional method of analysis. Past precedent makes clear that
military commissions may be used to try US citizens. Y 18 As one court held, "citizens
and non-citizens alike—whether or not members of the military, or under its di-
rection and control, maybe subject to the jurisdiction of a military commission for
violations of the law ofwar." 119 Thus, trial of prisoners ofwar by military commis-
sion would be by one of the same courts that has jurisdiction over a US service
member for a similar crime. From a historical use perspective, military commis-
sions have been convened against US service members, 120 indeed, even against
"camp-followers and other civilians employed by the government in connection
with the army." 121 On the other hand, no military commissions have been con-
vened since the period immediately following World War II.
One adjustment to the current state of affairs could improve the perception that
the trial of prisoners of war by military commission comports with the nondis-
crimination principle; that would be to modify the President's Military Order es-
tablishing commissions so as not to exclude US citizens from its jurisdiction. Of
course, an even stronger argument that the military commission forum complies
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with the requirement of nondiscrimination could be made if US service members
actually were brought before such tribunals. 122
In fact, were it not for the wartime setting, it would appear that neither courts-
martial nor military commissions would have sufficient jurisdiction to address ap-
propriate offenses. 123 It is only when terrorist conduct amounts to an act of war
that military commission or expanded court-martial jurisdiction engages. 124 Thus,
the concept of military commissions languished in desuetude during the last 50
years. This, in turn, explains why the parameters of the governing substantive law
were not addressed during the same period. As has always been the case, develop-
ment of the law of war comes after changes to war itself.
Conclusion
So what is the best way to bring terrorists to justice? Certainly that question existed
prior to September 11, 2001, but the collapse of New York's tallest buildings im-
posed on us, as Americans, and as citizens of the world, a mandate to find an an-
swer. Today, almost three years later, we have moved toward an answer, but there
remains much work yet to be done. Our challenge is to answer that question delib-
erately. As the United States proceeds with military commission trials of alleged
terrorists, history will be written. As in the aftermath of World War II and
Nuremberg, we are in the process of establishing a future world order. September
1 1, 2001 stands out conspicuously as a historic inflection point, but the long-term
impact of that day ultimately may prove to be the new legal paradigms established
in its wake.
The manner and tempo at which legal transformation takes place is important
to preserving and improving international cooperation. Many US allies evinced
discontent early in observing the shift from addressing terrorism solely as a law en-
forcement matter. The best United States response will be in making a point of
consciously influencing appropriate and useful changes to the law of war. The law
needs to adapt and adjust, and we are in the best position both to identify that need
and to lead the way in satisfying it. It has always been both "our national interest"
and "in our national interest" to establish the rule oflaw domestically and interna-
tionally. And the United States today has an unprecedented opportunity to estab-
lish an international order based on the rule oflaw. The war on terrorism should be
pursued to victory, but it should also be pursued in such a way as to develop the law
most effectively.
It is too easy to simply criticize something that represents change—and that is
the case with most criticism of military commissions. Over the past several years,
the United States Government has faced the challenge of attempting to apply the
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existing laws of war to the Global War on Terrorism. That application may not
please everyone, but neither does it deserve the condemnation associated with
claims of denigrating the rule of law. As in the aftermath of past conflicts, interna-
tional law has moved forward by effectively establishing a pattern of State practice
that eventually may be adopted as customary law or codified by convention. That
process is at work today.
Ifthere is one legitimate criticism ofthe US decision to initiate military commis-
sions, it is the failure to explain adequately its legal reasoning to reluctant allies. A
key component to any planned evolution of existing law through a consistent State
practice is the public articulation of the norm, values, and principles guiding that
practice. State practice is almost meaningless if a deontologically acceptable expla-
nation does not accompany its execution. 125 Our State practice, without explana-
tion, amounts to nothing more than fuel for criticism based on inconsistency or
ignorance. In this regard, enough cannot be said about the importance of clearly
engaging and communicating with the international community. To shape the law
intentionally, we must communicate why certain decisions are consistent with the
rule of law as we see it, and, if change is needed, our intent—both to effectuate the
change itself, and to maximize our standing to do so.
Alone, neither the law governing domestic criminal enforcement nor that gov-
erning war is well situated to address the ascendance of terrorism. The work of the
future is to adjust or perhaps merge these paradigms in a way that contemplates the
future. Military commissions are as good a potential component to such a future
legal regime as any. They represent both a well-founded precedent from the past,
and a forward-looking change for the future. The task before us is not to reject pre-
cedent, but rather to build on the foundation of existing law—national security
law, criminal law, and the law ofarmed conflict—as we seek to apply their relevant
tenets, justly, to the challenges of the war on terrorism. We can expect that such
change will be accompanied by a bit of anguish and perhaps a few missteps, but we
must not be dissuaded by the fact that change never comes easily.
The law ofwar has been written primarily in the aftermath of crisis—crafted to
address the concerns of past conflicts—with the hope of providing relevant guid-
ance for those ofthe future. That hope having seen its limitations as applied to our
current conflict, the law of war must be retooled to address the changed circum-
stances of the war on terrorism. A commander with whom I once had the privilege
of serving was fond of saying, "ifyou want a new idea, go read an old book—it's all
been done before." In military commissions, as reshaped to fit a unique and un-
foreseen adversary, we have something that is both old and new. In this same vein,
we do well to recall the paradoxical words of Alexander Bickel who, praising the
heroes among common law judges, characterized them as those who "imagined
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the past and remembered the future." 126 The United States, in using military com-
missions to try terrorists, is shaping the law imparted by the past, all the while
seeking to make it relevant, not just for today, but for tomorrow.
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terrorist threat also have reflected a predisposition to law enforcement. The United States
responded to the Khobar Towers attack both by launching a law enforcement investigation and
by commencing an international initiative that ultimately resulted in the negotiation and entry
into force of the Terrorist Bombing Convention. International Convention for the Suppression
of Terrorist Bombings, Jan. 12, 1998, 37 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 249. We attempted
to shore up weaknesses in the law enforcement model through treaties establishing a regime of
aut dedere aut punire (extradite or prosecute) for terrorism offenses; id., art. 8 (providing that
States, in whose territory a person is present who has committed or is alleged to have committed
an offense under the Convention, agree to investigate his involvement in the offense, and, if
appropriate, take such person into custody for the purpose of prosecution or extradition. If a
Party does not extradite the person, it is obliged, without exception whatsoever, to prosecute
him.). Another example of this general emphasis is the Terrorist Financing Convention.
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism art. 10(1), Jan. 10,
2000, 39 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 270 [hereinafter Terrorist Financing Convention].
5. See Dick Polman, "War" is Now More than a Metaphor; Deadly Terror Attacks—and the
Promised U.S. Response—Make a Long Overused Word Mean Just What It Says, PHILADELPHIA
INQUIRER, Sept. 13, 2001, at A5; Katherine M. Skiba, Terror Hits Were "Acts of War,"
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, Sept. 13, 2001, at 1A.
6. Joint Senate Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces Against Those
Responsible for the Recent Attacks Launched Against the United States, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115
Stat. 224(2001).
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7. The international community readily embraced the right of the United States to respond with
armed force. See, e.g., David Clark, Terror in America: Mr. Blair Must Be Prepared to Stand Up to
President Bush, INDEPENDENT (LONDON), Sept. 14, 2001, at 4 (noting that "[c]lear evidence that
Usama Bin Laden orchestrated [the 9/11] atrocities will necessitate military action to eliminate
the threat he and his organisation pose"); Bush Tells US to be Patient, AUSTRALIAN FINANCIAL
REVIEW, Sept. 17, 2001, at 1 (noting that President Bush "has broad commitments of
international support for his response to the attacks" of 9/1 1 and that the "President of Pakistan,
General Pervez Musharraf, agreed to help in whatever might be required").
8. See S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. SCOR, 4370th mtg., 40 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1277
(2001) [hereinafter 9/11 Resolution] (recognizing the "the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense in accordance with the Charter").
9. See North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO): Statement by NATO Secretary General, Lord
Robertson, 40 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1268 (2001) (resolution quoting Article 5 of
the NATO Charter and emphasizing that the attack on the United States "shall be considered an
attack on all" NATO members).
10. See Australian Prime Minister Media Release, Application of ANZUS Treaty to Terrorist
Attacks on the United States ("The Government has decided, in consultation with the United
States, that Article IV of the ANZUS Treaty applies to the terrorist attacks on the United
States."), available at http://www.pm.gov.au/news/01_news.html. Article IV provides, in
pertinent part, that: "Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of the
Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the
common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes." Security Treaty between
Australia, New Zealand and the United States ofAmerica (ANZUS), Sept. 1, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3420;
T.I.A.S. 2493; 131 U.N.T.S. 83. The Rio Treaty (Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance), Dec. 3, 1948, T.I.A.S. 1838; 21 U.N.T.S. 77 [hereinafter Rio Pact], has been ratified
by twenty-three States in the Western Hemisphere, including Argentina, the Bahamas, Bolivia,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and
Tobago, the United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. After the September 1 1th terrorist attacks, a
special session ofthe General Assembly ofthe Organization ofAmerican States (OAS) being held
in Lima, Peru on that very day "condemned in the strongest terms the terrorist acts . . . and
reiterated the need to strengthen hemispheric cooperation to combat this scourge that has
thrown the world and the hemispheric community into mourning." Ten days later, the OAS,
acting pursuant to the Rio Pact, labeled the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon
as "attacks against all the American States." See Terrorist Threat to the Americas, RC.24/RES.1/
01, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.F/II.24/RC.24/RES.l/01 rev. 1 corr. 1, at operative para. 1 (Sept. 21,
2001) (24th Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs).
11. Lecture 1—Early Forms of Liability, in OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW
(1881).
1 2. See President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 29, 2002), available at http:/
/www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020 129- 11.html ("We will . . . bring terrorists
to justice.").
13. See Richard Morin & Claudia Deane, Most Americans Back U.S. Tactics: Poll Finds Little
Worry Over Rights, WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 29, 2001, at Al.
14. As a general rule, the community of nations has not as completely accepted the paradigm
shift from law enforcement to war. This could be partly explained by the fact that it is the United
States that most conspicuously associates armed conflict with use of the military instrument.
Other governments use the military for some instances of domestic law enforcement, while the
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United States has traditionally rejected the same. See, e.g., The Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. §
1385 (2004) ("Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the
Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse
comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned. . . .").
Some academics have also suggested that it is appropriate to use the military instrument in an act
of war as a matter of self-defense without triggering the laws of war. Thus, while most would
agree that the Global War on Terrorism does not amount to a traditional armed conflict, some
would argue that it does not amount to an armed conflict at all. This view should be rejected as
amounting to a situation where there is almost no accepted legal regulation ofthe extraterritorial
use of force.
15. The military response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States was
assigned the name Operation Enduring Freedom. The initial military objectives of Operation
Enduring Freedom, as articulated by President Bush, included the destruction of terrorist
training camps and infrastructure within Afghanistan, the capture of al Qaeda leaders, and the
cessation of terrorist activities in Afghanistan. Long-term goals included the end of terrorism,
the deterrence of State sponsorship of terrorism, and the reintegration of Afghanistan into the
international community. See President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress
(Sep. 20, 2001) and Address to the Nation (Oct. 7, 2001), available at http://www.globalsecurity
.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom.htm.
1 6. See Roy Gutman, Christopher Dickey & Sami Yousafzai, Guantanamo Justice?, NEWSWEEK,
July 8, 2002, at 34.
17. See, e.g., Christopher Schroeder, Military Commissions and the War on Terrorism, 29
American Bar Association Litigation 28, 32 (2002).
18. US CONST, art. II. § 2. See also Joan Biskupic & Richard Willing, Military Tribunals: Swift
Judgments in Dire Times, USA TODAY, Nov. 15, 2001, at 1A.
19. Stephen M. Duncan, A War of A Different Kind: Military Force and America's
SEARCH FOR HOMELAND SECURITY 170-172 (2004); see generally Note: Responding To Terrorism,
Crime, Punishment, and War, 115 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 1217, 1235-37 (2002) [hereinafter
Terrorism, Crime, Punishment, and War],
20. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 58-59 ( 1 99 1 )
.
21. See Classified Information Procedures Act of 1980 (18 U.S.C. App. III).
22. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-72 (1966) (noting that the right to remain silent
is "fundamental to our system of constitutional rule," while the "right to have counsel present at
the interrogation is [an] indispensable [right]."). But see 148 Congressional Record S733 (daily
ed. Feb. 13, 2002) (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania upon his introduction of a
bill to establish procedures for military commissions, arguing that Miranda rights are
appropriately employed with regard to trials by military commission).
23. See, e.g., Senator Edward M. Kennedy Statement on the Pending Nomination of William
Haynes (May 11, 2004) available at http://kennedy.senate.gov/~kennedy/statements/04/03/
2004311703.html.
24. See, e.g., Terrorism, Crime, Punishment, and War, supra note 19.
25. Joanne Mariner, O.J. and Osama, the Fear of a Highly Publicized Bin Laden Trial, and the
Problem with Military Commissions, FlNDLAW LEGAL COMMENTARY, Nov. 26, 2001, available at
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/mariner/2001 1 126.html.
26. See Ryan H. Berry, Modern Use of Military Tribunals: A Legal "Can" and a Political
"Should"?, 28 Ohio Northern University Law Review 789, 808 (2002) (noting that "the case
of United States v. Rahman took nine months, involved seventy-one defense witnesses and
resulted in a massive opinion. In its opinion, the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
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even praised the trial judge for his "outstanding achievement in the face of challenges far beyond
those normally endured by a trial judge." All this was to bring nine men, tried at once, to justice.
While it is laudable that the United States domestic system was able to handle this case, imagine
the effect on the judicial system if over three hundred similar prisoners were brought to trial in
the domestic courts. Placing these cases in one court, such as the Federal District Court for
Alexandria, Virginia, would create a massive backlog for that court. Spreading the cases
throughout the country would create a legal nightmare of differing decisions on identical issues
across the circuits, leading to different treatment of similar cases. The Supreme Court would
eventually have to resolve these potential controversies. ...").
27. See Michael O. Lacey, Military Commissions: A Historical Perspective, ARMY LAWYER, Mar.
2002, at 49. Military commissions were utilized during the Civil War, the Second World War,
and, in between, the Indian Wars, the Spanish American War, and the First World War, all
employed the "commission concept to punish violations of the law of war." See also PETER
Maguire, Law And War: An American Story (2000).
28. See, e.g., Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942); In reYamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946). Only in the
Civil War's Ex parte Milligan decision did the Court limit the jurisdiction of such tribunals,
holding that US citizens could not be tried by military commission in a state not invaded and not
engaged in rebellion, in which the Federal courts were "open, and in the proper and
unobstructed exercise of their judicial functions." Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 121, 221 (1866).
See also, William H. Rehnquist, All The Laws But One, Civil Liberties in Wartime
(1998) (providing a detailed history of the facts underlying the Milligan decision).
29. This dilemma is not unworkable, but it highlights the unintended consequences of the
presumed preference for more developed judicial systems. By way of example discussed in
greater detail below, Colombian soldiers are regularly involved in fighting an insurgency
conducted by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (known by its Spanish acronym,
FARC) and other narco-terrorists. See Dan Burton & Barton Gillman, Miscues in the Drug War,
WASHINGTON TIMES, Apr. 1 1, 1999, at B4. The military frequently kills these terrorists during
armed conflict (and vice versa). If terrorists are captured, however, in compliance with the law,
they must be submitted almost immediately to the normal domestic court system, which, in
turn, can be influenced by the very terrorist groups the military is fighting. See FARC Leaders
Charged, LATIN AMERICAN NEWS LTD., May, 15, 2001, at 228. A conversation with a Colombian
military officer elicited this disturbing comment, "In a firefight, we try to kill as many of [the
narco-terrorists] as possible before they can surrender. The ones we capture go before the courts
and may end up back in the jungle—killing our relatives." Confidential interview with
Colombian military officer, Spring 2004 (notes on file with author).
30. Person to Person (CBS television broadcast, Sept. 20, 1957), quoted in GERHARD VON
Glahn, Law among Nations 4 (1981).
3 1
.
The Security Council attempted in recent years to fill part of this void ad hoc—but the
International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda never were intended to
replace the sovereign exercise of national jurisdiction to bring wrongdoers to justice. The
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, headquartered at The Hague, was
created by the Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, S.C.
Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993) [hereinafter Statute
of the ICTY]; The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, headquartered at Arusha,
Tanzania, was created by Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res.
955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg., Annex, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) [hereinafter
Statute of the ICTR]. The International Criminal Court (ICC), which the United States does not
view as an appropriate permanent international forum for addressing violations of the laws of
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war, has been praised as inaugurating an end to the "era of impunity." Statute of the
International Criminal Court, U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 183/9 (1998) [hereinafter
ICC Statute]. The ICC came into existence on July 1, 2002. It is the first permanent court ever
established to investigate and try individuals for the most serious violations of international
humanitarian law, including war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. See Barbara
Crossette, Long-Range Justice Raises Fearsfor Sovereignty, NEW YORK TIMES, July 1, 2001, §1 at 8
(quoting William Pace, convener of the Coalition for an International Criminal Court). But
even its proponents agree that the benefit of the ICC lies primarily in encouraging the exercise of
national jurisdiction. United Nations, General Assembly, 56th Session, Statement by the
International Committee of the Red Cross, New York, Establishment of the International
Criminal Court (Nov. 12, 2001), available at http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteengO.nsf/iwpList.
32. See President's Military Order, supra note 1, at Sec. 4(c)(2).
33. But see David Greenberg, Uncivil Courts: America's Military Tribunals Through the Ages,
SLATE, Dec. 5, 2001, http://www.slate.com/?id=2059375&amp;device= (arguing military
tribunals are not normally kangaroo courts).
34. See President's Military Order, supra note 1, at Sec. 2, If (a):
The term "individual subject to this order" shall mean any individual who is not a




there is reason to believe that such individual, at the relevant times,
(i) is or was a member of the organization known as al Qaeda;
(ii) has engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit, acts of international
terrorism, or acts in preparation therefore, that have caused, threaten to cause,
or have as their aim to cause, injury to or adverse effects on the United States,
its citizens, national security, foreign policy, or economy; or
(iii) has knowingly harbored one or more individuals described in subparagraphs
(i) or (ii) of subsection 2(a)(1) of this order; and
(2) it is in the interest ofthe United States that such individual be subject to this order.
35. Id., at Sec. 3, Detention Authority of the Secretary of Defense; and Sec. 4, Authority of the
Secretary of Defense Regarding Trials of Individuals Subject to this Order.
36. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic & Richard Willing, Military Tribunals: SwiftJudgments in Dire Times,
USA TODAY, Nov. 15, 2001, at 1A; Gearan, supra note 1; Bumiller & Johnston, supra note 1. See
generally Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, A Year ofLoss: Reexamining Civil Liberties Since
September 11, Sept. 5, 2002, at 32 (Claiming that the order creates a parallel criminal justice
system in which defendants would have only those rights that the President or Secretary of
Defense decide they would have, reciting a litany of specific concerns associated with the process
accorded an accused tried by military commission, and asserting that some of the cherished
principles on which the country is founded have been eroded or disregarded.).
37. Department of Defense, Military Commission Order No. 1, Procedures for Trials by
Military Commission of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism (Mar. 21, 2002)
[hereinafter MCO No. 1].
38. Department of Defense, Military Commission Instruction No. 1, Military Commission
Instructions (Apr. 30, 2003); Department of Defense, Military Commission Instruction No. 2,
Crimes and Elements for Trials by Military Commission (Apr. 30, 2003) [hereinafter MCI No.
2]; Department of Defense, Military Commission Instruction No. 3, Responsibilities ofthe Chief
Prosecutor, Prosecutors, and Assistant Prosecutors (Apr. 15, 2004); Department of Defense,
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Military Commission Instruction No. 4, Responsibilities of the Chief Defense Counsel, Detailed
Defense Counsel, and Civilian Defense Counsel (Apr. 15, 2004); Department of Defense,
Military Commission Instruction No. 5, Qualification of Civilian Defense Counsel (Apr. 30,
2003); Department of Defense, Military Commission Instruction No. 6, Reporting
Relationships for Military Commission Personnel (Apr. 15, 2004); Department of Defense,
Military Commission Instruction No. 7, Sentencing (Apr. 30, 2003); Department of Defense,
Military Commission Instruction No. 8, Administrative Procedures (Apr. 20, 2003);
Department of Defense, Military Commission Instruction No. 9, Review of Military
Commission Proceedings (Dec. 26, 2003).
39. See Department of Defense Military Commissions, Presidential Decisions, available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/presidential_decisions.html ("The President determined that
there is reason to believe that each of these enemy combatants was a member of al Qaeda or was
otherwise involved in terrorism directed against the United States.").
40. See President William Clinton, Remarks About the Saudi Arabia Explosion (June 25, 1996),
available at http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9606/25/clinton.remarks/index.html ("The United
States will be firm with terrorists. We will not make concessions. ... Ifwe find states supplying
money, weapons, training, identification, documents, travel, or safe haven for terrorists, we will
respond. Our aim is to demonstrate to these countries that supporting terrorism is not cost-free.
We will bring terrorists to justice. We will . . . identify, track, apprehend, prosecute, and punish
terrorists. Terrorism is crime, and terrorists must be treated as criminals."). See Department of
Defense, Compendium, Terrorist Group Profiles, Nov. 1988, at 1 (Four days before Christmas,
1988, Pan American Flight 103 from London to New York exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland.
All 259 passengers and 11 people on the ground were killed. In discussing his horror at the
bombing, President Reagan stated "Now that we know definitely that it was a bomb, we're going
to make every effort we can to find out who was guilty of this savage and tragic thing and bring
them to justice." See http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/target/etc/script.html.
See generally LOU CANNON, PRESIDENT REAGAN: THE ROLE OF A LIFETIME 654 (1991) (quoting
President Reagan's remarks on signing an anti-terrorism bill on August 27, 1986). President
Reagan also promulgated National Security Decision Directive 207, National Program for
Combating Terrorism (Jan. 1986) (outlining the basic tenets of US policy for responding to
international terrorism, whether conducted inside or outside US territory), available at http://
www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-207.htm.
41. See US Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, Memorandum for Alberto R.
Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Legality of the Use of Military Commissions to Try
Terrorists (November 6, 2001) (concluding that under 10 U.S.C. § 821 and pursuant to his
inherent powers as Commander in Chief, the President may establish military commissions to
try and punish terrorists apprehended as part of the investigation into, or the military and
intelligence operations in response to, the September 11 attacks [hereinafter Legal Counsel
Memo for Gonzales].).
42. See WILLIAM WlNTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS (2d ed. 1920).
43. Had an effective military tribunal system been extant in the Spring of 2003, the second
historic role of military commissions—as an occupation court—might have been a relevant
topic for discussion as well. Consider, for example, the potential utility of establishing military
commissions to assist in maintaining security in occupied Iraq. Such commissions could have
included Iraqi panel members and more efficiently established a judicial process for certain
categories of offenses. Many agree that, had commissions been established in other contexts in
more recent history, far greater consideration would have been accorded their use in Iraq.
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Perhaps more importantly, we should recognize that Winthrop's articulation of historical
precedent (id.) is merely a reflection of how the judicial arm of the military instrument
developed in the 18th and 19th centuries. We should anticipate its evolution in the future as well.
The use of commissions against individual members of transnational terrorist organizations
might stand on its own as an independent example of the use of military commissions in the
future.
44. See supra note 4 1
.
45. Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197 (1948) (Douglas, J., concurring).
46. See Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-946 [hereinafter UCMJ], at 10
U.S.C. § 821. General Enoch H. Crowder, Judge Advocate General of the Army, appeared before
Congress in 1916 as a sponsor for the adoption of the Articles ofWar and made it clear that the
concept of military commission jurisdiction enacted in the Articles of War was meant to be
preserved. He stated, "As long as the articles . . . provided that [persons subject to military law]
might be tried by court-martial, I was afraid that, having made special provision for their trial by
court-martial, it might be held that the provision operated to exclude trials by military
commission and other war courts; so this new article was introduced." See In re Yamashita, 327
U.S. 1, 20 n.7( 1946); see a/so Madsenv. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 (1952) ("[Article 15] just saves to
these war courts the jurisdiction they now have and makes it a concurrent jurisdiction with
courts-martial, so that the military commander in the field in time of war will be at liberty to
employ either form of court that happens to be convenient" (quoting General Crowder's
testimony at S. Rep. No. 130, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 40)).
47. 10 U.S.C. § 836.
48. See, e.g., 1 8 U.S.C. §326 (providing that the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of2000
would not effect jurisdiction of military commissions); 10 U.S.C. § 828 (providing for
employment of interpreters at military commissions); 10 U.S.C. § 3037 (noting that a judge
advocate of the Army must prepare records of proceedings in military commissions); and 18
U.S.C. § 3 1 72 (noting that the Speedy Trial Act does not apply to trials by military commissions).
49. See, e.g., Jan E. Aldykiewicz, Authority to Court-Martial Non-U. S. Military personnel for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed During Internal Armed
Conflicts, 167 MILITARY LAW REVIEW 74, 145-48 (2001).
50. UCMJ art. 18 ("general courts-martial also have jurisdiction to try any person who by the
law ofwar is subject to trial by military tribunal and may adjudge any punishment permitted by
the law of war." 10 U.S.C. § 818); UCMJ art. 21 ("The provisions of this chapter conferring
jurisdiction upon courts-martial do not deprive military commissions, provost courts, or other
military tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction with respect to offenders or offenses that by statute
or by the law of war may be tried by military commissions, provost courts, or other military
tribunals." 10 U.S.C. § 821.). See Mark S. Martins, National Forums for Punishing Offenses
Against International Law: Might U.S. Soldiers Have Their Day in the Same Court?, 36 VIRGINIA
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 659, 673-75 (1996) (noting that a "United States court-
martial trying an alleged war criminal would provide further safeguards. All of the protections
accorded in the Hague Tribunal [ICTY] would be accorded. In addition, the accused would be
protected by elaborate rules of evidence, such as those generally excluding hearsay. Were he
convicted, the presentencing procedures would give him the benefit of relaxed rules ofevidence to
present matters in extenuation and mitigation, while continuing to impose strict rules on the
prosecution. Were a sentence imposed on him, he also would receive several levels ofdirect appeal.").
51
.
The Uniform Code of Military Justice, was originally promulgated on May 5, 1950 as Pub.L.
81-506, 64 Stat. 107-49. The law took effect on May 31, 1951 and was codified at 10 U.S.C. §§
801-946.
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52. Manual for Courts-Martial, effective Apr. 1, 1928, at 213-16 (1936).
53. 10U.S.C. §821.
54. 10 U.S.C. § 818 ("General courts-martial also have jurisdiction to try any person who by law
of war is subject to trial by military tribunal and may adjudge any punishment permitted by the
law of war.").
55. See Department of the Army, International and Operational Law Department, The Judge
Advocate General's School, Operational Law Handbook 518 (2000) (It is DoD policy that a
member of the armed forces who commits an offense that qualifies as a "war crime" will be
charged with a specific article of the UCMJ.).
56. U.S. v. Calley, 46 C.M.R. 1131, 1137(C.M.A. 1973).
57. 1 U.S.C. § 800, et seq. Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, Military Rules ofEvidence
1102 (2002) [hereinafter MCM]. In fact, courts-martial now so mirror federal criminal
proceedings that eighteen months after their effective date in the federal system, changes to the
Federal Rules of Evidence are automatically applicable to courts-martial unless action to the
contrary is taken by the President.
58. See supra note 38.
59. See MCO No. 1, supra note 37.
60. Id. at § 6.B(1) (stating that the commission must give "a full and fair trial"); Id. at § 5.B
(stipulating that the defendant "shall be presumed innocent until proven guilty").
61. See, e.g., Mariner, supra note 25. Unlike the civilian courts with their underpinnings of
legislative activity and judicial review, the law ofwar has no similar mechanism for developing a
baseline procedural framework for military commissions. Perhaps the best law of war analog
exists vis-a-vis the common law characteristics of our domestic criminal law system
—
incremental changes in the law are rooted in a priori reasoning and guided by past practice. The
common law of war, however, is truly a function of the practice of nation States. Fortunately,
State practice with respect to many elements of the law ofwar has been limited; unfortunately, it
is perhaps most limited with respect to the prosecution ofviolations ofthe law ofarmed conflict.
62. See MCO No. 1, supra note 37, at § 6.D(2)(d)("The Presiding officer may authorize any
methods appropriate for the protection of witnesses and evidence.").
63. See ICC Statute, supra note 31; Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR, id.; (all establishing a
"probative value"-based evidentiary admission policy).
64. See Polman, supra note 5; Skiba, supra note 5.
65. For example, they permit protective measures, including closed trial sessions, to
accommodate the operational imperative of shielding intelligence information, methods, and
sources.
66. The focus of this section is on only those areas most significantly impacted by the war on
terror. This section does not purport to provide an exhaustive collection of pertinent law of war
standards regarding the trial process.
67. See, e.g., Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armies in the Field, July 27, 1929, 47 Stat. 2074, 118 L.N.T.S. 303, reprinted in THE LAWS OF
ARMED CONFLICTS 409 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 4th ed. 2004) [hereinafter 1929
Geneva Convention]. See also Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of
the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3 1 14, 75 U.N.T.S. 3
1
[hereinafter Geneva Convention (I)]; Geneva Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the
Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.S.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention (II)]; Geneva
Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners ofWar, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75
U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention (III)]; Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the
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Treatment of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287
[hereinafter Geneva Convention (IV)]; all reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR
(Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., 3d ed. 2000) at 197, 222, 244 and 301, respectively.
68. Department of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 5820.02B,
Implementation of the DoD Law ofWar Program (Mar. 25, 2002).
69. For example, Article 36 of Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I),
Jun. 8, 1977, 1 125 U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF War, supra note 67, at
422 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I], requires that the acquisition process include a legal
review of all new weapons to determine whether they comply with pertinent provisions of
international law. Note that the United States is not party to Additional Protocol I, but see
Michael J. Matheson, Remarks in Session One: The United States Position on the Relation of
Customary International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2
American University Journal of International Law & policy 419, 428 (1987) (declaring
that it is US policy to consider parts of Additional Protocol I customary international law). The
Defense Acquisition Program in turn requires a legal review of all intended weapon
acquisitions—regardless of whether the treaty is applicable regarding a conflict with the likely
adversary against whom the weapon might be used. Department of Defense, Directive 5000.1,
The Defense Acquisition System (May 23, 2003), para El. 1.15.
70. See Geneva Conventions (I), (II), (III) and (IV), supra note 67; Additional Protocol I, supra
note 69; and Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Conflict (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 609, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 67, at 483. This is not
to say that the law ofarmed conflict is silent regarding the persons in question. It is well accepted
that belligerents can be detained without charge until the end of hostilities. See Ex Parte Quirin,
317 U.S. 1, 31, 37 (1942); Colepaugh v. Looney, 235 F. 2d 429, 432 (10th Cir. 1956); In reTerrito,
156 F. 2d 142, 145 (9th Cir. 1946). But Geneva Convention (III) only regulates the detention of
those entitled to participate in hostilities. Moreover, additional questions not specifically
addressed by relevant treaties arise in the context of the Global War on Terrorism, such as when
the conflict that pertains to a particular unprivileged belligerent ends or what status a detainee
has when apprehended in a location away from a traditional battlefield.
71. See A Nation Challenged; Agency Differs with U.S. Over P.O.Ws, NEW YORK TIMES, Feb. 9,
2002, at A9; Seth Stern & Peter Grier, Untangling the Legalities in a Name, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, Jan. 30, 2002, at 3.
72. Interview with Paul Grossreider, Director, International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC), Le Temps, Jan. 29, 2002 ("Le droit humanitaire doit s'adapter sous peine d'etre
marginalize" translated as "Humanitarian law must adapt or risk marginalization."). The ICRC
has since distanced itself from the Grossreider comment, clamoring for the trial or repatriation
of the Guantanamo Bay detainees. See generally Report of the 28th International Conference of
the Red Cross and Red Crescent, International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of
Contemporary Armed Conflicts, Dec. 2-6, 2003 (emphasizing throughout that international
humanitarian law is specifically designed to take account of both State security and individual
rights).
73. Geneva Convention (III), supra note 67, art. 84 (stating, in part, "A prisoner ofwar shall be
tried only by a military court, unless the existing laws of the Detaining Power expressly permit
the civil courts to try a member of the armed forces of the Detaining Power in respect of the
particular offence alleged to have been committed by the prisoner of war.").
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74. Id., art. 84 ("In no circumstances whatever shall a prisoner ofwar be tried by a court of any
kind which does not offer the essential guarantees of independence and impartiality as generally
recognized, and, in particular, the procedure ofwhich does not afford the accused the rights and
means of defence provided for in Article 105.").
75. Id., art. 130; Geneva Convention (IV), supra note 67, art. 147.
76. Some Geneva Convention requirements are not reflected in the Military Commission
Instructions promulgated for al Qaeda. For example, pursuant to Geneva Convention (III),
supra note 67, art. 105, a prisoner ofwar is entitled, among other things, "to assistance by one of
his prisoner comrades." These less substantively important provisions could be easily
accommodated with additional implementing instructions were it to be decided that all the
technical provisions ofGeneva Convention (III), Article 102 were appropriate for application to
unlawful combatants.
77. Additional Protocol I, supra note 69, art. 75.
78. Id. Article 75 reads, in pertinent, part:
3. Any person arrested, detained or interned for actions related to the armed conflict
shall be informed promptly, in a language he understands, of the reasons why these
measures have been taken. Except in cases of arrest or detention for penal offences, such
persons shall be released with the minimum delay possible and in any event as soon as
the circumstances justifying the arrest, detention or internment have ceased to exist.
4. No sentence may be passed and no penalty may be executed on a person found
guilty of a penal offence related to the armed conflict except pursuant to a conviction
pronounced by an impartial and regularly constituted court respecting the generally
recognized principles of regular judicial procedure, which include the following:
(a) The procedure shall provide for an accused to be informed without delay ofthe
particulars of the offence alleged against him and shall afford the accused
before and during his trial all necessary rights and means of defence;
(b) No one shall be convicted of an offence except on the basis of individual penal
responsibility;
(c) No one shall be accused or convicted of a criminal offence on account of any
act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under the national
or international law to which he was subject at the time when it was
committed; nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than that which was
applicable at the time when the criminal offence was committed; if, after the
commission of the offence, provision is made by law for the imposition of a
lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby;
(d) Anyone charged with an offence is presumed innocent until proved guilty
according to law;
(e) Anyone charged with an offence shall have the right to be tried in his presence;
(f) No one shall be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt;
(g) Anyone charged with an offence shall have the right to examine, or have
examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and
examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses
against him;
(h) No one shall be prosecuted or punished by the same Party for an offence in
respect ofwhich a final judgment acquitting or convicting that person has been
previously pronounced under the same law and judicial procedure;
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(i) Anyone prosecuted for an offence shall have the right to have the judgment
pronounced publicly; and
(i) A convicted person shall be advised on conviction of his judicial and other
remedies and of the time-limits within which they may be exercised.
6. Persons who are arrested, detained or interned for reasons related to the armed
conflict shall enjoy the protection provided by this Article until their final release,
repatriation or re-establishment, even after the end of the armed conflict.
7. In order to avoid any doubt concerning the prosecution and trial of persons
accused ofwar crimes or crimes against humanity, the following principles shall apply:
(a) Persons who are accused ofsuch crimes should be submitted for the purpose of
prosecution and trial in accordance with the applicable rules of international
law; and
(b) Any such persons who do not benefit from more favourable treatment under
the Conventions or this Protocol shall be accorded the treatment provided by
this Article, whether or not the crimes of which they are accused constitute
grave breaches of the Conventions or of this Protocol.
8. No provision of this Article may be construed as limiting or infringing any other
more favourable provision granting greater protection, under any applicable rules of
international law, to persons covered by paragraph 1.
79. See Matheson, supra note 69. In the only recognized authoritative statement on the subject
by a US Government official, Mr. Matheson, then US Department of State Deputy Legal
Advisor, expounded at a law of armed conflict conference on those provisions of Additional
Protocol I the United States deemed to constitute customary international law. He included
Article 75's provisions among them.
80. Geneva Convention (III), supra note 67, art. 84.
81. Id.
82. Cf Melvin Heard, Robert P. Monahan, William Ryan & E. Page Wilkins, Military
Commissions: A Legal and Appropriate Means of Trying Suspected Terrorists? 49 NAVAL Law
REVIEW 71 (2002) (criticizing the "most significant weakness" in MCO No. 1—the lack of an
independent appellate court).
83. See MCM, supra note 57, Rules for Courts-Martial 504, 505 (prescribing a military panel as
the trier of fact). Moreover, ifGeneva is interpreted as requiring that the trier of fact function be
segregated in a different branch ofgovernment, several hundred years of military courts-martial
practice would have to be invalidated as well. To an American audience, "ludicrous" may be an
appropriate modifier for the above postulate that a military jury is not sufficiently
"independent" to comport with modern standards. It would be equally ludicrous to suggest that
the United States Senate, in ratifying the Geneva Conventions, was acceding to an international
law standard that would afford alleged war criminals theoretically superior trial rights than those
accorded US soldiers. We should be aware, however, that others may see things differently.
Indeed, the European Court ofHuman Rights has done just that. In Findlay v. United Kingdom,
24 E.H.R.R. 221 (1997), that court found insufficient independence in British courts-martial to
comply with parallel human rights provisions found in the European Convention on Human
Rights. Findlay at para. 59. The European Court ofHuman Rights, which has authority over the
United Kingdom, nullified a British court-martial and established a rule that required an entire
revamping of the United Kingdom's military justice system. See Simon P. Rowlinson, The British
System ofMilitary Justice, 52 AIR FORCE LAW REVIEW 17 (2002). In articulating the rule oflaw we
deem both correct under currently accepted norms and appropriate for a future that involves an
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ongoing war on terrorism, we must be cognizant of European and other sensibilities in this area
and ensure we are not unwittingly setting undesirable precedent.
84. See Geneva Convention (III), supra note 67, arts. 84, 85, 102.
85. Id., ait. 102.
86. See Legal Counsel Memo for Gonzales, supra note 41.
87. See Geneva Convention (III), supra note 67, art. 4.
88. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet, Status of Detainees at
Guantanamo (Feb. 7, 2002) [hereinafter White House Fact Sheet—Status of Detainees],
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020207- 1 3.html.
89. President's Military Order, supra note 1, at Sec. 2. One of the negotiators of the 1949
Conventions has argued that only courts-martial are now legally available for war crimes trials.
See, e.g., Raymund T. Yingling & Robert W. Ginane, The Geneva Conventions of 1949, 46
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL Law 393 (July 1952). It is not clear what consequences
this reading of Article 102 might impose on the United States, but at the very least, the
President's Military Order language prohibiting trial of US citizens becomes problematic, if not
as a legal issue, then certainly as one of international public relations.
90. See Geneva Convention (III), supra note 67, art. 99 (beginning the chapter in which article
102 is contained with language implying that the chapter will discuss offenses relegated under
the detaining power's law—i.e., post-capture offenses).
91. Id., art. 102.
92. Geneva Convention, supra note 67.
93. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
94. Geneva Convention (III), supra note 67, art. 85 (providing that "[prisoners of war
prosecuted under the laws of the Detaining Power for acts committed prior to capture shall
retain, even if convicted, the benefits of the present Convention.").
95. See Yingling 8c Ginane, supra note 89 (concluding, in an article published shortly after the
negotiation of the 1949 Conventions, that the courts and the procedure utilized must be the
same for prisoners of war as for the armed forces of the detaining power—even with regard to
pre-capture offenses). A more recent paper authored by Ed Cummings, Deputy Legal Advisor to
the US Department of State, reached this same conclusion.
96. Geneva Convention (III) essentially retained the 1929 language that ultimately became
Article 102, but the new additive provision, Article 85, had no parallel in the 1929 work.
97. Geneva Convention (III), supra note 67, art. 85. An expansive reading of Article 85 would
make superfluous another provision of the Convention—Article 84—also first added in 1949
(suggesting that if a choice of courts is available; military courts must be used unless civilian
courts have jurisdiction.) If the "same" courts must be used for pre-capture crimes, however,
then there is no choice of courts as described in Article 84, and the language is meaningless.
98. Id., arts. 99-100.
99. Id.
100. The terms of Article 84 suggest just such a reading of Article 85. Article 84 turns on
jurisdiction; it requires trial by a military court, "unless the existing laws of the Detaining Power
expressly permit the civil courts to try a member of the armed forces of the Detaining Power in
respect to the particular offense alleged to have been committed by the prisoner of war."
101. In the course of the Calley case, there was some discussion among prosecutors about
whether Calley should be charged under provisions of 10 U.S.C. § 821 with the commission of
war crimes in addition to the UCMJ charges for the substantive offenses underlying such war
crimes. Prudential concerns resulted in the charging only of non-law of war charges. U.S. v.
Calley, 46 C.M.R. 1131 (1973).
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102. This interpretation is rife with inherent subjectivity. A random sampling of the meaning of
Article 102 among uniformed judge advocates would probably yield a belief that the provision
requires trial by court-martial—simply because that is the forum with which most have the
greatest familiarity.
103. That is, if a certain subset of criminal offenses is applicable for consideration, then a court-
martial would undoubtedly be the most prevalent forum, both historically and with respect to
future probability.
104. That courts-martial charges have been brought against those accused in the prisoner abuse
scandal ofAbu Ghraib provides continued support for this proposition. See, e.g., Sergeant Javal
S. Davis—Charged under the UCMJ with conspiracy to maltreat detainees; dereliction of duty
for willfully failing to protect detainees from abuse, cruelty, and maltreatment; maltreatment of
detainees; assaulting detainees; and making a statement designed to deceive an investigator; and
Corporal Charles Graner—Charged under the UCMJ with conspiracy to maltreat detainees;
dereliction of duty for willfully failing to protect detainees from abuse, cruelty, and
maltreatment; maltreatment of detainees; assaulting detainees; committing indecent acts;
adultery with Private First Class England; and obstruction of justice. Charge sheets available at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/iraq/. See also Edmund Sanders & Richard Serrano,
Contrite GI Pleads Guilty to Abuse, LOS ANGELES TIMES, May 20, 2004 ("Choking back tears and
expressing remorse, US Army Spc. Jeremy C. Sivits pleaded guilty Wednesday in Baghdad, Iraq,
to abusing detainees at the Abu Ghraib detention center and was demoted, sentenced to a year in
military prison, and expelled from the Army. The sentence makes him the first US soldier court-
martialed in an evolving scandal that authorities say could reach beyond the seven soldiers
implicated so far."). See also Hearing Scheduled for Pfc. Lynndie England on Prisoner Abuse
Charges, Lawyer Says, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 28, 2004 (noting that "Army Pfc. England,
who appeared in Abu Ghraib prison photographs pointing at Iraqi prisoners' genitals and
holding a leash attached to a detainee, will face a military court hearing known as an "Article 32,"
scheduled for June 21-25, at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The Article 32 is a proceeding where
military prosecutors present evidence and a judge decides whether to go forward with a court-
martial. It is similar to a civilian grand jury. England is one of seven soldiers facing military
charges in the Abu Ghraib prison scandal. England is charged with assaulting Iraqi detainees,
conspiring with Spec. Charles Graner Jr. to mistreat the prisoners and committing an indecent
act by forcing prisoners to masturbate."), available at http://ap.tbo .com/ap/breaking/
MGBOZ4HGSUD.html.
105. See, e.g., Geneva Convention (III), supra note 67, art. 84 (authorizing trial by civil courts
when such courts have jurisdiction over "the particular offense alleged to have been
committed"). See also Yingling & Ginane, supra note 89 (arguing that Geneva limited the
Supreme Court's decision in Yamashita approving differing treatment of POWs vis-a-vis US
service members "for a like offense").
106. The War Crimes Act of 1996, 18U.S.C. §2441 (war crimes); 18U.S.C.§371 (conspiracy).
107. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-132, 702(a),
110 Stat. 1214, 1291-94 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2332b) (defining the charge of "material support
to terrorism").
108. The War Crimes Act, supra note 106, at § 2441(c).
109. Id. at § 2441(b).
110. Id.
111. See 10 U.S.C. § 802 (prescribing that "prisoners of war in custody of armed forces" are
subject to the UCMJ).
112. See MCM, supra note 57.
113. Id.
114. See, e.g., U.S. v. Calley, 46 C.M.R. 1131 (1973).
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115. MCM, supra note 57, part III (2002).
116. Id.
117. Treating prisoners of war "the same" at a court-martial raises problematic jurisdictional
issues as well. For example, the UCMJ limits its jurisdiction over US armed forces to crimes
committed after the member is under military control, and thus has no jurisdiction over pre-
enlistment or pre-commission crimes. Because Article 102 requires that prisoners of war be
treated the same way US armed forces are treated, one might argue that a court-martial has no
jurisdiction over pre-capture crimes.
118. Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
119. Mudd v. Caldera, 134F.Supp.2d 138 (D.D.C. 2001) (citing Ex Parte Quirin) . Only one case
has limited the reach of military commission jurisdiction over US citizens. See Ex Parte Milligan,
71 U.S. 2 (1866). In Milligan, the Court determined that a US citizen who was not a belligerent
—
and who resided in a state without active hostilities and where the civil courts were open and
operating—could not be tried by military commission. Id. These considerations would not serve
to limit the jurisdiction of military commissions over military members, however. Id. at 118
(citing accused's lack of military status as a factor in finding that military commission lacked
jurisdiction).
120. See WlNTHROP, supra note 42.
121. Id. (noting that, inter alia, officers' servants, government detectives, medical cadets, and
lieutenants in the revenue service were tried by military commission in the Civil War).
122. This would, however, not only create obvious political concerns, it would also raise
constitutional issues. For example, in response to a defense argument that the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments required trial by jury, the Quirin Court held that the "offenders were outside the
constitutional guarantee of trial by jury, not because they were aliens but only because they had
violated the law of war." Quirin, supra note 118, at 44. Read broadly, the decision may be
interpreted as placing all military commission proceedings outside of the realm of
Constitutional guarantees. Id. at 45 ("We conclude that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments did not
restrict whatever authority was conferred by the Constitution to try offenses against the law of
war by military commission. . . ."). But there is some risk that a reviewing court may read Quirin
more narrowly and find that some constitutional provisions do apply at military commissions
convened to try US citizens. In the case of a US citizen for example, if the 6th Amendment
Confrontation Clause was found to apply, commission hearsay rules might be restricted to
reflect that right. This would raise the concern, ofcourse, that the trials ofprisoners ofwar would
no longer be using the "same procedures" as trials of US service members (most of whom are
citizens).
123. Except perhaps in the unique case when a service member was prosecuted for terrorist-
related activities using either an enumerated violation of the UCMJ or an assimilated crime
charged as a violation of Article 134 of the UCMJ.
124. See MCI No. 2, supra note 38 (requiring that the contextual element for each offense, when
read in light of definitions, mandates a war nexus).
125. See Remarks by Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the President, American Bar Association
Standing Committee on Law and National Security, Washington, D.C., Feb. 24, 2004, available
at http://usinfo.state.gov/dhr/Archive/2004/Mar/ 1 7-83430 1 .html.
1 26. Bickel was quoting Sir Lewis Bernstein Namier in an address originally delivered in the 1 969
Oliver Wendell Holmes Lecture series at Harvard Law School, reprinted in ALEXANDER BlCKEL,




Jurisdictional, and Due Process
Requirements
Jordan J. Paust*
Presidential Power to Create a Military Commission and
Jurisdictional Competence
The President's power as Commander-in-Chief to set up a military commis-
sion and the jurisdictional competence of a military commission apply only
during an actual war within a war zone or a war-related occupied territory. 1 As
Colonel William Winthrop recognized in his classic study of military law: "A mili-
tary commission . . . can legally assume jurisdiction only of offences committed
within the field of command of the convening commander," and regarding mili-
tary occupation, "cannot take cognizance of an offence committed without such
territory— The place must be the theater ofwar or a place where military govern-
ment or martial law may be legally exercised; otherwise a military commission . .
.
will have no jurisdiction . . . ." 2 The military commission set up within the United
States during World War II and recognized in Ex parte Quirin 3 had been created
during war for prosecution of enemy belligerents for violations of the laws of war
that occurred within the United States and within the convening authority's field
ofcommand—which in that case was within the Eastern Defense Command ofthe
United States Army.4
* Mike and Teresa Baker Law Center Professor, University of Houston.
Military Commissions
Limitations with Respect to Place
What is unavoidably problematic with respect to military commission jurisdiction
at Guantanamo, Cuba is the fact that the US military base at Guantanamo is nei-
ther in a theater of actual war nor in a war-related occupied territory, 5 and, thus, a
military commission at Guantanamo will not be properly constituted and will be
without lawful jurisdiction. Moreover, alleged violations of the laws ofwar during
war in Afghanistan or Iraq clearly did not occur in Cuba. Another problem with re-
spect to prosecution of certain persons in a military commission at Guantanamo
involves an absolute prohibition under the laws of war. Any person who is not a
prisoner of war and who is captured in occupied territory in Afghanistan or Iraq
must not be transferred out of occupied territory. Article 49 of the Geneva Con-
vention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War6 expressly
mandates that "[ijndividual or mass forcible transfers . . . of protected persons
from occupied territory . . . are prohibited, regardless of their motive." 7 Further,
"unlawful deportation or transfer" is not merely a war crime; it is also a "grave
breach" of the Geneva Convention. 8 To correct such violations of the laws of war,
persons who are not prisoners ofwar and who were captured in occupied territory
and eventually found at Guantanamo or other areas under US control outside of
occupied territory should be returned to the territory where they were captured.
Limitations with Respect to Time
The President's power and a military commission's jurisdiction are limited in
terms of time to a circumstance of actual war until peace is finalized. 9 As Major
General Henry Halleck wrote early during the last century, military commissions
"are established by the President, by virtue of his war power as commander-in-
chief, and have jurisdiction of cases arising under the laws ofwar," adding: "[they]
are war courts and can exist only in time of war." 10 Similarly, in 1865 Attorney
General Speed formally advised the President:
A military tribunal exists under and according to the Constitution in time of war.
Congress may prescribe how all such tribunals are to be constituted, what shall be their
jurisdiction, and mode of procedure. Should Congress fail to create such tribunals,
then, under the Constitution, they must be constituted according to the laws and
usages of civilized warfare. They may take cognizance of such offences as the laws of
war permit .... In time of peace neither Congress nor the military can create any
military tribunals, except such as are made in pursuance of that clause of the
Constitution which gives to Congress the power "to make rules for the government of
the land and naval forces." 11
290
Jordan J. Paust
From the Attorney General's opinion, one can recognize that relevant presidential
power is tied to a war circumstance and law ofwar competencies such as the com-
petence of a war-related occupying power to set up a military commission to try
violations of the laws of war in accordance with the laws of war.
Crimes Triable Before Military Commissions
Since their authority is tied to war powers, military commissions generally have ju-
risdiction only over war crimes, which are violations of the laws of war. In fact,
some writers have stated that military commissions have jurisdiction only over war
crimes. 12 In 10 U.S.C. Sections 818 and 821, Congress has only expressly conferred
military commission jurisdiction for prosecution of "offenders or offenses that by
statute or by the law ofwar may be tried by military commissions." Such a congres-
sional grant of competence, without additional grants of jurisdiction over offend-
ers or offenses by statute, limits the offenders and offenses that are triable to those
that the law of war permits to be tried in a military commission. The Supreme
Court has also recognized that when Congress enacted the 1916 Articles of War,
which contained similar language, Congress "gave sanction" to uses of a "military
commission contemplated by the common law ofwar." 13 Section 4(A) ofthe Presi-
dent's 2001 Military Order 14 states that accused shall be tried for "offenses triable
by military commission." 15 Thus, one question is whether the law of war allows a
military commission to address crimes other than war crimes.
In practice, some military commissions have addressed other crimes under in-
ternational law that occurred during war (such as crimes against humanity occur-
ring during World War II) when, but only when, the military commissions were
convened in war-related occupied territory. 16 A war-related occupying power ac-
tually has a greater competence under the international law ofwar to maintain law
and order in the occupied territory and to prosecute various crimes. 17 Since inter-
national law is a constitutionally based part of the law of the United States and law
that the President is bound faithfully to execute here or abroad in time of peace or
war, 18 the President actually has an enhanced power to execute laws of war that
confer powers on a war-related occupying power to prosecute such crimes. 19 Con-
gress has also conferred such a competence in 10 U.S.C. Section 821, since the law
of war with respect to war-related occupation permits the trial of such offenders
and offenses. Thus, when the United States is exercising a war-related occupying
power, a military commission in such territory could prosecute crimes other than
war crimes because of a special competence conferred by the law ofwar concerning
war-related occupation. Where the United States is not such an occupying power,
it is apparent that military commission jurisdiction can be permissible in a theater
of war but will be limited to prosecution of war crimes.
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Again, military commissions at Guantanamo are not within a theater of war or
war-related occupied territory and have no such jurisdiction. 20 Even if they were
constituted in an actual theater ofwar such as Afghanistan or Iraq, questions have
been raised whether the current list of crimes set forth in Military Commission In-
struction No. 2 21 is partly improper because it attempts to list crimes that are not
prosecutable as war crimes as such despite a statement that the "crimes and ele-
ments derive from the law ofarmed conflict, . . . the law ofwar" and "constitute vi-
olations of the law of armed conflict or offenses that, consistent with that body of
law, are triable by military commission."22 For example, Human Rights First has
stated that the list includes crimes that are not war crimes and that offenses
prosecutable by military commission must occur during an armed conflict to
which the laws of war apply. 23 The list does include some crimes that are not war
crimes per se; but conduct relevant to some of the crimes, such as "hijacking or
hazarding a vessel or aircraft"24 and "terrorism," 25 could constitute a war crime
during actual war in a given circumstance and the Instruction requires that "[t]he
conduct took place in the context of and was associated with armed conflict."26 In
fact, terrorism is not new to the laws ofwar and some forms of "terrorism" are war
crimes.27 Some crimes on the list can be war crimes if they are committed against
persons or property protected from attack or destruction by the laws ofwar. These
could involve murder or destruction of property28 if in a given context the murder
or destruction were war crimes. 29 Yet, some of the crimes listed are merely crimes
against the state as such or "pure political offenses"30 and are not war crimes. These
include: "aiding the enemy, spying, 31 perjury or false testimony, and obstruction of
justice related to military commissions."32 The Human Rights First Report also
correctly notes that definitions of "armed conflict" are too broad with respect to
the laws of war and that an attempted jurisdictional reach through such a defini-
tion and concepts such as "associated with" an armed conflict are potentially im-
proper. 33
Other Constitutional Limitations
General Conferral ofCompetence by Congress
Some have argued that Congress must authorize the creation of military commis-
sions and that Congress has not done so with respect to military commissions ad-
dressed in the 2001 Military Order of the President. However, as noted Congress
has generally conferred military commission jurisdiction with respect to prosecu-
tion ofwar crimes in 10 U.S.C. Sections 818 and 821; and it has done so in the same
general language that existed in the 1916 congressional Articles ofWar34 addressed
by the US Supreme Court in Ex parte Quirin and In re Yamashita which not only
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allows such jurisdiction to obtain when a military commission is otherwise prop-
erly constituted and is being used in a manner "contemplated by the common law
of war,"35 but also incorporates the laws of war by reference as offenses against the
laws of the United States whether they are committed by United States or foreign
nationals here or abroad. 36 The President expressly mentioned such a conferral of
jurisdictional competence in his 2001 Military Order. 37 1 do not agree that Con-
gress must do so again in more specific legislation, although it is the case that Con-
gress has not approved the type of military commissions or procedures set forth in
the 2001 Military Order38 or in subsequent Department of Defense (DoD) military
commission rules of procedure or instructions.
A Violation of the Separation ofPowers
Nonetheless, a serious violation of the separation of powers exists with respect to
the attempt by the President in his 2001 Military Order to preclude any judicial re-
view ofUS military commission decisions39 concerning offenses against the laws of
war and other international crimes over which there is concurrent jurisdictional
competence in federal district courts.40 Additionally, under Article I, Section 8,
clause 9 ofthe United States Constitution, Congress merely has power
tt
[t]o consti-
tute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court" and, thus, tribunals subject to ulti-
mate control by the Supreme Court. 41 For this reason, the congressional
authorization for creation of military commissions in 10 U.S.C. Section 821 is nec-
essarily subject to the constitutional restraint contained in Article I, Section 8,
clause 9 and the President's attempt to preclude any form ofjudicial review is con-
stitutionally improper whether or not a military commission has support in a gen-
eral congressional authorization.42
Problems Concerning PresentDoD Rules ofProcedurefor
Military Commissions
Since 9/1 1, we have witnessed the deliberate creation of rules of procedure for US
military commissions that would violate human rights and Geneva law
guarantees43 and can create war crime civil and criminal responsibility for those di-
rectly participating in their creation and application if the military commission
rules are not changed and are utilized. 44 We have seen a refusal to even disclose the
names of persons detained and false Executive claims are made before our courts
and media that human beings have no human rights or Geneva law protections, no
right of access to an attorney or to their consulate, and no right of access to a court
of law to address the propriety of their detention without trial.45 Despite com-
mendable efforts by professional military lawyers to stretch the DoD rules of
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procedure where they can in order to follow the mandate of the President's Mili-
tary Order requiring that all accused have "a full and fair trial,"46 present DoD rules
for military commissions would assure denial of the customary and treaty-based
human rights to trial before a regularly constituted, competent, independent, and
impartial court;47 to counsel of one's choice and to effective representation;48 to
fair procedure and fair rules of evidence, including the right to confrontation and
examination of all witnesses against an accused (an important due process guaran-
tee that can be violated, for example, by use ofunsworn written statements, declas-
sified summaries of evidence, testimony from prior trials or proceedings, certain
forms of hearsay, other testimony from witnesses who do not appear before the
military commission, and reports);49 to review by a competent, independent, and
impartial court of law;50 and to various other human rights, including freedom
from discrimination on the basis ofnational origin (since only aliens will be subject
to prosecution before the military commissions), rights to equality of treatment
and equal protection, and "denial of justice" to aliens. 51 Relevant customary hu-
man rights to due process are also incorporated through common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions as minimum due process guarantees for all persons in any
armed conflict, regardless of their status as combatants or noncombatants52 and
whether or not the due process requirements are mirrored elsewhere in the
Conventions.
Clearly, the DoD rules should be changed. Moreover, they should be construed
consistently with the President's requirement of a "full and fair trial" wherever
possible, since in case ofa potential clash between lawful portions ofthe President's
Military Order and subsequent DoD rules ofprocedure or military commission in-
structions the lawful portions of the Military Order must prevail. 53 Additionally,
since the Executive is bound by international law, 54 the Military Order and subse-
quent DoD rules and instructions should be construed consistently with interna-
tional legal requirements wherever possible. 55 In cases where the Military Order or
DoD rules or instructions are unavoidably violative of international law, interna-
tional law must prevail as supreme law of the United States. 56
Conclusion
Military commissions are "war courts" and their jurisdiction is limited in terms of
context and time to a circumstance of actual war and in terms of place to a theater
of war or a war-related occupied territory. Guantanamo Bay, Cuba is not in a the-
ater ofwar or war-related occupied territory and, thus, a military commission situ-
ated there would not have lawful jurisdiction. Some of the crimes that might be
charged are also not within the competence of a military commission. A serious
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violation of the separation of powers exists because the military commissions at
Guantanamo Bay do not comply with Article I, Section 8, clause 9 of the US Con-
stitution, which requires that tribunals be constituted "inferior to the supreme
Court" and, thus, subject to its ultimate control.
Some of the present DoD rules of procedure and instructions for military com-
missions do not comply with international law, which is the constitutionally based
supreme law of the United States, and they should be changed. Some DoD rules
and instructions have a potential to create violations of international law and to vi-
olate the President's requirement of a "full and fair trial." They should be inter-
preted consistently with international law or changed ifcompliance is not possible.
Serious short- and long-term consequences can ensue for the United States,
other countries, United States and other military personnel, and other US nation-
als if violations of human rights and rights under the Geneva Conventions occur.
Violations are unnecessary. They would degrade this country, its values, and its in-
fluence. They can fulfill terrorist ambitions57 and pose serious long-term threats.
As military officers, we took an oath to preserve and protect the Constitution and
we are bound to comply with the laws ofthe United States, not to violate or degrade
them here or abroad even at the order of a President. 58
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Charles H. B. Garraway*
The decision to use Military Commissions to try persons held at Guantanamo
has attracted massive worldwide opposition. 1 Unfortunately, much of it has
been caught up in the increasing political vitriol that seems to be marking the
whole question of the so-called "war on terror." This is marring what should be a
genuine legal debate. The advent of the International Criminal Court (ICC) with
its emphasis on the doctrine of"complementarity"2 should have encouraged States
to discuss how best crimes arising out of armed conflict should be dealt with on a
domestic level. Is it appropriate in the 21st century to use military justice in this
way or should "democracy" require a civilian response? Instead the issue has be-
come polarized so that people tend to be either "for" military commissions—and
support them without criticism—or alternatively "against"—in which case noth-
ing is good about them at all.
Part of the difficulty is the confusion over the term "war on terror." Is it an
"armed conflict" to which the laws of armed conflict apply? Is it a matter for law
enforcement, in which case the laws of armed conflict may be irrelevant? Or is it a
new form ofconflict to which the law ofarmed conflict can only be applied by anal-
ogy? Traditionally terrorism has been dealt with in the law enforcement para-
digm—and to a large extent still is. 3 In the view of most, Afghanistan was a
traditional armed conflict with the Taliban being the de facto Government of that
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country. As such, the law of armed conflict applied to that conflict.4 The difficult
area is when attempts are made to expand that conflict into a worldwide campaign
against "terrorism" in general and Al Qaeda in particular.
The attempt to extend the law ofarmed conflict into what has traditionally been
a law enforcement area has been confusing and, frankly, badly handled. There has
been a lack of clarity in the pronouncements on law by members of the US Admin-
istration that has made it very difficult to ascertain what the official position is.
There has been a degree of "pick and mix" about the application of the law so that
the impression is given that the United States is selecting those parts that suit its
purpose and rejecting those as "unsuitable" that do not. However unfair this as-
sessment may be, there is no doubt that this is how it is seen in many parts of the
world including among traditional allies. The campaign against terror does raise
some difficult legal issues which both domestic criminal lawyers and international
lawyers have to come to terms with, but a unilateral reinterpretation of traditional
paradigms is not necessarily the right way forward.
Further confusion is caused by the use of the loose term "unlawful combatant."
It implies that those who take part in hostilities become "combatants" and lose
their status as civilians. 5 The argument is put forward that it is ridiculous to de-
scribe a civilian who has chosen to take up arms as anything other than a "combat-
ant." However, this is not necessarily as ridiculous as it may sound. It is accepted
that only certain persons are allowed to take part in hostilities. They are termed un-
der the law of armed conflict "combatants." 6 Those who are not so entitled are
termed "civilians" who have protected status. 7 If these "civilians" chose to take a
direct part in hostilities, they do not change status, any more than a wounded sol-
dier or prisoner ofwar changes status. They lose their protection. 8 Less confusing is
the old fashioned—but, coming from Richard Baxter—well established term
"unprivileged belligerent."9 Such people, in taking part in combat, remain
"unprivileged." That means that they have no combatant immunity and therefore
even acts that to a combatant would be legitimate under the law of armed conflict
are criminal in so far as the unprivileged belligerents are concerned. The combat-
ant who tries to masquerade as a civilian remains a "combatant," and while he may
be committing perfidy, he does not become an "unlawful civilian."
This background has helped to hide what may be the real issue here—a distaste
in the modern world for the concept of military justice. The United States, United
Kingdom and some other nations, mainly of the common law tradition, have well
established military justice systems going back centuries. Based on civil procedures
but modified to meet the peculiar requirements of service life, military justice as it
is applied in those nations is often fairer than the ordinary domestic criminal sys-
tems that it replicates. For example, in the United Kingdom, there was never any
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requirement for a judge in a domestic criminal trial to ensure that an accused fully
understood the nature of his plea if he pleaded guilty. In military courts, a detailed
procedure was followed to ensure that the accused did understand the conse-
quences of his plea and it was not uncommon for guilty pleas to be refused and a
not guilty plea entered. Ironically, many of these safeguards are being abandoned
in the attempt to reflect more closely the civilian system. 10
However, it has to be admitted, this is not the norm worldwide. Since 1945,
military justice has got a bad name through the misuse of the system by repressive
regimes both military and civilian. Could a military court in Stalin's Russia or in
Argentina under the junta be trusted to administer justice? It is because of these
abuses that military courts are looked at askance by so many. The UN Human
Rights Committee has criticized military jurisdiction, particularly over civilians,
stating that the use of military courts to try civilians "could present serious prob-
lems as far as the equitable, impartial and independent administration ofjustice is
concerned. Quite often the reason for the establishment of such courts is to enable
exceptional procedures to be applied which do not comply with normal standards
ofjustice." 11 The European Court ofHuman Rights may soon be asked to examine
just that issue in relation to UK courts-martial in the case of Alan Martin, a 17-
year-old dependent who was tried for murder by a general court-martial in Ger-
many in 1995. 12 The UK system has had to undergo radical overhaul in the last ten
years because of human rights concerns, but in none of the cases that have gone to
Strasbourg have the Court found an actual injustice. 13 The Court has made its rulings
on the basis that justice must be seen to be done and thus reliance on the good faith
of those who run the system is not sufficient. The Convening Officer—"Convening
Authority" in US terminology—has been abolished, not because of any abuse of
his powers but because of the perceived possibility of abuse. Military judges, who
had survived in the Navy though the Army and Air Force had used civilian "judge
advocates" since 1948, were abolished in 2003 for the same reason. 14 The world
has swung full circle.
It was not always so. At the end ofWorld War II, military justice was seen as the
most appropriate means of dealing with cases in a wartime situation. Prisoners of
war were made subject to the disciplinary laws of the forces of the Detaining
Power 15 and civilian court proceedings were to be the exception rather than the
rule. 16 The penal laws passed by an Occupying Power could be enforced by the
"properly constituted, non-political military courts" of the Occupying Power. 17 It
is interesting how military courts were then seen as essentially apolitical. In the case
ofwar crimes, the majority of cases were tried by military courts set up by the Allied
powers. 18 Although, at Nuremberg itself, the trials were conducted primarily, so far
as the Western powers were concerned, by civilian lawyers and judges, many had
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military experience and the military played a major role. Nuremberg was, however,
the exception, not the rule.
On June 14, 1945, by Royal Warrant, Regulations for the Trial ofWar Criminals
were established by the United Kingdom. 19 These established "Military Courts" for
this purpose and a "war crime" was defined as "a violation ofthe laws and usages of
war committed during any war in which His Majesty has been or may be engaged at
any time since the 2nd September 1939." Procedures were established and rules of
evidence laid down. This Royal Warrant is still extant today though it is in grievous
need of updating. The United Kingdom War Crimes Act of 1991,20 designed to en-
able the Government to deal with the legacy ofWorld War II war crimes arising out
of the opening up of the records in Eastern Europe, was, strictly speaking, unneces-
sary except in so far as it granted jurisdiction to civil courts, as military courts al-
ready had jurisdiction under the Warrant.
Even today, in many European nations, "military courts" have the primary ju-
risdiction in war crimes cases. This is so, for example, in Switzerland. 21 However,
this is not always a fair comparison as much "military justice" is now carried out by
the civilian authorities, occasionally using special courts or lawyers who hold re-
servist posts.
There is nothing inherently wrong with military courts, commissions, tribu-
nals—call them what you will—as a forum for dealing with cases ofthis nature. It is
therefore necessary to examine the commissions in a more technical manner rather
than attacking them as a matter of legal principle.
The Presidential Military Order of November 13, 200
1
22 caused considerable
alarm due to the starkness of its terms. For example, Section 1(f) stated "that it is
not practicable to apply in military commissions under this order the principles
of law and the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases
in the United States district courts." The concern was not so much with "rules of
evidence" as with "principles of law." These concerns were compounded by the
limitation of the Military Order to non-US citizens. 23 This is not the place to go
into the controversy of prisoner of war status and the possible conflict with Arti-
cle 82 of the Third Geneva Convention. However, it would appear from the text
that in the case of US citizens, the impracticability referred to in Section 1(f) does
not exist! Why the mere fact of nationality should affect the issue of practicability
is not explained. While it may be argued that US citizens are entitled to their con-
stitutional rights of which they cannot be deprived, this is not a matter of "practi-
cability" but one of law.
Other provisions of the Order also gave cause for concern, including the wide
provisions on evidence, 24 the lack of any judicial appellate structure25 and the ex-
clusion of the supervisory jurisdiction of the civil judiciary. 26 In fact, similar
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provisions appear in the British Royal Warrant of 1945. The problem, however, lies
primarily in the failure to appreciate that the language of 1945 may not any longer
be appropriate in the 21st century, some 60 years later. The world has moved on,
particularly in the field of human rights, a field in which the United States has
played a major part. One only has to consider the role of Eleanor Roosevelt in the
drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 27 The temptation to go
back to old precedents is enormous, but in this case, it undoubtedly caused unnec-
essary problems. Those assigned to translate the Presidential Order into other Or-
ders and Instructions were then faced with marrying up old language with modern
day commitments and starting from a position of antagonism by civil rights orga-
nizations that might, with more care, have been prevented. Many of the criticisms
were easily foreseeable and could have been forestalled with a bit more thought.
The Military Commission Order No. 1 ofMarch 21, 2002 28 and the subsequent
Instructions29 were greeted almost with a sense of relief in some circles! They ap-
peared to row back to a considerable extent from the blunt language of the Presi-
dential Order. In fact, they did not. They merely expressed that Order in slightly
more acceptable language for the 21st century. After all, it was the Presidential Or-
der that was the overall authority for the subsequent Orders and Instructions and
they thus had to be consistent with it. Nevertheless, there was, and still remains,
criticism of the structures proposed.
This will not be a detailed analysis ofthe Orders or Instructions, nor an analysis
of them under US domestic law. That is better carried out by others. This article
will, however, look at some of the key issues of contention and attempt to give an
international perspective to them. This means that it will not examine the scope of
jurisdiction including the crimes themselves and the elements of crimes, as this is
primarily an issue governed by US law. It is ironic that many of the elements are
based on those prepared for the ICC and, where there are changes, these are often
specifically designed to meet the different nature of the law. This is a US domestic
court—not an international one. This is particularly true in the decision to draft el-
ements for the inchoate crimes.30 This would have been far too difficult a task to
carry out for the ICC given the differences between legal systems. Despite US en-
couragement, the Preparatory Commission decided not to go down that particular
route. However, here, in a court operating under a single domestic legal system, US
law, there is merit in drafting such elements. However, these elements should not
necessarily be taken as a framework for other jurisdictions where different substan-
tive law applies, particularly civil law jurisdictions where some of the common law
terms are simply not known. 31
While on elements, one particular innovation is noteworthy—the split in com-




32 The former encompasses liability for the offenses committed, the latter for a
separate offense of failing to act. This is a step in the right direction and provides a
partial answer to the problems arising from the ICTY Appeals Chamber decision in
Hadzihasanovic.33
Criticisms have centered on the evidential provisions, the role of the defense
and the appellate structure. Each will be looked at in turn.
On evidence, the Presidential Order provided that the Commissions could
admit
Such evidence as would, in the opinion of the presiding officer of the military
commission (or instead, ifany other member ofthe commission so requests at the time
the presiding officer renders that opinion, the opinion of the commission rendered at
that time by a majority of the commission) have probative value to a reasonable
person.34
This has been substantially tempered firstly by the Military Commission Order
No. 1 itself which required that the Presiding Officer be a lawyer (to be exact "a
judge advocate ofany United States armed force"),35 as well as laying down slightly
more detailed evidential admissibility criteria. 36 It is still unfortunate that the deci-
sion of the Presiding Officer can be overruled by lay members but this was so, even
in the UK court-martial system, until comparatively recently. However, modern
trends are to leave issues of admissibility of evidence in the hands of a judge, thus
separating the role of judge and juror.
The criticism of the scope of permitted evidence would seem to be wide of the
mark. In domestic jurisdictions, particularly those of a common law nature, there
are extensive—and often illogical—rules on evidence admissibility. 37 Such rules
are much more relaxed in civil law jurisdictions and this is apparent also in the
rules governing international courts. Article 69(3) ofthe ICC Statute, for example,
gives the Court "the authority to request the submission of all evidence that it con-
siders necessary for the determination of the truth."38 This extremely broad provi-
sion is countered slightly by Article 69(4) which allows the Court to rule on
admissibility "taking into account, inter alia, the probative value of the evidence"
against any prejudicial affect. While the Rules of Procedure address methods of
dealing with admissibility questions, 39 they do not detract from the breadth of the
admissibility provisions in the Statute itself. Compared to that, the provisions for
the Military Commissions are comparatively modest!
The second area of concern is the provision of defense counsel. Article 14(3) of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights refers to "counsel of his
own choosing."40 It also refers to the right "to have legal assistance assigned to him,
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in any case where the interests ofjustice so require, and without payment by him in
any such case if he does not have sufficient means to pay for it."41 In so far as this
latter requirement is concerned, it is met by the provisions in Military Commission
Order No. 1, that "Detailed Defense Counsel" will be assigned "for each case."42
Such counsel are free of charge. Criticism is made of the fact that such counsel are
all military judge advocates. However, this appears to be merely another facet of
the distrust of military justice that pervades the world today (and in particular the
human rights community). Military judge advocates assigned to be defense coun-
sel are fiercely independent as they have already indicated.43 However, they are at
risk of coming under pressure from within the chain of command. It is because of
the possibility of such influence that human rights courts have discouraged the use
of military defense counsel. The concern is therefore one of presentation rather
than substance. It does not matter how independent military defense counsel are,
they will not be seen to be so by vast swathes ofthe community—and particularly in
the Muslim world.
Ofgreater concern is the requirement to provide "counsel ofhis own choosing."
It is true that, subject to certain requirements, the accused can select a military
judge advocate.44 However, his choice outside that is limited. He may retain the
services of a civilian attorney "at no expense to the United States Government" but
that attorney must himself fulfill a number of requirements including being a US
citizen and having been determined "to be eligible for access to information classi-
fied at the level SECRET or higher."45 In addition, Military Commission Instruc-
tion No. 546 required such counsel to sign an affidavit placing severe restrictions on
his movements, his power to seek assistance, and even on his right to confidential
communications with his client.47 Such restrictions would be unacceptable to any
British lawyer and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers issued an
ethics opinion "that it is unethical for a criminal defense lawyer to represent a per-
son accused before these military commissions because the conditions imposed
upon defense counsel before these commissions make it impossible for counsel to
provide adequate or ethical representation."48 This resulted in some amelioration
of these rather draconian provisions, in particular the requirement that counsel
pay for their own security clearance and, though here the changes are ambiguous,
on the monitoring of attorney-client communications. Nevertheless, the role of
the "Civilian Defense Counsel" is very definitely subordinate to the military De-
tailed Defense Counsel. He can be excluded from closed sessions and prevented
from obtaining any information on what went on during such sessions.49 If, for
whatever reason, it was decided to hold the complete trial in closed session, the role
of the civilian defense counsel would effectively be denied completely.
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The balance between security considerations and the requirements of fair trial
are always difficult and it is clear that an attempt has been made to find a way
through these two conflicting interests. However, it must be said that it is a com-
promise that, on paper, can satisfy nobody. Only time will tell if the efforts of the
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the American Bar
Association50 bear fruit sufficiently so that the civilian defense counsel actually has
a genuine role to play. While presiding officers, in accordance with their duty, will
undoubtedly strive diligently to ensure that the balance between fairness and the
needs of security is maintained, at present, the risk of abuse is too great and it
would almost have been better to bite the bullet and dispense with the civilian de-
fense counsel altogether. This would undoubtedly lead to an outcry from human
rights activists but in some way would be more honest than introducing such an
option hedged around with so many restrictions as to make it impracticable.
The third area of concern is the appellate structure. The Presidential Order re-
quired the "submission of the record of trial, including any conviction or sentence,
for review and final decision by me or by the Secretary of Defense, if so designated
by me for that purpose." 51 The exclusion of the jurisdiction of the US civil courts
further illustrated that the appellate process would not be through the judiciary but
through the Executive. Again Military Commission Order No.l sought to amelio-
rate this by the insertion in the process of a "Review Panel" at least one member of
which "shall have experience as a judge."52 There have been further developments
including the appointment of senior civil judges to the Review Panel (all being
given two-star rank for the purpose!). 53 The "Review Panel" has been given en-
hanced powers which do seem to go far beyond the original terms of the Order.
The original provisions were again based on old precedents. The British Royal
Warrant of 1945 provides for petitions to the Confirming Officer (the equivalent of
the "Appointing Authority" under Military Commission Order No. 1) and refer-
ence to the Judge Advocate General "for advice and report." 54 Beyond that, the rel-
evant authorities were the Secretaries of State (in this case for War and Foreign
Affairs) or various other designated officials, principally High Commissioners in
occupied territory. 55 This reflected the procedures adopted under military justice
generally. However, again times have moved on as has been reflected in some ofthe
modifications introduced.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights gives the right to "ev-
eryone convicted of a crime" to have his conviction and sentence "reviewed by a
higher tribunal according to law." 56 In 1951, the United Kingdom introduced the
Courts Martial Appeals Court, from where appeal lay to the House of Lords57 and
there are similar appeal provisions applicable in the United States military justice
system. 58 Here, there was initially a regression back to the position where appellate
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structures are wholly within the discretion of the Executive. Even before 1951, in
the United Kingdom, the military justice system was subject to control by the civil-
ian courts through the medium of the prerogative orders, even if that power was
rarely used. However, here, even that supervisory jurisdiction has been excluded.
It is worthy of note that in all the international tribunals established in recent
years to deal with war crimes and similar offenses, a judicial appellate structure has
been built into the system. 59 The days of the Executive having the final say in judi-
cial matters, or even a single judicial body with no right of appeal, have gone. The
United States would have been the first to protest if US citizens had faced similar
executive-controlled processes in the former Soviet block—and rightly so. What is
good for the goose is good for the gander and the argument of "Trust me—I'm the
good guy" no longer washes.
To conclude, this article has looked at three particular areas of concern. There
are others but these are the ones that have attracted the most opposition. It is un-
fortunate that the Executive chose originally to revert to precedents from the first
half of the last century, appearing to ignore the developments in procedures over
the last sixty years, many championed by the United States. The problems are real.
Ifthese proceedings are commenced in a manner that, rightly or wrongly, is seen as
unfair, the effects could be incalculable. There is already a growing view, particu-
larly in the Muslim world, that these Commissions are designed for convictions
and that nobody can receive a fair trial before them. That is wrong. Military judge
advocates of all armed services in the United States are proud of their profession
and will do their best to ensure that justice is done. Military defense counsel and
military judges will act "without fear or favor" and trials will be conducted to the
highest standards ofmilitary justice. However, there is more to it than that. There is
a political battle to be won and it is here ground is being lost. While great play was
made on the original Order and its deficiencies, there has been little publicity out-
side the United States of the ameliorating changes that have been introduced.
The authorities have made great efforts to listen to criticism and to seek to meet
those criticisms within the parameters laid down. It is a great tribute to all those in-
volved that they have not "hunkered down" and sought to defend their own posi-
tions. However, the damage has been done by the failure to present the case
properly. There has been an apparent lack oftransparency in the process which has
affected the way outsiders have looked at it.
Whether or not anybody accepts such a concept as a "war on terror," all may
unite in the view that there is a campaign to be fought and that it must be won, at
least in part, in the hearts and minds of ordinary people. If convicting a few people
of crimes by what are seen as dubious means simply antagonizes hundreds of oth-
ers, driving them into the hands of extremist organizations, the end will be worse
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than the beginning. The United States has been a beacon of liberty and democracy
for most of its existence. It would be unfortunate if the light from that beacon was
obscured by the apparent pursuit of short-term advantage at the expense of long-
term security.
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Introduction
War is not a law-free zone. There have always been rules governing when a
State can legitimately use armed force. In one familiar ancient example,
in the 12th century BC the Mycenaean Greeks most likely sacked the city of Troy
because it was rich and vulnerable. As summer 2004 moviegoers saw, however, by
800 BC the poet Homer felt compelled to clean up the story with a justificatory act
ofTrojan perfidy—the kidnapping of a Spartan queen by a Trojan prince. Accord-
ingly, a more respectable casus belli, rooted in revenge, love and passion, was pro-
vided in The Iliad 1 for what otherwise would have been blatant Greek aggression.
Thus, even in the Age of Heroes, when armed combat was glorified and gods were
believed to fight side-by-side with men, unalloyed aggression was viewed as mor-
ally questionable. The perceived need for some legal justification for unleashing
the dogs of war has remained a constant ever since.
At the beginning of the 17th century, Hugo Grotius noted that, although "[t]he
grounds ofwar are as numerous as those of suits at law Three justifiable causes
for war are generally cited: defense, recovery ofproperty, and punishment." 2 There
is little doubt that the casus belli regularly invoked by States over the subsequent
350 years fell into one or more of these categories. To be sure, given the broad na-
ture of such concepts as "defense" or "punishment," the potential for their abuse
or bad faith application has been quite obvious. Only a hopelessly unimaginative
* Messrs. Rivkin and Casey are partners in the Washington, D.C. office of Baker & Hostetler,
LLP.
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statesman would have been unable to articulate some plausible sounding basis for
his belligerent aims, whatever they might be.
Not surprisingly, while some leaders took full advantage of the considerable
elasticity inherent in the traditional resort-to-force legal and ethical strictures,
dubbed jus ad bellum, others have sought to leash the dogs of war by devising ever
more rigid and proscriptive rules. Indeed, the efforts to ban armed conflict alto-
gether (of which the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact3 is perhaps the best-known exam-
ple), or at least substantially constrain the use of violence, are as old as, or in some
instances, even older, than war itself. The search for legal limitations has intensified
in the 20th century, as the carnage of mechanized warfare and the horrendous ca-
sualties suffered during the two World Wars have substantially diminished com-
bat's erstwhile heroic luster.
These regulatory efforts featured most prominently a no-first use concept,
whereby force could be used only in response to an attack, rather than as an in-
strument of aggression. However, given the fact that waiting to absorb an attack by
an enemy before responding can be a risky strategy, most statesmen and generals
have sought to protect the option of using force first, albeit in anticipation of the
enemy's attack. This anticipatory self-defense doctrine has been a hardy perennial
in international law.4
Anticipatory Defense's Historical Record
Burning the Caroline
The 1837 Caroline incident, 5 involving the British destruction ofan American ship
in US territorial waters, buttressed the modern international law doctrine of "an-
ticipatory self-defense." In accepting the British explanation that the Caroline was
destroyed in "self-defense," anticipating that she would again be used to assist the
Canadian insurgents, American Secretary of State Daniel Webster acknowledged
in 1841 the doctrine's validity, although he attempted to limit its application to the
most extreme circumstances—where the need is "instant, overwhelming, and leav-
ing no choice of means and no moment for deliberation"6—leading many subse-
quent commentators to conclude that the doctrine could be invoked only when the
threat was imminent. 7
Of course, robust anticipatory self-defense had been a well-accepted rule,
firmly grounded in all-important State practice, for centuries before the Caroline
went crashing over Niagara Falls. Indeed, Webster's rather restrictive wording of
this rule was driven largely by the US desire to limit the circumstances in which
Britain or any other European power could claim a legitimate basis for using
force on American soil. In a sense, the Caroline doctrine was meant to provide
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some additional legal scaffolding for the Monroe Doctrine, promulgated in 1823.
Significantly, neither the practice nor the writings by the various international
law authorities evidenced much regard for the notion of instantaneity invoked by
Webster; indeed, many an attenuated or distant threat were judged to be a suffi-
cient casus belli.
In 1587, for example, England's Queen Elizabeth I sent a fleet, commanded by
Sir Francis Drake, to attack Spanish and Portuguese harbors—primarily Cadiz
—
in an effort to prevent, or at least to delay, the arrival of the "Invincible Armada."
Forty years later, Grotius endorsed the practice as lawful in his monumental trea-
tise, The Law ofWar and Peace, noting that self-defense was permissible, both upon
being attacked and also before, where "the deed may be anticipated." 8 Writing over
one hundred years later, another of modern international law's founding fathers,
Emmerich de Vattel, also asserted in The Law ofNations that a country "may even
anticipate the other's [aggressive] design, being careful however, not to act upon
vague and doubtful suspicions."9 Over the next three centuries, anticipatory self-
defense was regularly employed, whether openly or by implication.
By the 20th century, a robust self-defense prerogative was firmly rooted in inter-
national law. For example, in 1939 Britain and France acted in anticipatory self-
defense, warning Germany that the democracies would consider an attack on
Poland to be a casus belli, and going to war when that attack occurred. Germany's
armed forces were not, of course, at that time menacing either Britain or France and
the only legal right either State would have had to threaten Hitler—since Poland
was not British or French territory—must have been based in their rights to antici-
pate future attacks. In fact, it is this same fundamental rule that justifies the Atlan-
tic Alliance's "collective security" scheme—where more than two dozen States
pledged armed support if the territory of any one were attacked—and the United
Nations Charter's approval of "collective" self-defense.
Anticipatory Defense Today
Preemptive use of force has always been an implicit component ofAmerican strat-
egy, and during the Cold War the United States resolutely refused to adopt a de-
claratory no-first use position with respect to nuclear weapons. More recently, in a
June 1, 2002, West Point speech, President Bush articulated a traditional policy
justification for the anticipatory self-defense doctrine, noting that "we must take
the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans and confront the worst threats before they
emerge" and that "ifwe wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too
long." 10 These themes were further elaborated in the National Security Strategy of
the United States (NSS), 1 1 issued by the Bush Administration in September of2002.
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Despite anticipatory self-defense's venerable pedigree, the Bush Administra-
tion's critics claimed that the NSS went too far by not limiting preemption to cir-
cumstances involving imminent threats, by giving preemption such a pride of
place, and thereby alienating many friends and allies. This criticism is misplaced.
American declaratory strategy has always been meant to serve a variety of pur-
poses, including deterring enemies and reassuring friends. Most ofthe time both of
these goals can be accomplished simultaneously. Whenever faced, however, with
an unusually acute threat from groups or regimes difficult or impossible to deter
—
the situation the United States faces today—the deterrence imperatives may rea-
sonably prevail. Thus, emphasizing the vigor of the American preemption strategy
is meant to enhance, to the greatest extent possible, the quality of US deterrence.
Europe's Angst
For all its ample legacy, however, anticipatory self-defense remains controversial.
It is attacked for a variety of reasons, ranging from the more idealistic, albeit not
necessarily prudent, desire to abolish war, or at least to limit the circumstances in
which force can be used, to the belief that the application of the anticipatory self-
defense doctrine inherently leads to abuses and causes instabilities, to the desire to
limit American freedom of action. Indeed, many European officials assert that, ab-
sent a UN Security Council authorization, force can be used only to repel an armed
attack on a State's territory—after it has been initiated. This was certainly the posi-
tion articulated with considerable vigor during the Iraq-related debates by such
countries as France, Germany and Russia.
What explains Europe's embrace of the restrictive view of self-defense? To begin
with, the European criticisms on this subject are often laced with a heavy dose of
anti-Americanism, since it is the United States that is currently viewed as the most
obvious beneficiary of the anticipatory self-defense option. 12 Anti-Americanism
aside, Europe's defense analysts appear to be more concerned with the possibility
that the States' embracing the anticipatory defense strategy will overreact and
strike first without sufficient provocation, rather than with the danger that a de-
layed response to a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) -wielding foe would
prove disastrous.
Meanwhile, the more academically inclined pundits, who used to describe the
Soviet nuclear buildup as a reaction to the United States-initiated arms race, now
argue that the key to maintaining international stability and peace is to keep as high
of a threshold as possible against the use of force and that allowing States to attack,
based upon suspicions or intelligence warnings, would make the use of force a
more frequent occurrence. Their common underlying assumption is that
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misperceptions, mistakes and hair-trigger military deployments, geared towards
preemption, are destabilizing and the main cause of wars.
These criticisms, however, even in their more refined versions, are fundamen-
tally misplaced. The strategy, which would require States to wait until the smoke-
stacks of an enemy fleet rose over the horizon and the first broadside was fired
before responding, was hopelessly unrealistic even when the UN Charter was
adopted in 1945. Particularly in the post-September 11 environment, when ad-
vance warnings may be calculated in seconds rather than days or weeks, or may not
come at all, the consequences ofallowing an enemy to get in the first blow may well
be catastrophic. As President Bush has pointed out, even the most robust deter-
rence "means nothing against shadow terrorist networks with no nation or citizens
to defend," and containment is not possible "when unbalanced dictators with
weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons surreptitiously to our
shores or secretly provide them to terrorist allies." 13
In fact, far from being inconsistent with deterrence, a preemption strategy es-
sentially broadens the range of conduct to be deterred to encompass not just the
use of force—as was the case with the traditional deterrence model—but also ef-
forts to acquire prohibited weapons (or even the efforts to pursue a strategy that
appears to flirt withWMD development and acquisition) or render aid to terrorist
groups. As such, preemption both buttresses and extends deterrence.
Distant Threats
Additional criticisms of the Administration's recasting of the anticipatory self-
defense strategy come from those who claim that, even under the traditional centu-
ries-old view of that doctrine, to justify response the threat had to be imminent.
This argument, however, does not hold water. First of all, although Webster's
Caroline letter indeed formulated the anticipatory self-defense doctrine in terms
that stressed the instantaneousness of the threat, leaving no opportunity for delib-
eration, this was not the formulation used by many of the earlier leading interna-
tional law experts. Moreover, centuries of State practice in this area featured
preemption against both immediate and more long-term threats.
In any case, the concept of an imminent threat is not synonymous with a short-
lead time threat. A threat can be strategically imminent, albeit years away from full
fruition. In today's world, for example, a rogue regime or a pan-national terrorist
group that is committed to our destruction and is seeking to acquire weapons of
mass destruction, while undertaking in the interim more conventional attacks,
poses a strategically imminent threat to the United States fully sufficient to justify
the preemptive use of force. With regard to al Qaeda, in particular, this was the
threat situation that we have been facing for a number of years now.
323
Using Force Lawfully in the 21st Century
Moreover, given the nature of the al Qaeda-style attacks, the only way to pre-
empt successfully against such groups is to do so months, and even years, in ad-
vance of these attacks being launched. This is because the way the enemy is
preparing and carrying out such attacks makes near-term preemption by the
United States inherently ineffective. For example, even if the United States had
toppled the Taliban regime in the summer of 2001, or succeeded in eliminating bin
Laden himselfduring that time period, it would not have necessarily prevented the
September 1 1 attacks. Most of the perpetrators had already infiltrated the United
States, and they could have proceeded without additional help or instructions from
their superiors.
To be sure, to the extent that preemption is being contemplated in response to a
long-term strategic threat, it is reasonable to hold that the threat involved must be
extremely serious in nature. (Conversely, an immediate and certain threat, e.g.,
Caroline-style gun running, even ifnot particularly grave in nature, potentially jus-
tifies a preemptive response.) To proceed otherwise would admittedly render the
anticipatory self-defense doctrine infinitely elastic, eroding all limitations on the
use of force.
Intelligence Mistakes Revisited
Another oft-invoked anti-preemption argument builds upon the Bush Adminis-
tration's failure to find WMD stockpiles in Iraq, claiming that it underscores the
inherent unreliability of all weapons programs intelligence and mitigates against
trying to use force to forestall attenuated, long-term threats. This claim has some
merit; prosecuting a robust preemption strategy may well lead to some erroneous
uses of force. On balance, however, given the threats faced, erring on the side ofbe-
ing too cautious may not be a wise strategy. This is especially the case when dealing
with Saddam Hussein and other regimes that have engaged in aberrant and unpre-
dictable conduct.
Even more fundamentally, the fact that Saddam apparently eschewed, following
the end of the first GulfWar, retaining and enhancing actualWMD stocks did not
render his regime harmless. Iraq retained activeWMD development programs and
engaged in an elaborate strategic cat-and-mouse game, denying any WMD-related
ambitions, while behaving as if it already had substantial weapon stockpiles. 14
Moreover, since Saddam himself was in the best position to determine when he
would require a particular set of weapons, and producing sufficient quantities of
chemical and biological agents and weaponizing them could have been done in a
relatively short time, this just-in-time deployment strategy was perfectly viable. In
any case, from beginning to end, the burden was on Saddam Hussein to prove that
he had fully disarmed—not on the anti-Saddam coalition to prove that he retained
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weapons stockpiles or research programs. The broader point, repeatedly made by
the Bush Administration during the months leading up to the war, was that rogue
regimes, instead of playing hide-and-seek games, were supposed to put forward
various confidence-building measures capable of reassuring the international
community that they were fully and irreversibly disarmed.
The real danger in today's world comes from rogue regimes and terrorist orga-
nizations that care not a whit about international law. As a result, the requirements
of deterrence have become far more onerous, with many of our foes believing that
the United States, in bin Laden's famous words, is "a weak horse." 15 In this situa-
tion, for the United States to accept the proposition that the anticipatory self-
defense doctrine is no longer valid and that, aside from responding to an armed
attack on one's territory, all uses of force require the blessing of the UN Security
Council, would be nothing short of suicidal. More generally, adopting this model
would create an unprecedented dissonance between the policy imperatives and
the legal rules. This is a strain that the law cannot bear. It would lead to the even-
tual demise of all legal restrictions on the use of force.
What about the UN Charter?
Stassen's Revenge
Not surprisingly, since the policy arguments about the benefits of narrowing the
circumstances in which law-abiding States can use force are ultimately unpersua-
sive, its proponents have also sought to use the law as a trump card. They claim that
the anticipatory self-defense doctrine, however venerable or consonant with real
politik imperatives, did not survive the adoption of the United Nations Charter, a
portion of which—Article 2—requires all members of the United Nations to "re-
frain in their international relations from the threat or use of force." The propo-
nents of this restrictive view argue that, absent the Security Council's blessing, the
Charter limits the lawful use of force to circumstances, set forth in Article 51, in
which an armed attack already has taken place and, even then, only pending action
by the Security Council. This assertion, however, relies on an implausible reading
ofArticle 51 and ofother UN Charter provisions. Even more fundamentally, it also
reflects an erroneous, albeit widely held view, that the UN Charter has superceded
and vitiated the entire pre-existing body of customary and treaty-based interna-
tional law.
In fact, the Charter, upon which many of the Bush Administration's critics rely,
neither abrogated the pre-existing body of international law nor abolished the an-
ticipatory self-defense doctrine. To be sure, the goal of at least some of the individ-
uals involved in the negotiations leading up the United Nation's establishment was
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to outlaw war and to limit the right of self-defense so far as to require a State to ab-
sorb an aggressor's first strike. Indeed, this appears to have been the position of
Harold Stassen, who served on the American delegation and suggested that the
right of self-defense was so narrowly crafted that the United States could not attack
an enemy fleet steaming towards the Jersey shore. 16
Yet, whatever Governor Stassen's purposes, when the Charter is read as a whole,
its limitations on the use of force are far more modest. Article 2 ofthe Charter actu-
ally prohibits the use of force in only three circumstances: ( 1) to seize territory; (2)
to impose a colonial-style government; and (3) in a manner "inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations." Thus, the use of military force that does not in-
volve territorial expansion, or does not threaten a member State's independence, is
not forbidden so long as it is not otherwise inconsistent with the United Nation's
purposes. The first among these "purposes" is the maintenance of "international
peace and security," 17 a goal which, while worthy and laudable, is inherently am-
biguous. For example, fierce debates have raged over whether a given use of force,
be it against Slobodan Milosevic or Saddam Hussein, advances or retards "interna-
tional peace and security." Meanwhile, the fact that Article 2 refers to "interna-
tional peace and security" and not just peace also suggests that war avoidance, at all
costs, was not the policy goal advanced by the Charter's drafters.
The notion that the Charter, taken as a whole, allows the unilateral use of force
only in response to an armed aggression is also belied by the actual language of
Article 51. If this restrictive interpretation was correct, Article 51 would have
granted to the UN members the carefully defined self-defense rights. 18 Yet, Article
51 conveys no such authority; instead, it merely acknowledges the continued vital-
ity of the pre-Charter's "inherent right of individual or collective self-defence,"
rooted in customary international law. It also employs a rather casual language, in-
dicating that "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence [attaches] if
an armed attack occurs"; the term "armed attack" is not defined and there is no in-
dication that this inherent right arises only if an armed attack takes place. 19
This level of precision is perfectly acceptable if one construes Article 51 as an il-
lustrative example of a much broader set of self-defense-related powers that are
available to all sovereign States. It is, however, manifestly deficient if that article
provides the only legally permissible avenue for using force, short of obtaining a
Security Council authorization. 20 Moreover, a restrictive reading of Article 51, as
the exclusive venue for using force, essentially renders Article 2's broad and rather
permissive language regarding the use of force entirely superfluous. It is, of course,
the common principle of statutory or treaty interpretation that any construction
that vitiates some of the provisions is disfavored. By contrast, viewing Article 2 as
the Charter's main provision for assessing the legitimacy of the use of force, with
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the Article 51 being a rather narrow "safe harbor" 21—if the use of force fits into
the Article 51 -compliant set of circumstances, there no is need to perform the
broader "all facts and circumstance" -type analysis envisioned by Article 2—is
both consistent with the relevant statutory language and gives meaning to both of
the Articles.
Moreover, given the nature of the UN system, which features veto authority by
the permanent members of the Security Council, and gives even non-permanent
members an opportunity to block the Council from exercising its Chapter VII
powers, it was predictable that a Security Council deadlock would be a common
state of affairs. Indeed, it is significant that throughout its entire operating history,
both during the Cold War and thereafter, the Council has never acted in the way
that the proponents ofthe restrictive reading ofthe Charter expected it to act; while
the Council has determined on several occasions that a breach of the peace or a
threat to the peace existed, it has never engaged in enforcement measures, involv-
ing the mandatory use of military force. 22 It is, therefore, implausible to believe that
the Charter's drafters, aside from a few pacifists like Harold Stassen, would have
vested that body with an exclusive authority to use force. When one considers that
the Charter's drafters were only too aware ofthe extent to which the obsession with
the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the policy of appeasing Hitler had paved the way for
World War II, this interpretation is even more incomprehensible.
Anticipatory-Defense "Lite"
Some international law scholars also espouse the view that, while a broad version of
anticipatory self-defense has been blocked by the Charter's adoption, a more mod-
est version of this doctrine has survived. Professor Dinstein, who is one of the lead-
ing proponents of this claim, has even coined the term "interceptive" 23 self-
defense. This right is evidently triggered by an armed attack that is "imminent" and
"unavoidable," but that has not yet reached its intended victim. 24 In fleshing out
this concept of interceptive self-defense, Dinstein has used such examples as the
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Thus, he argues
that ifthe United States were to have destroyed Admiral Yamamoto's carrier battle
groups as they were steaming towards Pearl Harbor, the Unites States would have
been engaged in interceptive self-defense. When it comes to the 1967 War, given a
wide range of hostile measures taken by Egypt—ejection ofthe UN observers from
the Gaza Strip and Sinai, the closure of the Straits of Tiran, military mobilization
and movement of forces, accompanied by shrill anti-Israeli rhetoric—in Dinstein's
view Israel's early use of force was another example of interceptive self-defense.
From the policy perspective, Dinstein's somewhat elastic formulation is certainly
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preferable to the most rigid formulation of Article 51, which would require the
"victim" actively to absorb a first strike.
It is, however, not a particularly useful analytical tool for determining, on a pro-
spective basis, the legality of any particular use of force. The reason for this is quite
simple; unless one adopts a rather crude Marxist interpretation ofhistorical events,
in which certain events become inevitable because of the underlying workings of
history, nothing is truly unavoidable and inevitable. Thus, unless one awaits until
the attack has been physically launched (in which case, the doctrine becomes virtu-
ally indistinguishable from the traditional narrow reading of Article 51)—i.e., the
missiles are in the air—one never knows in advance when an attack is unavoidable.
History is replete with examples of crises building up to a crescendo, when the use
offeree seemed imminent, only to dissipate because of last-minute diplomatic in-
terventions. Indeed, before the "lights went out," in Lord Gray's famous formula-
tion, in 1914, there were several instances when European war was avoided at the
last minute. Examples include the 1909 Austrian Annexation of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, the 1911 "Agadir Crisis," and the 1912-13 Balkan wars. When one
looks at the Pearl Harbor example, it is certainly conceivable, albeit highly unlikely,
that the Japanese government could have issued last-minute recall orders to Admi-
ral Yamamoto. The same is true when one comes to the 1967 situation; an adroit
US-Soviet diplomacy could have prevented it. 25
However, the single greatest weakness of this anticipatory defense "lite" doc-
trine is that it is not based upon the Charter's actual language. Article 51's language
uses the word "occurs," rather than "launched or commenced," in describing the
triggering circumstances. Yet, to justify Dinstein's "interceptive" concept, the
word "occurs" would have to be stretched to the point where it loses any
discernable meaning. Once this is done, "occurs" may just as well be construed to
mean the birth of a future aggressor or the early hatching of an aggressive plan.
The bottom line is that anticipatory self-defense "lite" is less supportable by the
Charter's language, than either the permissive or restrictive interpretations ofArti-
cles 2 and 51.
Assault on National Interest
In parsing the UN Charter and assessing the legal merits of the various arguments
relating to the legitimacy of the anticipatory self-defense doctrine, it is also signifi-
cant that the arguments used by the Administration's critics are internally incon-
sistent. For example, in trying to figure out whether a given use of force violates
Article 2, one must ascertain whether the action at issue would promote the pur-
poses of the United Nations. In this regard, it is certainly reasonable to argue that
removing from power a man like Saddam Hussein—who for decades clearly
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sought to acquire nuclear weapons; developed, deployed and used both chemical
and biological weapons on his own people and his neighbors; viewed himself as a
modern day Saladin; and defied Security Council resolutions for well over a de-
cade—was entirely consistent with the UN Charter.
It is also possible to opine, of course, that the strategy of regime change in Iraq
was not likely to promote international security. Indeed, some scholars argue pre-
cisely that, while also claiming that some other uses of force, which they happen to
favor, like NATO's use of force against Milosevic's Serbia, were more consonant
with United Nation's purposes. However, whatever one thinks about the analytical
merits of the argument that Milosevic posed a greater threat to international peace
and security than did Saddam Hussein, or that the Kosovars were oppressed (and
thereby deserving of a rescue) more than the Iraqi Shiites and Kurds, the very elas-
tic nature of these claims renders them utterly unsuitable as legal arguments.
It is also disingenuous to argue that, as a matter of law, humanitarian interven-
tion to aid the residents of another country that are being brutalized by their rulers
is legal under the UN Charter, presumably because it is always consistent with the
Charter's laudable goals, but a national interest-driven intervention is somehow
not similarly legitimate. 26 Leaving aside the issue of the rather idiosyncratic read-
ing of the Charter, which, on its face, does not legitimize humanitarian interven-
tions, it is not obvious why this humanitarian intervention principle only applies
to the protection of foreign nationals, rather than a State's own citizens. In a post-
September 1 1 world, US actions to destroy terrorist organizations and their spon-
sors are the clear equivalent of a humanitarian intervention in defense of
American citizens.
Collective Action
Then there are scholars who, perhaps realizing the utter un-workability of a pure
restrictive interpretation of the UN Charter, try to read into it some modified ver-
sion of the Security Council's primacy in the use-of-force area. They do this by ex-
tolling the legal legitimacy of collective actions, even if these do not command the
support of the entire Security Council. From a policy perspective, an approach
which postulates that force can be legitimately used even though one or two States
have blocked the Security Council from acting is perhaps more manageable than
requiring a Security Council's blessing; the only problem is that there is not the
slightest support in the UN Charter or any other international legal document for
this theory.
There are also commentators who purport to discover in the UN Charter provi-
sions that bless regional actions, while leaving nation States acting "unilaterally"
entirely to the mercies of Article 51. However, those provisions (found in Chapter
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VIII of the UN Charter), do not permit a regional organization, such as the Organi-
zation of American States (OAS) or NATO, to operate as the Security Council's
surrogate. Indeed, for example, the imprimatur of regional organizations, while
perhaps valuable as a diplomatic tool, is of little legal value. During the Cuban Mis-
sile Crisis, for example, the foundation of both the right of the United States, and
the OAS, to take action against the Soviet Union and Cuba was their inherent right
of individual and collective self defense, including the right of anticipatory self-
defense. As a matter of international law, a group of States has no more inherent
right to use force than any one of its nation-State members. The champions of
Chapter VIII of the Charter also do not seem to realize the inherent frailty of their
approach: all one has to do to qualify, in an otherwise restrictive regulatory envi-
ronment, for a broad anticipatory self-defense option, is to create a cooperative re-
gional organization. This can be accomplished in a fortnight.
The Actual Practice of States
Moreover, the notion that anticipatory self-defense is barred by the UN Charter
has not been supported by the actual practice of States in the years since the
United Nations was established. That, in the final reckoning, is the critical point.
Anyone attempting to determine what international law, whether customary or
conventional, truly provides on any particular point would do well to heed the
Marquise de Merteuil's maxim in Les Liaisons Dangereuses27 ; don't listen to what
people tell you, watch what they do. Here, the evidence is overwhelming that the
traditional law of anticipatory self-defense has survived the adoption of the UN
Charter. As Michael Glennon notes, since 1945 two-thirds of the members of the
United Nations have fought 291 inter-State conflicts in which over 22 million
people have been killed. 28
Among the more important post-Charter instances of "anticipatory" self-
defense must be counted the 1956 "Suez Crisis," where France, Britain and Israel
launched military operations against Egypt based on Nasser's seizure of the Suez
Canal. The affair was a political disaster for the governments involved, but it is
highly significant that Britain and France, both charter members of the United Na-
tions and permanent members of the Security Council, claimed that the Israeli-
Egyptian military clash, which took place in a close proximity to the Suez Canal,
was a threat to the world's economy and therefore adequate to justify armed action.
Needless to say, this was a very broad formulation of a classical anticipatory self-
defense argument, perhaps even broader than the argument used by the Japanese
Prime Minister Tojo, who justified Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor by the claim that
American economic sanctions were strangling imperial Japan.
330
David B. Rivkin, Jr. and Lee A. Casey
In 1967, Israel acted preemptively against Egypt, Syria and Jordan, rather than
await the attack of their massing forces. Israel was neither condemned nor sanc-
tioned by the UN for this action. Similarly, Israel attacked and destroyed an Iraqi
nuclear power facility in 1981, again citing "self-defense" as justification. Al-
though, this time, Israel's action was condemned in the Security Council, no action
was taken to address this supposed "aggression." Recalling the Marquise's maxim,
whatever the verbiage used, this strongly suggests a fundamental recognition that
Israel acted in accordance with its rights under international law to anticipate, and
foil, attacks before they are launched.
Israel, of course, has not been alone in exercising the right of anticipatory self-
defense. In 1986, President Reagan ordered attacks against terrorist targets in Libya
to prevent their use against US interests. In 1982, Britain claimed a 150-mile ex-
clusion zone around the Falkland Islands as a preventative measure, and in 1983,
Sweden asserted the right to use armed force against any foreign submarine sailing
within 12 miles of her territorial sea. In 1989, the George H. W. Bush Administra-
tion used force to oust Panama's strongman Manuel Noriega, arguing that he
posed a threat to the safety of the American service members present in Panama
and their families. All ofthese actions can be justified only by a right of anticipatory
self-defense.
Yet, perhaps the most important modern example of anticipatory self-defense
—
before Operation Iraqi Freedom—came during the Cuban Missile Crisis caused by
the Soviet efforts to install ballistic missiles armed with nuclear warheads in Cuba.
Although there were absolutely no indications that the Soviets intended to launch
these missiles against the United States, immediately or in even the distant future,
the Kennedy Administration claimed that the purpose of the Soviet deploy-
ments
—
"to provide a nuclear strike capability against the Western Hemi-
sphere"—was sufficient justification for the imposition of a naval "quarantine."29
Although the US threat assessment was also shaped by a perception that Soviet
leader Khrushchev had engaged in nuclear saber rattling, threatened the United
States in Berlin and elsewhere, and may have been irrational and impulsive, Presi-
dent Kennedy's bottom-line conclusion was clearly that, in a nuclear age, a precipi-
tous effort by an avowed American foe to change the strategic balance ofpower was
enough of a threat to American security to justify the resort to an anticipatory self-
defense doctrine.
To argue that all of these uses of force have been illegal under the UN Charter, as
some proponents of the restrictive interpretation of the Charter have done, (or
even that most ofthem were illegal has been done by those who advocate anticipa-
tory defense "lite" or allow its use only when invoked by regional organizations)
constitutes both a rejection of the validity of State practice—traditionally, the most
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reliable and authoritative way to establish international legal norms—and a partic-
ular dogmatic approach to the Charter's interpretation. Significantly, the fact that
States involved have consistently claimed that their actions have been consistent
with the UN Charter is neither hypocritical nor an effort to re-write the Charter
through subsequent practice; rather, it is a proof of their embrace of the permissive
interpretation of the Charter.
Conclusion
Overall, the UN Charter, far from being a comprehensive legal edifice barring all
uses of force, except for the Article 51 -compliant situations and various forms of
collective action, is actually a far more modest document. It basically reaffirms a
long-standing rule, which was not always honored, but nevertheless, frequently
announced, against an aggressive use of force, sets forth a safe harbor rule for the
use of force in response to an armed attack against one's territory or the territory of
one's allies, while not inhibiting a broader range of defensive uses of force, includ-
ing in anticipation of an attack.
Although a nuclear Armageddon is far less likely today, the actual use of weap-
ons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical, and biological, has become a very real
and immediate threat. The principal danger is not that one State will attack another
with these weapons, but that non-State actors, such as al Qaeda, who are by defini-
tion beyond deterrence, will obtain and use WMDs. This is because, for the first
time ever, modern technology has enabled private individuals, aided and abetted
by failed States, to create military-style forces capable of projecting power across
the globe. That, of course, is precisely what al-Qaeda achieved on September 11; it
projected power. Traditional deterrence works poorly in this novel strategic
environment.
This means that the traditional rules of international law, which permit States to
anticipate threats and to act before an attack actually is initiated, are far more im-
portant than in the past. Unfortunately, while these rules have not been vitiated by
the UN Charter and have been reflected in ample State practice, both prior to and
post- 1945, they have been subjected to strident legal and policy attacks by many
States, international organizations and most international law experts. Given the
importance of legal and ethical considerations in American policy-making, the
United States must continue to defend the validity of these traditional rules. Only
with these rules in place can the United States hope to protect its citizens from at-
tack, maintain international stability, and defeat rogue States and terrorist groups
that pose a grave threat to the entire civilized world.
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There is a popular notion (based on some loose language used by the Bush
Administration) that the hostilities conducted by the American-led Coali-
tion ofthe willing against Iraq in 2003 were based on a legal doctrine ofpreemptive
forcible action against a potential threat. From the standpoint of international law,
this popular notion is as untenable as it is unnecessary. The present article will first
set the proper predicate for the legality of the action taken against Iraq. Then, the
article will turn to the spurious contention of preemptive action.
A Legal Analysis ofthe Various Phases ofthe GulfWar
It is common practice to refer to the hostilities in Iraq in 2003 in a manner discon-
nected from the hostilities of the early 1990s: some media stories have even used
the expressions "GulfWar I" and "GulfWar II." However, in reality there has been
only a single GulfWar which started in 1990 and is still not over in 2004. Admit-
tedly, that war has consisted of a number of phases, yet each phase must be viewed
as a part of the whole. The three main phases of the GulfWar are:
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The Gulf War: 1990-2004 (And Still Counting)
The Invasion and Liberation of Kuwait (1990-1991)
Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990. Within a few hours, the United Nations
Security Council adopted Resolution 660, which determined the existence of "a
breach of international peace and security," and demanded immediate and uncon-
ditional withdrawal of the Iraqi forces. 1 This was (and still is) only the second reso-
lution in the history of the Security Council in which it used the phrase "breach of
international peace" and then proceeded to take action. (The first being Resolution
82 of 1950 relating to the invasion of South Korea by North Korea, 2 although that
resolution used the slightly different phrase "breach of the peace.")
Following Resolution 660, the Council adopted a string of other resolutions
which, inter alia, imposed on Iraq mandatory economic sanctions under Chapter
VII of the Charter (Resolution 661 3 ) and even a blockade (Resolution 6654 ).
When Iraq did not relent, the Council—in Resolution 678 of November 29,
1990—authorized the "Member States co-operating with the Government of Ku-
wait," should Iraq not fully comply with previous Council resolutions by January
15, 1991, "to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660
(1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace
and security in the area." 5 The formula "to use all necessary means" has since be-
come the common and accepted euphemism for the use of force.
Pursuant to Resolution 678, and upon the expiry of the ultimatum, the armed
forces of a large American-led Coalition struck at Iraq on the night of January 16/
17, 1991. It is important to understand that at no time did the Council establish a
United Nations force for combat purposes against Iraq.6 The legal foundation of
the use of force against Iraq by the coalition was collective self-defense. 7 Under Ar-
ticle 5 1 of the United Nations Charter, when an armed attack occurs, any State is
entitled to respond by exercising its right of individual or collective self-defense. 8 A
specific affirmation of "the inherent right ofindividual or collective self-defence, in
response to the armed attack by Iraq against Kuwait, in accordance with Article 51
of the Charter," was already incorporated into Resolution 66 1. 9 Even the phrase
"Member States co-operating with the Government ofKuwait" suggests that these
are "nations engaged in collective [self-] defense with Kuwait." 10
The meaning of Resolution 678 is that, while the Security Council abstained
from deploying a veritable United Nations force as an instrument of collective se-
curity, it gave its blessing in advance to the voluntary exercise of collective self-
defense by the members of the Coalition (following an interval of several weeks de-
signed for the exhaustion of the political process). The core of the resolution was
the prospective approval of future action. 11 In an ordinary constellation of events,
States first employ force in individual or collective self-defense and only then re-
port to the Council about the measures that they have taken, so that the Council
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investigates the nature of the hostilities retrospectively. In the particular case of
Iraq, the Coalition sought and obtained from the Council a green light for the exer-
cise of collective self-defense against the perpetrator of an armed attack (Iraq) well
before the projected military clash. Thereafter, the Coalition did not have to worry
about the reaction of the Council, inasmuch as that reaction had predated the ac-
tual combat.
Considering that the military operations of the Coalition in 1991 were a mani-
festation of collective self-defense—rather than collective security—there was
technically no need for the specific mandate of Resolution 678 to legally validate
the employment of forcible measures against Iraq. 12 Article 51 per se ought to have
sufficed in authorizing the Coalition to resort to force in response to the Iraqi
armed attack, and arguably Resolution 678 only tied the hands of the countries co-
operating with Kuwait in that they had to hold their fire until January 15. 13 Of
course, in political and psychological terms, Resolution 678 had an incalculable ef-
fect: internationally (cementing the solidarity of the Coalition and swelling its
ranks) as well as domestically (mobilizing public opinion to political support ofthe
action against Iraq).
The Cease-Fire Period (1991-2003)
Cease-fire terms were dictated to Iraq by the Security Council, in April 1991, in
Resolution 687. 14 These were rigorous terms, which compelled Iraq, inter alia, to dis-
arm itself of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), but Iraq accepted them. It must
be appreciated that, although the conditions ofthe cease-fire were delineated by Res-
olution 687, the ensuing cease-fire constituted an agreement between the Coali-
tion—rather than the United Nations (which remained above the fray)—and Iraq.
The cease-fire in Iraq went on for a dozen years, yet it failed to spawn peace. In-
stead of moving towards a peaceful settlement, the Coalition and Iraq were con-
stantly at loggerheads, inasmuch as Iraq—from the very onset of the cease-fire
—
was unwilling to fully comply with its agreed-upon terms, especially as regards dis-
armament ofWMD. Huge quantities of chemical weapons agents, and a variety of
biological weapons production equipment and materials, were destroyed under
the supervision of UN inspectors. 15 However, quite frequently between 1991 and
2003 (in particular, in 1998/1999), Coalition warplanes struck Iraqi targets, striv-
ing unsuccessfully to compel Iraq to abide by the cease-fire conditions and espe-
cially to cooperate with UN disarmament inspectors. 16 The sundry air strikes by
the Coalition must be construed as a resumption of combat operations in the face
of Iraqi violations of the cease-fire terms. 17
Already under Resolution 688, adopted within a few days of the entry into force
of the cease-fire, the Security Council (without naming Chapter VII) held that the
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Iraqi repression of the civilian population (particularly the Kurds) "threaten inter-
national peace and security in the region" and insisted that Iraq "allow immediate
access by international humanitarian organizations to all those in need of assis-
tance in all parts of Iraq and to make available all necessary facilities for their opera-
tion." 18 As a result, with the military help of armed forces of the United States and
other Coalition countries, "access" to humanitarian aid was achieved through the
creation ofan air exclusion ("no-fly") zone securing a Kurdish enclave in the north
of Iraq. In 1992, another "no-fly" zone was established over the Shiite areas in the
south of the country. In the next decade, many air strikes were conducted by Coali-
tion warplanes against Iraq in response to Iraqi defiance of the "no-fly" zones. 19
The Occupation of Iraq (2003)
The state of war between Iraq and the Coalition continued notwithstanding the
suspension of general hostilities in 1991. When the friction between Iraq and the
Coalition culminated in the resumption of general hostilities of 2003, events were
examined by a host of commentators against the backdrop of a doctrine of "pre-
emption" set out by President George W. Bush (see below). 20 But, as conceded by
the Legal Adviser of the Department of State: "Was Operation Iraqi Freedom an ex-
ample of preemptive use of force? Viewed as the final episode in a conflict initiated
more than a dozen years earlier by Iraq's invasion ofKuwait, it may not seem so." 21
There is absolutely nothing preemptive about the resumption of hostilities
when a cease-fire disintegrates. The leading partner of the United States in the Co-
alition against Iraq—the United Kingdom—formally took the position that the le-
gal basis of the 2003 hostilities was a revival of the Coalition's right to use force
against Iraq consequent upon the Iraqi material breach of the cease-fire.22
As indicated, Iraqi reluctance to comply with its obligations ofWMD disarma-
ment brought about numerous clashes with the Coalition throughout the cease-
fire period. Ultimately, in the face of persistent reports about Iraq's violations of
its obligations in this regard, the Coalition decided to terminate the cease-fire. The
fact that no WMD were found in Iraq after its occupation is irrelevant: on the eve
of the resumption of hostilities, everybody—including the UN inspectors—be-
lieved that Iraq had not fully observed its disarmament undertakings. 23 Iraqi re-
fusal to cooperate unreservedly with UN inspectors led to a series of Security
Council resolutions branding its conduct a "material breach" of its disarmament
obligations.
It is wrong to argue (as was done by the United Kingdom) that the legality of the
Coalition's right to use of force against Iraq in 2003 hinged on a revival of Security
Council Resolution 678. 24 Resolution 678 gave the blessing of the Security Council
to the military action taken in 1 99 1 , and surely it had nothing to do with operations
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conducted a dozen years later under totally different circumstances. However,
there was no need for a revival of Resolution 678 in 2003, just as there was no strict
need for its original adoption in 1990. Both in 1991 and in 2003, the Coalition
acted on the basis of the right of collective self-defense with which it was directly
vested by Article 51 of the Charter and by customary international law.
A cease-fire, which merely suspends hostilities without terminating the war,
does not extinguish the right of collective self-defense that remains legally intact
for the duration of the war. 25 The criteria for the legitimate exercise of this right re-
main anchored to the circumstances of the outbreak of the war (in this case, in
1990). The disintegration of a cease-fire by dint of its violation by one belligerent
party—and the forcible response of the adversary—is not to be confused with the
initiation of a new war.
Under Article 40 of the Regulations annexed to Hague Convention (II) of 1899
and to Hague Convention (IV) of 1907 Respecting the Laws and Customs ofWar
on Land, a serious violation by a party to a cease-fire ("armistice" in the original
wording of the Regulations) empowers the other side to denounce it and, in cases
ofurgency, to resume hostilities immediately. 26 The modern practice is to refer not
to a serious violation but to a "material breach." This phrase appears in Article
60(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (as a ground for termina-
tion or suspension ofbilateral treaties). 27 The applicability of the "material breach"
criterion to general cease-fire agreements had been recognized in the international
legal literature even before the Vienna Convention was crafted in its final form. 28
The meaning of the phrase "material breach" is not unequivocal. 29 Article 60(3)
of the Vienna Convention defines a "material breach" as either "a repudiation of
the treaty not sanctioned by the present Convention" or a "violation of a provision
essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of the treaty."30 Which
provision is to be considered "essential"? It is generally recognized that, in the con-
text of a material breach, the term covers any "important ancillary provision" of a
treaty.31 Thus, the WMD disarmament clauses in the cease-fire agreement with
Iraq were decidedly essential (albeit ancillary to the suspension of hostilities), and
their violation constituted a "material breach."
It is therefore noteworthy that, as early as August 1991 (a few months after the
entry into force of the cease-fire suspending hostilities), the Security Council
—
acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, in Resolution 707 (1991)—already con-
demned Iraq's serious violation of its disarmament obligations and established
that the violation "constitutes a material breach of the relevant provisions of reso-
lution 687.
"
32 Eleven years late, in Resolution 1441 (2002), the Security Council
(again acting under Chapter VII) decided "that Iraq has been and remains in
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material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions, including resolution
687(1991)." 33
Many commentators maintain that—subsequent to Resolution 1441—the Co-
alition could not take military action against Iraq in 2003 without obtaining a spe-
cific go-ahead signal from the Security Council to resort to force. 34 The fact that
the Coalition failed to persuade the Security Council to adopt a further resolution
expressly authorizing—in the vein of Resolution 678—the use of "all necessary
means" (i.e., force) against Iraq was regrettable from a political standpoint. But,
legally speaking, such an additional resolution was not required. Even those con-
tending that Resolution 1441 "does not contain any 'automaticity' as concerns the
potential use of force" have to concede that the text lends itself to a different inter-
pretation. 35 It most assuredly does not prescribe—or even necessarily imply
—
that, prior to recourse to force, the Coalition must return to the Security Council
for a second (confirmatory) resolution. 36
The clear inference from the determination by the Security Council as regards
the Iraqi "material breach" was that the other side to the cease-fire agreement was
released from its obligation to continue to respect the cease-fire.37 A salient point,
often missed by commentators on this topic,38 is that the other side to the cease-fire
agreement with Iraq was not the United Nations as such but the Coalition. 39 Re-
sumption ofthe hostilities, therefore, did not require an explicit stamp ofapproval
from the Security Council.
In reality, even the determination of the existence of an Iraqi "material breach"
need not have been made by the Security Council.40 By right, this determination
could have been made by the Coalition itself. Differently put, there was no legal (as
distinct from a political) need for the Coalition to have turned to the Security
Council in the first place (just as in 1990/1991 the Coalition did not have to go the
Security Council for Resolution 678 or, for that matter, Resolution 687). Yet, since
the Coalition chose to bring the matter before the Security Council in 2002—and
since the Council did set up an enhanced inspection regime, giving Iraq a "final op-
portunity" to comply with the disarmament obligation41—the Coalition was con-
strained to give that inspection regime a chance of success. Similarly to Resolution
678, which equally offered Iraq a "final opportunity"42 and tied the hands of the
Coalition by introducing a temporal interval during which it had to hold its fire,
Resolution 1441 did not leave the Coalition the option to recommence hostilities
immediately. Thus, despite the determination of the existence of a "material
breach" of the cease-fire terms, the Coalition had to await new UN inspectors' re-
ports. However, when a number of reports were in, it became clear that there were
still unresolved issues and that Iraq had failed to take all the steps required to put an
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end to its "material breach."43 The freedom of action of the Coalition was accord-
ingly regained.
Following a final ultimatum, the Coalition terminated the cease-fire with Iraq
and resumed hostilities on March 20, 2003. Baghdad fell on April 9th, and in a few
days major combat operations were over. All the same, irregular fighting has per-
sisted long after the occupation of Iraq (with an upsurge in the violence a year later,
in 2004). Already in May 2003, the Security Council determined that the situation
in Iraq, although improved, continued to constitute "a threat to international
peace and security."44 In October 2003, the Council expressly authorized "a multi-
national force under unified command" (structured around the Coalition military
units) "to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security
and stability in Iraq."45 In June 2004, in accordance with Security Council Resolu-
tion 1546, the formal occupation of Iraq by the Coalition ended, and an Interim
Government reasserted full responsibility and authority; nevertheless, the multi-
national (Coalition) force remained in the country and its authority "to take all
necessary measures" was reaffirmed by the Council.46
Preemptive Self-Defense
The United States has traditionally taken the position that a State may exercise "an-
ticipatory" self-defense,47 in response not merely to a "hostile act" but even to a
"hostile intent" (a dichotomy elevated to the level of doctrine by the US Rules of
Engagement).48 In the past, the United States was careful to underscore that antici-
patory self-defense—or response to a hostile intent—must nevertheless relate to
the "threat of imminent use of force."49 The emphatic use of the qualifying adjec-
tive "imminent" is of great import. As we shall see, the imminence of an armed at-
tack (provided that it is no longer a mere threat) does indeed justify an early
response by way of interceptive self-defense. However, after the heinous terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), a well-known statement of policy on pre-
emptive action in self-defense was issued as part of the US National Security Strat-
egy, 50 and this is often referred to as the "Bush Doctrine" (after President George
W. Bush). 51 The new policy appears to push the envelope by claiming a right to
"preemptive" self-defense countering pure threats based on the "capabilities and
objectives" of today's adversaries, especially terrorists and in particular when the
potential use ofWMD comes into the equation. 52 It is not yet clear what practical
effects the new policy will have in reality. But to the extent that it will actually bring
about the preventive use of force in response to sheer threats, it will not be in com-
pliance with Article 51 of the Charter.
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Since Article 51 permits self-defense solely when an "armed attack" occurs, the
question arises whether there exists—independently of the Charter—a broader
customary international law right of anticipatory self-defense. The International
Court of Justice, in the Military and Paramilitaries Activities case of 1986, based its
decision on the norms of customary international law concerning self-defense as a
sequel to an armed attack. 53 Yet, the Court stressed that this was due to the circum-
stances of the case, and it passed no judgment on the issue at hand. 54
On the other hand, Judge Schwebel—in his Dissenting Opinion—did take a
clear-cut position on the subject. In conformity with a scholarly school of thought
maintaining that Article 51 only highlights one form of self-defense (viz., response
to an armed attack), without negating other patterns of legitimate action in self-
defense vouchsafed by customary international law,55 Judge Schwebel rejected a
reading of the text which would imply that the right of self-defense under Article
51 exists "if, and only if, an armed attack occurs."56
In the opinion ofthe present writer, precisely such a limitative reading ofArticle
51 is called for. Any other interpretation of the Article would be counter-textual,
counter-factual and counter-logical.
First, a different interpretation of Article 51 would be counter-textual because
the use of the phrase "armed attack" in Article 51 is not inadvertent. The expres-
sion should be juxtaposed with comparable locutions in other provisions of the
Charter. It is particularly striking that the framers ofthe text preferred in Article 5
1
the coinage "armed attack" to the term "aggression," which appears in the Charter
in several contexts (the Purposes ofthe United Nations (Article 1(1)), collective se-
curity (Article 39) and regional arrangements (Article 53(1)). 57 The choice of
words in Article 51 is deliberately confined to a response to an armed attack.
An armed attack is, of course, a type of aggression. Aggression in its generic
meaning may be stretched to include mere threats, although it is interesting that a
consensus Definition of Aggression, adopted by the General Assembly in 1974
—
while not pretending to be exhaustive—does not cover the threat of force. 58 Yet,
only a special form of aggression amounting to an armed attack justifies self-de-
fense under Article 5 1 . The French version of the Article sharpens its thrust by
speaking of "une agression armee." 59 Under the Article, a State is permitted to use
force in self-defense only in response to aggression which is armed.
Second, the idea that one can go beyond the text of Article 51 and find support
for a broad concept of preventive self-defense in customary international law is
counter-factual. When did such customary international law evolve and what evi-
dence in the practice of States (as distinct from scholarly writings) do we have for
it? The right of self-defense crystallized only upon the prohibition of the use of
force between States. That prohibition was first evinced in the Kellogg-Briand Pact
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of 192860 and reiterated, in clearer and broader terms, in Article 2(4) of the Charter
in 1945. 61 What preventive war of self-defense was unleashed between 1928 and
1945?
Third, the reliance on an extra-Charter customary right of self-defense is also
counter-logical. After all, the framers of Article 51 introduced significant limi-
tations on the exercise ofself-defense (which is subject to the overriding powers
of the Security Council). Does it make sense that the most obvious case of self-
defense—in response to an armed attack—is subordinated to critical conditions,
whereas self-defense putatively invoked in other circumstances (on a preventive
basis) is absolved ofthose conditions? What is the point in stating the obvious (i.e.,
that an armed attack gives rise to the right of self-defense), while omitting any ref-
erence whatever to the ambiguous conditions of an allegedly permissible preven-
tive war? Preventive war in self-defense (if legitimate under the Charter) would
require regulation by lex scripta more acutely than a response to an armed attack,
since the opportunities for abuse are incomparably greater. Surely, if preventive
war in self-defense is justified (on the basis of "probable cause" rather than an ac-
tual use of force), it ought to be exposed to no less—if possible, even closer—su-
pervision by the Security Council. In all, is this not an appropriate case for the
application of the maxim of interpretation expressio unius est exclusio alterius7.
Having said all that, it is the considered opinion of the present writer that the
right to self-defense can be invoked in response to an armed attack as soon as it be-
comes evident to the victim State (on the basis of hard intelligence available at the
time) that the attack is in progress. There is no need to wait for the bombs to fall
—
or, for that matter, for fire to open—if a moral certainty exists that the armed at-
tack has actually begun (however incipient the stage of the attack is at that point).
The target State can lawfully (under Article 51) intercept the armed attack with a
view to blunting its edge.
The best way to illustrate the circumstances in which interceptive self-defense
can be relied upon is to assume that the Japanese carrier striking force, en route to
the point from which it mounted the notorious attack on Pearl Harbor in Decem-
ber 1 94 1 , had been destroyed by American forces before a single Japanese naval air-
craft got anywhere near Hawaii.62 If that were to have happened, and the
Americans would have succeeded in aborting an onslaught which in one fell swoop
managed to change the balance of military power in the Pacific, it would have been
preposterous to look upon the United States as answerable for inflicting an armed
attack upon Japan.
The proper analysis of the case should be based on three disparate hypothetical
scenarios (all based on the counter-factual postulate that the Americans knew the
Japanese plans).
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The easiest scenario relates to the hypothetical shooting down by the Americans
ofthe Japanese aircraft—following detection by radar or other means—in the rela-
tively short time-frame between their launch from the air carriers and the actual
execution of the attack mission. Once the launch was completed, there can be no
doubt that (although theoretically the mission could still be called off) the United
States as the target State had every right to regard the Japanese armed attack as hav-
ing commenced and to intercept it.
The more difficult scenario pertains to a hypothetical sinking of the Japanese
fleet when poised for the attack on Pearl Harbor but before the launch of the air-
craft. In the opinion of the present writer, the turning point in the unfolding events
was the sailing of the Japanese fleet towards its fateful destination (again, notwith-
standing the possibility of its being instructed to turn back). Had the Americans
—
perhaps through the breaking of Japanese naval codes—been in possession of con-
clusive evidence as to the nature of the mission in which the Japanese Striking
Force was already engaged, and had the Americans located the whereabouts of the
Japanese fleet, they need not have relinquished the opportunity to intercept.
On the other hand, had the Americans sought to destroy the Japanese fleet be-
fore it sailed—while it was still training for its mission, war-gaming it or otherwise
making advance preparations—this would have been not an interceptive (hence,
lawful) response to an armed attack but an (unlawful) preventive use of force in
advance of the attack which had not yet commenced. As and of themselves, train-
ing, war-gaming and advance preparations do not cross the red line of an armed
attack.
The crux ofthe issue, therefore, is not who fired the first shot but who embarked
upon an apparently irreversible course of action, thereby crossing the legal
Rubicon. The casting of the die, rather than the actual opening of fire, is what starts
the armed attack. It would be absurd to require that the defending State should sus-
tain and absorb a devastating (perhaps a fatal) blow, only to prove an immaculate
conception of self-defense. As Sir Humphrey Waldock phrased it: "Where there is
convincing evidence not merely ofthreats and potential danger but ofan attack be-
ing actually mounted, then an armed attack may be said to have begun to occur,
though it has not passed the frontier."63
Interceptive self-defense is lawful even under Article 51 of the Charter,64 inas-
much as it takes place after the other side has committed itselfto an armed attack in
an ostensibly irrevocable way. Whereas a preventive strike anticipates an armed at-
tack that is merely "foreseeable" (or even just "conceivable"), an interceptive strike
counters an armed attack which is in progress, even if it is still incipient: the blow is
"imminent" and practically "unavoidable."65 To put it in another way, there is
nothing preventive about nipping an armed attack in the bud. But that bud is an
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absolute requirement. Self-defense cannot be exercised merely on the ground of
assumptions, expectations or fear. It has to be demonstrably apparent that the
other side is already engaged in carrying out an armed attack (even ifthe attack has
not yet fully developed).
Conclusion
Based on the preceding analysis, it is clear that the Coalition case of taking military
action against Iraq in 2003 was legally impregnable. Unfortunately, some leading
spokesmen and supporters of the Administration in Washington—instead of fo-
cusing (like the British) on the issue of Iraqi "material breach" of the preexisting
cease-fire—preferred to link the hostilities to preemptive self-defense, thereby ex-
posing the military operations against Iraq to harsh and legitimate criticism. The
moral of the story is that, at times, a wrong "spin" of the tool of international law
can become a dangerous boomerang.
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The Right of Self-Defense in the Global Fight
against Terrorism
Christoph Muller
The fight against the scourge ofterrorism has become a key objective in inter-
national politics. It has become much more than a pure law enforcement
task but a political fight in the widest sense that has to draw on all the resources of
political action, including, if necessary, military options. When the fight against
terrorism turns into military action abroad, international politics meets interna-
tional law. The use of military force by a State beyond its borders is governed by in-
ternational law. Still, given the political depth of the fight against terrorism that
sometimes seems to acquire existential meaning—is it at all possible to discuss the
right of self-defense in the global fight against terrorism in purely legal terms?
When each and every legal argument may assume major political significance, are
we still talking about international law or do we discuss politics? Apparently both.
This article seeks to shed some light not only on the law but also on the dynamic in-
terrelationship between State policies on the use of force and the evolution of the
law: the historical background of the UN Charter law, the law as it stands, and the
rift between world order as designed by the UN Charter and the real state of affairs.
In conclusion, it will be argued that the political and legal benefits flowing from a
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strengthening of the UN Charter's framework on the use of force clearly outweigh
the risks incurred by letting that framework fall into desuetude.
Historical Background
Ninety years ago, in June 1914, a terrorist organization code-named "Black Hand"
unsuccessfully tried to stop an assassination plot that it had earlier supported by
supplying arms, training and money. On the 28th of June, one ofthe terrorists nur-
tured by "Black Hand" carried out the plot. He assassinated the crown prince of the
Austro-Hungarian Empire and his wife. 1
The empire then struck back. By turning against the State of Serbia, the pre-
sumed home base of "Black Hand," Austria-Hungary set into motion a world war
and its own demise. It would seem to be an interesting, even though academic
question how to qualify the Austro-Hungarian action in the context ofthe contem-
porary debate. Of course, given the mood of the day and the European system of
trip-wire alliances, World War I was probably inevitable anyway. Still, the story of
June 1914 seems a useful reminder of the deeper layers of terrorism's destructive
power, a destructive potential that works indirectly, through the poisoning of in-
ternational relations, and may even trigger wars that were not intended to happen
the way they did.
The major lesson of the First World War was related to the broader question of
legality and legitimacy ofthe use offorce in international relations. After the horror
experienced by the killing of some 10 million people, a new question was being
asked: could it be that something was fundamentally wrong with a world in
which any nation with the power to use force felt free to do so? President
Woodrow Wilson of the United States tried to initiate a revolutionary alternative:
an international organization ofglobal reach, tying all States together in a system of
collective security. He was ahead of his time; the US Senate did not follow his lead.
The truncated League of Nations, as it did emerge, was too weak to deal effectively
with the blows from Japan, Germany, and Italy. 2 World War II followed, more
than 50 million people were killed, this time the majority ofvictims being civilians.
During the war, it was again an American president who took the lead in starting a
new search for an organizational framework to create world order. 3 These efforts
resulted in the Charter of the United Nations, which sets forth the basic principles
and rules intended to govern international relations.
For nearly sixty years, the UN Charter has been the basic legal document for
public international law. Accordingly, this article will turn to the Charter to try
and find some answers to the question ofhow to define the scope of self-defense in
the fight against terrorism. There is no alternative starting point for finding the
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applicable rules of international law. Furthermore, there is already evidence that
legal practice under the Charter is adapting to the new threat. 4 At the same time, a
lawyer working in the context of international politics has to note, of course, that
time and again it seems fashionable to put into doubt the whole UN system. 5 It is
true that the objectives of the United Nations are still far from being met. For
decades, the Cold War paralyzed the Security Council. Even under the new,
more favorable conditions existing since the 1990s, the Security Council's record
in taking effective action has been mixed. To appreciate the United Nations, we
have to imagine a world without it. 6 After the catastrophic breakdown of the old
order of nation States in the first half of the 20th century there has never been any
doubt for post-war Germany that the lead of the American architects of the new
multilateral order should be followed, and that in addition to a robust defensive
alliance of the West, an effective global system of collective security and coopera-
tion must be sought.
The Law as it Stands
No other article of the UN Charter plays such a prominent role in the current de-
bate on the significance ofinternational law for a stable and peaceful world order as
does Article 51. How is it to be read after the events ofSeptember 11, 2001, the sub-
sequent war in Afghanistan, the United States' presentation of its new security
strategy in September 2002, and the Iraq war? How is it to be read in the light ofthe
threats posed by failing States, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
and international terrorism? Article 51 is the final provision of the UN Charter's
Chapter VII which sets out the conditions that justify the use of force within the
system of collective security created by the Charter should there by any threat to
the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. The system of collective security
is based on the prohibition of the use of force against other States. Only two excep-
tions to that prohibition are provided for in the Charter: coercive measures that
must be authorized by the Security Council, and the "inherent" right of individual
or collective self-defense. The first sentence ofArticle 51 reads as follows: "Nothing
in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defence ifan armed attack occurs against a Member ofthe United Nations, un-
til the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international
peace and security."
The exercise of the "inherent right of individual or collective self-defence" is
thus permissible only in the event of "an armed attack . . . against a Member of the
United Nations." It cannot be invoked when faced with actions that do not reach
the threshold ofan armed attack and it may only be exercised until such time as the
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Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace
and security. 7 September 1 1 raised the question ofwhether the right of self-defense
also applies in the face of terrorist action. The Security Council gave a clear answer
immediately, on the day following the attack in Resolution 1 368 (200 1 ) 8 and again,
at the end of the same month, in Resolution 1373 (2001 ). 9 It determined in general
terms, first, all acts of international terrorism constitute a threat to international
peace and security, and second, the right of individual or collective self-defense in
accordance with the Charter could be applicable in connection with acts of inter-
national terrorism. No authorization is required from the Security Council in such
self-defense actions, however, the measures taken by a State in the exercise of its
right of self-defense must be immediately reported to the Security Council.
The Security Council's decision to recognize especially grievous terrorist attacks
as an "armed attack . . . against a Member of the United Nations" was a very signifi-
cant, evolutionary step in the reading of Article 51. Previously, legal doctrine gen-
erally assumed that an "armed attack" could not be carried out by non-State actors,
but required action by a State. The new reading of Article 51 met with the virtually
unanimous approval of international jurists and governments. 10 The recent advi-
sory opinion, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wa//,
11 of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice did not explicitly endorse the new reading of Article 51, but
the Court's seemingly restrictive language
—
"Article 51 of the Charter thus recog-
nizes the existence ofan inherent right ofself-defence in the case ofarmed attack by
one State against another State" 12—should not be understood as a contradiction,
either. The Court apparently aimed at emphasizing the point that an armed attack
has to originate from a territory outside the control of the attacked party. 13
Recognizing the possibility of non-State actors mounting an "armed attack" as
meant by Article 51 leads to a tricky follow-on question: who or which entity con-
stitutes a legitimate target when defending against such terrorist attack? 14 Follow-
ing September 1 1 the answer to this question was relatively simple: given the
obvious links between Al Qaeda and the Taliban, the use of force by the United
States and coalition forces in Afghanistan to topple the Taliban regime was legiti-
mate self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. The German Government
and all other NATO States shared this view. On October 2, 2001, the North Atlantic
Council decided, for the first time in its history, to invoke the principle of collective
defense contained in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. On the basis of Article
5 1 ofthe UN Charter, in conjunction with Security Council Resolutions 1 368 15 and
1373, 16 the German Bundestag on November 16, 2001 issued a mandate authoriz-
ing the Bundeswehr to support the United States in Operation Enduring Freedom.
This mandate was renewed for the second time in November 2003. As authorized
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by that mandate, the German Government provided soldiers for the war in Af-
ghanistan, as well as for naval duties in the fight against terrorism.
Defensive action after September 1 1 followed an armed attack. What about an-
ticipatory self-defense? 17 Whether there is room for a right of preemptive or even
preventive self-defense for individual States within the UN Charter's system of col-
lective security is a highly controversial question. 18 The restrictive wording of Arti-
cle 51 ("if an armed attack occurs") would seem to rule out a right of anticipatory
self-defense. What little State practice there has been to date also seems to indicate
caution. Prior to 2001, the question was explicitly discussed in the UN framework
only on two occasions, during Israel's preventive strike against Egypt during the
Six-Day War in 1967 and when Israel bombed the partially constructed Iraqi nu-
clear reactor Tamuz I in 1981. While a number of States felt that preventive self-
defense was permissible in the former case, 19 in the latter case it was held to be im-
permissible and unanimously rejected by the UN Security Council in Resolution
487 (1981). 20 At that time the United States was among the States that opposed
Israel's preventive action in the Security Council debate with particularly persua-
sive arguments based on international law. Those States which did not want to rule
out the option of anticipatory self-defense absolutely and a priori have based their
arguments on a case from the year 1837. The test introduced in the Caroline case
permitted pre-emptive self-defense in very exceptional cases. US Secretary of State
Daniel Webster formulated it as follows: "It will be for the government to show a
necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and
no moment for deliberation." 21
The criteria of urgent necessity contained in this test led to the subsequent de-
velopment in international law of the requirement that an attack must be immi-
nent. 22 Very restrictive conditions have been placed on the concept of
"imminence." Such imminence must moreover be apparent to an objective ob-
server. The United States' national security strategy of September 2002, however,
took a wider approach:
We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of
today's adversaries .... The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction—and
the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if
uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack.23
Just how the United States will implement this concept remains an open ques-
tion. No precise criteria have been specified yet. Nor does the security strategy
place the right of self-defense within the context of the UN Charter and its system
of collective security. The Iraq war may, in political terms, be viewed as an
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application ofthe new national security strategy. In justifying its position under in-
ternational law to the UN Security Council, however, the United States did not ar-
gue the asserted right of anticipatory self-defense. It rather stated that its military
operations were in accordance with Resolutions 678 (1990) 24 and 687 (1991),25
and in particular with the threat of serious consequences made in Resolution 1441
(2002). 26
The European Union adopted a new security strategy in December 2003, which
lays out a threat assessment similar to that contained in the US security strategy,
also referring to the threats posed by terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction, failing States and organized crime. It also recognizes the need for
anticipatory action:
Our traditional concept ofself-defence - up to and including the Cold War - was based
on the threat of invasion. With the new threats, the first line of defence will often be
abroad. The new threats are dynamic. The risks of proliferation grow over time; left
alone, terrorist networks will become even more dangerous. State failure and
organized crime spread if they are neglected - as we have seen in West Africa. This
implies that we should be ready to act before a crisis occurs. Conflict prevention and
threat prevention cannot start too early We need to develop a strategic culture that
fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention We need to be able to
act before countries around us deteriorate, when signs of proliferation are detected,
and before humanitarian emergencies arise. Preventive engagement can avoid more
serious problems in the future.27
However, the objectives of the European Security Strategy are explicitly put into
the context of "effective multilateralism" and a "rule-based international order":
We are committed to upholding and developing International Law. The fundamental
framework for international relations is the United Nations Charter. The United
Nations Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security. Strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to
fulfill its responsibilities and to act effectively, is a European priority. ... It is a
condition of a rule-based international order that laws evolve in response to
developments such as proliferation, terrorism and global warming.28
The common European view of international law governing the use of force is thus
very much geared towards the United Nations. At the same time, it is not static, but
open to new developments contributing to truly effective multilateralism. In this
context, Secretary-General Kofi Annan's statement in September 2003 seems




Now, some say this understanding is no longer tenable, since an 'armed attack' with
weapons of mass destruction could be launched at any time, without warning, or by a
clandestine group. Rather than wait for that to happen, they argue, States have the right
and obligation to use force pre-emptively, even on the territory of other States, and
even while weapons systems that might be used to attack them are still being
developed.
My concern is that, if it were to be adopted, it could set precedents that resulted in a
proliferation ofthe unilateral and lawless use offeree, with or without justification. But
it is not enough to denounce unilateralism, unless we also face up squarely to the
concerns that make some States feel uniquely vulnerable, since it is those concerns that
drive them to take unilateral action. We must show that those concerns can, and will,
be addressed effectively through collective action.
The Council needs to consider how it will deal with the possibility that individual States
may use force 'pre-emptively' against perceived threats. Its members may need to
begin a discussion on the criteria for an early authorization of coercive measures to
address certain types of threats - for instance, terrorist groups armed with weapons of
mass destruction.29
The German Government shares the assessment of the Secretary-General.
While the UN Charter narrowly limits the use of military force by individual States
for good reason, i.e., to prevent the escalation of violence, the Security Council
does have a wide range ofoptions at its disposal. Under Article 24 it is given the pri-
mary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security; under
Article 39 it is granted the necessary powers to act in the event of a threat to or
breach of the peace. This preventive competence bestowed on the UN Security
Council, together with the conflict prevention instruments available to the UN
Secretary-General, must be made easier to use in the future—precisely in order to
prevent the escalation of violence and the spread of armed conflict.
Meanwhile, following his speech of the 23rd of September, Secretary-General
Annan in November 2003 appointed a high level panel to develop recommenda-
tions for UN reform and for a collective response to the new threats. 30 The report of
the panel was issued in December 2004. 31 All States were invited to contribute to its
work. The European Union submitted a joint contribution whose thrust is clear
—
the Security Council should do more to assume its responsibilities under the Char-
ter. The relevant paragraphs of the EU contribution read as follows:
The EU reaffirms that the provisions of the UN Charter regarding the use of force
remain valid. The EU also recognizes the potentially devastating threat posed to UN
member states by modern terrorism, and by weapons of mass destruction in the hands
of non-state actors. The threat is devastating both to states targeted and to those where
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they are allowed to operate. Military action may in certain circumstances - such as
when a state is unwilling or unable to deal with the threat posed by a non-state actor on
its territory - be required to meet the threat effectively. In this context, the EU is of the
view that military action going beyond the lawful exercise of the right to self-defence
should be taken on the basis of Security Council decisions. The Security Council,
however, must be prepared to make a rapid assessment of any threat brought to its
attention and, if necessary, to act quickly and decisively in order to neutralize it. Strong
engagement by the Council on terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, as
recommended above, and the expertise thereby commanded, would confer on it an
additional strong measure of authority in demanding compliance with obligations,
and of respect for its collective decisions.32
To sum up: Germany, like its European partners, clearly sees the necessity for
more effective anticipatory action in the light of the new threats, including a wide
spectrum ofmeasures that may be grouped under preventive engagement by polit-
ical means. Preventive military action, however, should be authorized by the UN
Security Council. Only in cases where a previously indistinct threat turns into the
threat of an imminent attack33 is pre-emptive self-defense authorized under inter-
national law.
The Rule ofLaw—Squeezed by Machtpolitik, Saved by Realpolitik?
Law transcends politics but time and again it has to meet the test of political accep-
tance. When legal norms are perceived as faltering or when they appear unsuited to
meet their intended purpose, political pressures will mount to change the law. The
UN Charter law on the use offorce provides the legal framework designed to main-
tain international peace and security. However, even a cursory look around the
globe reveals that peaceful order has remained as elusive a goal as ever. What went
wrong with the UN Charter system of maintaining international peace and secu-
rity? Are there better ways and means to create order in the world?34
Order cannot be created without harnessing power and establishing rules for
the use of force. In a functioning nation State, government has a monopoly on the
use of force. Internationally, the UN Charter system has envisaged a distribution of
the authority to use force between the nation States and the UN Security Council.
The system has shown three major deficiencies. First, a growing number of nation
States have proved to be unable to establish internal peace and a monopoly on
the use of force on their own territory, hence the increase in civil strife and cross-
border violence by non-State actors, including terrorists. Second, governments
have repeatedly used force beyond the limits set by the UN Charter. Third, the
Security Council has only sometimes been able to take remedial action against the
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disorder spreading from disintegrating States or the unauthorized use of force by
governments. Of these three deficiencies, only the first eludes direct and swift rem-
edies. The other two would seem to be remediable: given the political will, govern-
ments could cease to flout the UN Charter rules on the use of force, and those
represented in the Security Council, especially the five permanent members, could
make it work. Why don't they just do it?
Some governments apparently do not believe that playing by the rules ofthe UN
Charter could ever satisfy their vital security concerns. During the Cold War, such
skepticism was well-founded. Given the ideological rift and the imperial designs of
the Soviet Union, the idea of collective security never really had a chance so that
traditional patterns ofgreat power rivalry and balance ofpower continued to shape
international politics, establishing defacto rules on the use of force in international
relations. 35 Following the demise of the Soviet empire, the 1990s seemed to witness
a renaissance of the UN Charter's normative framework on the use of force. 36 Un-
der the shock of September 1 1 and the twin threat of terrorism and the prolifera-
tion of weapons of mass destruction, the picture has become mixed; the United
States in particular seems to have only limited confidence in the preventive and
protective potential of the UN Charter system. 37
It is true that the reality of today's world does not really fit the legal abstractions
of the UN Charter. The Charter envisaged a world composed of nation States
which implicitly were assumed to have a number of seemingly self-evident charac-
teristics that allowed them to interact on the basis of sovereign equality, that made
them share a common sense ofpurpose, and that gave them the ability to shape the
course of events. Nation States were, by and large, implicitly assumed to be reason-
ably well organized, to be run by responsible governments, to be masters in their
own house, to have a bonafide orientation towards the lofty goals ofthe Charter, to
pursue power not as an end in itself, to overcome the traditional zero-sum-game
mentality of international politics and to seek a better life through cooperation
with others. The real world, of course, looks different. While States in some
regions, in particular in Europe, have indeed buried their centuries-old rivalries
and the very idea of war amongst themselves, others continue traditional power
politics, whilst a third category of a growing number of States seems to be headed
towards primeval chaos,38 not to mention the dubious domestic legitimacy of too
many dictatorships and authoritarian regimes. The dangers inherent in spreading
zones of chaos are multiplied by new categories of powerful non-State actors in
fields like organized crime, weapons proliferation, and terrorism, who are not only
operating international networks, but sometimes have even acquired the capability
to initiate and sustain a new type of armed conflict that may most aptly be called
asymmetrical warfare. 39
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It is against the background of such a pointedly realistic world view—which, in-
cidentally, is widely shared by both the United States as well as the EU security
strategies40—that the normative thinking of some authors has returned to tradi-
tional patterns of power politics where little room is left for the UN Charter's
multilateralist concept ofworld order. These authors consider this concept as ide-
alistic at best, as naive and irresponsible at worst. Their views are reflected in the
following statements: "Although the effort to subject the use of force to the rule of
law was the monumental internationalist experience of the twentieth century, the
fact is that that experiment has failed" 41 and "The first and last geopolitical truth is
that states pursue security by pursuing power. Legalist institutions that manage
that pursuit maladroitly are ultimately swept away."42 But which order would
emerge if the United Nations were thus swept away? Given the unipolar reality of
the day, could it not, should it not be a Pax Americana? Robert Cooper provides a
thoughtful comment on such an eventuality:
In general, monopolies are undesirable. One exception to this rule is the monopoly of
force. This is not just desirable; it is the essential basis of order in the state and in the
state system. What is wrong, then, with a virtual monopoly of force in the world? The
answer is that the state is based on the legitimate monopoly of force and the difficulty
with the American monopoly of force in the world community is that it is American
and will be exercised, necessarily, in the interest of the United States. This will not be
seen as legitimate. Legitimacy is as much a source of power as force. Force without
legitimacy is tyranny - for those who are subject to it. In an age in which security will
depend on taking early action against emerging threats abroad, legitimacy is more
important than ever. And, like it or not, the United Nations remains the most powerful
source of legitimacy for such action.43
In response, Robert Kagan suggests "the legitimacy of liberalism"—apparently
meant to operate outside and independently of the UN framework—which the
United States and the liberal democracies of Europe would exercise in harmony,
could add to American power.44 However, he puts this vision himself into doubt by
assuming that "many Europeans are betting that the risks from the 'axis of evil,'
from terrorism and tyrants, will never be as great as the risk of the American Levia-
than unbound."45 It seems indeed doubtful whether a joint transatlantic push for
legitimacy outside the United Nations could contribute to making US power poli-
tics a success—but not for the reason Kagan assumes. His assertion that many
Europeans are more concerned about American power than the risks of nuclear
proliferation and mega-terrorism seems totally beside the point. Robert Cooper's
remarks on legitimacy probably come closer to mainstream European thinking,
but the core of European skepticism vis-a-vis the unrestrained use of American
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power may be found in a more elementary thought that is the opposite of starry-
eyed idealism: many Europeans simply believe that unipolar power politics,
whether executed purely unilaterally or through a coalition of the willing, are not
practical and do not work. Suicidal terrorists will not be moved by the "shock and
awe" of a bombing campaign, the application ofsheer power alone does not render
the desired results under conditions of asymmetrical warfare, the transformation
of deficient nation States into responsible liberal democracies requires different
means than the application of military force.
The rebirth of democratic West Germany out of the ruins of the Third Reich is
sometimes referred to as an example for successful State-engineering initiated by
overwhelming force. Maybe it is—but only ceteris paribus: in Germany 1945, the
Allies entered with huge armies and fully controlled a country that was utterly ex-
hausted and destroyed by nearly six years of "total war" of the Germans' own
choosing. The Wehrmacht did not melt away to resurface later in a guerilla but
fought until it was finished. Furthermore, people were demoralized not only by de-
feat, destruction and million fold deaths, but also, when faced with the truth ofun-
speakable crimes, by a rapidly growing sense of guilt. In that situation, it simply did
not occur to the remaining young men to question defeat and to form suicidal
bands of fanatics trying to fight asymmetrical war. Instead, the Germans, who also
happened to consist of a homogeneous and highly educated population, took up
the generous offer by the victors to re-enter the civilized world, chose to rebuild
their country, and had another try at democracy.
Today's threats are different and require different treatment. In the end, only
non-military means will drain the breeding grounds of a suicidal terrorism that is
fueled by pseudo-religious fervor. The battle for hearts and minds will involve a
war of ideas where there is no substitute for the victory of reason. For reason to
prevail, it will be essential that the use of force, when necessary, is properly under-
stood as action in the common interest.46 It appears hardly conceivable to achieve
this objective without following a course of "effective multilateralism" as envis-
aged by the European Security Strategy,47 with a reformed and revitalized UN Se-
curity Council assuming a central role. In that regard, it seems as if some
American authors have replaced the old maxim "if it ain't broke, don't fix it" by a
new leitmotif, "if it ain't fixed yet, break it," whereas a pragmatist would probably
suggest "if it ain't fixed yet, try and do it." Therefore, if the implementation of the
UN Charter system has indeed remained deficient, why sweep it away, why not try
and fix it? A number of important steps into that direction have already been
taken by the Security Council, not only before, but also after the unfortunate con-
troversy preceding the Iraq war, including, inter alia, Security Council Resolution
1373 (2001) to fight international terrorism,48 Resolution 1540 (2004) to fight the
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proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,49 and Resolution 1546 (2004) on
Iraq's political transition and reconstruction. 50 The road towards international
peace and security through effective multilateral action has been clearly laid out by
Secretary-General Annan: it should follow the rule of law, 51 lead to a reform of the
Security Council, and arrive at a new commitment for joint action that should in-
clude criteria on when and how anticipatory action by the Council is necessary to
counter the terrorist threat.
In conclusion, it seems fair to say that the reading ofthe international law on the
use of force as set forth above is strongly supported by contemporary political be-
liefs in Germany. The cataclysmic events in the first half of the 20th century, the
German role in those events, and our national experience after 1945; all those fac-
tors have converged into a very strong conviction of mainstream foreign policy
thinking in Germany: the conviction that we should follow the new course of inter-
national relations charted in San Francisco in June 1945, which had been inspired
by the United States. Germans presumably will stay this course not only because
they firmly believe that it is right, but also because they see no practical alternative
in terms of Realpolitik.
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The Legality of Operation Iraqi Freedom
under International Law
Michael N. Schmitt*
In the months preceding the attack on Iraq by the US-commanded "coalition of
the willing," 1 few issues captured greater international attention than the legal-
ity of the impending armed conflict. Even United Nations Secretary-General Kofi
Annan entered the fray, intimating that an attack without the imprimatur of a
Security Council mandate would violate the UN Charter. 2 Once Operation Iraqi
Freedom began on March 19, 2003, however, one might have expected the brou-
haha to die down, particularly given the speed ofvictory, and the fact that the trou-
bled occupation should have diverted attention fromjws ad helium reservations. 3
Indeed, controversy regarding the legality of the two campaigns the United States
and United Kingdom had recently conducted, Operations Allied Force and En-
during Freedom,4 faded quickly once hostilities ended.
Yet, as this article is being written in early 2004, the controversy over Iraqi Free-
dom rages on. The 2004 US presidential election campaign has contributed to the
staying power of the issue. So too have the transatlantic and intra-European
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divides created, or at least exacerbated, by virulent opposition to the war on the
part ofsome European States, especially France and Germany. The seeming inabil-
ity of weapons inspectors to locate the alleged weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) capabilities that President Bush pointed to so frequently as war clouds
loomed, and the failure to find a smoking gun tying Iraq to Al Qaeda, have added
fuel to the fire.
Given the panoply of justifications for the operation bandied about by govern-
ments, politicians, political commentators, legal experts, non-governmental orga-
nizations, and the public at large, Iraqi Freedom serves as a fascinating jus ad
bellum case study. This article considers those most commonly posed—implicit
Security Council authorization, self-defense against State support to terrorism, an-
ticipatory (often mislabeled preemptive) self-defense against terrorism and weap-
ons of mass destruction, breach of the 1991 cease-fire, humanitarian intervention,
and regime change. States mounting the attack formally proffered only breach of
the cease-fire that ended the first Gulf War as its legal basis. However, unofficial
sources in policy and academic circles floated the others as independent grounds
for the action, and the States involved cited each as a de facto, albeit not legal, factor
legitimizing the attack.
Implicit Security Council Authorization
The most universally accepted basis for the use of force is authorization by the
United Nations Security Council. Before granting it, the Council must determine,
pursuant to Article 39 of the UN Charter, that a particular situation amounts to a
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression. Once it does so, the
Security Council must first attempt to resolve the matter by employing non-force-
ful measures, such as an embargo. 5 If non-forceful actions prove unsuccessful, or if
it believes that attempting them would be "inadequate," the Council may then, act-
ing under Article 42, "take such action by air, sea, or land forces as it may deem
necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security." Such actions are
known as "Chapter VII enforcement operations," a reference to the Charter chap-
ter in which the relevant articles appear.
This decision generally comes in the form of a Security Council resolution con-
taining a mandate to use "all necessary means" to achieve a specified end. For in-
stance, Resolution 678 of 1990 authorized "Member States cooperating with
Kuwait" to use all necessary means to "uphold and implement Security Council
Resolution 660 and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international
peace and security."6 Resolution 660 had demanded the withdrawal of Iraqi forces
from Kuwait following their August 1990 invasion. 7 Mandates can be issued to
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individual States or an ad hoc coalition thereof, to a regional security organization
such as NATO, or to a UN commanded and controlled force. 8
As events unfolded in late 2002 and early 2003, the United States and United
Kingdom actively sought a Security Council mandate for action against Iraq. How-
ever, the best they could achieve was Resolution 1441, which did not contain the
desired "all necessary means" clause. 9 Both countries abandoned subsequent ef-
forts to secure a follow-on use of force resolution when France and Russia threat-
ened to exercise their veto authority.
Resolution 1441, passed unanimously on November 8, condemned Iraq's fail-
ure to fully disclose information about its weapons of mass destruction and ballis-
tic missile programs, 10 cooperate with weapons inspectors, 11 end ties to
terrorism, 12 cease repression of its population, 13 facilitate humanitarian assistance
by aid agencies, 14 and cooperate in accounting for missing individuals and prop-
erty from the first Gulf War. 15 The resolution went on to find Iraq in "material
breach" of these obligations under various resolutions, including Resolution 687,
which, as conspicuously noted in 1441, set forth the terms of the 1991 cease-fire.
After granting Iraq "a final opportunity" to comply with its disarmament obliga-
tions, imposing detailed requirements regarding the future weapons inspection re-
gime, and demanding that Iraq "cooperate immediately, unconditionally, and
actively" with inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
and United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission
(UNMOVIC), the resolution ominously "recalled" "that the Council has repeat-
edly warned Iraq that it will face serious consequences as a result of its continued
violations of its obligations."
With war drawing close, some argued that Resolution 1441, standing alone, im-
plicitly authorized the impending attack. The resolution specifically noted that the
Security Council was operating under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which pro-
vides the basis for authorizing the use of force in response to a threat to the peace.
Although it gave Iraq a final opportunity to meet its obligations, Chief UN
Weapons Inspector Hans Blix briefed the Council on March 7, 2003 that Iraq had
not cooperated "immediately," as required by Resolution 144 1. 16 Finally, the reso-
lution warned of "serious consequences" if Iraq failed to meet the Council's condi-
tions. Given prior sanctions on Iraq, the phrase could only have been a reference,
so the argument goes, to forceful disarmament. Thus, when Iraq failed to cooper-
ate immediately with the inspectors, the 1441 condition precedent for the use of
force presented itself.
This line of reasoning is fundamentally flawed. First, the lack of the "all neces-
sary means" clause evidences the Council's discord over whether armed force con-
stituted the appropriate remedy for Iraq's failure to meet its obligations. Moreover,
369
The Legality ofOperation Iraqi Freedom under International Law
in 1990 the Security Council had likewise given Iraq a "final opportunity" to meet
its obligations under prior resolutions, most significantly withdrawal from Ku-
wait. 17 But on that occasion it also authorized Member States that were cooperat-
ing with Kuwait to "use all necessary means" to uphold and implement the resolu-
tions and "restore international peace and security in the area" if Iraq failed to
comply with them by January 15, 1991. Thus, Iraqi non-compliance automatically
triggered the use of force mandate. Resolution 1441 contained no such trigger.
In fact, only the ttorc-inclusion of the "all necessary means" language made Res-
olution 1441's adoption possible. During the Security Council session that ap-
proved the resolution, France, Russia, and China insisted that they viewed 1441 as
but the first step in a two-step process, and that only the Council could decide what
to do in the event of Iraqi non-compliance. The French Ambassador was particu-
larly pointed: "France welcomes the fact that all ambiguity on this point and all ele-
ments of automaticity have disappeared from the resolution." 18
Tellingly, US Ambassador Negroponte conceded as much in his own remarks.
As we have said on numerous occasions to Council members, this resolution contains
no "hidden triggers" and no "automaticity" with respect to the use of force. If there is a
further Iraqi breach, reported to the Council by UNMOVIC, the IAEA or a Member
State, the matter will return to the Council for discussions as required in paragraph
12.
19
Portentously, he went on to qualify his comments.
The resolution makes clear that any Iraqi failure to comply is unacceptable and that
Iraq must be disarmed. And, one way or another, Iraq will be disarmed. If the Security
Council fails to act decisively in the event of further Iraqi violations, this resolution
does not constrain any Member State from acting to defend itself against the threat
posed by Iraq or to enforce relevant United Nations resolutions and protect world
peace and security.20
Consistent with this approach, the United States later returned to the Security
Council to urge armed force, most famously on February 5, 2003 when Secretary of
State Colin Powell briefed it on Iraq's failures and urged the Council to "not shrink
from whatever is ahead." 21 As noted, the Council did not act, a failure that led Pres-
ident Bush to proclaim: "The United Nations Security Council has not lived up to
its responsibilities, so we will rise to ours."22 Therefore, it should be apparent that
when Coalition forces attacked days later, their legal basis for armed action was not
Resolution 1441; nor would the resolution have provided a proper basis had they
made such an assertion.
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Self-Defense against State Support to Terrorism
Beyond Security Council authorization to use force under Chapter VII, the only
other explicit exception to Charter Article 2(4)'s broad prohibition on the use of
force23 is self-defense pursuant to Article 51. Article 51 provides that "[n]othing in
the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until
the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace
and security." Thus, whereas a mere threat to the peace suffices to engage the Secu-
rity Council's right to mandate forceful enforcement measures, an armed attack is
the condition precedent for self-defense.
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 crystallized the applicability of the
law of self-defense to acts of terrorism. The following day the Security Council
passed Resolution 1368 affirming the "inherent right of self-defense as recognized
by the Charter of the United Nations." On September 28, it again cited the right to
self-defense in Resolution 1373, which set forth a number of measures to combat
terrorism. Subsequent resolutions reaffirmed 1368 and 1373, thus implicitly ac-
knowledging that the situation implicated the right to self-defense. 24
However, by March 19, 2003, Iraq had not conducted terrorist attacks against
the United States, nor was there an immediate threat of it doing so. True, in 1993,
Iraq had been involved in an assassination plot against former President George
Bush, Sr., to which the United States responded with cruise missile strikes. But
since then, no known terrorist attacks have been conducted by Iraqi agents. There-
fore, any justification of Operation Iraqi Freedom related to ongoing terrorism
must be based on Iraq's support of terrorists, such as Al Qaeda.
The law surrounding the use offeree against State supporters of terrorism has ex-
perienced a sea change over the past two decades. Recall that Operation El Dorado
Canyon, the 1986 package of US air strikes against Libya following a terrorist at-
tack in Berlin that targeted US military personnel, generated nearly universal con-
demnation. With the exception of Israel and the United Kingdom, even close allies
of the United States criticized the operation. 25 The General Assembly passed a res-
olution condemning it as a violation of international law,26 and Secretary-General
Javier Perez de Cueller stated that he "deplored" the "military action by one mem-
ber state against another."27
State support of guerilla forces surfaced in a judicial opinion rendered the same
year. In Military and Paramilitary Activities, a case between the United States and
Nicaragua, the International Court of Justice addressed the appropriateness of im-
puting an armed attack to a State because of its sponsorship of rebels such that mil-
itary action against the State itself is appropriate in self-defense. 28 The Court held
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that a State committed an armed attack by "the sending by or on behalfof a State of
armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed
force against another State of such gravity as to amount to (inter alia) an actual
armed attack conducted by regular forces, or its substantial involvement
therein."29 The opinion went on to state that " [t]his description, contained in Arti-
cle 3, paragraph (g), of the Definition of Aggression annexed to General Assembly
Resolution 3314 (XXIX), may be taken to reflect customary international law."30
Reduced to basics, the requirement was that the group be acting on behalf of the
State or that the State have been otherwise highly involved in the actual operation.
Yet, when the United States and United Kingdom directly attacked the Taliban,
the de facto government of Afghanistan, because of its decision to "allow the parts
of Afghanistan that it controls to be used by [Al Qaeda] as a base of operations," 31
the international community was very supportive. In addition to UK participation
in the initial strikes, Georgia, Oman, Pakistan, the Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Ara-
bia, Tajikistan, Turkey, and Uzbekistan provided airspace and facilities. China,
Egypt, Russia, and the European Union publicly backed the operations, while even
the Organization for the Islamic Conference limited itself to urging the United
States to restrict its campaign to Afghanistan. 32 Australia, Canada, the Czech Re-
public, Germany, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Turkey, and the
United Kingdom offered ground troops. 33 Paradoxically, this all occurred in spite
of the fact that the Taliban were more dependent on Al Qaeda (for support in its
conflict with the Northern Alliance) than vice versa, and therefore did not appear
to fit the Military and Paramilitary Activities standard.
Particularly indicative of the shifting attitude towards the degree of State sup-
port that rises to the level of an armed attack is the fact that the justification for at-
tacking the Taliban was contained in the required US notification to the Security
Council that it was acting in self-defense. Therefore, the international community
was clearly on notice that the United States characterized its action as one in self-
defense and it appears to have accepted the premise that, in appropriate circum-
stances, State supporters of terrorism risk a military response pursuant to that
right.
That said, the precise level of State support that amounts to an armed attack re-
mains uncertain. The horror of 9/1 1, particularly the number of casualties and the
direct targeting of innocent civilians, clearly contributed to international accep-
tance ofthe US response. So too did the fact that the United Nations had repeatedly
warned the Taliban to put an end to terrorist activities on its territory,34 as had the
United States post-9/1 1. 35 The fact that the Taliban were internationally ostracized
made striking them even more palatable. Nevertheless, the attack against the
Taliban and the response thereto were certainly watershed events for the law
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surrounding lawful responses to State support of terrorism. Without any doubt,
the degree of support necessary to constitute an armed attack has dropped
precipitously.
And what of Iraq's complicity in terrorism? Failure of occupation forces to find
a direct link between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda attacks (or any other terrorist
forces actively conducting operations against the United States) is relevant, but not
dispositive. International law judges actors by what they reasonably believed under
the circumstances. 36 Therefore, the question is not whether there were links be-
tween Iraq and terrorists, but rather would any links the United States rationally
thought existed, even mistakenly, have justified an attack on Iraq in self-defense?
Defensive actions must also meet the legal criteria of necessity and proportion-
ality in the face of an immediate threat. 37 Necessity requires that there be no rea-
sonable alternative to the use of force; proportionality limits the force used to that
required to actually defeat the attack; and imminency requires the self-defense to
occur only during the last window of opportunity to mount an effective defensive
operation.
Secretary of State Powell provided the most comprehensive picture ofwhat the
United States believed regarding Iraqi complicity in his February 5, 2003 briefing
to the Security Council. The Secretary made the case that "Iraq . . . harbours a
deadly terrorist network headed by Adu Musab al-Zarqawi, an associate and col-
laborator of Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda lieutenants."38 According to
Powell, Zarqawi set up a terrorist training camp in Afghanistan, which he subse-
quently moved to northeastern Iraq after the United States ousted the Taliban
from Afghanistan. Although this camp was located outside territory controlled by
the Iraqi government, Baghdad did have an agent in Ansar al-Islam, the radical or-
ganization that controlled the area. That agent provided some members of Al
Qaeda safe haven. Powell went on to claim that Al Qaeda associates had moved
into the capital, where they operated freely. Further, he asserted that over the past
decade there had been frequent contacts between Iraqi agents and Al Qaeda and
that interrogation of an Al Qaeda detainee led to an admission that Iraq provided
chemical and biological weapons training for two members of the organization.39
US concerns about Iraqi involvement in terrorism were not isolated. Even the
Security Council had determined that "Iraq has failed to comply with its commit-
ments pursuant to resolution 687 ( 1991 ) with regard to terrorism
"40 Assuming
that the US allegations were reasonable and made in good faith, did they justify a
response in self-defense?
To begin with, by linking Iraq to Al Qaeda, the issue of anticipatory self-defense
becomes moot. Al Qaeda has been conducting a campaign of terrorism against the
United States for at least a decade. 41 Its attacks (planned or executed) can hardly be
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characterized as isolated, independent actions, with each response judged sepa-
rately for compliance with the law of self-defense. US defensive actions are not an-
ticipatory, but rather undertaken in the face of an ongoing campaign.
Was Iraq's involvement in this campaign sufficient to merit an attack directly
against the country? It would appear not. The major factor that Powell emphasized
was the presence of a key Al Qaeda operative in northern Iraq. However, this was
an area beyond the control of the government. Further, to the extent Iraq harbored
terrorists, that activity certainly did not rise to the level of Taliban/Al Qaeda con-
nections, with terrorist camps operating openly in Afghanistan. The additional
contacts that Powell cited were insufficiently developed to merit characterizing the
Al Qaeda campaign as an armed attack by Iraq. As demonstrated by the interna-
tional condemnation of the 1998 US cruise missile strike on a Sudanese pharma-
ceutical plant (in contrast to acceptance of a related strike against a terrorist facility
in Afghanistan), the international community insists that the evidence on which
States base counter-terrorist defensive operations be reliable.42
Anticipatory Self-Defense against WMD and Terrorism
Although some commentators argued that Iraqi ties to Al Qaeda legally justified
Operation Iraqi Freedom as self-defense against an ongoing attack, anticipatory
self-defense43 found greater support within the legal and policy communities, spe-
cifically anticipatory defense against the dual evils of weapons of mass destruction
(whether wielded by a State or terrorists) and transnational terrorism (whether
State sponsored or not). And Operation Iraqi Freedom made good on President
Bush's September 2002 National Security Strategy promise, echoed in his pub-
lished weapons of mass destruction and terrorism strategies, to act preemptively
when necessary. 44
The inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of today's threats, and the
magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries' choice of
weapons do not permit [relying on a reactive posture]. We cannot let our enemies
strike first.
45
Legal arguments based on anticipatory self-defense usually falter on the criterion
of imminency. Recall the international law requirements that an act of self-defense
be proportional and necessary to an armed attack that is either imminent or under-
way. They derive historically from an 1837 incident involving the Caroline^ a vessel
used to supply Canadian rebels fighting British rule during the Mackenzie Rebel-
lion. British forces crossed into the United States (after asking the United States,
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without result, to put an end to rebel activities on its territory), captured the
Caroline, set it ablaze, and sent it over Niagara Falls. Two US citizens perished.
An exchange of diplomatic notes ensued in which Secretary of State Daniel
Webster argued that defensive actions require "a necessity of self-defense, instant,
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation . . .
[and must be] justified by the necessity of self-defence, must be limited by that ne-
cessity, and kept clearly within it."46 Lord Ashburton, his British counterpart, ac-
cepted this formula as the basis of their exchange. 47 Both the International Military
Tribunal at Nuremberg and the International Court of Justice have cited the stan-
dard with approval. 48
By any measure of estimation, Iraq was not about to launch an attack on the
United States, with weapons of mass destruction or otherwise, in the immediate
future. Nor is there any compelling evidence of Iraq distributing weapons of mass
destruction to transnational terrorists or in any other way directing or sponsoring
specific and imminent attacks on the United States. Rather, the United States be-
lieved that Iraq had failed to fully disarm as required by the UN disarmament re-
gime; had not fully accounted for the biological and chemical weapons, such as
anthrax and the nerve agent VX it possessed immediately after the first Gulf War;
could rapidly produce and disperse more such weapons; was actively concealing
efforts to develop additional weapons of mass destruction, as well as existing capa-
bilities, for instance, by dispersing rocket launchers and warheads containing bio-
logical warfare agents into western Iraq while Resolution 1441 was under
negotiation; was determined to develop a nuclear weapon and was seeking the
capability to produce fissile material; and was developing the ability to deliver
weapons of mass destruction with ballistic missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAV).49 Although assertions that Iraq possessed biological and chemical weapons
and a nuclear weapons development program are highly doubtable in light of the
failure of post-attack weapons inspectors to discover convincing evidence
thereof,50 bear in mind that it is the reasonable belief of the attacker, even if mis-
taken, that is legally relevant.
While these "facts" arguably fail to meet the imminency criterion as it is tradi-
tionally understood, in its National Security Strategy the United States has asserted
that imminency must be interpreted more liberally in the current circumstances:
We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of
today's adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists do not seek to attack us using
conventional means. They know such attacks would fail. Instead, they rely on acts of
terror and, potentially, the use of weapons of mass destruction—weapons that can be
easily concealed, delivered covertly, and used without warning. 51
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Indeed, the Congressional joint resolution authorizing the President to commit US
forces to battle against Iraq adopted exactly this liberal interpretation of anticipatory
self-defense. Whereas Iraq's demonstrated capability and willingness to use weapons of
mass destruction, the high risk that the current Iraqi regime will either employ those
weapons to launch a surprise attack against the United States or its Armed Forces or
provide them to international terrorists who would do so, and the extreme magnitude
of harm that would result to the United States and its citizens from such an attack,
combine to justify action by the United States to defend itself. . . .52
Those who urge fidelity to an outdated restrictive interpretation of imminency
fail to grasp the realities of twenty-first-century conflict. In an era when the enemy
may be a shadowy non-State group intent on remaining invisible until it strikes its
blow, a requirement to withhold defensive action until that blow is about to land
would render the right to self-defense meaningless. Exacerbating matters is the fact
that, given WMD proliferation, any miscalculation as to when an attack will come
could be fatal.
If international law is to contribute to the maintenance of global order, the
rights and duties it sets out must be interpreted not only in conformity with their
core purposes, but also with sensitivity to the security context in which they are ap-
plied. The requirement ofimminency deters States from resorting precipitously to
the most powerful—and potentially destabilizing—option available in interna-
tional relations. On the other hand, the right of self-defense exists to allow States an
effective shield against aggression. In the Charter framework, the recognition of
this inherent right compensates for the possibility (a de facto likelihood) that the
Chapter VII scheme for maintaining or restoring international peace and security
might fail.
A careful balancing of the presumption against using force with the need to al-
low States an effectual defense suggests the appropriate standard. Stated in the af-
firmative, a State may act anticipatorily (preemptively) if it must strike
immediately to defend itself in a meaningful way and the potential aggressor has ir-
revocably committed itself to attack. The determinative question when evaluating
claims to anticipatory self-defense is whether the defensive action occurred during
the last possible window ofopportunity in the face ofan attack that was almost cer-
tainly going to occur.
This approach to imminency generally operates synergistically with the neces-
sity criterion. After all, if the use of force is not the sole remaining viable option for
resolving the matter, then in most cases the last window of opportunity will not
have been reached.
Assuming, for the sake of analysis, the facts believed by the Coalition at the mo-
ment it acted, the case for acting anticipatorily was weak. There is no doubt that
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Iraq presented some threat to the United States and its Coalition partners, particu-
larly given its ties to transnational terrorism, its demonstrated willingness to use
weapons of mass destruction, its possession of such weapons, and its decade-long
hostility to the United States. However, little evidence existed of an Iraqi intention
to useWMD in the near future. Nor did Iraq possess a reliable means of delivering
those weapons over great distances. Further, although Iraq unquestionably had
connections to terrorism, there was no suggestion that it was about to transfer the
weapons it reportedly possessed to terrorists.
On the contrary, both individual States and the United Nations had the country
under a microscope. Moreover, the lessons ofAfghanistan could not have been lost
on the Iraqis. The Iraqi leadership must have realized that any use ofWMD against
the United States, whether by themselves or Iraqi-supported terrorists, would have
proven suicidal. Indeed, use against any State, or even an internal group, would
have been exceedingly irrational, for such use would have immediately silenced
opposition to a use of force mandate in the Security Council. In fact, UN pressure
was serving as an incentive for compliance, a fact apparent in Iraqi acceptance of
inspectors pursuant to Resolution 1441, and its subsequent cooperation, however
grudging, with them; clearly, the Iraqis feared an attack. To conclude in these cir-
cumstances that Iraq was simultaneously planning a strike against the United
States or any Coalition partner, and that March 2003 represented the last window
of opportunity to mount an effective defense, would have been illogical.
In the case of Iraq, anticipatory self-defense arguably fails on the other two crite-
ria as well. That the Iraqis had not fully complied with the requirements ofthe rele-
vant Security Council resolutions is unquestionable; but international pressure on
Iraq had seen progress, particularly following the US and UK saber rattling and the
Council's adoption of Resolution 1441. Neither inspection team believed it had
reached a dead end. And the Security Council could not even agree that force was
needed to enforce its prior resolutions, an easier conclusion to reach than one that
held an attack was forthcoming and only an immediate armed response could stave
it off. Thus, Operation Iraqi Freedom falters on the necessity criterion.
But even had an attack been necessary in March 2003, some might have argued
that conquest and belligerent occupation ofthe country was disproportionate. For
instance, selected air strikes against WMD-related targets, or perhaps even a rolling
campaign designed to impose ever-greater costs, might have compelled Iraq to dis-
mantle its capabilities, cooperate fully with international weapons inspectors, and
refrain from further involvement with terrorists. That said, given Saddam
Hussein's record of intransigence (and in light of Operation Desert Fox's inability
to convince him to readmit weapons inspectors), assertions of disproportionality
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are unconvincing. Of course, because the operation was not "necessary" as that
term is understood in the law ofself-defense, the entire issue is purely theoretical.
Breach ofthe 1991 Cease-Fire
The lead Coalition partners, the United States and United Kingdom, did not
base the legality oftheir attack against Iraq on a self-defense argument, anticipatory
or otherwise. Before commencing hostilities, the United Kingdom made this clear
in a formal opinion of the Attorney General. 53 The United States issued no compa-
rable official legal opinion, a problem because the US administration was publicly
discussing possible reasons for the attack that ranged from WMD and enforcing
cease-fires to terrorism and regime change. 54 However, immediately after launch
ofOperation Iraqi Freedom, the United States addressed a letter to the President of
the Security Council in which it outlined its legal rationale for resorting to armed
force, a justification very similar to that contained in the earlier Attorney General
opinion. 55 The United Kingdom did likewise. 56
It is important to distinguish these formal legal justifications from the myriad
other justifications suggested by the US and UK governments, many of which ap-
peared to be robed in the mantle of the law. For instance, in his notification to
Congress that the United States was employing force against Iraq, the President
stated he has determined that "further diplomatic and other peaceful means alone
will neither adequately protect the national security of the United States against
the continuing threat posed by Iraq, nor lead to enforcement of all relevant United
Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq."57 Some might conclude that
such statements indicate application of the preemptive self-defense strategy an-
nounced in the 2002 National Security Strategy. Such assertions confuse strategy
with the underlying legal basis for application of a strategy in particular circum-
stances. Precision requires distinguishing strategic rationale from underlying legal
justification.
To date, the most complete "official" presentation of the legal position taken by
the United States is contained in an article coauthored by the US State Depart-
ment's Legal Adviser, William H. Taft IV, and the Assistant Legal Adviser for Polit-
ical/Military Affairs, Todd F. Buchwald, in the American Journal of International
Law. 5* In that piece, they amplify on the rationale contained in letters to the Coun-
cil President. They begin by accurately dispensing with the notion that preemptive
self-defense is either necessarily legal or illegal; such assertions are red herrings be-
cause the legality of preemptive actions is always fact-specific. 59 They then turn to
the US legal basis for Operation Iraqi Freedom, one grounded in both the situation
in 2002-3 and the history of the Iraq case over the past dozen years. Their analysis
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combined with that contained in the US and UK notifications to the Security
Council and the Attorney General's opinion yield the following justification for
the war.
After Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, the United Nations Security
Council passed Resolution 660, declaring the attack a breach of the peace and de-
manding immediate withdrawal.60 Over the ensuing two months, it passed a num-
ber of resolutions imposing sanctions on Iraq in the hope of pressuring it to
comply with 660. 61 Finally, on November 29 the Council, pursuant to its Chapter
VII authority, adopted Resolution 678, which authorized States cooperating with
Kuwait to use "all necessary means" to implement 660 and subsequent resolutions
and "to restore international peace and security in the area."62 The latter phrase is
particularly relevant as it empowered the use of force not merely to expel the Iraqi
military from Kuwait, but also to create the conditions necessary for regional sta-
bility. In order to afford Iraq "one final opportunity," the resolution set a compli-
ance deadline of January 15, 1991. Meanwhile, the United States and a number of
other States had deployed forces to the region "in the exercise of the inherent right
of individual and collective self-defense."63
When Iraq failed to comply with the UN resolutions by the deadline, Coalition
forces attacked. This action was taken pursuant to 678, not a new Security Council
mandate; thus, individual States—not the Security Council—determined Iraq had
not complied and took the decision to attack. By March 3, Iraqi forces were in re-
treat and field commanders negotiated a cease-fire.
Exactly one month later, the Security Council adopted Resolution 687.64 It set
forth the terms of a cease-fire that would come into effect upon Iraqi acceptance,
including terms relating to such issues as borders, terrorism, and, most signifi-
cantly,WMD disarmament. A system of inspections (and weapons destruction) by
the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and IAEA was set up for this
latter purpose. Iraq grudgingly accepted the terms on April 6 in a letter to the Secu-
rity Council.65
As a matter of law, material breach of the terms of a cease-fire by one side re-
leases the other from its own obligations, including that to refrain from the use of
force. 66 Those who suggest that breach of a cease-fire contained in a Security
Council resolution requires a subsequent use of force mandate before resuming
hostilities ignore the fact that the state of war continues during a cease-fire.67
Cease-fires are merely temporary cessations of hostilities, usually agreed upon in
order to facilitate negotiations on formal termination of hostilities. Only when
hostilities have formally ended, for instance through a peace agreement, does the
UN Charter Article 2(4) prohibition on the use of force become operative again as
between the parties to the conflict.68
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On a number of occasions, Coalition forces had responded to Iraqi breaches
forcibly, most notably in 1993 and 1998. Although the Security Council did not
specifically authorize the use of force either time, significant indications ofconcur-
rence with the position that Resolution 678 alone sufficed to justify a resumption
of hostilities existed in both cases. Not only did France (an opponent of the 2003
action) participate in the 1993 operation with the United States and United King-
dom, but Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali stated:
the raid was carried out in accordance with a mandate from the Security Council under
resolution 678 (1991), and the motive for the raid was Iraq's violation of that
resolution which concerns the cease-fire. As General-Secretary ofthe United Nations, I
can tell you that the action was taken in accordance with the resolutions ofthe Security
Council and the Charter of the United Nations.69
Similarly, following the 1998 Operation Desert Fox strikes, a vituperative debate
over the necessity of a Security Council Resolution finding Iraq in material breach
as a condition precedent to attack took place; tellingly, this debate assumed that if
the Security Council had rendered such a finding, States could have used force in
response thereto. 70
In fact, in the years following implementation of the cease-fire, the Security
Council found Iraq in non-compliance with Security Council resolutions on mul-
tiple occasions. For instance, in August 1991, the Council condemned Iraq's "seri-
ous violation of a number of its obligations under . . . resolution 687 (1991) and of
its undertakings to cooperate with the Special Commission and the International
Atomic Energy Agency, which constitutes a material breach of the relevant provi-
sions of that resolution which established a cease-fire. . . ." 71 In March 1998, the
Council issued a stern warning to Iraq that "compliance . . . with its obligations . .
.
to accord immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to the Special Com-
mission and the IAEA, in conformity with the relevant resolutions, is necessary for
the implementation of resolution 687 (1991) . . . [and] that any violation would
have the severest consequences for Iraq."72 That November, the Council con-
demned Iraq for "the decision ... of 31 October 1998 to cease cooperation with the
Special Commission" and labeled the step a "flagrant violation of resolution 687
(1991) and other relevant resolutions
"73 Operation Desert Fox commenced on
December 16, 1998 and continued for three days, but Iraq refused to admit inspec-
tors for the next four years.
The most relevant finding of breach came when the Security Council unani-
mously adopted Resolution 1441 on November 8, 2002. As outlined above, in that
resolution the Council determined that Iraq had failed to comply with
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requirements to disclose WMD information, cooperate with weapons inspectors,
cut ties to terrorists, cease repression of its population, facilitate humanitarian as-
sistance, and cooperate in accounting for human and property losses from the first
Gulf War. It affirmed "Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obliga-
tions under relevant resolutions, including resolution 687 (1991), in particular
through Iraq's failure to cooperate with United Nations inspectors and the IAEA
and to complete actions required under paragraphs 8-13 of resolution 687
(1991)."74 Resolution 1441 also specifically "recalled" that Resolution 678 had au-
thorized the use of "all necessary means" to uphold and implement both prior and
subsequent relevant UN resolutions (thereby including 1441) and restore interna-
tional peace and security. The Council afforded Iraq a "final opportunity" to meet
its obligations, but "failure by Iraq at any time to comply with and cooperate fully
in the implementation of this resolution [which requires a declaration on all as-
pects ofthe IraqiWMD program and cooperation with inspectors] shall constitute
a further material breach of Iraq's obligation. . ." (emphasis added). Resolution
1441 concluded with a stern warning of "serious consequences" in the event of
"continued violation [by Iraq] of its obligations." Significantly, 1441 required the
Security Council to reconvene if Iraq did not fulfill its obligations. As noted earlier,
the Council did so to consider the reports ofweapons inspectors, who did not give
Iraq a clean bill of health, and the concerns of individual States, most notably the
United States.
What Resolution 1441 did not contain was a requirement to return to the Coun-
cil for a use of force authorization. As noted by the US legal advisers, earlier drafts
circulated among the Security Council members required the Council to meet
again to "decide any measures to ensure full compliance of all its relevant resolu-
tions."75 Negotiations led to the rejection of this wording.
Based on these facts, the United States and its coalition partners presented a
rather linear argument. Resolution 687 (1991) conditioned the cease-fire on Iraqi
compliance with its terms. Iraq had not fully complied, resulting in several Security
Council declarations that such non-compliance amounted to material breach. The
Council even gave Iraq a "final opportunity" to bring itself into conformity and
placed Iraq on notice that further non-compliance would constitute a material
breach which could result in serious consequences. In the US view, the Security
Council should have acted at that point to enforce its own resolutions, but did not.
Therefore, the United States and other Coalition States were released from their
cease-fire obligations and the initial use of force authorization contained in Reso-
lution 678 became operative again, as it had on multiple occasions in the previous
decade. The sole limitation on their actions was that they do no more than autho-
rized by the broad mandate contained in Resolution 678 —to enforce past and
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future Council resolutions and restore international peace and security. Given
more than a decade of violation of Security Council resolutions intended to create
the conditions for stability, ousting Saddam Hussein and the Baathists from power
fell neatly within that mandate.
As a matter of law, this line of argumentation is sound. Under the principles of
humanitarian law, cease-fires are clearly temporary measures that bind parties
thereto only so long as the other side is not in material breach. The Security Coun-
cil had agreed in November 2002 that Iraq was in breach (thereby mooting any ar-
gument about whether a US or UK assertion of breach was justified). Further,
immediately prior to the attack the UN's own inspectors asserted that the Iraqis
were not meeting all the requirements imposed on them, a situation which 1441
had pre-determined to be a further material breach. As a general matter of law,
hostilities may immediately resume in the event of material breach. In this particu-
lar case, the right to resume hostilities was clearer still, for the cease-fire resolution
specifically reaffirmed Resolution 678, which authorized the use of force, "except
as expressly changed." The only change to that resolution was imposition of the
cease-fire itself. But with the cease-fire materially breached, the 678 use of force au-
thorization came back into play by the express terms of Resolution 687.
Some have claimed that only the Security Council was authorized to determine
how to respond to the cease-fire breach it had acknowledged in Resolution 1441
and previous resolutions. However, such assertions ignore the fact that the cease-
fire was not between the United Nations and Iraq, but, according to 687, "Iraq and
Kuwait and member States cooperating with Kuwait in accordance with resolution
678 (1990)." Therefore, those States were empowered under international law to
determine whether to resort to force once a material breach of the cease-fire to
which they were a Party occurred. 76 The fact that Resolution 687 provided the Se-
curity Council remained "actively seized of the matter" has similarly been misin-
terpreted as indicating that exclusive authority to mandate a response resided in
the Council. In fact, the phrase is nothing more than standard text appearing in
many resolutions indicating the Security Council will continue to address the situ-
ation at hand (as it did with 1441 and other post-687 resolutions). Unless specifi-
cally provided, such text does not preclude actions (that are in compliance with
international law) taken by States or other international governmental organiza-
tions to respond to a situation. It has also been argued that the use of force authori-
zation was limited to expelling the Iraqis from Kuwait, and that any use of force
beyond that purpose would require further Council authorization. However, the
stated purpose of678 was to "uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and all
subsequent resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area."
That this was a broad grant ofauthority is evidenced by inclusion of the diversity of
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cease-fire terms (from borders to disarmament) in Resolution 687. Clearly, in
1990-91, the Council understood that restoring international peace and security
involved much more than merely liberating Kuwait.
Admittedly, this line of analysis, albeit legally valid, poses a difficult practical di-
lemma, for the views of the Security Council on the use of force against Iraq dif-
fered dramatically in March 2003 from those ofApril 1991. Yet, the Council, in the
face of US and UK opposition, was powerless to withdraw, or even modify, either
its 1990 use of force authorization or the terms of its 1991 cease-fire. 77 This is a par-
ticularly vexing problem given post-conflict difficulties offinding theWMD or ter-
rorism smoking guns. Thus, we witnessed a use of force based on Security Council
resolutions that the Council itselfwould not have approved had it been the sole de-
cision-maker. It represented the triumph of law over policy.
In the future, the Council is likely to be very reticent about granting open-ended
continuing authority to employ force. In particular, it can be expected to carefully
craft its Chapter VII resolutions to require explicit follow-on authorization for any
resumption of hostilities should a cessation of hostilities occur. That said, the para-
doxical legal fact remains that based on the interplay of a series of Security Council
resolutions and the law of cease-fires, Operation Iraqi Freedom was legal.
Humanitarian Intervention
There is no question that the Security Council could have authorized an interven-
tion into Iraq based on the regime's mistreatment of its population. In doing so,
the internal situation need merely have represented a "threat to the peace" under
Article 39 of the Charter, such that the Council's Article 42 authority vested. Since
the Council itself determines when a threat has emerged, it enjoys unfettered dis-
cretion in authorizing a forcible humanitarian intervention under Chapter VII of
the Charter.
The Security Council has mandated such interventions on numerous occasions.
For instance, when internal order in Somalia collapsed in 1992, the Council autho-
rized "member States ... to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a
secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia."78 The United
States responded with Operation Restore Hope, conducted by the multinational
Unified Task Force (UNITAF). The following year, acting under Chapter VII, the
Council approved the replacement of UNITAF by the United Nations Operation
in Somalia (UNOSOM) II. 79
The nature of the intervention need not be classically humanitarian. In 1994,
the Security Council authorized member States to forcibly intervene in Haiti to ef-
fect the "restoration of the legitimate authorities of the Government of Haiti."80
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Although the resolution cited the humanitarian situation in the country, including
the denial of civil liberties, the intent was clearly political in purpose—regime
change through "the prompt return of the legitimately elected President, Jean-
Bertrand Aristide, within the framework of the Governors Island Agreement." 81
Some humanitarian interventions mounted without Security Council sanction
have subsequently acquired the support of the Council. In 1990, the Economic
Community ofWest African States (ECOWAS) intervened in Liberia without UN
approval. The following year, a Security Council Presidential Statement "com-
mended the efforts made by the ECOWAS Heads of State and Government to pro-
mote peace and normalcy in Liberia."82 When fighting broke out again in 1992, the
Council praised ECOWAS for its role in addressing this "threat to international
peace and security." 83 ECOWAS conducted yet another humanitarian interven-
tion without Security Council sanction in 1997 when events in Sierra Leone slipped
out of control. As in the Liberia case, an ex post facto Presidential Statement com-
mended ECOWAS for the "important role" it was playing "towards the peaceful
resolution of this crisis."84
Although also conducted without Security Council objection, these cases can be
readily distinguished from the situation in Iraq. First, regional organizations car-
ried them out, thereby adding some degree of legitimacy to the operations. Fur-
ther, there was no apparent opposition to the interventions in the Security
Council, and certainly none from any of the Permanent Five. Finally, in both
countries the humanitarian crisis was widespread, immediate, and horrendous.
The 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo represents a closer case because there
the Security Council had previously labeled the situation a threat to the peace as in
Iraq and the operation was mounted in the face of opposition on the Security
Council, most significantly from Russia. Unsurprisingly, Operation Allied Force
generated significant criticism from the international legal community. Although
few contested the legitimacy of the NATO operation, many supporters acknowl-
edged the frailty of its asserted legal basis. Kosovo was not, after all, Rwanda, where
deaths numbered in the hundreds of thousands. In that case, individual States and
the international community were roundly criticized for inaction; but it was the
scale of the tragedy that tended to underpin such criticism. 85
Even with the rise of concepts such as human rights, human dignity, world or-
der, and sovereignty residing in the citizenry rather than the government, interna-
tional law continues to react negatively to the prospect of State A determining that
events in State B merit resort to the use of force. UN Charter Article 2(4), which
prohibits the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any State, continues to enjoy normative positive valence. Asserting exceptions




self-defense and Security Council authorization—inevitably generates skepticism
and opposition.
Iraq lies further down the continuum of situations that might legally justify hu-
manitarian intervention than the aforementioned cases. With Iraq, no regional or-
ganization rose to the challenge of intervention. On the contrary, close allies of
those who did attack Iraq were openly opposed to intervention without Council
approval. Further, the humanitarian situation in the country, albeit deplorable, did
not rise to the level of suffering of the previous precedents. In the period preceding
the attack, there is no question that torture was widespread, ethnic minorities were
expelled from their homes, infant and child mortality rates had grown dramatically
as a result of Saddam Hussein's non-cooperation with the "food-for-oil" program
assets, and that the humanitarian situation was generally deteriorating. 86 Never-
theless, the scale and scope of suffering had not reached genocidal proportions as it
had in Rwanda, nor was there fear of an imminent campaign of genocide, as in
Kosovo. Simply put, the human situation in the country was not at a point where a
majority of international legal scholars and practitioners would agree that a factual
basis for humanitarian intervention, a controversial matter in international law
even in the abstract, existed.
Thus, while the regime's treatment of the Iraqi population was morally and le-
gally reprehensible, and although President Bush repeatedly cited such treatment
as a rationale for action against Iraq (for example, during his 2002 State of the Un-
ion Address), it did not justify humanitarian intervention absent Security Council
de jure or de facto acquiescence. Although thejus ad helium has moved in the direc-
tion of increased acceptance of humanitarian intervention since the end of the
Cold War, by March 2003 it had not reached situations such as that in Iraq. Thus, it
is unsurprising that none of the countries participating in Operation Iraqi Free-
dom formally cited the internal suffering as legally justifying their action.
Regime Change
In 1998, a distinguished group of individuals, many of whom now occupy key
positions in the Bush administration, openly urged the removal by force of
Saddam Hussein's regime. 87 Clearly, the Administration desperately desired re-
gime change in Iraq. Yet, despite a self-evident need for a new regime in the coun-
try, and although the US administration actually demanded on March 17, 2003
that Saddam Hussein step down within 48 hours or face forceful removal,88 there is
no independent basis in international law for regime change. Rather, regime
change can only be a legitimate consequence of otherwise legal uses of force. 89
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For example, the Security Council may determine that continued governance
by a particular group threatens international peace and authorize the removal of
that government under Chapter VII, as it did in the case of Haiti in 1994. Or it may
determine that another situation amounts to a threat to the peace, breach of peace,
or act ofaggression and authorize the use of military force pursuant to Article 42 to
restore international peace and security. If the fall of a regime results from the en-
suing military action, that regime change would be legal. For instance, many argue
that Coalition forces should have marched on Baghdad in 1991 to topple Saddam
Hussein because with the dictator still in power it was impossible to permanently
restore international peace and security pursuant to Resolution 678. Similarly, an
effective defense, either individual or collective, may result in the fall of the regime
that mounted an aggressive attack. It is even possible that a humanitarian interven-
tion could result in removal ofa regime, either as a coincidental consequence ofthe
operation or because doing so is necessary to safeguard the civilian population.
That certainly would have been the case with the Hutu-dominated government of
Rwanda had external forces intervened in 1994 to stop its slaughter of the Tutsis.
However, States may not, absent Security Council mandate, act for the sole pur-
pose of removing a regime of which they disapprove; doing so would constitute a
patent violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. Therefore, in the absence of a
separate legal basis for action (which existed in this case), any effort to remove
Saddam Hussein from power would have been illegal.
Conclusions
Despite the often-confusing rhetoric that has accompanied Operation Iraqi
Freedom, there is only one legal basis on which the action could have been plainly
justified, and it is on that basis that the States forming the coalition against Saddam
Hussein rested their case. Therefore, the war against Iraq is unlikely to impact cur-
rent understanding of the jus ad bellum in any dramatic way, as Operation En-
during Freedom did with regard to the use of force against terrorists and their State
supporters.
If anything (and somewhat counter- intuitively), the affair is likely to
strengthen the centrality of the UN Charter use of force regime and the Security
Council's role in determining when States may employ armed force. All parties
agreed that first resort in the matter was to the Security Council. Indeed, the
United States and its Coalition allies actively sought a use of force mandate from
the Council. When they did not receive one, they nevertheless justified their ac-
tions on a string of Security Council resolutions reaching back over a decade.
Analogously, States opposed to Operation Iraqi Freedom based their resistance on
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the argument that the Coalition should not have attacked without an explicit
Council mandate.
Had the Coalition chosen any other ground to justify the attack, currently pre-
vailing interpretations of the jus ad bellum would have been placed under signifi-
cant stress, with some scholars and practitioners arguing for new interpretations of
existing law in light of changed circumstances, others suggesting the emergence of
new norms, and many asserting that the attack was quite simply unlawful. It is for-
tunate that the Coalition avoided alternative justifications, for, as every law student
knows, hard cases make bad law. Instead, the lesson of this experience is that States
will continue to look to the Security Council as the font for authorization to use
force; therefore, that body must exercise its discretion with great care, surgical pre-
cision, and an eye to the future.
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Kenneth Roth and Robert F. Turner*
Moderator: The last set of questions to the preceding panel members is a perfect
segue to questions oflaw enforcement and military responses to fighting terrorism,
and in this particular case, targeting terrorists. We are now going to take a closer
look at questions ofpreemption and prevention, as well as specific techniques that
might apply to combating terrorists and terrorist groups.
I am a journalist and generally examine the issue of targeting terrorists through
a domestic lens focused on homeland security and criminal justice, so I am looking
forward to a debate that broadens the focus to include international law and mili-
tary operations. This debate is much more interesting when we start to compare
activities conducted beyond the borders of the United States with activities con-
ducted within our borders, and then determining what standards will be applied in
targeting terrorists abroad versus within the United States.
Our first speaker is Mr. Ken Roth, who has been Executive Director of Human
Rights Watch since 1993, and served as the deputy director of that organization
from 1987 to 1993. Human Rights Watch is the largest human rights organization
based in the United States. Its researchers conduct fact-finding investigations into
human rights abuses in all regions ofthe world and then publishes those findings in
dozens ofbooks and reports every year, generating extensive coverage in local and
international media.
* Mr. Kenneth Roth is the Executive Director of Human Rights Watch. Professor Robert F.
Turner is Associate Director, Center for National Security Law at the University of Virginia
School of Law.
Debating the Issues
Mr. Roth: It is an honor to be here. I am grateful for the invitation. I am also grate-
ful to the Supreme Court for waiting to hear the benefits of today's conversation
before deciding the Hamdi and Padilla cases now pending before it so that we can
address the issues from a blank slate. What I will address this morning is the ques-
tion: what are the limits to the war on terror. More specifically, when is the war on
terror a real war and when is it a metaphor more akin to the war on drugs or the
war on poverty or various other efforts to mobilize the population to pursue an
important goal.
Obviously Afghanistan was a war. There is no question that armed conflict
occurred there. Insofar as Iraq had anything to do with terrorism, no question,
that was a war, too. But what about elsewhere? President Bush has spoken about
the war on terror being global, since al Qaeda has cells around the world, so the
war against it and the war on terrorism must be pursued globally. Is he speaking in
a metaphoric sense or literally? The answer to that question is important because if
we're talking only metaphor, then we are obviously applying the rules of peace-
time law enforcement. And under those rules, as you all know, you have a duty to
arrest a suspect if at all possible—indeed only arrest the suspect upon probable
cause. Then the suspect is brought before a judge, represented by a lawyer, entitled
to a trial, et cetera. Lethal force can sometimes be used but only if strictly necessary
to stop a threat to life or a threat of serious bodily injury to another. And so lethal
force is carefully circumscribed. In a war context, you look at the law of armed
conflict. If you have detained an enemy combatant, there is no need to give him a
lawyer, no need to give him a trial, no need to charge him with anything. In the
midst of battle, you can shoot to kill. You don't have to attempt arrest. Obviously,
if an enemy surrenders, you have to respect that. But if, for example, the enemy
combatant is walking down the street or operating on patrol, you can shoot to kill.
You don't need to first attempt an arrest. Those are big differences. The question
is: which set of rules should apply to combating terrorists—those for law enforce-
ment or those for law of armed conflict.
Unfortunately, the law of armed conflict provides relatively little guidance for
making that decision. It sets forth detailed rules that apply once you have an armed
conflict. But it is unclear, however, exactly when the circumstances are such that
they may be considered to be an armed conflict.
If you look at the commentary to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, for example,
there are references to the intensity of the violence and to the regularity of armed
clashes. You can argue that the series of al Qaeda operations from the African
embassies to the USS Cole to the World Trade Center are but a series ofvery impor-
tant criminal acts, or you might argue that those are various acts ofwar. There is no
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terribly good way to resolve that argument by looking to the Geneva Conventions
and the accompanying commentary. You end up having a battle of metaphors.
What I propose to do is to look beyond the metaphors and to try to examine a
few cases—some troublesome cases—to see whether they help us decide the point
at which the real war on terrorism should end and the metaphor should begin. I
would like to examine these cases from a policy prospective to determine what re-
ally makes sense. I'll conclude by proposing a general rule that might provide guid-
ance in drawing that line.
The obvious place to start is the Padilla case. Padilla, of course, is the alleged
"Dirty Bomber" who flew from Pakistan to Chicago's O'Hare Airport. It now ap-
pears that maybe he wasn't pursuing a dirty bomb; maybe he was going to blow up
an apartment building. But whatever he was doing, he seems to have been up to no
good. The US Government, after initially arresting him as a material witness, very
quickly moved to classify him as an enemy combatant and then shipped him to the
naval brig in South Carolina. There he was denied access to his lawyer for long peri-
ods of time on the grounds that he didn't have to be charged with a crime.
Now, does that make sense? Is Padilla, who was far from any traditional battle-
field, an enemy combatant? One way to address that question is to seriously con-
sider what it would mean if Padilla really were an enemy combatant. Because if
stepping off that plane in O'Hare Airport and through the terminal to pick up his
luggage were sufficient to make him an enemy combatant as alleged, there would
be no duty to arrest him. He could simply have been shot under the provisions of
the law of armed conflict that entitle a belligerent to kill enemy combatants.
I am troubled by that conclusion. I suspect many ofyou are as well. But it leads
me to question whether the characterization of an individual, even ifhe is up to no
good, as an enemy combatant is appropriate. One of the reasons I am troubled is
that there was a functioning legal system in the United States. Padilla easily could
have been arrested and brought before it. Indeed, he was, as a material witness, be-
fore being made an enemy combatant.
Another enemy combatant who was arrested in the United States was al-Marri.
He was arrested in his house in Peoria, Illinois. We now know his main offense was
being a nephew ofthe alleged 20th hijacker but at the time it was alleged that he was
a member of a sleeper cell. Again if he was really an enemy combatant, he could
have been shot as he came to open the door. He didn't have to be arrested. Is that
really where we want to go?
Ifyou think about another war that is generally understood to be metaphoric
—
the war on drugs—we are dealing with comparable dangers in many respects. Drug
trafficking is also an international phenomenon; there is a raging armed conflict in
Columbia. Even though drug cartels send clandestine agents to the United States
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who engage in violent activities that kill thousands of people, nonetheless we are
uncomfortable treating drug traffickers as combatants. We don't start shooting
them—we arrest and prosecute them. Why is terrorism different when we are in a
situation where prosecution is possible?
Now let's look on the other side of the spectrum. This morning's panel dis-
cussed the 2002 attack on a senior al Qaeda operative in Yemen. This is an instance
where I think it was appropriate to classify him as a combatant, but the United
States never made a good case at explaining its reasoning. At the time, all we knew
was that a CIA-operated Predator drone flying over Yemen launched a missile
which struck a car carrying Abu Ali al-Harithi, along with several of his alleged
coconspirators, and that they were all killed. Very little else beyond that was
known. In fact, even that information was not supposed to be made public. No ef-
fort was made at the time to justify the killing ofal-Harithi as an enemy combatant.
So let me try to do that in retrospect. I think that this was probably a circum-
stance in which it was appropriate to classify him as an enemy combatant. First, al-
though it appears al-Harithi had been responsible for the attack on the Cole, in and
of itself that would not be sufficient because ifyou've simply committed a crime in
the past, that doesn't justify shooting you today. To be shot today, you have to be
engaged in ongoing combatant activities. So the allegation has to be that al-Harithi
was engaging in continuing terrorist activities—an allegation that the United
States never made publicly. Yet my understanding is that this was believed to be the
case.
Second, the United States never made the case publicly as to why he couldn't
have been arrested. In fact, we know that it would have been very difficult to arrest
him. In a prior attempt by Yemen forces to arrest him, a dozen Yemeni soldiers
were killed. Al-Harithi stayed in the tribal areas of Yemen where he was basically
beyond the reach of the Yemeni government.
You might ask, "Couldn't the United States, with Yemen's permission, send in
troops to arrest him?" I understand that the United States considered this alterna-
tive, but apparently felt it would be impossible for troops to infiltrate that area
without the tribal forces immediately knowing they were there. Under those cir-
cumstances, there would have been fierce resistance with casualties far in excess of
those sustained in the Predator attack.
I think the case could have been made that with respect to al-Harithi you had an
active combatant engaged in ongoing plans against the United States and no capac-
ity to use traditional law enforcement means to arrest him. Under those circum-
stances, no one should contend that the United States could not take action to
defend itself. Treating him as an enemy combatant and resorting to lethal force was
appropriate. In that case, war rules were the right rules, even though the United
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States didn't explain its case well. But the al-Harithi case is more of an exception
than the rule.
Just to give you a few more examples, there were six Algerians arrested in
Bosnia. In that case, the United States decided initially to employ the law enforce-
ment approach and brought these individuals before a Bosnian court. The court,
which had been created by the United States, agreed to accept the cases and asked
for the evidence, but it then found the evidence insufficient to hold the suspects.
The United States responded by saying that it had decided instead to treat the six as
enemy combatants and whisked them off to Guantanamo Bay despite the fact that
the Bosnian court order directed their release.
That I find troublesome because here was an available, clearly functioning legal
system, hardly hostile to US interests, in which honest justices looked at the case
and determined they had not been provided sufficient evidence to warrant prose-
cution. Rather than produce the evidence, rather than using the functioning judi-
cial system, the United States sent them off to Guantanamo Bay.
Something very similar happened in Malawi where five al Qaeda suspects were
picked up. The local court system looked at the evidence, determined there was no
evidence of criminal conduct, and ordered them released. The United States said,
"No problem, we'll treat them as enemy combatants," and detained them anyway.
In that case, sometime later the United States decided that in fact the Malawian
court was correct; there was no evidence. The suspects were then released. This il-
lustrates the problem with allowing war rules to be applied globally even where
law enforcement is an option. Frankly, it means that there is nothing that prevents
the US Government from picking up any one of us, declaring us an enemy com-
batant, and whisking us away without access to a lawyer. Indeed, as we know from
al-Harithi, there's nothing to stop the US Government from shooting us by declar-
ing us enemy combatants and just firing away. I had the chance to ask Attorney
General Ashcroft about this and he said, "Oh, trust us; we've only done this twice,"
referring to the Padilla and the al-Marri cases.
I think it's fair to say those are test cases. Ifthe Bush Administration gets the rul-
ing it wants from the Supreme Court, we are going to see many more ofthose cases.
We already have many more of them outside of the United States. This is particu-
larly worrisome in terrorism cases because much ofwhat is said to be known about
terrorists is based on intelligence that can be of varying reliability. Particularly in
that situation, you want the evidence tested in an open court in some kind of ad-
versarial process.
With those dangers in mind, I would like to propose a three-part test, a series of




Obviously, you have Afghanistan and Iraq (at least in the initial stages of the
military campaign) as traditional battlefields. But in the absence of a traditional
battlefield, I would first argue that you need to be able to make the case that there is
a regularity and level of intensity to the violence such that it is fair to characterize
the overall campaign as one ofwar; that a mere criminal act here or there will not be
sufficient.
Second, in determining whether a particular individual is a combatant, he
must be a direct participant. Here I refer to the traditional rules on when an irreg-
ular or civilian can be treated as a combatant. You need some direct participation
in this violent activity, although that does not necessarily imply carrying a gun or
placing a bomb. I understand the role of planners or organizers, but the case has
to be made that this is a direct participant, not a sympathizer or a financier. We
have to keep in mind the traditional line that we draw even in a classic war be-
tween combatants and others who provide support, but who may not be directly
targeted.
Finally, and most important, law enforcement options have to be unavailable.
If someone can reasonably be arrested, if there is a functioning court system,
those avenues should be pursued. We should reserve the use of war rules to situa-
tions when armed combat is really the only option—situations like those that ex-
ist in the tribal areas of Pakistan or in Afghanistan before the conflict broke out,
where you had an uncooperative government that was sheltering individuals who
were actively in the process of launching attacks against the United States. Those
are not circumstances where we want to require the law enforcement option.
Now let me just briefly say a word about torture.
I don't have to repeat the international humanitarian law rules prohibiting
torture for this audience; you know these all too well. I want to note that even in
situations where the Geneva Conventions are inapplicable; there is a parallel body
of law that military lawyers often forget about, that is, human rights law. That law
applies even in the absence of the Geneva Conventions. So, for example, the Con-
vention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment prohibits torture in any circumstance. There are no exceptions
whatsoever. In explicit terms, it similarly prohibits cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment. Similarly, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
prohibits both torture and cruel and inhuman treatment. It is clear that both of
those are nonderogatory. Even in a public emergency you can never use torture.
You can never engage in cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. With that back-
ground, this should be an open and shut case, and we should have nothing to ad-
dress on that issue.
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In fact, a series of decisions by appointed lawyers in the Bush Administration
did set us on that road where torture and cruel and inhuman treatment are being
openly discussed by the American (and international) public. The decisions were
taken step-by-step. The first was to decide that the 1949 Geneva Convention III
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War was inapplicable not only to al
Qaeda, but initially to the Afghan conflict. This decision was reached using some
combination of a novel failed-State theory and/or by arguing that the Taliban didn't
distinguish itself from the civilian population even though every Afghan knew
exactly who the Taliban was by the turban and the dress they wore. Nonetheless,
facts didn't get in the way of the Bush Administration, which declared the Geneva
Convention inapplicable. That was step one.
Step two was to completely ignore the parallel requirements of human rights
law. The initial decisions made in January 2002 determined the Prisoners ofWar
Convention was inapplicable but did indicate that those who were in US hands
were to be treated humanely. Until August of that year, there was no public men-
tion of the Torture Convention at all.
When we finally see mention of the Torture Convention it is in that notorious
August 2002 Jay Bybee memorandum from the Justice Department. In that memo-
randum, we see that the use of torture is dealt with in an extremely narrow way.
There is no mention of the parallel prohibition of cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment, other than to say torture is much worse than that. There is not a hint
that there is actually a requirement to refrain from cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment. I think the reason for that is that the Torture Convention doesn't re-
quire criminalization of cruel and inhuman treatment, only oftorture, and the Jus-
tice Department lawyers were mainly worried about avoiding prosecution.
It wasn't until June 2003, after a series of meetings that Human Rights Watch
staff members and others had with Condoleezza Rice, the National Security Ad-
viser, that the Bush Administration mentioned publicly the prohibition on cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment. The Department of Defense General Counsel
stated (in a well thought out statement) that the prohibition on cruel, inhuman
and degrading treatment proscribes the same conduct in the United States under
the US Constitution as international law proscribes overseas. In other words, ifyou
can't do it at the local police station, you can't do it anywhere. This correct state-
ment of the law was, as evidenced by the various interrogation techniques that we
now know were authorized, promptly ignored. In some cases, the authorized inter-
rogation techniques even involved torture.
Indeed, even after meeting with Condoleezza Rice a few weeks ago to press
her to disown coercive interrogation as contrary to the US Army's Intelligence
Interrogation manual and contrary to the prohibition of cruel and inhuman
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treatment, the Bush Administration still insists that there is a realm of coercive
interrogation that is permissible and appropriate. Thus, this is not an issue of in-
dividual aberrant interrogators but one of policy involving senior levels of the
Administration.
We're all aware that various defenses have been offered for the Bush Adminis-
tration's decisions. I won't spend much time on them other than to say it is embar-
rassing to a see a lawyer putting them forward. The first is that the President, in the
exercise of his commander-in-chief authority, can authorize torture—can, in ef-
fect, rip up the Torture Convention and the Geneva Prisoners ofWar Convention.
The second theory put forward is that in self-defense you can torture. Of course,
war involves self-defense but in that instance the use offorce is governed by a whole
body of law—the law of armed conflict. That law is absolutely clear in prohibiting
torture—you simply can't do it! The Bush Administration's decisions may be
equated to the rules for a barroom brawl—anything goes.
Finally, the Bush Administration puts forward the argument of necessity—if
you really have to, it's permissible. But one of the requirements of necessity is that
the legislature has not prohibited a certain type of response. The Administration
states the rule of necessity, but then ignores the US ratification of the Torture Con-
vention with its provision that you can never torture or use cruel or inhuman
treatment, even in extreme situations. There is no exception to this prohibition in
the Convention.
What this all adds up to is a highly permissive environment when it comes to co-
ercive interrogation. We don't have evidence yet oforders from the top. I doubt we
ever will find an explicit order to torture. But we do have a group of politically ap-
pointed lawyers who, rather than conscientiously applying clear international pro-
hibitions, were basically looking for legal loopholes of enormous dubiousness and
sending the signal, "do whatever you want, we'll get you off." It should be no sur-
prise under this circumstance that torture and abuse were the result. Thank you.
Moderator: Thank you, Mr. Roth. Our second speaker is Professor Bob Turner,
who serves as the Associate Director of the Center for National Security Law at the
University of Virginia School of Law. Professor Turner knows these issues from
both a personal and academic standpoint having served two Army tours in Viet
Nam. He has served in the Pentagon as Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy, in the White House as Counsel to the President's Intelligence
Oversight Board, at the State Department as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Legislative Affairs, and as the first President of the congressionally established
United States Institute of Peace.
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Professor Turner: Our time is limited. I want to leave a lot of time for not only
questions but also comments because there are many people in the audience who
know as much about these issues as I do and almost as much as Ken does, so we'll
cut to the chase.
There are a lot of differences between us; but I think, at its core, the difference is
going to be about whether the law enforcement paradigm or the law ofarmed con-
flict paradigm ought to govern in the war against terrorism. On that issue we pro-
foundly disagree. I don't deny we have the legal option of arresting enemy
combatants and trying them in Article III federal courts, but we also have the option
of resorting to traditional methods of self-defense under the law ofarmed conflict,
which include the legal right to target enemy combatants, even enemy leaders who
take no actual part in the hostilities, and to detain them without trial until the end
of the conflict.
I was pleased to hear Ken recognize that. I would remind you that during World
War II the United States detained hundreds of thousands of German and some
Italian prisoners ofwar within our territory without judicial oversight and without
access to lawyers. During the more than eight years that some American pilots were
held as prisoners of war in North Viet Nam, not once did we ask the North Viet-
namese to give them a right to a lawyer nor did they receive a judicial hearing.
We understood that under existing international law, in the Geneva prisoners of
war convention, during a period of armed conflict it is permissible to essentially
"warehouse" enemy soldiers for the duration of the conflict. To be sure, if they are
accused of criminal behavior they then obtain a number of procedural rights and
essentially international due process of law. But even in that setting they're not
supposed to be sent into Article III courts. Article 84 of the Geneva Convention
provides expressly that if POWs are accused of criminal behavior, either commit-
ted while prisoners or war crimes committed during the conflict and before they
were captured, they are to be tried only by military courts.
Ken and I disagree about whether law enforcement or law of armed conflict
rules should apply. But that's not a hard decision to make and it seems to be impor-
tant to ask who ought to make that decision. It seems to me one can argue under our
constitutional system that, as chiefexecutive officer, as commander in chiefin charge
of fighting our wars, and so forth, maybe it is the President's decision to make.
Our very first speaker at this conference told us that the war on terrorism is in
fact a war. He said terrorism is an act ofwar. That I think is clear. I don't think any-
body will dispute this.
The President views this war as governed by the law of armed conflict. But then
again, maybe we can say that it's not the President's decision; that it ought to be the
law-making authority that makes this decision so maybe it's a decision for
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Congress. Or perhaps this is really a question of international law, so maybe it
ought to be the United Nations—and since it involves the issue of war and peace,
perhaps it's the UN Security Council, which is the primary organ ofthe United Na-
tions for the maintenance of international peace and security.
The response to the suggestion that it is other than the President's decision, I
would submit, is that it was determined on September 18, 2001, when the United
States Congress, by overwhelming votes in both houses, enacted Public Law 107-
40, which authorized the use of US armed forces against and, I quote, "those na-
tions, organizations or persons, he [the President of the United States] determines
planned, authorized or committed or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on
September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons in order to prevent
any future act of international terrorism against the United States."
Thus, I would submit the war on terrorism is not really a metaphor like the "war
on poverty" or the "war on drugs." The United States has been the object of nu-
merous armed attacks within the United States and abroad that have claimed
thousands ofhuman lives and Congress has by law authorized a military response
against those persons whom the President determines played a role in the 9/11 at-
tacks or belonged to an organization involved in those attacks.
That Joint Resolution was the constitutional equivalent of a declaration of war.
And there is no provision in the statute for judicial review, no provision saying that
before you can target an enemy terrorist you have to take him before an Article III
judge and make a determination beyond a reasonable doubt that he did belong to
that organization or did take part in that activity. That is not the way wars are
fought.
Ken may not like it, many of us may not like it, but the decision has been made
by our President and our Congress that the law ofwar governs. And ten days after
Congress authorized the use of armed force on September 28, 2001, the UN Secu-
rity Council unanimously passed Resolution 1373, which reaffirmed that all acts of
international terrorism constitute a threat to international peace and security and
may be combated by all means. Not just by law enforcement means, but by all
means, specifically mentioning the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defense as recognized by the Charter of the United Nations.
Once again, this is the language of armed conflict, not the language of law en-
forcement. And earlier this year, in Security Council Resolution 1526, the Council
again reaffirmed the need to combat, "by all means in accordance with the Charter
of the United Nations and international law threats to international peace and se-
curity caused by terrorist acts."
Now, I submit that at least until the Supreme Court orders otherwise, and I
would say personally I'm delighted the Supreme Court is looking at this, this issue
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has been resolved and the law of armed conflict is an appropriate paradigm in the
war against international terrorism.
I might add that ifHuman Rights Watch and other NGOs really believe that this
is only a law enforcement problem, it's hard to understand all the concerns we've
heard from them about the Geneva Conventions in the last few years.
It is true by definition that terrorists do not abide by the law of armed conflict
and thus do not qualify under international law as lawful combatants. But the ar-
gument that this misconduct should somehow entitle them to preferred treatment
to that given to lawful combatants when engaged in acts of war eludes me.
I am not suggesting that there is not an important role for the law enforcement
paradigm in the war on terror. Various Security Council resolutions have noted,
for example, the importance of using law enforcement tools to criminalize the pro-
vision of funds to terrorist organizations and the like. We have the option of arrest-
ing and trying terrorist suspects. When those individuals are US persons, that may
well be the most appropriate approach.
Again, I'm pleased the Supreme Court is looking at the Padilla and al-Marri
cases. When you are dealing with US persons under our legal system you some-
times get a different situation than dealing with foreign nationals.
Now, it is true that mistakes can happen and that innocent people honestly be-
lieved to be terrorists might be apprehended and detained against their will and in
violation offundamental principles ofjustice. Despite the best intentions of every-
one involved, sometimes innocent people are killed in wartime. It's happened in
Iraq. It's happened in Afghanistan. It happened in Viet Nam. It happened in
World War II.
There may be a war in history where mistakes were not made or innocent people
were not killed, but I am unaware of any such situation. War is often a necessity, a
choice between lesser evils, and ifwe demand that no enemy be targeted unless we
are absolutely certain of their identity and that no collateral damage will occur, we
are not going to win very many wars and a lot ofgood people on our side are going
to be killed by the enemies we elect not to target.
Under the law enforcement paradigm, presumably when Jose Padilla arrived in
the United States with instructions to explore the possibility of exploding a radio-
logical weapon, we should have told the FBI, "Hey, this guy may be up to no good,
kind ofkeep an eye on him. Don't violate his rights, don't profile him, don't harass
him. Follow him around a little bit ifyou can. Ifyou happen to see him kill a mil-
lion people, bring him in so we can try him." That is the criminal paradigm.
One may say he was already guilty of conspiracy. An interesting bit of informa-
tion is that when he was in Afghanistan and Pakistan he in fact did meet with senior
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al Qaeda leaders and came back home on a mission that was a conspiracy to com-
mit some horrible felonies.
Thirty-five years ago, as a junior Army lieutenant, I had the experience of going
through a chemical-biological-nuclear warfare course. Every graduate of that
course, even those who weren't paying much attention, focused on the discussion
of radiological poisoning and the symptoms and the painful death that follows.
And I can tell you with reasonable certainty, because we talked about it during the
breaks, that ifany of us were told there's going to be a nuclear war and you have the
choice of being at ground zero or being far enough away that it's going to take you a
few weeks to die of radiological poisoning, every one of us would have said, "Please
God, let me be at ground zero." It is one ofthe most painful ways to die I can think of.
As I say, perhaps Padilla was involved in a criminal conspiracy when he stepped
off that plane. But I doubt seriously we could have proven that in federal district
court without seriously compromising our counterterrorism infrastructure.
Hearsay prohibitions do not exist in international law or most of the world's
legal systems, but presumably US evidentiary rules would have required us to bring
in our most sensitive intelligence sources from Pakistan or Afghanistan to be iden-
tified and cross-examined in open court in order to get a conviction ofMr. Padilla.
That means, of course, those sources would not have been able to return to al
Qaeda cell meetings to find out what targets were planned for next week and next
month. That obviously is too high a price to pay for one conviction. So under Ken's
preferred paradigm, we would have been limited to following Padilla around, again
without violating his rights, in the hopes that perhaps if he murdered a few thou-
sand or a few hundred thousand or a few million ofour fellow citizens with a radio-
logical device we might be able to catch him in the act and get a conviction. Of
course, even to get that conviction, we would likely have to disclose in open court
how we managed to keep track of him, the various technologies used to monitor
his activities, to intercept his communications and the like, and his friends would
no doubt be sitting there taking careful notes. If they didn't, in reporting on the
trial, Time magazine would help the American people and al Qaeda understand
what tools the United States can use that al Qaeda needs to avoid.
Let me turn briefly to the issue of targeting individual terrorist leaders, an issue
that is incorrectly described as "assassination." Some ofyou know this has been an
issue close to my heart going back many, many years to my service in Viet Nam,
where one ofmy jobs was investigating acts ofterrorism and assassination. In fact, I
wrote a very long classified study called The Viet Cong Tactic of Assassination in
1970. 1 don't think it went anywhere. They couldn't get it declassified so it probably
was left behind. These are issues of interest to me.
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For five years in the mid-70s I worked as national security adviser to a member
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and followed both the Church and the
Pike hearings. The Church Committee issued a several-hundred-page report at the
end ofwhich they concluded they could not identify a single incident anywhere in
the world where the CIA had ever assassinated anyone. That didn't make the front
pages. Most surprising today!
In 1981, a few days after President Reagan issued Executive Order 12333, 1 was
hired by the White House to be the Counsel to the President's Intelligence Over-
sight Board charged with the job ofoverseeing the activities of all of the intelligence
community and reporting directly to the President any violation of the law or of
Executive Order 12333. As most ofyou know, Section 2.1 1 of that Order provided,
and I quote, "Prohibition on Assassination. No person employed by or acting on
behalf of the United States Government shall engage in or conspire to engage in
assassination."
Now again, by way of background, you may remember Frank Church being
very indignant about the role of the CIA. Prior to the Church Committee coming
into existence, two CIA directors—Director of Central Intelligence William Colby
and his predecessor Richard Helms—had issued internal regulations prohibiting
assassination by anyone in the CIA.
So this issue was not really a major problem. But again, this is an issue I have
been thinking about and working on since 1974, ifnot before. And I think it is very
important we define our terms. The Executive Order does not define
"assassination."
Over the years, I have come up with almost two dozen different definitions in
various dictionaries and legal dictionaries and the like, and in almost every instance
one word is used
—
"murder." A typical definition is that assassination is the "mur-
der of a person by lying in wait for him and then killing him, particularly the mur-
der of prominent people for political motives; e.g., the assassination of President
Kennedy."
I would suggest what we are talking about is not murder at all, and thus it is not
assassination, but rather it is the intentional targeting of terrorists as an act of self-
defense. Approaching the subject in that way eliminates a lot the very burdensome
baggage of being linked with Abraham Lincoln, John Kennedy and Martin Luther
King. I think we should agree that "assassination" is wrong and ought not to be an
option.
On the other hand, "self-defense" is a good thing, at least a relatively good thing
considering the alternatives. What I am talking about are situations in which the
intentional taking of life of one wrongdoer might be expected to prevent the
slaughter of large numbers of innocent people. I would submit that directing our
407
Debating the Issues
force primarily against the leadership of terrorist groups is morally preferable to a
strategy that kills large numbers of their foot soldiers. It is difficult to deter people
who really want to die for their religion, although I have my doubts about the ea-
gerness to die ofsome of their leaders. You will note, for example, we haven't seen
Osama bin Laden rushing out in front of gunships waving his arms and saying
"please make me a martyr."
There are numerous aspects of this issue that time simply will not permit me to
address. One thing I do want to emphasize is that in using lethal force that right is,
of course, limited by the duties to avoid unnecessary suffering and to mitigate col-
lateral damage.
In conclusion, let me emphasize that the war on terrorism is serious business. It
is not a game. An overwhelming presumption in favor of the terrorists is neither
mandated by the law or by prudent policy. Ifwe relax our guard and tie the hands
of our leaders and our militaries, al Qaeda will be given an opportunity to kill vast
numbers of our fellow citizens. Be assured that they will take full advantage of that
opportunity. I, for one, will be surprised if they don't hit us again hard before
November.
At the same time, if we sacrifice our Bill of Rights in the war on terrorism,
Osama bin Laden will have won a far greater victory than was apparent as we dug
through the rubble of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in September of
2001 looking for survivors.
Ifwe demand unrealistic and inappropriate standards, insisting that the war on
terrorism be waged in federal district court by law enforcement rules, while our en-
emy is using military weapons and tactics against our civilian population, we will
likely soon be burying large numbers of our citizens—and the cause of civil liber-
ties will not be served by the likely public reaction.
Preserving the rule of law is critically important in our struggle against terror-
ism, but preserving the lives of our citizens is also important. The constitutional
framework set forth in the Fifth Amendment establishes three values I think are
particularly important. They are that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without "due process of law." But it is not an alphabetical list. We cherish
life above liberty because we understand that when your life is taken from you so
also expire your liberties. In the war on terrorism, these are in fact values we have to
balance. Ifwe err on the side of civil liberties, our fellow citizens may pay with their
lives. Civil liberties are one of the things that have distinguished this country from
so much of the world. They are cherished values we have to uphold. But the Con-
gress, the President, and the UN Security Council all recognize that the law of
armed conflict is the appropriate paradigm in this struggle.
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International law makes Osama bin Laden and other al Qaeda leaders lawful
targets for the intentional application of lethal force. That is not, in my view, a close
call. Thank you.
Moderator: Thank you, Professor Turner. In the interest of keeping this a little bit
more a like a debate, I'll give Ken maybe two minutes to rebut and then we'll go to
the audience for questions.
Mr. Roth: On the Padilla case, Bob seemed to sort of vie back and forth between a
nuclear explosion and a radiological weapon, which we know are quite different. In
any event, the government now admits he wasn't going to use a radiological
weapon; he had some other bombing plan in mind.
Be that as it may, the alternative was not to try to follow him until he kills thou-
sands ofpeople. The alternative was quite simply to arrest him on criminal charges,
demonstrating probable cause. To do that would not have required any revelation
of clandestine techniques.
An FBI agent or some other law enforcement official could have come before an
Article 3 judge and said a source has told me under the following circumstances
that Mr. Padilla was plotting to blow up buildings. That would have been sufficient
to arrest him. Hearsay works. I can speak from experience—personal experience
—
here. You don't need eyewitness testimony to get an arrest warrant.
So you get Padilla arrested under probable cause. Then under the Speedy Trial
Act you make application for an interest ofjustice exclusion to delay his actual trial
until such time as it is possible to produce whatever witnesses need to be brought to
court. This is a doable proposition.
We should be realistic here that there were quite genuine law enforcement op-
tions that were not pursued because the Bush Administration wanted to push their
radical theory that anyone they pick up is an enemy combatant.
Second point. It is a red herring to say that Human Rights Watch or critics ofthe
Bush Administration believe that terrorism has to be fought simply through law
enforcement agents. I thought I made that clear at the outset: there are times when
war is perfectly appropriate. Indeed there are traditional battlefields where clearly
war rules apply. Afghanistan is a perfect example of that. The question is: does
some declaration of the war against al Qaeda justify war rules around the world.
Because if it does, what that means very simply is that we have taken a couple of
centuries ofdue process protections, international human rights law and constitu-
tions, and set them aside. It means that governments, simply by declaring someone
an enemy combatant can, without any evidence, lock that person up for forever.
That is a radical notion, but that is what the global application ofwar rules entails.
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You should be very reluctant to do that. We should insist that war rules be applied
only in circumstances when there is some level of actual armed conflict. We should
not be handing out this extraordinary power that essentially obliterates our civil
rights. Thank you.
Question and Answer Period
Question: Professor Turner, you mentioned the Joint Congressional Resolution. I
think it is important to assess the scope of that Resolution in light of another stat-
ute, Title 18 USC § 4001 A, known as the Non-detention Act that Congress passed,
about 35 years ago. That statute said the government can't detain a United States
citizen even for offenses like espionage or sabotage. Shouldn't we at least read the
Joint Resolution and that statute together to provide that any enemy combatants
are subject to procedural safeguards like judicial review and right to counsel?
Professor Turner: That is a good question. I have not spent a lot oftime looking at
that issue and I don't have a complete answer to it. I think perhaps an answer might
be, but this is very much a lay opinion, that what Congress is talking about is the
American judicial process or domestic law and that an exception exists in interna-
tional armed conflict settings, but I don't know if that is the answer.
To the extent the President has independent power to do this, the question then
becomes can Congress take away that power even by statute. I would argue, despite
separation ofpowers in many areas, the President does have constitutional author-
ity to do some things that can effectively amount to a taking away of a statutorily
derived right. You don't amend the Constitution by a statute that Congress passes
purporting to tell the President he must do thus and so.
I will just give you one example. Bob Dole, when he was running for President
against Bill Clinton, pushed through a statutory amendment that provided that the
President had to move the American embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. I can't
imagine why, in an election year, he'd want to be bothered with something like
that, but he seemed to think it had some benefit. The Supreme Court has deter-
mined that the decision as to where to site an embassy is part of the decision on
what government is to be recognized as the lawful government of a foreign sover-
eign, and thus an act of Congress trying to usurp power that clearly belongs to the
President is null and void.
I think a case can also be made, particularly after Congress has authorized use
of lethal force—has authorized war—that the President has certain powers that
cannot be limited by statute, and the best way to interpret the statute is to narrow
its reading so as not to infringe upon the President's power.
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This is really an off-the-cuff response to your question. It is a good question.
Maybe somebody else has a better answer to it. Another option is that you may well
be right. It is an issue that needs to be raised. I was delighted that the Supreme
Court took these three cases. I think that it is fairly clear from the existing prece-
dents that there were one and arguably two German soldiers in the Quirin case who
were US persons. I think two of them claimed citizenship and I believe the Court
concluded at least one was an American. But the Court said when a US citizen joins
the armed forces of the enemy he becomes subject to the same consequences that
enemy soldiers face. It seems to me that principle governs until the Supreme Court
decides otherwise. But I am delighted it is considering these cases and I look for-
ward to reading the opinions when they come out.
Question: First, a comment. Both speakers, by desperately trying to keep within
the confines of current international law, are contributing to the undermining of
basic principles of the law of armed conflict. As we have been discussing through-
out the conference, the ultimate legal justification to target and kill terrorists,
which I agree is not assassination, is based on the right of self-defense. Yet combat-
ing terrorism does not fall within the traditional definitions of either international
or non-international armed conflict. Obviously I agree that terrorism must be
combated under the right of self-defense and that the use of military force must be
part of that effort, but rather than attempting to apply the law of armed conflict,
which was developed initially to regulate wars between States, in circumstances for
which it was not intended, the focus should be on the development of a new legal
regime governing what can be done to address the threat of terrorism.
When we attempt to apply the law of armed conflict to the conflict between
States and non-State actors, we are shaking the very fundamental principle of the
law of armed conflict—the principle of reciprocal rights and obligations between
States in a truly international armed conflict. The "war on terror," if I may call it
that, raises novel issues that simply defy analysis under the law of armed conflict
since one party to that war is not a State. Thank you.
Mr. Roth: I'm not entirely sure I understand the point. There is much of the law of
armed conflict that isn't entirely dependent on reciprocity among governments.
Take Common Article 3. In this case we're dealing with an internationalized, but
not an intergovernmental conflict. I know the Bush Administration is taking the
view that Article 3 only applies to civil wars, but I don't know the basis for that po-
sition. There's no reason why it can't apply across borders as well.
Yes, of course, there's the right ofself-defense. Nobody challenges that. But does
that right allow you to use war methods every place or is there some kind of limit to
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that? You can certainly launch a war wherever you want. Once it looks like a real
war we know that classic war rules apply. But can you go into a country and when
you fail to arrest the people through judicial means declare a war for that five min-
utes it takes to detain them and pull them out as enemy combatants? I don't think
so. That kind of playing games with war rules is the problem.
Professor Turner: I agree with most of the points you made as I understood them.
It seems to me when the Security Council and the US Congress have authorized
measures of self-defense that you have the option of resorting to law enforcement,
but since both the Security Council and Congress clearly identified al Qaeda as the
source of the attacks, you can engage in self-defense actions against individual
members of al Qaeda. Should you decide initially to arrest them and then change
your mind and decide you would rather use a law of armed conflict approach, I
don't have a problem with that.
To me it is unjust to tell the President that you can't arrest someone who you
honestly believe to be an enemy combatant and hold them in detention. If that is
the case, it would seem to follow with a lot more force that you obviously can't
make a decision to shoot them or can't order a cruise missile strike vice arresting
them. If we're going to apply law enforcement rules, presumably every soldier
needs to be told before you take a shot at that guy on the other side who's point-
ing a rifle at you, you need to first take him back to the 9th Circuit, perhaps to the
Supreme Court, to obtain a ruling that there is no doubt about this person's
identity.
By the same logic that says the President is allowed to authorize a private (hope-
fully through a general, a colonel and maybe a lieutenant) to kill a suspected enemy
combatant, it would seem to follow that they could also detain him under the rules
of the law of armed conflict.
Comment (Audience Member): I too share the fears of the questioner about un-
due categorization. I would like to make a comment about the war on terror. In
March 2004, the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations made a very im-
portant general comment, General Comment Number 31. It states that interna-
tional humanitarian law and human rights law are complementary. It's not a
question of either/or. Now, if we are faced with a war on terror and this war that
will never end, a war in which there will never be a ceasefire or a peace treaty, we re-
ally have to rethink the interaction between human rights law and the law ofarmed
conflict. I believe that's something we really need to think about. In fact, it could be
the subject of a conference in its own right.
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Question: Mr. Roth, you talked about the troublesome hypothesis of the govern-
ment shooting Mr. Padilla upon his arrival at O'Hare Airport. Let's change that hy-
pothetical slightly. Say he vaulted over his would-be captors and was about to step
into a taxi. The law enforcement choice would have been to kill him or to let him
go. What is your solution to that situation?
Mr. Roth: Well, under classic law enforcement rules you are allowed to use lethal
force if you are a cop on the beat and it's necessary to stop an imminent threat of
loss of life or serious bodily injury.
Now my understanding of Padilla is that he was nowhere near posing such an
imminent threat. In that case, a mere fleeing suspect cannot be shot. Ifyou change
the hypothetical a little bit, if he's about to go and plant the bomb, of course you
can shoot him. You do not need international humanitarian law to do that.
But in a situation like this where there is a sole operator and you have everybody
tracking him and an available judicial system, there is no reason why you shouldn't
use law enforcement rules. The danger of allowing war rules is that it potentially
applies to all of us.
Professor Turner: There is a reason we authorized the President to delegate the au-
thority to take human life without a judicial hearing. It has to do with the nature of
war. Just as we authorized the President to fight a war against al Qaeda, if the Presi-
dent really wanted to order a cruise missile to be launched against one of us, I am
not sure what formal check on his authority would prevent that. I know what the
aftereffects of that will be. I know the American people will be outraged over it. I
know the American Congress would be outraged over it. There are checks in our
system that are less formal.
When I spoke recently in Munich, I made the point that if the United States,
which has this unchecked military power, uses that power in an aggressive manner,
the American people aren't going to tolerate it. Just as they stopped the war in Viet
Nam, they will stop the war on terrorism if they conclude, rightly or wrongly, that
violations are going on.
There are lots of quieter checks if the President were to give an order to launch a
missile at John Kerry's home. You would have lots of people in that chain of com-
mand presumably resigning, going public, doing whatever was necessary to pre-
vent that from happening. But the difference between that situation and a situation
where you say a federal district court has to authorize the taking of life in armed
conflict is tremendous.
The President has to be able to protect the nation to save lives. If that means a
decision is made to shoot Mr. Padilla, that may be a decision with which some
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would disagree. And, of course, it would be a particularly unfortunate decision if
Mr. Padilla or someone similarly situated turns out to be an innocent person.
But the consequences of the alternative, the alternative of saying you can't take
human life, you can't deprive someone of due process or personal liberty, are far
greater. Do you want the President to be able to authorize the US armed forces to
take the lives of people that they have strong reason to believe are al Qaeda opera-
tives? I think most ofus want him to be able to do that. To those who argue that it is
permissible to shoot al Qaeda members but they can't be detained, I say there is a
disconnect in the logic that I can't understand.
Question: Mr. Roth has referred, on a couple of occasions, to the question of the
application or characterization of a war zone on a global scale. I would suggest that
a state of war exists. We have an adversary who is pursuing a set of policy aims
through the use of armed force. That is what distinguishes this from metaphorical
wars, like the war on drugs or the war on poverty. In terms of the place of execu-
tion, or the battlefield as it were in which that war is executed, one ofthe things that
we teach at the Naval War College is that the enemy gets a vote. Al Qaeda has cho-
sen the battlefield of the world and the nontraditional battlefield of soft targets
worldwide. The choice is theirs, not ours. The choice that is ours is do we respond,
do we fight back, do we engage in a war that has been declared against us, or do we
not. To get to the question, I would prefer to see the panelists address the issue,
which is very real, of given that situation, which is almost unprecedented, of how
do we protect our civil liberties and how do we protect the values of our culture
while still fighting in that battlespace.
Mr. Roth: Let me say it's not so easy to distinguish the war on drugs. It's worth tak-
ing that analogy seriously because there too you have clandestine groups that have
chosen a global battlefield, routinely use violence, and kill many, many more peo-
ple than terrorism does. Nonetheless we have chosen to keep it a metaphorical war
because we understand the consequences of not doing so would be devastating for
the type of democracy in which we live.
Similarly, al Qaeda has chosen to use violence worldwide. I don't doubt that.
How should we respond? If we choose to respond with lethal force using tradi-
tional military means as in Afghanistan, then war rules apply. But should we be re-
sponding elsewhere, such as in Hamburg, as if it's a war? I think to do so would be
devastating.
I think we need to draw those lines establishing that in some instances the use of
military force operating under the law of armed conflict is the appropriate re-
sponse, but in other instances law enforcement means should be used. As a matter
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of policy—and of prudence—I would argue, it would be a mistake to respond as if
the war is global, because the consequences for the civil rights that we view as the
center of our society would be quite severe.
Comment (Audience Member): If I may, just one follow-on comment. It is a chal-
lenge and that is what I am asking you to try to respond to. It is a war and it is global
because there are policy objectives being pursued by our adversary through the use
ofarmed force. The drug lords don't have policy objectives. They have profit objec-
tives. That is part of the distinction that defines war and makes this a state of war
that is, in fact, occurring on a global battlefield. We can't change that. What we can
change or what we can address, and hopefully will, is how to protect our freedoms
while fighting on the battlefield that they have chosen.
Mr. Roth: The profit motive is not the distinction. Saddam invaded Kuwait for
profit. Yes, al Qaeda is using violent means. As a matter of policy that is what it's
doing. That still begs the question of how we should respond. We should be very
selective in how we apply war rules. In some instances, the option of law enforce-
ment means should be preferred because that is more likely to produce the kind of
society that we desire.
Professor Turner: Under our constitutional system, the President has been given a
great deal ofunchecked power. In Marbury v. Madison, ChiefJustice John Marshall
wrote that certain matters, which are of a political character, are confided to the
President's discretion. But he said these things affect the nation, not individual
rights, and that Congress has the primary responsibilities for preservation of indi-
vidual rights. By passing the equivalent of a declaration of war, Congress decided
that the United States may use lethal force against al Qaeda and other terrorists
wherever they may be found. If we find them in Germany, however, we don't
launch cruise missiles into Germany.
Let me raise a more fundamental question about human rights because some
feel, since 9/11, that I've become the poster boy for government repression because
I've sat on so many panels addressing the issues that have been discussed at this
conference. I'm convinced that if the American people become really scared,
they're going to make a decision to demand lessening restraints on the use of force
and more limitations on civil liberties.
I will give you one example to think about. Go back 62 years to a decision made
by President Roosevelt. Of all of our presidents there are very few that had a better
record in civil liberties and humanitarian issues. Yet President Roosevelt issued an
order to arrest, to apprehend, and to detain thousands ofAmerican nationals, most
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ofthem US citizens and many ofthem native-born Americans. Most ofthem were
not even suspected of the slightest wrongdoing. These thousands ofour fellow citi-
zens were sent to detention camps, which were, in many respects, the equivalent of
concentration camps except folks were not killed when they arrived.
These people were quite properly outraged. They applied for release to the fed-
eral courts. Who argued the case before the courts that this detention was a lawful
act? Earl Warren, then the Attorney General of California, who later became Chief
Justice ofthe United States. He argued that the order was a proper exercise ofpresi-
dential authority because it was believed that the security of the United States was
threatened. The case finally made its way to the Supreme Court on appeal. The
Court unanimously upheld President Roosevelt's order. Who was the justice who
wrote the opinion in that case? Justice Hugo Black. There probably has never been
a finer civil libertarian in the history of the US Supreme Court and yet he, like Pres-
ident Roosevelt, was afraid. In that fear they sacrificed the human rights, the civil
liberties, of tens of thousands of innocent people.
Now, one reason that I favor reasonable measures, even understanding they
may involve the unjust detention of a few innocent people, is because I understand
if the fundamental responsibility ofprotecting the lives ofour people is not carried
out, the demand for casting aside the Bill of Rights is going to be overwhelming.
We saw that in 1942. We will see that in 2004, 2005, or 2006, ifwe don't continue an
effective war against terrorism.
The thought of losing our civil liberties terrifies me, but if you look at public
opinion polls, the American public will support it. We must preserve our lives if
we're going to preserve our liberties. Thank you.
Moderator: Thank you Mr. Roth and Professor Turner for your insightful discus-
sion of very important issues. As is often the case in discussions such as this, one
doesn't necessarily reach specific conclusions, but the dialogue is very helpful in
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